


---

This is a reproduction of a library book that was digitized by Google as part of an ongoing effort to preserve the information in books and make it universally accessible.


Google<sup>TM</sup> books

<https://books.google.com>













# **INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS**

---

## **HEARINGS**

**BEFORE THE  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER  
INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS**

**OF THE  
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY  
UNITED STATES SENATE**

**EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS**

**FIRST SESSION**

**ON**

**THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS**


---

### **PART 4**

**SEPTEMBER 26, 28, OCTOBER 1, 5, 6 AND 10, 1951**

---

**Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary**



**UNITED STATES  
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
WASHINGTON : 1951**

## COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

PAT McCARRAN, Nevada, *Chairman*

HARLEY M. KILGORE, West Virginia	ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi	WILLIAM LANGER, North Dakota
WARREN G. MAGNUSON, Washington	HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan
HERBERT R. O'CONOR, Maryland	WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana
ESTES KEFAUVER, Tennessee	ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah
WILLIS SMITH, North Carolina	ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON, New Jersey

J. G. SOURWINE, *Counsel*

---

### SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

PAT McCARRAN, Nevada, *Chairman*

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi	HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan
HERBERT R. O'CONOR, Maryland	WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana
WILLIS SMITH, North Carolina	ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah

---

### SUBCOMMITTEE INVESTIGATING THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, *Chairman*

PAT McCARRAN, Nevada

HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan

ROBERT MORRIS, *Special Counsel*

BENJAMIN MANDEL, *Director of Research*

Stack  
Annex  
DU  
1  
I 5455  
1.4

## CONTENTS

---

Testimony of—	Page
Budenz, Louis F.....	1077
Dennett, Raymond.....	937
Holland, William L.....	1139
McGovern, William M.....	1007
Stassen, Harold E.....	1035-1112
Appendix I, map of China.....	Facing 1250

III



# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL  
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, Senator Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Ferguson, Watkins, and Jenner.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order, please.

Mr. MORRIS, you may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. This is Mr. Dennett, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. DENNETT. I do.

TESTIMONY OF RAYMOND DENNETT, CAMBRIDGE, MASS., DIRECTOR  
OF WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION, BOSTON, MASS.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, will you give your name and address to the reporter?

Mr. DENNETT. Raymond Dennett, 21 Lowell Street, Cambridge, Mass.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation?

Mr. DENNETT. Director, World Peace Foundation, Boston, Mass.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, did you ever hold the position of the secretary of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DENNETT. I did, approximately March 1944 to December 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. Who first offered you that position, Mr. Dennett?

Mr. DENNETT. I think that first came in a letter to me from William Lockwood, then the secretary, in the spring of 1943.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you decline the offer at that time?

Mr. DENNETT. I declined the offer at that time. Instead, later that summer, I took a job with the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation and with UNRRA. The offer was renewed in January 1944, at which time I accepted it.

Mr. MORRIS. Who offered the job the second time, Mr. Dennett?

Mr. DENNETT. It was either Edward C. Carter or Harriet Moore, or both.



Mr. MORRIS. Why do you think that job was offered to you, Mr. Dennett?

Mr. DENNETT. I know that, when Lockwood left, Miss Moore was acting secretary, and I know she wanted to leave. I assume that one of my qualifications was that I was 4-F and, therefore, available and I wouldn't mind getting the job, and as a result of the manpower shortage. At least, it is possible it was that.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you assume the duties of secretary of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DENNETT. I did; in March 1944.

Mr. MORRIS. How many people were under your direct supervision at that time?

Mr. DENNETT. Somewhere between 24 and 30, roughly.

Mr. MORRIS. Who made up that group?

Mr. DENNETT. There was a group in New York consisting of the New York staff. Do you want the names?

Mr. MORRIS. As many as possible, Mr. Dennett, yes.

Mr. DENNETT. The assistant treasurer was Tillie G. Shahn; Miss Marguerite Stewart in charge of the school program; Rosamund Lee in charge of promotion; Miss Miriam Farley was in charge of, I think, the pamphlets and the Far Eastern Survey. I think Mrs. Catherine Porter was there when I first came but left very soon thereafter to go with OWI. There were a number of clerical help. I guess Miss Yardumian was in the library.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that Rose Yardumian?

Mr. DENNETT. Rose Yardumian. She was later transferred to the Washington office. There was also a Washington office directly under the supervision of the New York office.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was in charge of the staff in the Washington office?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't know as of March 1944, but within a very short time we had a set-up in the Washington office in which Miss Yardumian was in general charge of office procedure, Mr. William C. Johnstone was in charge of the study-group program, and either then or later Mr. Owen Lattimore was associated with the Washington office.

Mr. MORRIS. In addition to the Washington office, what other branches were there, Mr. Dennett?

Mr. DENNETT. We had a branch in Chicago which was more or less dormant. It was a volunteer group which arranged occasional meetings as visiting firemen came through Chicago. We had a fairly active group in Seattle. We had a very active group in the Bay region.

While I was there, another group was developed in the Spokane area and there was some reactivation of a group which had previously been active in Los Angeles.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, what was the underlying union situation in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DENNETT. Well, we had a union contract.

Mr. MORRIS. With what union?

Mr. DENNETT. The Union of Office and Professional Workers of America.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know what local of that union?

Mr. DENNETT. No; I don't know the exact local of it.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it local 18, Mr. Dennett?

Mr. DENNETT. It probably was. It was whatever the local was that was operating in New York City. I never did know the number particularly.

Mr. MORRIS. I think that has a functional rather than a jurisdictional breakdown, Mr. Dennett.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just for the sake of precision, you spoke of the "Union of Office and Professional Workers of America". Did you mean the United Office and Professional Workers of America?

Mr. DENNETT. It was the UOPWA, whatever that stood for.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that the CIO?

Mr. DENNETT. That was the CIO union. We had a union-shop agreement rather than a closed-shop agreement.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you explain what that is, Mr. Dennett?

Mr. DENNETT. The arrangements were that anybody who joined the staff at any level had to become a member of the union within 30 days after joining, with the exception of myself. I represented management. Everybody else had to be a member of the union. That did not apply to the Washington office, but it did apply to the New York office.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, will you tell us the nature of the staff workers at the Institute of Pacific Relations with respect to their objectivity?

Mr. DENNETT. It is a fairly involved story, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us as much as possible what happened in connection with that situation, Mr. Dennett?

Mr. DENNETT. The situation when I came there, very shortly after I arrived—in the first place, I was a little concerned about the nature of the union contract.

Mr. MORRIS. Why were you concerned?

Mr. DENNETT. It seemed to me with a staff of 24 people, which was engaged in research, objective research, that a union contract of this nature in which everybody had to be written into the union was probably an error because there might be some people whom you would want to hire who didn't particularly believe they ought to be members of the union. I was not too certain as to the nature of the staff, how good they were, how bad they were, and I certainly was not at that point in a position to know in any great detail all the individuals who were writing or had been writing for the institute. So, I established a series of outside committees, a research advisory committee, I think a publications committee.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you did not trust the staff; is that right, Mr. Dennett?

Mr. DENNETT. Well, I came not to trust them. I had no feeling of no trust at the time I took over the job, or I would not have taken over the job.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us as much as possible, Mr. Dennett, why you came to distrust the staff?

Mr. DENNETT. Well, the situation developed in 1945, late 1944 and 1945. The executive committee had been after me to get an assistant secretary because I was carrying quite a heavy load. At the time of the San Francisco conference the Bay region people wanted me to come out and help them with their San Francisco office. Prior to my departure I went to one of the members of the staff and suggested

to her that, if she took over while I was away and did a good job, I would suggest her as assistant secretary upon my return from San Francisco.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was that?

Mr. DENNETT. Mrs. Stewart.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Maxwell S. Stewart?

Mr. DENNETT. Yes.

Upon my return from San Francisco in the late part of May or early June of 1945, I went to the executive committee and suggested that she be appointed assistant secretary, was told by some members of the executive committee that they had not been satisfied with her work while I was away, and they turned down the suggestion.

The shop committee of the union immediately came in to see me to protest—this was a grievance—that I had in fact promised Mrs. Stewart the job, and insisted that I appoint her assistant secretary in any event.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were the shop stewards, Mr. Dennett?

Mr. DENNETT. At that time—well, the shop committee changed semiannually. At that time I think Miriam S. Farley and probably Miss Shirley Jenkins, plus one of the clerical help, were on the staff. Mrs. Jenkins and probably one of the clerical help were on the shop committee. I don't recall.

I was going on vacation. I told the shop committee I would transmit their complaints to the executive committee, which I did, and when I returned I found on my desk a communication from the shop committee to the executive committee, from the union to the executive committee, demanding that the executive committee reverse its decision and appoint Mrs. Stewart assistant secretary. This seemed to me to put pretty clearly the question who was running the organization, the staff or the executive committee, and in order to clear the air I submitted my resignation at that time. It was not accepted until the following December.

Mr. MORRIS. Was any effort made to prevent you from going through with your resignation? Did they ask you not to go through with it?

Mr. DENNETT. Well, the executive committee at that time refused to accept it in July.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there any special committee set up to hear the merits of the case?

Mr. DENNETT. Yes; there was a special committee appointed to investigate. It consisted of Frederick Vanderbilt Field and Mrs. Ada Comstock Notestein, both of whom were members of the executive committee. They heard Mrs. Stewart on her side and the shop committee and they heard me on the other. Mrs. Stewart was not appointed assistant secretary. There was some face-saving formula developed to go over the whole procedure.

Mr. MORRIS. What position did Mr. Field take in all of this?

Mr. DENNETT. Mr. Field was rather consistently in favor of the union.

Mr. MORRIS. He was consistently in favor of the union?

Mr. DENNETT. I think that is fair to say yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How about the union?

Mr. DENNETT. After all, he had put in the union contract when he was in charge of the Institute of Pacific Relations; so I was told, anyway.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, I wonder if you could tell me more about the operations of the staff in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations? How influential was the staff in the running of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DENNETT. During the period when I was there the staff was not very influential.

Mr. MORRIS. Was not influential?

Mr. DENNETT. Not while I was there.

Mr. MORRIS. Why is that, Mr. Dennett?

Mr. DENNETT. Because at that time I was brought in I gather that the staff had regularly been appearing at meetings of the executive committee. I was informed that the executive committee in the immediate period prior to my arrival had not been a particularly active group and that was one of the things which was to be changed when I came in, and I certainly had the impression that the staff had had a good deal more to do with the determination of policy than is generally accepted.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, Senator McCarran has been called down to the Rules Committee. We will have to stand by until another Senator arrives.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator WATKINS. The committee will resume session.

You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, I would like to show you a draft of a working agreement between the Book and Magazine Guild, Local 18, United Office and Professional Workers of America, CIO, and the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., and ask you if that is the local you have been testifying about this morning?

Mr. DENNETT. I assume that it is. This is the 1939 draft. I was not there until 1944 but I think it was a continuing contract annually with the same group.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the union with which you negotiated?

Mr. DENNETT. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce in the record the working agreement between the Book and Magazine Guild, Local 18, of UOPWA, CIO, and the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, which Mr. Mandel will verify was a paper taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator WATKINS. What is the number of the exhibit, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. We are now introducing it, Senator.

Senator WATKINS. Does it have a number?

Mr. MORRIS. Not yet.

Mr. MANDEL. This contract was taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. May that be accepted in the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator WATKINS. That will be the order.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 281" and is as follows:)

**WORKING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE BOOK AND MAGAZINE GUILD, LOCAL 18, UOPWA, CIO AND THE AMERICAN COUNCIL OF THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.**

This agreement, made and entered into this -- day of -----, 1939, by and between the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., hereinafter referred to as the council, and the Book and Magazine Guild, local 18, United Office and Professional Workers of America, CIO, hereinafter referred to as the guild, witnesses that

Whereas, it is the desire of the parties hereto to establish a permanent and stable basis for the continuance of amicable and harmonious relations between the council and its employees and for the maintenance and improvement of standards of work and conditions of employment; and

Whereas these objectives can best be achieved through an agreement clearly defining the obligations of each party.

Now, therefore, in consideration of the covenants herein contained, the parties hereto mutually agree as follows:

**I. UNION RECOGNITION**

The council recognizes and acknowledges the guild as the sole and exclusive representative of all employees attached to its New York office, for the purpose of collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and all other conditions of employment.

1. For the purpose of this agreement "employees" shall be defined as persons on the payroll of the council's New York office, whether on a full or part-time basis, and normally working in the New York office. It shall not include persons having the power to hire and fire, volunteer workers, persons engaged temporarily for special projects, workers on a retainer basis, or holders of fellowships working under the supervision of the council but receiving no compensation from it. The list of persons covered by the contract shall be determined by agreement between the council and the office committee, hereinafter provided for, in accordance with the above definition.

2. It is understood that all staff work shall be performed by paid employees, except in cases where a volunteer would not replace a paid worker and where the appointment of the volunteer is made after consultation and agreement with the office committee.

**II. PREFERENTIAL HIRING**

Employees who are members of the guild at the time of signing of this contract or who subsequently join the guild shall remain members in good standing during the life of this contract. Employees who are not members of the guild at the time of signing shall not be bound by this contract to become members of the guild, although membership shall be open to those eligible for membership under the bylaws of the guild.

1. *Hiring.*—Whenever a vacancy occurs in any position, the council agrees to fill such vacancy by promotion from among the employees already in the office, or where this is impracticable it shall apply to the guild to fill such vacancy. If the guild is unable to supply a qualified person within 10 consecutive working days, the council may employ a person of its own selection.

When positions are to be filled otherwise than through the guild, the council shall recommend to all candidates that, if hired by the council, they become members of the guild; and in making appointments shall give preference to candidates who will agree to join the guild if hired, unless such preference would result in the appointment of a candidate who is not qualified to fill the position in question.

2. *Trial period.*—The council shall have the right, at the time of employing a worker, to declare a trial period of not more than 1 month, but the same worker may not be employed for more than one trial period in the same type of work. In special circumstances, however, an extension of the trial period may be permitted by agreement between the council and the office committee.

3. *Temporary employees.*—Temporary employees may be hired for a specified period, upon designation in advance of the temporary character of the employment, so long as the period of temporary employment shall not exceed 1 month. Any temporary employee retained for a longer period shall automatically become a regular employee. In special circumstances, however, an extension of the period of temporary employment may be permitted by agreement between the

council and the office committee. Temporary employees shall be paid 10 percent above the minimum rates established for permanent employees in each category hereinafter provided, except by agreement with the office committee.

4. *Part-time employees.*—Part-time employees shall be paid in accordance with the wage provisions hereinafter set forth, adjusted pro rata in proportion to the average weekly hours of work of such employees.

### III. LAY-OFFS, DISCHARGE

Should the council at any time find it necessary to reduce the number of employees, it is agreed that seniority rights will be respected; namely, that the last person hired in any particular capacity shall be the first to be laid off. In the event of a subsequent increase in the staff such employees, if qualified and available, shall be given preference in hiring.

No employee shall be discharged or laid off except for just and sufficient cause as determined by consultation and agreement between the council and the office committee. Nor shall any employee be discriminated against or discharged for his actions in behalf of the guild.

1. *Severance pay.*—Any employee who is laid off or discharged, except for dishonesty or other serious offense as determined by agreement between the council and the office committee, shall receive extra compensation as follows: One week's pay for every 6 months or major fraction thereof which he has spent in the employ of the council, up to a maximum of 26 weeks' pay. This may be paid either in a lump sum or in installments, as agreed between the council, the employee, and the office committee, provided that the full amount is paid within the period for which the employee is entitled to receive severance pay, and that no single installment is less than the amount of the employee's weekly wage.

2. *Resignations.*—In the event that any employee desires to resign from the staff, he shall give the council at least 2 weeks' notice of his intention to resign.

### IV. WAGES

No employee shall be paid at a rate less than \$21 per full-time week. The following minimum wages shall be paid to employees within the classification specified, it being understood and agreed that this schedule represents merely a minimum standard and is not to be regarded as a wage scale fixing the salary of every employee:

	<i>Per week</i>
Office boys, clerical workers, typist.....	\$21
Secretaries.....	25
Professional workers.....	30

It is understood to be the policy of the council that in granting wage increases the factor of length of service shall be given consideration together with other factors.

Nothing in this contract shall prevent any individual employee from entering into an individual agreement with the council for a salary above the minimum to which he is entitled under this contract, provided that such agreement be made only after consultation between the council and the office committee. The office committee may also take the initiative in such matters.

At the time when the annual budget of the council is being drawn up, or at any other time when changes in the budget affecting any salaries or reduction of staff are under consideration, the office committee shall be consulted on such changes. No reduction in the wages of any employee shall be made except after consultation and agreement with the office committee.

The salary schedules of the council and such other financial data as may be relevant to the question of salaries shall at all times be open to the inspection of the office committee.

### V. TRANSFERS

It is understood that no employee shall be transferred to different work without due notification to the employees concerned.

### VI. HOURS

The working week shall consist of 5 days and 35 hours, from Monday to Friday, except that in order to keep the office open to the public on Saturday



one employee at a time may be required to work an additional 3 hours on Saturday morning; or in the event of unusual pressure of work any employee may be required to work an additional 3 hours on Saturday morning.

Any employee required to do overtime work shall receive an equivalent amount of free time with pay.

#### VII. HOLIDAYS

Employees shall not be required to work on legal holidays, nor on religious holidays when leave is requested for observance of such holidays.

#### VIII. VACATIONS

All employees shall be entitled to the following yearly vacations with full pay: during the first 2 years of employment, 1 weekday for every month of employment; after 2 years of employment, 1 month.

#### IX. SICK LEAVE

No deductions from an employee's pay shall be made by reason of absence on account of sickness, provided such absences do not exceed a reasonable period as determined by agreement between the council and the office committee.

#### X. EXISTING PRIVILEGES

No rights or privileges now enjoyed by the employees and not specifically mentioned in this contract shall be withdrawn, curtailed, or modified in any way except by agreement with the office committee.

#### XI. OFFICE COMMITTEE

Employees who are members of the guild shall elect from among their number an office committee. It shall be the function of the office committee to represent the employees in all dealings with the council or its representative which may concern them as a group; to act as representative of the employees in the consideration and presentation to the management of all employee grievances, whether individual or collective; and to hear, consider, and negotiate for the settlement of all complaints and grievances presented by the council or its representative which may arise from or otherwise concern the relationship between the council and its employees. The office committee may seek the aid of any member of the guild, whether or not employees of the council, in performing any of the above functions.

#### XII. EMPLOYER REPRESENTATIVE

The council shall designate in writing a particular person or persons with whom the office committee shall conduct any necessary dealings and negotiations and who shall have full power and authority to make decisions with respect to such dealings and negotiations.

#### XIII. GRIEVANCES

All grievances or complaints, whether of the council or any of its employees, resulting from the operation of this contract or otherwise affecting relations between the council and its employees, shall be made the subject of discussion between the council representative and the office committee, who shall endeavor to adjust the matter by mutual agreement.

#### XIV. ARBITRATION

In the event of disagreement as to the interpretation, application, or enforcement of this contract, which cannot be settled by negotiation between the parties, such dispute shall be referred to a board of arbitration consisting of one member designated by the council, one member designated by the guild, and a third member to be chosen by the other two. If they cannot agree on the third member, such member shall be chosen by the board of mediation of the New York State Department of Labor. The decision of the board of arbitration shall be accepted by both parties as final.

## XV. MODIFICATION OF TERMS

At any time before 30 days prior to the date of expiration of this agreement either party hereto may give to the other written notice of desire to change the terms of this agreement by adding to, deleting, or modifying the existing provisions thereof; it being understood that while the office committee shall participate in all steps and negotiations with respect to such changes, said committee shall act only through the guild. The notice herein provided for shall state the nature of the changes desired. Within five working days after receipt of such notice the parties shall enter into negotiations with respect to the proposed modifications, and such negotiations shall be continued until an agreement is reached or until it becomes obvious that the parties cannot agree. If no agreement is reached with respect to the changes proposed, the terms of this contract shall continue with the same force and effect as though no changes had ever been proposed, until its expiration date.

## XVI. DURATION OF CONTRACT

This contract shall continue in full force for 1 year from the date of signing and it shall automatically renew itself for an additional year at the end of each and every yearly expiration date, unless either party to it gives written notice to the other that it desires to modify or change this agreement at the expiration date. Such formal notice shall be given at least 30 days before the yearly expiration date of the agreement. In such an event negotiations shall be immediately opened for the purpose of concluding a new agreement. During such negotiations and until the conclusion thereof, either by the signing of a new contract or the withdrawal of either party from the negotiations, this agreement shall remain in effect, even though it extend beyond the stated term.

This contract shall be signed in duplicate and one copy retained by each party.  
For the Book and Magazine Guild:

-----  
-----  
For the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc. :  
-----  
-----

## LIST OF EMPLOYEES COVERED BY THIS CONTRACT

Kathleen Barnes  
Annette Blumenthal  
Hilda Austern Bretholtz  
Miriam S. Farley  
Katrine R. C. Greene  
Bruno Lasker  
William W. Lockwood, Jr.  
Michael Minarovich

Catherine Porter  
Jeannette Randolph  
Elizabeth Raymond  
Russell G. Shiman  
Margaret R. Taylor  
Emily C. Twaddell  
Helen Wiss

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, do you have a paper which would indicate that that particular local and that union were expelled by the CIO as being Communist controlled?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a resolution expelling the United Office and Professional Workers of America, with which the Book and Magazine Guild was affiliated, from the CIO. The last paragraph of that resolution reads as follows:

3. That, in pursuance of the powers granted to the executive board by section 10 of article IV of the constitution of the Congress of Industrial Organizations and pursuant to the findings of this board that the policies and activities of the United Office and Professional Workers of America are consistently directed toward the achievement of the program and the purposes of the Communist party rather than the objectives and policies set forth in the constitution of the CIO, the certificate of affiliation with the CIO heretofore granted to the United Office and Professional Workers of America is, effective March 1, 1950, revoked, and the United Office and Professional Workers of America is, as of that date, expelled from the CIO.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like this whole resolution of the CIO introduced in the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator WATKINS. It may be admitted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 282" and is as follows:)

RESOLUTION EXPELLING THE UNITED OFFICE AND PROFESSIONAL WORKERS OF AMERICA

Whereas section 10 of article VI of the constitution of the Congress of Industrial Organizations reads as follows:

"Sec. 10. The executive board shall have the further power, upon a two-thirds vote, to revoke the certificate of affiliation of or to expel or to take any other appropriate action against any national or international union or organizing committee the policies and activities of which are consistently directed toward the achievement of the program or the purposes of the Communist Party, any Fascist organization, or other totalitarian movement, rather than the objectives and policies set forth in the constitution of the CIO. Any action of the executive board under this section may be appealed to the convention: *Provided, however,* That such action shall be effective when taken and shall remain in full force and effect pending the appeal."

and

Whereas the eleventh constitutional convention of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, held at Cleveland, Ohio, between October 31 and November 4, 1949, adopted a resolution by the overwhelming vote of the delegates in attendance at the convention, which resolution reads as follows:

"Whereas, this convention has amended the constitution to empower the executive board to take appropriate action to maintain the integrity of the CIO and to project it against those who seek to pervert it from its constitutional objectives and purposes: Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved*, That this convention hereby instructs the executive board immediately to exercise its powers under article VI, section 10 of the constitution and to take appropriate action to protect the CIO and to prevent the use of the good name of the CIO by those who have consistently directed their policies and activities toward the achievement of the program or the purposes of the Communist Party, any Fascist organization, or other totalitarian movement."

and

Whereas, at the meeting of the executive board of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, held on November 5, 1949, William Steinberg, president of the American Radio Association and a member of the CIO executive board, filed charges with said board that the policies and activities of the United Office and Professional Workers of America are consistently directed toward the achievement of the program and the purposes of the Communist Party rather than the objectives set forth in the constitution of the CIO; and

Whereas the CIO executive board thereupon by resolution duly adopted authorized the giving of notice of the charges and the appointment by the president of the CIO of a committee to conduct hearings on the charges and to make a report and recommendations to the executive board; and

Whereas pursuant to and in accordance with this resolution, Philip Murray, president of the CIO, designated Emil Rieve, president of the Textile Workers Union of America, Martin Wagner, president of the United Gas, Coke & Chemical Workers, and Harry Sayre, president of the United Paperworkers of America, all of whom are members of the national CIO Executive Board, as a committee to conduct hearings on said charges and to make a report or reports to the executive board recommending appropriate action; and

Whereas appointment of said committee by President Murray was announced to and approved by the executive board, and due notice of the appointment of said committee and of said charges was given to the United Office and Professional Workers of America; and

Whereas upon notice duly given, hearings were held by the committee at which the committee heard testimony and received exhibits both in support of and in opposition to the charges; and

Whereas the United Office and Professional Workers of America were given full, complete, and adequate opportunity to present testimony and to submit material to the committee in opposition to the charges; and

Whereas the committee has presented to and filed with the executive board of the CIO at a meeting of said board duly convened and held in Washington, D. C., commencing February 14, 1950, the report, findings, and recommendations of the committee, copies of which were furnished to the United Office and Professional Workers of America and to all of the members of the executive board present at said meeting; and

Whereas the executive board has considered the report of the committee and has given an opportunity to and has heard the United Office and Professional Workers of America in opposition to the findings and recommendations of the committee, and has heard other testimony both in support of and in opposition to these findings: Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved by the executive board of the Congress of Industrial Organizations* at a meeting of the board duly held at Washington, D. C., at CIO headquarters on Wednesday, February 15, 1950, as follows:

1. That the report, findings, and recommendations of the executive board committee appointed by President Philip Murray to conduct the hearing in the matter of the United Office and Professional Workers of America, be and said report, findings, and recommendations of that committee are in all respects approved, confirmed, and accepted as the report, findings, and decision of the executive board of the CIO.

2. That upon the basis of the report of the committee to investigate the charges against the United Office and Professional Workers of America and upon the hearing and argument conducted before this board, the executive board finds and concludes that the policies and activities of the United Office and Professional Workers of America are consistently directed toward the achievement of the program and purposes of the Communist Party rather than the objectives and policies set forth in the CIO constitution.

3. That, in pursuance of the powers granted to the executive board by section 10 of article VI of the constitution of the Congress of Industrial Organizations and pursuant to the findings of this board that the policies and activities of the United Office and Professional Workers of America are consistently directed toward the achievement of the program and the purposes of the Communist Party rather than the objectives and policies set forth in the constitution of the CIO, the certificate of affiliation with the CIO heretofore granted to the United Office and Professional Workers of America is, effective March 1, 1950, revoked, and the United Office and Professional Workers of America is, as of that date, expelled from the CIO.

Mr. MANDEL. Mr. Morris, I have here also the report of the executive board committee appointed by President Murray to investigate charges against the United Office and Professional Workers of America.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you admit that into the record? It is a long document, and I do not particularly think it is necessary to have it copied in the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you wish to have it incorporated by reference?

Mr. MORRIS. I think that would be adequate.

Senator WATKINS. It may be filed and incorporated by reference, but it need not be copied into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 283" and filed for the record.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, is it your testimony that Frederick Field was the man responsible for initiating the negotiations of local 18 of the UOPWA, CIO?

Mr. DENNETT. That is what I was informed. I have no personal knowledge, but I believe the union contract was first written around 1938 or 1939, or perhaps slightly earlier than that, when Field was in charge of the American Council.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you find that that particular contract interfered with the orderly operation of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DENNETT. Not in precisely those terms. I think I perhaps ought to clarify the situation by saying that prior to the incident to which you refer there had been no particular difficulties with the union in regard to the operation of the union contract. Normal negotiations took place semiannually with no particular difficulties involved.

My personal feeling is that the difficulties arose as the method which I had set up for operations slowly deprived the staff or tended to restrict the staff in their normal, or what had been previously their normal, decisions by referring it to the executive committee or funneling their recommendations to advisory committees, and that as the staff found itself somewhat restricted it began to rely on the union contract as a method for, shall we say, getting rid of me.

Mr. MORRIS. In the last analysis you felt that the issue was whether or not the staff was going to control the operations of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations or whether you as secretary was going to be able to operate and administer the functions?

Mr. DENNETT. Whether the executive committee was going to control or I through the executive committee. I think I previously testified it got to the point where I had to go to one of the members of the executive committee to dictate a memorandum to my own committee because my memorandum would go to the union before it got into the United States mails.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, could you tell us whether the staff workers of the Institute of Pacific Relations were in fact objective research workers?

Mr. DENNETT. I had grave doubts. My problem or my responsibility, as I understood it, was to assure the supporters or be responsible to the supporters of the Institute of Pacific Relations, whether they were foundations, big business, or members, that we were getting balanced objective reports on the Far East. Now that encouraged actually the presentation of different points of view, but the problem was whether or not in the totality of our production we did in fact present a balanced objective scholarly interpretation. It was my feeling that in regard to periodical material and pamphlet material that there was a tendency on the part of the staff to pick people as authors and to submit their manuscripts to other writers for critical comment who by and large tended to agree with the point of view of the staff prior to the selection of either the authors or the readers of the manuscript, and that this tended over the whole period to give less than a complete objective picture, or at least tended to give less than the complete range of critical comment on the Far East that existed at the time.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, were you in a position to know whether or not any of the staff workers were members of the Communist Party?

Mr. DENNETT. I certainly was not, nor did it ever occur to me at the time.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, Mr. Dennett, you feel you are not qualified to judge whether or not they were Communists?

Mr. DENNETT. I certainly am not, nor was I.

Senator WATKINS. May I ask this question? You state that you had a feeling that they were a little less than objective. Did anything specific happen that you could indicate to the committee now on which you based that conclusion? In other words, we would like to have some first-hand evidence of what occurred rather than just your opinion or your conclusion, so we may draw our own conclusions.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you yourself ever write anything, Mr. Dennett?

Mr. DENNETT. Yes; I was thinking specifically of one or two instances of that sort. I wrote periodically for the Far Eastern Survey. I recall very specifically one article which I wrote. The normal procedure, I might say, when the articles were written was to circulate them in draft form to the various people involved in the research level for comment before they were put in final form for publication. I remember I wrote one article in regard to the Sino-Soviet treaties of 1945 in which I compared the 1945 treaties with the 1895 and 1898 treaties which the Czars had made with China, discovered there were some 14 or 15 identical articles, and drew among other conclusions this was a reentry by the Soviet Union into the Czarist control of Manchuria and was therefore merely an example of Soviet imperialism rather than Czarist imperialism, but it was in fact part and parcel of the same thing.

Senator WATKINS. Was this treaty of 1945 the treaty that was entered into as a result of the Yalta Agreement?

Mr. DENNETT. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you use the term "Soviet imperialism"?

Mr. DENNETT. I recall I did, and I recall it was the subject of very considerable criticism by some members of the staff who didn't think I should refer to Soviet imperialism.

Senator WATKINS. For what reason? Did they indicate why they did not want you to refer to it?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't recall the arguments, but the general feeling seemed to be that the connection I had made between the Czars and the Soviets was not precisely accurate because the Soviet Union was, after all, different from the Czarist regime.

Senator WATKINS. Did it in any way reflect on the Soviet Union or Communists?

Mr. DENNETT. I think what you are getting at is basically what I came to feel, Senator, and that is there was a preoccupation with explaining the Soviet Union on the theory—

Senator WATKINS. In other words, a sort of apology for them or at least explaining them in a more favorable light?

Mr. DENNETT. Explaining it on the ground, and I think the staff felt at that time, if we had to live with the Soviet Union during the postwar period we had to explain why the Soviet Union acted this way. I thought there was a point at which we had to say after all you had to call imperialism imperialism as well as Czars.

Senator WATKINS. In other words, you were speaking rather frankly and bluntly?

Mr. DENNETT. I thought I was speaking accurately.

Senator WATKINS. That is probably a good expression for it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, do you offer that episode as a typical reaction on the part of the staff and use it to describe the bias you said you attributed to the staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DENNETT. I do not recall any other episode quite as strong as that.

Mr. MORRIS. But that is typical?

Mr. DENNETT. That was the kind of thing which I was running into periodically on various issues.



Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you found there was disposition on the part of the staff to favor the Soviet Union?

Senator WATKINS. Maybe he ought to finish what he started, Mr. Morris. I think he had an idea.

Mr. DENNETT. I was thinking of one other episode in regard to an article on China in which I suggested that some of the adjectives used were a little unnecessary. I don't recall the adjectives, whether they were futile or exactly what they were, but there were a number of rather heavy adjectives, and I thought the article would be just as good without the adjectives. This was describing the Nationalist regime.

Senator WATKINS. Critically?

Mr. DENNETT. Yes, and I had to fight kind of hard to get the adjectives and adverbs taken out.

Senator WATKINS. Indicating a bias against the Nationalist regime?

Mr. DENNETT. Certainly no favorable representation.

Mr. MORRIS. Further than that, was there a bias against the Nationalist government expressed on the part of the staff?

Mr. DENNETT. I think generally, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there a sympathetic and favorable view to the Chinese Communists uniformly expressed by the staff?

Mr. DENNETT. I would say probably. I think now when you are talking about staff we ought to be more explicit because I think the people who are involved in the writing and the upper administration echelons are the people I am talking about. Clerical help were exempt from this. Library help were exempt. The four or five people who were doing the writing and the selection of materials, and so on,—

Mr. MORRIS. Who were they, again?

Mr. DENNETT. Mrs. Stewart, Miss Farley, subsequently Lawrence Salisbury, who joined the staff later, although less in his instance; possibly Mrs. Jenkins, who also joined the staff later. Those are the ones primarily involved in the writing.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you found there was disposition on the part of the staff to favor the Soviet Union?

Mr. DENNETT. If you would use the word "favorable" to interpret the Soviet Union, I would say "Yes."

Mr. MORRIS. I will amend the question.

Senator WATKINS. That amounts to practically the same thing, does it not?

Mr. DENNETT. Sir, I don't like to be put in the position of accusing people when I don't know exactly what they were doing. Favorably interpret, yes.

Senator WATKINS. You saw the result of what they were doing?

Mr. DENNETT. Maybe a distinction without a difference, but it makes me happier to have the distinction.

Senator WATKINS. Of course you are the witness.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, are you acquainted with a publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations entitled "Our Job in the Pacific" by Henry A. Wallace?

Mr. DENNETT. I am.

Mr. MORRIS. This was put out under the auspices of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DENNETT. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that pamphlet familiar to you, Mr. Dennett?

Mr. DENNETT. It is indeed.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that pamphlet prepared while you were Secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DENNETT. It was.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us the circumstances behind the preparation of that pamphlet, Mr. Dennett?

Mr. DENNETT. Early in 1945 I received word from the Washington office that Owen Lattimore believed that Mr. Wallace might be willing to write a pamphlet for a pamphlet series in regard to American post-war Pacific policy. The question was taken up and discussed in the executive committee. It was decided that we should go ahead with this.

Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore was given the job of doing the writing for it. She had, I gather, three or four, two or three, sessions with the Vice President during which she took notes on his ideas. The pamphlet was then prepared by her and the manuscript subsequently approved by Mr. Wallace.

Mr. MORRIS. Where was he when he finally approved it?

Mr. DENNETT. According to my recollection, and I am not sure on this because I was in San Francisco at the time, the manuscript was sent out to him while he was on his trip in China. I didn't handle that last stage of it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, on the 13th of July, 1951, during the executive session with Owen Lattimore—

Senator WATKINS. You mean while he was before the committee?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. Mrs. Owen Lattimore accompanied Mr. Lattimore and we asked her at this time whether or not she would confirm the testimony of Mr. Dennett which had been taken prior to that time in executive session on this particular point.

Mr. Mandel, will you read from the executive session of Owen Lattimore on July 13, the testimony of Mrs. Owen Lattimore on this particular point?

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Lattimore, would you tell us what contribution you made to the preparation of Mr. Wallace's pamphlet on the Far East, which I will introduce here in just a minute?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I think I can describe my contribution as donkey work. I helped with the actual writing, not with the assembling.

Mr. MORRIS. With the actual writing?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. That is what I want to determine for the record, the extent to which you contributed to the preparation of that pamphlet which was later issued under IPR auspices under the name of Henry Wallace.

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I suppose I might have been termed the ghost.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the colloquy in the afternoon session, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

Mr. FORTAS—

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Fortas is the attorney for Mr. Lattimore who sat in at that session.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

Mr. FORTAS. Before the recess some questions were asked of Mrs. Lattimore concerning her participation in the preparation of an IPR pamphlet for Mr.

Wallace. I wonder if it would be agreeable to you if she stated the facts there in somewhat more detail?

Senator EASTLAND. Surely.

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Mr. Fortas thought the term "ghost" was not a very clearly defined term. Perhaps different people understood different things from the term "ghost."

I simply meant that the ideas were Mr. Wallace's, and I simply did the actual writing down. I went to see him and he told me what his ideas were, and I would make a draft and go back to him with the draft.

Mr. MORRIS. How was the draft sent to him?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I don't remember whether I mailed it or took it. I went to see him several times because he didn't have time to do the actual writing himself. He simply dictated a lot of stuff to me.

Mr. MORRIS. My impression was that the draft was being worked on while he was with Mr. Lattimore.

Mrs. LATTIMORE. No. This was before my husband went on this trip.

Mr. MORRIS. Wasn't the final draft sent to him in China or Siberia?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Possibly for proof reading or for final O. K. or something. I don't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. It was that that I was asking about, when that was sent out and how.

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I don't remember.

Mr. FORTAS. I wonder if Mrs. Lattimore could state just how she came to participate in this.

Senator EASTLAND. That is all right.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you show that to anyone else before you finished with it? Did you consult with anyone?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I am sure I did. The custom with IPR pamphlets was to have a lot of people read them and make suggestions.

Mr. MORRIS. I understand that.

Mrs. LATTIMORE. It originated because Mr. Wallace, who was the Vice President of the United States, had become interested in the Far East, and had some ideas about the Far East, and so the IPR thought it would be very interesting to have a pamphlet written by him. It was one of these very popular pamphlets for very wide distribution.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there anyone who had to approve it before you sent it out?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Mr. Wallace had to approve it and I suppose the editor at IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was that?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I think it was Miss Miriam Farley. I am not absolutely sure about that.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, inasmuch as Mr. Mandel has read the entire excerpt that is pertinent from the executive testimony, there is no need for our introducing that in the record.

Senator WATKINS. It is in the record now as read.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you will read certain excerpts from this particular pamphlet into the record at this time.

Mr. MANDEL. I read from page 24 of the pamphlet entitled "Our Job in the Pacific" by Henry A. Wallace, as follows:

Free Asia will include first of all China and Soviet Asia, which form a great area of freedom, potentially a "freedom bloc" which is to our interest to have become a freedom bloc in fact. \* \* \*

Then from page 28:

The Russians have demonstrated their friendly attitude toward China by their willingness to refrain from intervening in China's internal affairs. \* \* \*

Then from page 30:

Russia's relation to Pan Asia may come to resemble in many ways our own relation to Pan America, with the same choices between good neighborliness and imperialism. \* \* \*

Then from page 30:

Russian interest in the Far East is not likely to be that of territorial expansion. The Russians certainly want a friendly government in China and a friendly

government in Korea just as we do. The term "friendly" does not imply a desire for socialist governments but for governments that will work with Russia and not against her. This is vital for Russia as a matter of security in protecting her far-eastern front. \* \* \*

Then from page 37:

\* \* \* Our example in the Philippines, however, together with Russia's enlightened treatment of Asiatic minorities and any steps which China may take toward cultural and linguistic as well as political minorities, can bring tremendous pressure to bear on the whole colonial problem. \* \* \*

Senator WATKINS. May I just at this moment make a suggestion with respect to the excerpt from the transcript of the executive hearing that you had Mr. Mandel read. I wish to instruct the clerk and the reporter to check with his original notes to be sure that it is an exact copy of what was put in the evidence at the executive hearing, so there will be no question about it.

Mr. MORRIS. That will be done, Mr. Chairman.

It may be rather unfair, although I do not think so, to take certain excerpts from this book. Inasmuch as the pamphlet itself runs only 47 pages, I suggest that the whole pamphlet be put into the record, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WATKINS. You mean have it typed into the record or filed as an exhibit, being incorporated in the record?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WATKINS. It will be filed as an exhibit and numbered in consecutive order, not necessarily copied into the record but incorporated by reference only.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 284" and filed for the record.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, was there any controversy within the Institute of Pacific Relations on the publication of this pamphlet?

Mr. DENNETT. I recall there was some discussion, yes. When the matter was first brought up in the executive committee there were some members of the committee who felt that Mr. Wallace, who was then in the process of, I gathered from the press, trying to continue his position as Vice President in the forthcoming convention, was too controversial a figure for us to publish the pamphlet. There was another feeling on the part of others that since the Institute of Pacific Relations presented all points of view, Mr. Wallace's point of view was certainly one which was entitled to public hearing, and, therefore, we would not be under criticism if we published this pamphlet. There were others who felt very strongly that we ought to publish it in any event even though this were controversial. So we at least, I would say, had two discussions within the executive committee of this general subject.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it finally cleared?

Mr. DENNETT. It was finally agreed that Mr. Wallace was to write the pamphlet. So far as I recall, there was no reading of what he had written or what Mrs. Lattimore had written because we more or less felt that we were not in a position to edit the Vice President. Therefore we had to accept pretty much what he sent without editing.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Dennett, who was the principal advocate of the publication of this pamphlet in these controversies within the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DENNETT. Frederick Field, I would say.

Mr. MORRIS. He was the one pushing hardest for the publication of this pamphlet?

Mr. DENNETT. Yes; he was certainly in favor, although I think it is fair to say that the executive committee in the end decided we should publish it.

Senator WATKINS. What position did he occupy?

Mr. DENNETT. He was a member of the executive committee, at the time I was there, 1 of about 10 or 11 members.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the date of publication of this pamphlet?

Mr. DENNETT. Probably late May or June 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know at that time that Frederick Field had a byline in the Daily Worker at that time?

Mr. DENNETT. This was after the San Francisco Conference, so I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it generally known in the IPR office that Frederick Field had a byline in the Daily Worker?

Mr. DENNETT. Make your distinction between office and executive committee.

Mr. MORRIS. I mean them both.

Mr. DENNETT. I think it was certainly generally assumed by everyone that Frederick Field was, if not a Communist, at least a fellow traveler.

Mr. MORRIS. My question was more direct than that. I was wondering if it was generally known he had a byline at that time in the Daily Worker?

Mr. Chairman, we have introduced into the evidence that sometime during 1944 Frederick Field ran a regular weekly column with a byline in the Daily Worker.

Senator WATKINS. Using his own name?

Mr. MORRIS. Using his own name. I am asking Mr. Dennett if as a matter of fact he knew about it and he stated he did.

Mr. DENNETT. I did after the San Francisco Conference. I did not before that.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right. That is at the time of this publication?

Mr. DENNETT. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Now do you know whether or not the staff members or the officers of the Institute of Pacific Relations knew that Field had that byline in the Daily Worker?

Mr. DENNETT. I assume the staff did. I have no knowledge whether the executive committee did or not, because it was not mentioned.

Senator WATKINS. In the course of studies and investigations made by the institute, of course they would see the Daily Worker and it would be referred to and studied to get the point of view at least of the Soviet Government; would it not?

Mr. DENNETT. As far as I know, we did not get the Daily Worker in the IPR office.

Senator WATKINS. You did not have it there?

Mr. DENNETT. No; we didn't have it there. It never came in while I was there, that I know of.

Senator WATKINS. That is interesting.

Mr. DENNETT. Frankly, Senator, it never occurred to me that is surprising, but actually, so far as I knew, we never got the Daily Worker in the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator WATKINS. You do not know whether you subscribed to it?

Mr. DENNETT. I know we didn't subscribe to it. As far as I know, I didn't see a copy.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not consider it to be part of your job to be familiar with it?

Mr. DENNETT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Nobody ever told you that you should be familiar with it in that job?

Mr. DENNETT. I never saw it.

Senator WATKINS. May I call your attention, for the purpose of clearing the record and probably refreshing your recollection, to the third page of this pamphlet? I think you stated this pamphlet was published in 1945.

Mr. DENNETT. You are right; it is 1944. It was in the spring of 1944.

Senator WATKINS. That refreshes your recollection?

Mr. DENNETT. Yes; it was June of 1944. I thought it was after the San Francisco Conference but it was the year prior to that, which may have some reference as to what Mr. Morris asked when he said testimony had been introduced that Field had a by-line in the Daily Worker in the latter part of 1944. If that came out in the spring of 1944, we would not necessarily have known he had a by-line at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. We have introduced in the record in the past the fact that Frederick Field ran what appears to be a regular weekly column in the Daily Worker commencing April 25, 1944. It runs April 25, May 6, May 13, May 20, May 27, June 3, June 10, and June 17.

Senator WATKINS. Did it have his name in the column?

Mr. MORRIS. It had his by-line.

Mr. DENNETT, were you secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations when the Amerasia case broke?

Mr. DENNETT. I certainly was.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you first learn about the arrest of the six Amerasia defendants?

Mr. DENNETT. When I got on the station in Bronxville that morning and saw it in the New York Times, upper left-hand headline.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you recognize any of the names in that story in the New York Times?

Mr. DENNETT. I did indeed.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were the people you recognized?

Mr. DENNETT. The people whose names I recognized, that I knew specifically at that time, were Andrew Roth—I think he was the only one I knew personally. I think I had met Kate Mitchell but I am not sure. The others I knew by reputation or by comment or by the fact that they were working in this field. Mr. Service we had put on in a meeting before the Washington group, before the IPR, very shortly after he came back from Chungking, I think about a month or three weeks previous to the arrest. I had not met him there; I had not been at the meeting.

Senator WATKINS. Who is that to whom you referred?

Mr. DENNETT. Mr. Service.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe the atmosphere that prevailed in the Institute of Pacific Relations' Office in the subsequent days after that arrest, Mr. Dennett?



Mr. DENNETT. I would say there was some consternation in the office.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there in addition considerable conversation about the arrest?

Mr. DENNETT. There was conversation about practically nothing else for several days. When I came into the office, knowing that we had put on a meeting for Mr. Service, naturally I was concerned as to what had happened in Washington. I immediately called the Washington office and discovered that Miss Yardumian and her secretary had been questioned by the Federal Bureau of Investigation that morning.

Mr. MORRIS. What position did Miss Yardumian hold at that time?

Mr. DENNETT. She was in general administrative charge of our Washington office. So I hopped the first train I could to Washington to find out what was going on and talked with Miss Yardumian and her secretary when I arrived.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was her secretary, Mr. Dennett?

Mr. DENNETT. A Mrs. Ussachevsky?

Mr. MORRIS. Is that Betty Ussachevsky?

Mr. DENNETT. That is right.

I got from them the facts that they had been interviewed by the FBI that morning. I learned further that Miss Yardumian was quite concerned because several days or a few days prior to this general round-up she had put on a party in her apartment for Mr. Roth, who was about to leave for Hawaii, and that five of the six people had been present at this party, and she was therefore somewhat concerned about her involvement in this particular episode.

Mr. MORRIS. You say that you knew Mr. Roth?

Mr. DENNETT. I had met him, yes; several times.

Mr. MORRIS. At the institute in connection with your duties as secretary?

Mr. DENNETT. He had at one time, I think, worked for the International Secretariat and I saw him both at the Institute of Pacific Relations and I saw him occasionally when I was in Washington. I saw him I think once or twice with Phil Jaffe, but I am not sure.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, you described the atmosphere in the Institute of Pacific Relations as one of consternation. Could you tell us with particularity who some of the individuals were who seemed to be particularly upset by the arrest?

Mr. DENNETT. I think, by and large, most of the research people were upset. I know I was certainly upset because I was wondering whether the Institute of Pacific Relations was going to get involved in this. But I would say that all of the major, the senior staff people, were very much concerned about it.

In the International Secretariat one or two of their staff had also been interviewed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation because they were in one way or another close friends of one another, of the people who had been arrested.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Hilda Austern involved in any way in that case, do you know?

Mr. DENNETT. She told me that she had been interviewed by the FBI and that she had been spending some time with Mr. Jaffe and Miss Mitchell in the 2 or 3 weeks prior to the arrest.

She was not on my staff, you understand. None of my staff except Miss Yardumian was involved.

Mr. MORRIS. What was Austern's position?

Mr. DENNETT. She was working for Mr. Carter in the International Secretariat. There was a sharp distinction while I was——

Mr. MORRIS. I think it would be appropriate at this time if we had Mr. Dennett, executive secretary of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, describe the structure of the Institute of Pacific Relations with relation to the international organization itself.

Senator WATKINS. You may do so.

Mr. DENNETT. The International Secretariat, the so-called Pacific Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, was run by a separate committee composed of representatives of the 10 or 11 or 12 national councils. The administrative head was Edward C. Carter who had on his staff a director of research, who during the time I was there was either William L. Holland or Horace Belshaw, a New Zealander, and a certain number of people doing research on the payroll of the International Secretariat. These included while I was there T. A. Bissen and Andrew Grajdanzev, and may have included others. I think there may have been a Chinese there while I was there. I don't recall. Miss Austern was his administrative assistant who took care of administration, arranging for conferences and that sort of thing. She was sort of a contact person.

The American Council was separately directed entirely by its own board of directors, its own executive committee, of which Mr. Carter at that time was not a member, and therefore our program was entirely separate from the International Secretariat's program.

By and large, the Secretariat had charge of the publication of research studies and the preparation of conferences. Our fields covered the publication of periodical material with the exception of Pacific Affairs, which was an international publication, and the preparation of pamphlet material for adult use, the kind of thing Mr. Wallace's pamphlet is, and the preparation of simplified pamphlet textbooks which were to be used in the school system and were published by the Webster Publishing Co., I guess it was, and an agreement which we had with them.

Senator WATKINS. You mean to say that your council published pamphlets for use in the schools of the country?

Mr. DENNETT. Yes, sir, we did.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe for us the nature of that operation, Mr. Dennett?

Mr. DENNETT. The general pamphlet program, school textbook program, was under the direction of Miss Marguerite Stewart.

Mr. MORRIS. She is the wife of Maxwell S. Stewart?

Mr. DENNETT. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have had testimony previously to the effect that Mr. Maxwell S. Stewart was a member of the Communist Party.

Senator WATKINS. What about his wife?

Mr. MORRIS. We have had no testimony to that effect.

Mr. DENNETT. This arrangement had been made some time prior to my arrival and a contract had been made with, I guess, Webster. I think that is the publishing house—I wouldn't want to be sure without verifying it—for the preparation of either 8 or 10 pamphlet

texts for use in high-school social science courses on various aspects of the Far East.

There was, I recall, a pamphlet on India, there was a pamphlet on the Soviet Far East. I don't recall the titles of the other pamphlets.

These were usually 128-page pamphlets designed for use in, I think, sophomore or junior years in high school. Mrs. Stewart located the authors, read the manuscripts. It was circulated to the committee for checking, and then was issued commercially by the Webster Publishing Co. in conjunction with the Institute of Pacific Relations, with the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator WATKINS. How many of those pamphlets would you say were prepared for use in public schools?

Mr. DENNETT. We completed our contract and I think it was either 8 or 10.

Senator WATKINS. In what year was that?

Mr. DENNETT. I think they probably started around 1942 or 1943. I think the last pamphlet was completed during the time I was there. I don't think I saw more than one or two of the pamphlets. The operation had all been set up before I arrived.

Senator WATKINS. Did you have any responsibility for passing on the subject matter or content of any of these pamphlets?

Mr. DENNETT. I did not, no, because they were either—I think the last pamphlet or next to the last pamphlet was in the process of being issued at the time I was there.

Senator WATKINS. You say a committee was set up to pass on that?

Mr. DENNETT. I assume there was. I have no knowledge.

Senator WATKINS. Were there any pamphlets published after your arrival under your direction?

Mr. DENNETT. Not that I recall. There may have been the final one but I have very little recollection of this because Mrs. Stewart was pretty much running her own show at that time. I don't think that these pamphlets went through the research advisory committee which I set up; that is what I am trying to establish.

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Morris, do you have any of those pamphlets or do you have them all?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; we have introduced some of them in the record.

Do you know, as a matter of fact, the Land of the Soviets was so distributed among the schools, Mr. Dennett?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't. I don't know whether that was a pamphlet or the pamphlet was a cut-down version of that book. If I could see the pamphlet, I could tell you, but I don't recall. I haven't seen them in years.

Mr. MORRIS. The one I have in mind is going to come up later in the testimony and it might be appropriate to have it now.

Senator WATKINS. While we are on the subject it might be interesting to tie in what the witness has been testifying to.

Mr. MORRIS. While they are looking for that, Mr. Chairman, may I go on to the next aspect of that?

Senator WATKINS. Yes. You will come back to that?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Do you know whether the Army or Navy bought any of the IPR pamphlets while you were secretary of the American Council?

Mr. DENNETT. A great many of them.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you estimate the number, Mr. Dennett?

Mr. DENNETT. During the period that I was there or in the immediately preceding period the Educational and Information Branch of the Army and the equivalent in the Navy purchased somewhere in the vicinity of several hundred thousand total of pamphlets issued by the American Council for use in orientation programs on the Far East. Most of these pamphlets were, I believe, an IPR series similar to the Wallace pamphlet.

Senator WATKINS. Was the Wallace pamphlet one of them?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't think they bought that, but I don't recall. This was called the IPR series. This was called a different series.

Mr. SOURWINE. By "that" you mean the series including the publication *Land of the Soviets* and by "this" you mean the publication of *Land of the Soviets* which you now hold in your hand?

Mr. DENNETT. Right. It is primarily the series called IPR pamphlets which were bought by the Army and the Navy. A few of the numbers of this series were bought by the Army and Navy, that is, the ones entitled "A Cooperative Project Between the American Council, IPR, and Webster Publishing Co."

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that this particular pamphlet was sent to the schools?

Mr. DENNETT. Yes; I think this is perhaps less typical, that is, I hope it is less typical, than some of the pamphlets, than some of the other pamphlets.

Senator WATKINS. Why do you say that?

Mr. DENNETT. This happens to be a pamphlet which I think is a very good example of what I referred to as the lack of objectivity in the American Council staff.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let us be a little more frank about that. What kind of nonobjectivity is this pamphlet an example of?

Mr. DENNETT. I have an impression that Mr. Morris is going to read excerpts from it.

Mr. SOURWINE. We are interested at the moment in your opinion about that. You volunteered an opinion about the pamphlets.

Mr. DENNETT. I only read the pamphlet once and it was some years ago, and I have not read it since. It was certainly my impression that there was a disposition to give the most favorable light possible on the Soviet Union in that pamphlet.

Mr. SOURWINE. That single reading, as a matter of fact, was enough to impress you so that you still remember the impression that this pamphlet distorted the facts for the benefit of the Soviet Union, did it not?

Mr. DENNETT. You are putting words into my mouth which I don't think I put in there. You said "distorted the facts." I am not an expert on the Soviet Far East, on *Land of the Soviet*, therefore I don't know whether the facts are distorted. I would say such facts as I do know have been interpreted most favorably in that, more favorably than I would have done so.

Mr. SOURWINE. I was simply trying to get the state of your impression at the time you got it, as you now remember it, which is a difficult thing to do.

Mr. DENNETT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. But it was obviously a strong impression because it has stayed with you all this time from that single reading.

Mr. DENNETT. That is quite correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was that single reading?

Mr. DENNETT. I wouldn't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it shortly after the pamphlet was issued?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't know when the pamphlet was issued. If I may check the series on that?

Mr. SOURWINE. If you do not recall when you did read it, then looking at the date will not help you answer that last question, will it?

Mr. DENNETT. It must have been some time while I was at the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. I was trying to relate the time you read it with the publication of the pamphlet. I thought those two matters might stick in your mind.

Mr. DENNETT. This was published in 1942. This was one of the early ones in the series.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was published before you came to the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DENNETT. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Probably if we read some excerpts it might refresh the recollection of the witness in connection with Mr. Sourwine's question as to whether or not it conforms with the actualities that existed in the Soviet Union.

Senator WATKINS. At least as to why he formed the opinion and impression he did.

Mr. MANDEL. I read certain excerpts from the pamphlet *Land of the Soviets*, by Marguerite Ann Stewart.

Senator WATKINS. Has this been put into the record?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Who wrote this pamphlet?

Mr. MANDEL. This was written by Marguerite Ann Stewart and edited by Maxwell S. Stewart.

Mr. MORRIS. What position did Marguerite Ann Stewart, the author of this pamphlet, bear to the whole pamphlet series?

Mr. DENNETT. She was in charge of the educational program of the American Council. She had been hired some time prior to my arrival to work with the schools in the school program of the American Council.

Mr. MORRIS. It is important, Mr. Chairman, to know whether or not this is a typical publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Will you read some sections, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

Because these Soviets were the organ which represented the people most widely at that time, they grew rapidly in influence and respect during the troubled months of 1917 until, on November 7, they became the government.

That is on page 3. Then another excerpt:

As we know, under the capitalist system, property of all kinds may be owned by private individuals or commercial organizations, and all business is conducted primarily for the profit of the owner. \* \* \* But, under a Socialist system, the factories and other types of business are socially owned, that is, they belong to the population as a whole and are operated by the government, not for the profit of any one person or group of individuals, but for the benefit of all the people. \* \* \* And all industry—every single factory, office, bank, grocery, and department store, every theater, movie, bakery, and

newspaper—is the property of the people as a whole and is operated by their government or by their organizations.

That is from page 6.

But when the Soviets assumed power this was changed. One of their first acts was to proclaim the equality of all people in the country and the right of each to full and free cultural development. No nationality was to dominate another. Each had a right to its own language, culture, and institutions, sub-races no longer. The minorities were invited as equals in a free union of free peoples.

This is from page 14.

The Soviet Constitution grants equal rights for citizens of the U. S. S. R. regardless of their nationality or race and warns that any limitation of these rights or privileges for citizens on account of their race or nationality as well as any propaganda of racial or national exclusiveness or hatred or contempt shall be punishable by law.

That is from page 15. Another excerpt:

Ivan Petrovich Petrov might be considered a rather typical Russian city worker. Blonde, rosy-cheeked, and of medium height, he has a keen sense of humor; loves to dance, sing, and talk until late at night and to enjoy himself with his friends; admires things on a big scale and adores mechanical devices and machinery.

That is page 17.

Senator WATKINS. What was the purpose of this, to ascertain what was written before and after?

Mr. MANDEL. That was an idealization of the status of the Soviet worker.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the previous paragraph to that?

Mr. MANDEL. It is a symbol of the worker, not any particular worker. Then again, on page 15, describing the lot of the typical Soviet worker:

Ivan, a very responsible worker, was a member of the factory committee elected by the workers to advise the director of the plant. Each day he and Anna took Sascha at that time to an attractive nursery school maintained by the factory for the children of its employees.

That is page 17. Then on page 21:

Curious as it may seem to us, the person at the top of the social scale is the worker.

Then on page 26:

But while the Russians are quick to condemn those who display ambition for personal power, they have no place too high for the person who devotes himself conscientiously to the common good. \* \* \* An additional motive peculiar to the Russian system is the pride of ownership of the Soviet workers. They have a voice in running the factories.

There are other excerpts which I could read if they are wanted, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WATKINS. Let us hear a few more of them.

Mr. MANDEL. Now on page 27:

Why did the Russians resort to revolution in 1917? Was such a complete overthrow necessary? And, why, after the revolution, did they set up a system so different from that of other governments? Why were they not satisfied with a republic, for example, like that of the United States?

Then on page 37:

On November 7 (October 25 by the old Russian calendar), the Red Guards were sent by the Soviets to surround the winter palace and all the government

buildings in the name of the Socialist Revolution. All the provisional ministers were arrested except Kerensky, who managed to escape. \* \* \* Thus, at one stroke, the peasants attained the right to more than 500 million additional acres which had heretofore belonged to the Crown, the nobility, and the church. Industry, likewise, was taken over as the property of the people.

That is page 37.

Mr. Chairman, I might add at this point we have in the files an analysis of this pamphlet made by the Russian experts of the Library of Congress. If you so desire, that analysis can be made part of the record.

Senator WATKINS. Since this is a pamphlet distributed in the public schools of the United States, I think it would be well to have that analysis in the record. At least, have it filed as an exhibit where it would be available, or incorporated by reference if it is too long to be printed in its entirety.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 285," and filed for the record.)

Mr. MANDEL. There was a revolt against the collective system in Russia at the time of collectivization. Mrs. Stewart's comment is as follows:

The Soviet answer to those who thus broke the peace was swift and severe. It regarded such acts as violations against socialist property and punished them accordingly. The culprits were forcibly removed from their villages. In some cases they were imprisoned, but more frequently their property was confiscated and they were sent to another part of the country to begin life again; in a few instances they were shot. \* \* \*

In other words, justifying violence against peasants who refused to give up their property to the Government.

Here is an idealization of Communists on page 66:

Communists are expected to be an example to others.

Senator WATKINS. Did it specify what kind of an example?

Mr. MANDEL. No; but the previous sentence reads:

Conditions for membership are strict for it is generally regarded as a mark of responsible leadership and a high honor. Communists are expected to be an example to others. Applicants have to demonstrate unselfish loyalty to the Soviet state and to the principles of the party. They are required to give up a great deal of time for the party work and pay heavy dues.

And so, on it goes. It is part of a long session praising the work of the Communist Party and the Soviet Union.

The Soviets, as a system, are also idealized. On page 68 it reads:

Each of these has its own village soviet, chosen at a village meeting not unlike our New England town meeting. \* \* \* City soviets are also elected directly by the people.

Senator FERGUSON. Who is writing that?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a pamphlet entitled "Land of the Soviets," written by Marguerite Stewart and edited by Maxwell S. Stewart and published by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Webster Publishing Co.

Senator WATKINS. Is this one of those pamphlets that 500,000 copies were ordered for the Navy and the Armed Forces?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't recall whether that was one of those ordered or not. There were a total of some 700,000 of the whole pamphlet series. There may have been 10,000 of one and 25,000 of another. Whether this was included in the orders or not, I don't know.

Senator WATKINS. How can we find out?

Mr. DENNETT. It must be in the file somewhere as to what they sold to whom.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether this one was sold to the armed services so they would read it?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that is a fact?

Mr. DENNETT. Before you came in, Senator, I said this was one of the things which bothered me with regard to the staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations which I think answers your question rather effectively.

Senator FERGUSON. It seems so absurd to have pamphlets put out, let us say, by American taxpayers—not taxpayers but American people who support the Institute of Pacific Relations. That is where it is really supported, by the American people?

Mr. DENNETT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. By their donations and membership fees?

Mr. DENNETT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. As Professor Colegrove said yesterday, he belonged because he wanted to get the pamphlet. Does that mean that the institute would even publish untruths to get both sides? You do not get both sides by publishing an untruth, do you?

Mr. DENNETT. That is quite correct. You don't.

Senator WATKINS. May I suggest this pamphlet was one of the series that was used and sent out to the public schools in the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that one sent out?

Senator WATKINS. I think so.

Mr. DENNETT. It was one of a series of eight that were prepared by Mrs. Stewart for use in schools.

Senator WATKINS. It was not actually published by the Institute of Pacific Relations, but through contract with a publishing house.

Senator FERGUSON. It is sponsorship. In other words, it has the name on it.

Mr. MORRIS. The Institute of Pacific Relations was largely responsible for the initiation and the carrying through of that pamphlet, was it not?

Mr. DENNETT. So far as I know. The whole arrangement was made before I arrived. I think all but one of the pamphlets were prepared prior to my arrival in the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. But, Mr. Secretary, here we have the name, Institute of Pacific Relations, which is really a sponsorship, as Professor Colegrove said yesterday. At one time it was considered it was a sponsorship of facts and trying to get to the American people the facts so that they might become familiar with the various problems in the Pacific, and that was the reason why he, as a college professor in political science, and many others who were teaching students, were relying upon this. Yesterday, he indicated that after seeing the so-called letter by Mr. Lattimore to the secretariat, he came to the conclusion that this was, as he appraised it, a fraud upon the public because it was taking a Communist Party line.

Now, we find here the institute sponsoring what seems again is the Communist Party line even down to the school children of America.



Wasn't there some censorship to find that untruths were going out and that they were following the party line?

Mr. DENNETT. Senator, as I explained before you came in, Mrs. Stewart presumably had those pamphlets read. By whom I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I am wondering. Who read them?

Mr. DENNETT. As I explained, when I came in, I set up a research advisory committee and a publications committee, the function of which was to screen precisely such manuscripts as that.

Senator FERGUSON. We were misled once before. That is, the American public was misled. They were told that the satellites were going to have free elections. Now, free elections in Russia's language are not elections at all, which the satellites discovered, but the American public at the time were told a high sounding name of "free elections."

Here we get the same thing in this book. That is why it struck me so forcibly that we are again repeating to the school children about Russia's free elections. Anyone who knows anything about the Russian elections knows there are no elections at all in the sense that the American public knows them. Yet, we are telling our school children, "Here is how the people over in Russia elect their officials."

Senator WATKINS. Would the Senator say it is in line with the Mission to Moscow and such other writings?

Senator FERGUSON. The whole process of deceiving the American public, perpetrating the worst kind of a fraud upon the American public, is to represent that they have free elections over there and we were duped once and the satellites were really taken away from us by virtue of the fraud that was perpetrated in the offering of free elections.

Now we are continuing to do it with publications that are around. I think something ought to be done to gather up these books so the school children do not read books such as this to get the idea they have free elections under communism.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, is it your testimony that all eight of the series were prepared by Marguerite Stewart?

Mr. DENNETT. That is my understanding of it; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand, out of this series, the Army and the Navy bought something?

Mr. MORRIS. We are coming to that, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would find out who in the Army and the Navy was responsible for the purchase of these books and who in the Army and the Navy read them, if anybody did read them, before they were purchased for the Armed Forces.

Mr. MORRIS. We are coming to that as the next item.

While we are on the schools, I have one letter we had planned to introduce later. I think it may be appropriate to read it into the record now.

Mr. Dennett, I show you this memorandum which Mr. Mandel will certify came from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and ask you if you can recall that particular memorandum?

Mr. DENNETT. I can't recall it. It is to me from Edward C. Carter. I have no doubt I received it. Mr. Carter would send anywhere from one to a dozen memoranda a day on various subjects.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you certify that was taken from the files of the institute, and then read the contents into the record, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a memorandum headed: "RD" which presumably stands for Raymond Dennett from "ECC" presumably E. C. Carter, dated July 2, 1945, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

As you doubtless know, Martha Gerbode came to Washington last week in the hope of going abroad for the San Francisco Examiner, but because her husband is overseas, the War Department gave an emphatic no. She plans to be in New York a few days this week before returning to San Francisco. She hopes we have had a good vacation. It occurs to me it might be well if she got a thorough exposure to Mrs. Stewart and her program as Martha could really do a lot in the secondary school field, I am sure, if she got the feel of Peggy's program in vision.

Mr. MORRIS. "Peggy" in this case being Marguerite Stewart?

Mr. DENNETT. Right.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like that introduced in the record.

Senator WATKINS. It may be made a part of the record.

(Document referred to and read in full by Mr. Mandel was marked "Exhibit No. 286" and filed for the record.)

Senator FERGUSON. Who is Martha Gerbode?

Mr. DENNETT. She was a member of the board of directors of the San Francisco Bay region in San Francisco.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean the board of directors of the institute?

Mr. DENNETT. Yes. The bay region had its own group of directors, and she was a member of that. I think she may have also been a member of the national board of directors.

Mr. SOURWINE. She was a newspaperwoman?

Mr. DENNETT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you take to be "Peggy's program in vision," that they were trying to expose Martha Gerbode to?

Mr. DENNETT. I presume Mr. Carter had in mind Mrs. Stewart's school program and his evaluation of her position he considered as her vision.

Senator WATKINS. That would be a program that would get out books like we have had excerpts from read to us this morning?

Mr. DENNETT. Yes. It is beyond my capacity, Senator, to read into what Mr. Carter said what he may have had in mind behind it.

Senator FERGUSON. While we are talking about a program and a vision, we are talking about a vision which would indicate high ideals. Then we get a program that is set forth in these books which, if I can read it properly, is the Communist line to try to indoctrinate into the American people through the school system the Communist line. We get that being called in this organization, the Institute of Pacific Relations, a vision.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter was the secretary-general of the Institute of Pacific Relations at that time?

Mr. DENNETT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. How could Martha Gerbode help them? Was she a writer in magazines or newspapers?

Mr. DENNETT. No; she was not.

Senator FERGUSON. What was she? She was going abroad for the San Francisco Examiner.

MR. DENNETT. As far as I know, she never had any connection with newspapers but you would have to ask her that.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I do not understand.

Senator WATKINS. She did not go.

Senator FERGUSON. But she wanted to go.

MR. MORRIS. Did she have something to do with the secondary school system?

MR. DENNETT. Not so far as I know.

MR. MORRIS. There is a reference to that.

MR. DENNETT. As far as I know, she was the wife of a distinguished surgeon in San Francisco who had been active in the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator FERGUSON. There is another word in here that rather intrigues me. It is the word "exposure." When you expose a person to a Communist line, is that not in keeping? You would not call exposing a person to American philosophy, would you?

MR. DENNETT. I don't quite know what you are trying to get at in your questions.

Senator FERGUSON. I am trying to find out what that word "exposure" might mean here.

MR. DENNETT. I think that is a question which you could better ask Mr. Carter than I. I had a great many dealings with Mr. Carter, and I still don't know many of the things he meant in the memoranda he sent to me, nor would I try to guess.

Senator FERGUSON. If you were dealing with an American program, it would be an open, frank discussion of the problems, would it not? You would not go around behind the words like "exposure" and try and conceal what you were trying to do and yet have it actually accomplished; is that correct?

MR. DENNETT. That is probably correct. I would like to make it very clear I do not know by my own knowledge, as I testified earlier, about whether any of these people—Mr. Carter or Mrs. Stewart or any of the rest of them were or were not Communists or Communist sympathizers. Under those circumstances, I do not wish to impute motives when I do not know they exist, because I think that is, by and large, not a particularly wise thing to do.

Senator FERGUSON. Let me put a question to you. If you knew all that you know now, would you have taken the appointment with the institute?

MR. DENNETT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Why not?

MR. DENNETT. For precisely the reasons which I have been giving, Senator, that I do not think it was an objective research organization.

Senator FERGUSON. You feel there was such a thing as trying to put over something that was not definitely and clearly stated; is that correct?

MR. DENNETT. I won't go that far with you. It may have been; it may not have been. I think that certainly, so far as the staff is concerned, many of them, as I stated in my opinion, were not objective. Some of them may have been Communists. I don't know. I don't know now with the benefit of hindsight, but there were, if you may recall, a great many people in 1944 and 1945 who were not exclusively on the staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations who felt that the

benefit of postwar or the future of American security depended upon cooperation with the five major allies.

These people may have been sincere; they may have been Communists. In the absence of knowledge they were Communists, I do not wish to accuse them by inference or any other method.

They may have been guilty merely of bad judgment. Bad judgment carries its own penalties. I don't want to be in a position of labeling them by my guess as guilty of the greatest possible bad judgment, which is membership in the Communist Party. I am perfectly prepared to testify as to the factual material which I know. I do not know the facts behind Mr. Carter's mind when he wrote that memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Dennett, you were in this organization, and there were other people, other people that had no idea when they went in what was going on. I think the so-called cagey letter is an example of the fundamentals underlying what was going on in the institute. As the professor indicated yesterday, he stayed in a long time until he came to the conclusion of what it was. I am satisfied that people who now see that letter—have you read it?

Mr. DENNETT. No.

Senator WATKINS. Please identify the letter.

Senator FERGUSON. It is a letter dated the 10th of July 1938.

Senator WATKINS. Who signed it?

Senator FERGUSON. It was signed by Owen Lattimore.

Senator WATKINS. To whom was it addressed?

Senator FERGUSON. It is addressed to E. C. Carter, and it is on the letterhead of the Pacific Affairs, published quarterly by the Institute of Pacific Relations, and, as I said, dated July 10, 1938.

Mr. DENNETT. It is a very revealing paragraph, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I think this is true and I will ask Mr. Mandel so it will appear on the record as to whether or not there is anything in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations where Mr. Carter replied to this and indicated that he was shocked in any way by any such proposition, or indicating that he would, under no circumstances, carry on such a deceptive and fraudulent program?

Mr. MANDEL. I have no knowledge of any such reply.

Senator WATKINS. I may say, in fairness to Mr. Carter, that I think he said he did not agree with that when he was on the stand.

Senator FERGUSON. I just wanted that in the record.

Senator WATKINS. He did not follow out the suggestion.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Carter did not have the role of carrying things out, did he? Pacific Affairs had something to do with what was obtained?

Mr. DENNETT. The publication of the international secretariat, Pacific Affairs.

Senator FERGUSON. We find here at a later date this program that they wanted this lady to be exposed to, in effect, carrying out the program that is set forth in the Lattimore letter of 1938, wouldn't you say so?

Mr. DENNETT. It certainly could be interpreted that way; yes. I assure you, Senator, I am not in a position to interpret Mr. Carter or what he did. I think my position is very clear. I was responsible for objective research. I did not feel there was objectivity, and I resigned and got out.

Senator FERGUSON. Then there was a lack of objectivity?

Mr. DENNETT. That is precisely what I have been testifying to.

Senator FERGUSON. Along what line? Did you find they were following the line that would lead to Moscow?

Mr. DENNETT. I didn't think of it in those terms. They may have.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did it lead, as far as you were concerned?

Mr. DENNETT. It led to the position where I was in charge of a program of objective analysis for the Far East and for which I was responsible, but in which I could not carry out any responsibilities.

Senator FERGUSON. In what way did it vary from being objective?

Mr. DENNETT. As I testified earlier, I felt that it was leading to somewhat too great an emphasis, in my opinion, on explaining the position of the Soviet Union; that is, the tendency always was to explain what the Soviet Union was doing or had done, or why it was doing things, rather than to make judgments upon those actions in the light of what was considered to be, or what I would consider to be, the best interests of our analysis of the Far East.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you think this lack of objectivity, looking back, this lack on the part of the staff, aided the Communist movement?

Mr. DENNETT. It could very well have.

Mr. MORRIS. Did it, looking back, in your opinion?

Mr. DENNETT. It may very well have. I don't know enough about the Communist movement to judge, but I would say it probably did.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, since we are on the subject of schools, I think two excerpts from Institute of Pacific Relations' publications should be put into the record.

Mr. Mandel, will you read these and identify them?

Mr. MANDEL. This is an excerpt from *Security in the Pacific*, a preliminary report of the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations held at Hot Springs, Va., January 6 to 17, 1945, as follows:

Since 1941 the IPR has published 72 volumes concerning social, political, and economic problems of the Pacific area. More than a million IPR texts and popular pamphlets have been used by schools, colleges, and by the United Nations' armies and navies in the training of armed forces going into the Pacific region.

Mr. MORRIS. From what is that?

Mr. MANDEL. This is taken from *Security in the Pacific*, a preliminary report of the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. That is an official IPR publication?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

This is an excerpt from IPR in Wartime, a report of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941-43, page 24. The excerpt reads as follows:

In the winter of 1942-43, a new series of "unit texts" for high-school use were prepared under the council's auspices, and published by one of the leading school publishers, the Webster Publishing Co. of St. Louis. Thus far the IPR Webster series includes the following titles: *Changing China*; *Land of the Soviets*; *Lands Down Under*; *People of the China Seas*; *Modern Japan*; *India* (in preparation), and *America's Stake in the Pacific* (in preparation).

These small books have met with an unprecedented response. Attractively designed and retailing at 40 cents they represent virtually the first authoritatively written materials on Asia to receive wide distribution through American schools. The first edition was exhausted in 6 weeks; the second was running out in the succeeding 3 months. One school superintendent in a midwestern city, for example, was so enthusiastic that he directed that a month be spent on the series in each of the four high-school classes.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that from an official IPR publication?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. These excerpts may be received in evidence and marked with the next consecutive exhibit numbers.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 287 and 288," and filed for the record.)

#### EXHIBIT No. 287

Since 1941 the IPR has published 72 volumes concerning social, political, and economic problems of the Pacific area. More than a million IPR texts and popular pamphlets have been used by schools, colleges, and by the United Nations Armies and Navies, in the training of armed forces going into the Pacific region.

(Source: From book wrapper of *Security in the Pacific*, a preliminary report of the Ninth Conference of the IPR, Hot Springs, Va., January 6-17, 1945.)

#### EXHIBIT No. 288

In the winter of 1942-43 a new series of "unit tests" for high-school use were prepared under the council's auspices, and published by one of the leading school publishers, the Webster Publishing Co., of St. Louis. Thus far the IPR Webster series includes the following titles: *Changing China*; *Land of the Soviets*; *Lands Down Under*; *People of the China Seas*; *Modern Japan*; *India* (in preparation); and *America's Stake in the Pacific* (in preparation).

These small books have met with an unprecedented response. Attractively designed and retailing at 40 cents, they represent virtually the first authoritatively written materials on Asia to receive wide distribution through American schools. The first edition was exhausted in 6 weeks; the second was running out in the succeeding 3 months. One school superintendent in a midwestern city, for example, was so enthusiastic that he directed that a month be spent on the series in each of the four high-school classes.

(IPR in Wartime, report of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., 1941-43 (p. 24).)

Mr. MORRIS. Before getting off the schools, Mr. Chairman, I asked for an analysis made by the Library of Congress which we have already asked to be made a part of the record.

Mr. Mandel, have you obtained that analysis?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here an analysis coming from the Library of Congress:

U. S. S. R.: Some apparent contradictions from one congressional document to statements made in the book *Land of the Soviets*.

This was prepared by John L. Houk, Foreign Affairs Section, reviewed by Sergius Yakobson, senior specialist, International Relations, May 22, 1951, for the Library of Congress. I just read one excerpt by way of example.

From the *Land of the Soviets*, on page 70, it says:

The 1936 Constitution of the U. S. S. R. also introduced into the Soviet Union many elements of democracy as we know them in this country. \* \* \*

The Library specialist finds the following as taken from *Communism in Action*, a Government publication, and this is on page 133, as follows:

\* \* \* It must be kept in mind, however, that Soviet constitutional guarantee, unlike those in the Constitution of the United States, are not legally binding on the legislative and executive authorities of the Union. They are, generally speaking, statements of aims or goals, or, in some instances, descriptions of policies in effect at the time the constitution was adopted. They may be repealed or amended at any time by ordinary laws or regulations.

This is an excerpt from the analysis.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, that is in the record as exhibit No. 285.

Will you read the two letters on the Institute of Pacific Relations' letterhead?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a memorandum giving the minutes or the proceedings of a meeting of the executive committee of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated October 11, 1945, and it is signed by Philip C. Jessup, acting secretary. I read an excerpt from these minutes:

The treasurer submitted a financial report, including a statement by the executive secretary. He reported that it would be possible to go through November without drawing the additional \$3,000 from the publications fund under the previous authorization; \$5,000 of the \$8,000 authorized for transfer have already been transferred. The sum of \$19,000 due from Army-Navy purchases of pamphlets represents a profit balance which will enable the council probably to complete the year with a slight credit balance.

Senator WATKINS. Is that in evidence?

Mr. MANDEL. It has not been placed in evidence yet.

I have another letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated July 20, 1945, addressed to "Dear Board Member" and signed "Raymond Dennett, secretary." I read an excerpt from that:

I am sure you will be interested to know that membership in the American Council has increased to a total of 1,800 as compared with 1,100, 18 months ago. Under the editorship of Laurence E. Salisbury, the Far Eastern Survey has increased from printings of approximately 2,500 to printings of approximately 3,800. In addition, the armed services have recently purchased nearly 700,000 copies of our pamphlet material for their educational work with soldiers being transferred from the European to the Pacific theater.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, do you recall these two letters?

Mr. DENNETT. This one I have no knowledge of, the first one, of October 11. It apparently was an executive committee meeting when I was not present.

This one I have no doubt that I wrote. I can testify to the fact that approximately 700,000 of these pamphlets were purchased by the Army and the Navy, but I do not know what titles or what numbers of what titles.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you certify to these two letters and that they came from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. They may be received and marked with the next consecutive exhibit numbers.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 289 and 290," and are as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 289

#### MEETING OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, AMERICAN COUNCIL, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

MIDSTON HOUSE,  
New York City, October 11, 1945.

The meeting was called to order by Dean Robert D. Calkins, former chairman, who had been asked to take the chair for this occasion.

The following members of the committee were present: Mr. Eugene E. Barnett, Mr. Frederick V. Field, Mr. Huntington Gilchrist, Mr. G. Ellsworth Huggins, Dr. James L. McConaughy, Mr. Lawrence Morris, Mrs. Ada Comstock Notestein. In addition, the following persons who had been invited to attend were present and took part in the discussion without voting: Prof. Joseph Chamberlain, Dr. Philip C. Jessup, Dr. Grayson Kirk, and Mr. Owen Lattimore.

In the absence of the executive secretary, Mr. Jessup was designated as acting secretary.

At the suggestion of the Chair, it was agreed that any decisions would be taken by vote of the members of the executive committee only, but that if questions of principle were decided the views of the guests would be recorded.

On motion made and seconded, the reading of the minutes of the last meeting were dispensed with, in view of the fact that they had been circulated and that they were adopted subject to the filing in writing of any corrections.

The treasurer submitted a financial report, including a statement by the executive secretary. He reported that it would be possible to go through November without drawing the additional \$3,000 from the publications fund under the previous authorization; \$5,000 of the \$8,000 authorized for transfer have already been transferred. The sum of \$19,000 due from Army-Navy purchases of pamphlets represents a profit balance which will enable the council probably to complete the year with a slight credit balance.

After discussion, it was moved, seconded, and passed that the report be accepted.

The committee then discussed the item on the agenda of organizational problems and program. There was general consideration of the purposes and program of the American Council and of the problems confronting it.

At the conclusion of the discussion, Mr. McConaughy moved that a special committee, composed of Mr. Calkins, Mr. Gilchrist, and Mr. Jessup be appointed to carry on discussions and negotiations with any officers or branches of the American Council and with any outside organizations with a view to making proposals concerning the solution of the problems facing the council, including recommendations concerning the location of the various activities of the council, the special committee to report to the executive committee definite proposals at its next meeting.

The motion was seconded by Mr. Huggins, Mr. Gilchrist having indicated his inability to serve due to absence from the country, Mr. Conaughy was substituted in his place.

After discussion, the motion was unanimously carried, the nonmembers of the committee indicating their concurrence therein.

On motion of Mr. Gilchrist, seconded by Mr. Barnett, it was agreed that the executive committee, enlarged by the guests in attendance, would continue to function as a group until decisions had been reached on the main problems now confronting the council and that Mr. Calkins be requested to continue to serve as chairman during this period for this purpose.

It was moved and voted that Mr. Morris and Mr. Field serve as a subcommittee to suggest possible personnel who might be willing to serve on the executive committee.

It was agreed, after discussion, that the report of the program committee, submitted on October 1, 1945, would be revised and resubmitted for consideration at the next meeting.

The next meeting was scheduled for Tuesday, November 13, at 6 o'clock, at Midston House, the agenda to include the report of the special committee and the instructions to be given to the representatives of the American Council at the meeting of the Pacific Council in November.

PHILIP C. JESSUP, *Acting Secretary.*

---

EXHIBIT No. 290

AMERICAN COUNCIL, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.,  
*New York, N. Y., July 20, 1945.*

DEAR BOARD MEMBER: Attached herewith is a copy of the auditors' report for the fiscal year 1944 of the work of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

I wish particularly to call to your attention that we had to negotiate a loan to carry us through last year. Although this has been paid off in full, it means that we must make every effort to increase our contributions during the present year.

I am sure you will be interested to know that membership in the American Council has increased to a total of 1,800 as compared with 1,100 18 months ago. Under the editorship of Laurence E. Salisbury, the Far Eastern Survey has increased from printings of approximately 2,500 to printings of approximately



3,800. In addition, the armed services have recently purchased nearly 700,000 copies of our pamphlet material for their educational work with soldiers being transferred from the European to the Pacific theater.

Despite financial difficulties, therefore, the work of the American Council is growing in importance and usefulness.

Sincerely yours,

RAYMOND DENNETT, *Secretary.*

Senator FERGUSON. Have you the names of the pamphlets the armed services did purchase?

Mr. MANDEL. Senator, they are not ready now, but we have a list of the contracts with numbers made with Government agencies for purchase of IPR material. If the committee is willing, we can place those in the record when we have them ready.

Mr. MORRIS. At this point, I think, Mr. Chairman, I would like to read one paragraph from the publication, IPR in Wartime, which is a report of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941 to 1943. Since it bears on this whole subject, I would like this one paragraph read into the record, which I will do, myself.

Under the heading, "IPR Services," it reads:

The first months of the war, therefore, placed exceptionally heavy demands on the Institute of Pacific Relations for direct services to Government agencies as staffs and libraries were hastily assembled to handle far-eastern questions first with the demand for Institute of Pacific Relations publications and bibliographical aids. Happily, a large number of Institute of Pacific Relations' studies began as far back as 1936 were nearing completion in 1941. Together they provided a mine of up-to-date information on the resources, government economy, and problems of Japan, China, Burma, Thailand, Formosa, the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, et cetera. They were rushed into publication, or in some cases made available in proof or manuscript.

Institute of Pacific Relations libraries were exclusively used by officials from a dozen departments. Staff members gave freely of their time in consulting on research materials and programs; second, with requests for aid in recruiting far eastern experts for Government service. Here the IPR's extensive knowledge of scholars, journalists, and businessmen in the far eastern field was put at the disposal of Government agencies. This mobilization of key scholars, so few in number, has had its distressing aspects for it has stripped the universities and educational institutions of virtually all their trained far eastern personnel, but it was necessary and it will have its compensations in the enormous impetus to far eastern studies which the war will give. Hundreds of men are being trained in the far eastern languages through cooperative arrangements among the universities, the Government, and the American Council of Learned Societies which has taken the lead in this field.

Senator FERGUSON. By whom is that signed?

Mr. MORRIS. This is the official publication put out by, apparently, the executive committee. It ends up:

The job of the IPR is boundless and the stakes are high.

but there is no signature.

The next heading is headed: "By educating the Armed Forces."

The third aspect of direct IPR aid in the war effort has been the use of its publications in the education of the Armed Forces. Today, tens of thousands of young Americans are being called upon to fight for their country in a half of the world about which they know virtually nothing—China, India, Australia, New Guinea, the Solomons, and Alaska.

When the Army and the Navy wanted educational materials on these countries for use in camps, and on shipboard after Pearl Harbor, they turned to the IPR. In scores of Army and Navy establishments here and abroad will be found copies of China, America's Ally, Our Far Eastern Record, Meet the Anzacs, Know Your Enemy, Japan, and other Institute of Pacific Relations pamphlets which had been supplied at cost.

From the standpoint of the council this is an educational job of first importance. With reference to the varied contributions of institute work to the war effort, IPR members and supporters may have satisfaction in such tributes as the following from a high-ranking official in Washington—

I think we will end up with that, Mr. Chairman. But this is the tribute:

From my own experience, which I know is also shared by others entrusted with official responsibilities has been that IPR publications are an indispensable aid. May I take this opportunity of paying special tribute to the help which the IPR has rendered and is continuing to render to the war effort of the United Nations. Its studies, notably the inquiry, constitutes what is undoubtedly the complete and useful documentation available on the nature, cause, and consequences of the far eastern conflict.

That is from a report of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941 to 1943, entitled "Institute of Pacific Relations in Wartime."

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know certain people were writing articles under the sponsorship of the Institute of Pacific Relations and using fictitious names?

Mr. DENNETT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not ever hear that?

(Nodding negatively.)

Senator FERGUSON. Would you have thought that people should write objective facts under fictitious names?

Mr. DENNETT. It has been done in a great many places, Senator. I think it depends on the individual. I believe one of the most important architects of our present containment policy of the Soviet Union wrote an article in Foreign Affairs under the name of "X." I think that is fine.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is that?

Mr. DENNETT. That was George Kennan.

Senator FERGUSON. He has assigned his reason for doing that.

Mr. DENNETT. Well, I think that is reasonable, too. I think just to write under a fictitious name for that purpose is a bad idea. If there is a reason for it, I think that may explain it.

Senator FERGUSON. He had a genuine reason.

Mr. DENNETT. Certainly. I don't know about any people writing under the IPR, so I can't answer your question.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you have approved writing under fictitious names?

Mr. DENNETT. In the case of somebody like Mr. Kennan; yes.

In the case of somebody else; no.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you state a number of people here who were writing under fictitious names?

Mr. MORRIS. The one that came up was Asiaticus.

Mr. DENNETT. I know nothing about him.

Senator FERGUSON. He is the one mentioned in the "cagey letter."

Mr. DENNETT. He was not there when I was there.

Mr. MORRIS. I think we would have to have a compilation of that list.

Senator FERGUSON. Please put it in the record at this place, the people who have written under fictitious names for the Institute of Pacific Relations.

(The information referred to is as follows:)

Asiatieus-----	Hans Mueller
J. E. N-----	Edmund O. Clubb

Mr. DENNETT. I was not there when that occurred.

Senator FERGUSON. At least you did not know about it?

Mr. DENNETT. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, were you secretary of the American Council of the IPR when Alfred Kohlberg brought his charges that there was Communist influence in the Institute?

Mr. DENNETT. I was. I don't know whether it was when he brought his charges, because I don't know when they began.

I was there at the time he initiated legal action against the institute.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, was there ever any thorough investigation made of the so-called Kohlberg charges?

Mr. DENNETT. I would say "No." I would say an answer was prepared, which was somewhat different.

Mr. MORRIS. Who prepared the answer?

Mr. DENNETT. Marguerite Ann Stewart.

Mr. MORRIS. Did she make any objective investigation of the so-called charges?

Mr. DENNETT. I am not really in a position to judge that, Mr. Morris. I would be inclined to think not, but I don't recall at what time that was in preparation; but I think the general feeling was that Mr. Kohlberg's charges were so wild as to be ignored.

Mr. MORRIS. That was the feeling of the officers of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DENNETT. That was certainly the feeling of the staff and I think in the executive committee it was the feeling, at least, of some members.

Mr. MORRIS. As a matter of fact, Mr. Dennett, was there an investigation ever made of the Kohlberg charges?

Mr. DENNETT. I have stated there was not. There was an answer prepared.

Mr. MORRIS. It was prepared by Marguerite Stewart, the author of *Land of the Soviets*?

Mr. DENNETT. Quite correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that ratified by the executive committee? That answer?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't recall. The sequence of events, to the best of my recollection, is that Mr. Kohlberg issued a subpoena on me to show reasons as to why we should not make available to him the membership lists of the American Council for purposes of a proxy fight. At that point, the matter was turned over to the lawyers. After a period of somewhere between 12 and 14 months an agreement was made, as I recall, by which Mr. Kohlberg was entitled to mail out to the members of the Institute of Pacific Relations his material.

We then felt, or it was then felt, in the institute, that we should mail out some material counteracting his. This material was prepared by Mrs. Stewart. I believe it was mailed out prior to the annual elections in March of 1946, at which time I had left the Institute of Pacific Relations.

I don't recall that there was ever any analysis or any investigation by the executive committee of Mrs. Stewart's reply. I know at one

time I sent out a memorandum to the board which incorporated certain statistical material which Mrs. Stewart had given me.

Mr. MORRIS. That which you gave was prepared by Mrs. Stewart?

Mr. DENNETT. Yes; and I sent it out to the board members.

Mr. MORRIS. Who designated Mrs. Stewart as the one to prepare an answer to the Kohlberg charges?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't recall that. It undoubtedly was approved by me at the time. I think it probably was a question of who was free in the office and who could take on this additional job. She volunteered to do it and presumably it would be a long one, so I said "All right."

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever read *The Land of the Soviets* by her?

Mr. DENNETT. I explained to the committee that I had, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. After reading that, do you think that you would designate her as the person to make an objective investigation as to whether Kohlberg's charges were true?

Mr. DENNETT. I would not.

Senator FERGUSON. It would indicate now that a thorough investigation not be made for the board and the board put on an offensive before Kohlberg could put his on; was that not right? Was not information sent out to the various people?

Mr. DENNETT. Information was sent out. As I recall the sequence, as I said, there was a court action by Kohlberg that went through the district court and went up and came back down again. There was a compromise which we agreed to mail out to the members—the issue was whether or not Kohlberg could get the membership lists of the American Council. We agreed to mail out his material to the members. At the same time, we were going to mail out this material prepared by Mrs. Stewart so they would receive both Kohlberg's charges and this compilation, this report, of Mrs. Stewart.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the Stewart analysis indicate it was a thorough investigation by the board?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't recall the covering letter.

Senator FERGUSON. Have we the covering letter, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. We will try to obtain it. If so, we will put it in the record.

(The letter referred to is as follows:)

AMERICAN COUNCIL, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.,  
New York, April 4, 1945.

Confidential.

TO: MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES,  
MEMBERS OF THE RESEARCH COMMITTEE,  
REGIONAL OFFICES:

Following the policy of the previous confidential memorandum on the Hot Springs Conference, the present report is circulated for the purpose of summarizing recent developments of interest to those in positions of responsibility in the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

*Conference of the United Nations.*—The Bay Region Division, through Ray Lyman Wilbur, has forwarded to the Secretary of State an offer of its facilities during the period of the United Nations Conference which convenes on April 25 next. The Secretary received a request from Admiral John W. Greenslade, executive vice president, to visit San Francisco to assist in making plans for the activities of the office during the Conference, planned to leave New York on March 23, but was prevented by developments in the legal action against the Council by Alfred E. Kohlberg. He now plans to leave New York at the latest

by April 10—and earlier if possible—and to stay until after the Conference opens. According to information solicited from friends in the Department of State, the IPR can be of service in the following ways:

1. Through offering the use of its facilities, both library and office, to those in charge of Conference arrangements.
2. Through such arrangements as might be made to assist in the housing of delegates and technical advisers.
3. Through planning informal dinners for the Far Eastern experts in the various delegations.

Although the Department, officially, is discouraging the presence of informal observers from the multitude of American organizations who all have an interest in the Conference, assurances were informally given to the Secretary that the IPR might be able to be of real service both because of the expert character of its information, the projected release of the report of the Hot Springs Conference on April 18, and its international character which rather clearly distinguished it from those groups who will be present. In addition to any services which might be rendered to the Conference and its personnel, it is anticipated that newspaper correspondents covering the sessions may turn to the IPR for assistance and background material for their interpretative reports. The Foreign Policy Association has asked for the cooperation of the Bay Region Division of the IPR in offering office space to Mrs. Vera Micheles Dean and Mr. Blair Bolles, who will cover the proceedings for the FPA, and it is anticipated that such a combination will make the IPR office a real center for expert information. The Pacific Council will probably be represented during a portion of the Conference by various members of the staff of the International Secretariat.

*Meeting of the Research Advisory Committee.*—At the March meeting of the Research Advisory Committee, to the membership of which the Executive Committee had previously added the names of David N. Rowe of the Yale Institute of International Studies, William C. Johnstone, Dean of the School of Government at George Washington University, and Felix M. Keesing of Stanford University, the following decisions were reached:

1. An allocation of \$1,500 was made for the study on colonial dependencies mentioned in the last report of the Secretary. The work is to be undertaken under the general supervision of a small steering committee in Washington which hopes to prepare a manuscript for discussion group consideration by fall, with a publication date line of the Spring of 1946.

2. It reserved judgment on the details of the projected study on the effect of Chinese industrialization upon the American economy pending a further report of a discussion group to be called together in Washington.

*American Representatives on International Committees.*—The Executive Committee has appointed the following as the representatives of the American Council on the International Committees of the Institute:

Pacific Council—Dr. Robert G. Sproul.

International Research Committee—Dr. Eugene Staley.

International Program Committee—Dr. William C. Johnstone, Jr.

International Finance Committee—G. E. Huggins, Treasurer.

*Program Planning.*—The Executive Committee has authorized the appointment of a subcommittee to meet with the Secretary and the staff to work out a carefully integrated program for the American Council for the next few years. The report of this committee will no doubt provide a basis for discussion at the proposed national meeting of the IPR to be held later this year. It has been felt for some time that it is difficult to assess accurately the demands upon both staff and budget of various projects which are presented to the American Council until a yardstick in the form of a three to five year program has been formulated by which these demands can be judged. The Research Committee has recommended that, so far as research activity is concerned, the activities of the Council should be directed toward the study of those problems the decision on which are likely to set the pattern for Pacific relations for the next few decades. Within this general criterion, however, considerable further elaboration is needed.

*The IPR and Mr. Alfred E. Kohlberg.*—As indicated in a recent letter sent to the members of the American Council, the Executive Committee finally decided to attempt to solve the problems raised by Mr. Kohlberg's legal action to compel the IPR to furnish him with a list of members by allowing him to circulate the membership in an effort to secure proxies. The only restriction placed upon his communication is that it should not contain libelous material.

Prior to this decision, several efforts were made to reach a satisfactory solution with Mr. Kohlberg. The Executive Committee took up Mr. Kohlberg's original request for a committee to examine his charges, and suggested that a group composed of Mr. Randall Gould (named by Mr. Kohlberg as one of seven who would be acceptable to him), Mrs. Ada Comstock Notestein of the Executive Committee, and Mr. Arthur Dean of the firm of Sullivan and Cromwell be asked to "investigate whether there had been bias in the publications of the IPR during the last eight years, and whether there had been a suppression or distortion of facts to support such bias." Mr. Kohlberg however retorted by withdrawing the name of Mr. Gould, substituting additional names, and insisting upon the right of the committee to examine files, correspondence, and minutes of *all* the Councils of the IPR, as well as "hear witnesses" whom he might wish to call. He also insisted that the frame of reference of the committee should not be the question of the existence of bias but an examination of the alleged "communist" background of writers and contributors to IPR publications.

To protect its position, the Executive Committee has (a) sought the advice of the legal firm of Shearman, Stirling, and Wright; (b) secured the authorization of the individual officers of the Pacific Council for its permission to Mr. Kohlberg to include charges against the International organization in his communication to the members of the American Council.

The exact nature of future developments remains uncertain. If Mr. Kohlberg prepares a communication which we are assured by counsel will not open the American Council to possible action for damages, he will presumably circulate the membership with a request for proxies. If he does not prepare suitable material, his petition requesting the court to require the American Council to provide him with the membership list will come up for hearing on April 9. We are advised that his petition is not likely to be granted.

The absurdity of the charges made by Mr. Kohlberg is revealed in a thorough study of his original 88-page document. This study, made under the direction of the Executive Committee, reveals the following facts:

1. Only 33 articles and book reviews, three pamphlets, and one book are quoted. During the period under review, publications of the IPR totalled 1,961 articles and book reviews and 384 books and pamphlets. The charges therefore, are based upon a selection of 2 percent of the articles and book reviews and 0.002 percent of the books and pamphlets.

2. The document, in the large majority of instances, ignores (a) the fact that material supporting the opposite point of view could be taken from the same pamphlets or articles by the same author, (b) the appearance in the same or later issues of the magazines of articles by other authors taking the opposite position of those quoted, or (c) the true meaning of the articles by selecting quotations out of context.

3. A close examination of his document fails to reveal the four definite shifts in attitude toward China which Mr. Kohlberg has charged.

*National Conference of the American Council.*—No final decision has been reached on the date or the agenda for the national meeting of the American Council as suggested by the informal meetings at Hot Springs. Regional offices have expressed a preference for having the meeting in San Francisco—which may be impossible in June if the United Nations Conference is still in session—but have disagreed as to time. Honolulu and the Inland Empire group prefer September, the Pacific Northwest group prefers June, and no word has been received from Milwaukee, Chicago, or San Francisco.

The Executive Committee would be pleased to receive any comments or suggestions which may come to mind from this memorandum.

Sincerely yours,

RAYMOND DENNETT, *Secretary.*

---

CAMBRIDGE, MASS., November 5, 1951.

MR. ROBERT MORRIS,  
Special Counsel, Subcommittee on Internal Security,  
Committee on the Judiciary,  
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. MORRIS: I have your letter of October 31.

While I don't recall in detail the memorandum which you introduced in the record during my appearance before the open session, I do recall, to the best

of my knowledge, that Mrs. Stéwart, who was then engaged in examination of Kohlberg's brochure, provided me with the statistical analysis contained in that report which I incorporated with other information which I was sending to the Trustees.

Cordially yours,

RAYMOND DENNETT.

Mr. MORRIS. I think, Mr. Chairman, I would like to have in the record at this point the statistical report supplied to Mr. Dennett by Mrs. Stewart and have that made a part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have that?

Mr. MORRIS. We have it.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 291.")

(Only 33 articles and book reviews, three pamphlets and one book are quoted. During the period under review, publications of the IPR totaled 1,961 articles and book reviews and 384 books and pamphlets. The charges therefore, are based upon a selection of 2 percent of the articles and book reviews and 0.002 percent of the books and pamphlets.)

Mr. MORRIS. Were you secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations when the Hot Springs convention of the Institute of Pacific Relations was held?

Mr. DENNETT. I was.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us when plans were first made for the working out of this conference?

Mr. DENNETT. I imagine that the preparation must have been begun in the spring of 1944 very shortly after I arrived. The conference was scheduled for January of 1945. I did not arrive in the American Council until March of 1944.

I think by the time I had arrived there probably had been some preliminary planning on it, because a conference of that sort takes some time to work out.

I was actively engaged in the preparation for it, I should suppose, by midsummer of 1944.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, would you explain the general nature of this Hot Springs conference with respect to the Institute of Pacific Relations organization?

Mr. DENNETT. Yes.

The Pacific Council, the International Secretariat, the international end of the Institute of Pacific Relations, had for some years—I don't know when it first began—planned periodic international conferences to which the various national councils would send delegations to discuss an agenda agreed upon in advance which usually covered economic and political developments in the far eastern area. These conferences occurred every 3 or 4 years. The delegations usually had from 7 or 8 from the smaller countries to 15 or 25 from the largest countries who were part of the International Institute of Pacific Relations.

At the beginning these conferences had been exclusively limited to individuals, professors, economists, businessmen, and so on.

Starting, I believe, with the Mont Tremblant conference, which I know nothing about, because I was not there, in 1942 there had been apparently a disposition on the part of those in charge of the International secretariat to admit a limited number of government officials partially because many of the far eastern experts were serving governments, partially because I think they thought these discussions might

have an air of reality if you had some government people who were closer to what was actually going on.

All the people at these conferences participated as individuals and they were not necessarily speaking for their organizations, their businesses, or their official connections.

Hot Springs, therefore, was one of a series of similar conferences to those which had gone before.

The American Council was the host council and therefore had special responsibilities in regard to entertainment and arrangements, et cetera.

Mr. MORRIS. In the preparation of this conference, Mr. Dennett, did the people with the prime responsibility have their eye on the forthcoming United Nations conference?

Mr. DENNETT. I presume they did. I don't know exactly when that United Nations conference was announced as being held. I think, as I recall, the final announcement of the holding of the San Francisco conference did not come out until after the Yalta sessions in January and the Institute of Pacific Relations conference was at about the time of Yalta.

So I doubt very much whether we had that specifically in mind, although I assume we knew there was going to be some sort of a post-war conference.

Mr. MORRIS. At the time of the conference, itself, you were well aware of the forthcoming United Nations conference?

Mr. DENNETT. I would have to check dates, but it must have been about that time, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. In your executive session testimony, you said that generally the Hot Springs conference proved to be a trial balloon for the forthcoming United Nations conference.

Mr. DENNETT. That was unquestionably the case. I don't know whether that was something which we realized on a prior basis or a post hoc propter hoc basis, because I don't recall the announcement of the United Nations conference.

Mr. MORRIS. How similar were the delegations of the Hot Springs convention of the IPR and the subsequent United Nations conference?

Mr. DENNETT. I wouldn't know without a careful checking of the record, but it was certainly my impression that somewhere between a fourth and a third of those who attended the Hot Springs conference from these 10 or 11 countries subsequently turned up at San Francisco, either on delegations or as advisers to delegations of the similar countries.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, I would like to show you a copy of a letter that Philip C. Jessup wrote to you on August 1, 1944, and ask you if you can recall that letter?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't recall the letter, but I have no doubt I received it.

Mr. MORRIS. This letter was introduced previously as exhibit No. 132 at the hearing of August 16, 1951, Mr. Chairman. It is the one that contains the recommendation on the part of Mr. Jessup to Mr. Dennett who was then secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations for delegates to the Hot Springs convention. It contains the names of Benjamin Kizer, among others, and Larchlin Currie, John Carter Vincent, Harry Dexter White, Owen Lattimore, Len DeCaux, Col.



Carl Faymonville, Joseph Barnes, Frederick V. Field, Alger Hiss, and Frank Coe.

You say you probably did receive that letter?

Mr. DENNETT. I have no doubt I received it.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce into the record at this time a letter from Mr. Dennett to Mr. William C. Johnstone, dated June 27, 1944, and it is on the same subject, that is, recommendations for delegates to the Hot Springs convention.

Mr. Mandel, will you certify the authenticity of this letter and read pertinent paragraphs?

Mr. MANDEL. It is a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated June 27, 1944, addressed to Dean William C. Johnstone, from Raymond Dennett, secretary.

I read portions of this letter:

When I talked to Grew about the conference there was one rather disturbing reaction which I backed away from at full speed. Grew commented that since the conference would be discussing entirely postwar plans he did not see how anyone in his capacity or in his department could attend, even in their individual capacity, since they would naturally reflect the postwar planning of the State Department itself upon which only Mr. Hull was competent to make statements. Not wanting to ask Grew and have him refuse, not to mention that I wanted Vincent and have Grew refuse to consider such action, I changed the subject. It is quite apparent that Grew is hypersensitive since the Chicago speech which he took 15 minutes to assure me was inaccurately reported by the press.

I think it highly important that you do a little sounding out with Currie or someone at that level as to just how we handle this situation. Either Grew has got to be changed or he might even refuse to let Vincent come, quite apart from coming himself. Hornbeck I am sure would like to come, but whether Grew would accept Hornbeck's statement that it was all right I am inclined to doubt. Currie spoke quite frankly in saying that it was unnecessary to worry much about SKH.

Presumably Stanley K. Hornbeck.

Then another excerpt:

You will be interested to know that Currie suggested the Government delegates should be Acheson, Vincent, Dooman (the latter two at the technical level: the first at the over-all policy level), Will Clayton, Harry White, and possibly Frank Coe. Rupert Emerson should be asked to represent FEA. I think this gives you an idea of Currie's opinion of the importance of the conference, but it might take some spade work by him to get Acheson there. His suggestion, of course, is a neat way of bracketing Hornbeck out.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like that introduced into the record and marked accordingly.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted into the record at this point.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 292" and is as follows:)

JUNE 27, 1944.

Dean WILLIAM C. JOHNSTONE,

*American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,*

*Washington 6, D. C.*

DEAR BILL: I hope you had a pleasant trip and that you are full of gossip and information as to precisely what happened in San Francisco after I left. Dolly has written me mysterious words, but I have no official knowledge of what went on.

I had a very interesting 3 days in Washington during which I called on Currie, Hornbeck, Grew, Dooman, and various others. Currie was obviously very much interested in the conference and quite obviously would like to come. Hornbeck made an interesting comment to the effect that he rather disliked the apparent growing connection between the IPR and Government and the effort at the last

conference to arrive at a consensus which approximated the idea of passing resolutions. He felt that as we approached that level of action the British would outsmart us and we would lose our strength.

When I talked to Grew about the conference there was one rather disturbing reaction which I backed away from at full speed. Grew commented that since the conference would be discussing entirely postwar plans he did not see how anyone in his capacity or in his department could attend, even in their individual capacity, since they would naturally reflect the postwar planning of the State Department itself upon which only Mr. Hull was competent to make statements. Not wanting to ask Grew and have him refuse, not to mention that I wanted Vincent and have Grew refuse to consider such action, I changed the subject. It is quite apparent that Grew is hypersensitive since the Chicago speech which he took 15 minutes to assure me was inaccurately reported by the press.

I think it highly important that you do a little sounding out with Currie or someone at that level as to just how we handle this situation. Either Grew has got to be changed or he might even refuse to let Vincent come, quite apart from coming himself. Hornbeck I am sure would like to come, but whether Grew would accept Hornbeck's statement that it was all right I am inclined to doubt. Currie spoke quite frankly in saying that it was unnecessary to worry much about SKH.

I wish you would sound the situation out a little so that all will be clear before any formal invitations are issued.

You will be interested to know that Currie suggested the Government delegates should be Acheson, Vincent, Dooman (the latter two at the technical level, the first at the over-all policy level), Will Clayton, Harry White, and possibly Frank Coe. Rupert Emerson should be asked to represent FEA. I think this gives you an idea of Currie's opinion of the importance of the conference, but it might take some spade work by him to get Acheson there. His suggestion, of course, is a neat way of bracketing Hornbeck out.

Sincerely,

RAYMOND DENNETT, *Secretary.*

Senator FERGUSON. This man Currie has come up very frequently, and this letter brings him out again forcibly to the attention of the committee.

What did he have to do? What was his position? Here it sounds like a very important position as to how you reach Government officials. He was directly connected with the White House, the executive office.

Will you tell us where Currie fits into this proposition? Was he the liaison between the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Government?

Mr. DENNETT. It is rather difficult to say, Senator, because I think I only saw him twice, of which this summary was one.

I believe that Mr. Carter saw him fairly often, but I don't know.

I had obviously been sent to him by somebody—I don't know whom—to discuss the whole question of membership of the American delegation; that is, the official representation in the American delegation.

I am, therefore, summarizing here what he said to me.

Senator FERGUSON. He must have been a confidante because here it is said:

I think it highly important you do a little sounding out with Currie.

You only sound out with a confidante, do you not?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't know what you mean by confidante. He was no confidante of mine.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DENNETT. He may very well have been. I heard him mentioned several times.

I believe Mr. Carter saw him several times.

Senator FERGUSON. Here you were using this expression, "or someone at that level as to just how we handle this situation."

You wanted Currie to handle the situation that you could not handle with Grew who was the Under Secretary of State, was he not?

Mr. DENNETT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Explain who this man was, this man Currie. What could he do for IPR that the Under Secretary under Hull could not do? Why did you not lay your cards on the table and say to Mr. Grew, "Here is what we want to do"?

Why did you want to go around through Currie and manipulate things, which this indicates?

Mr. DENNETT. I assume, Senator, that the reason we wanted that was because we wanted certain people to come to the conference.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not want other people to come?

Mr. DENNETT. I assume so.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you try to block off Hornbeck?

Mr. DENNETT. Mr. Hornbeck had——

Senator FERGUSON. It is a neat way. You say:

I think this gives you an idea of Currie's opinion of the importance of the conference, but it might take some spade work by him to get Acheson there.

And then you say:

His suggestion, of course, is a neat way of bracketing Hornbeck out.

What is wrong with Hornbeck?

Mr. DENNETT. My understanding of that situation which goes back over 5 or 6 years is that at the time Mr. Hornbeck had already expressed his question as to the wisdom, or as to the desirability of the kind of conference which the Institute of Pacific Relations had put on at Mont Tremblant at which he had been present.

It would be natural, therefore, if he disapproved of this, not to have him as one of the delegates.

Senator FERGUSON. You only wanted yes men at the convention?

Mr. DENNETT. Don't put words into my mouth, Senator, because I didn't say that, nor did I mean to infer that.

The situation in regard to these delegations was somewhat influenced, and I think this is important to understand in regard to both of these letters, by the nature of the delegations coming from other countries.

The way the thing happened was that we would hear that the British were sending so and so and so and so, and the French were sending so and so.

Our problem, so far as the governmental representation was concerned, and as host council, was to attempt insofar as we could, to match the delegations from these other countries.

It was, therefore, logical to go to the Government and say, "Here is this conference. The British are sending somebody who is an expert on economic matters in the Far East. Here is somebody who is in charge, let us say, of the Chinese Desk. We would like to match them with similar people within the department," or whatever it happened to be.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not want to match them in opinion?

Mr. DENNETT. No, match them with the person holding the office. The office was the thing which was the matter of some concern to us.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't tell me you want to bracket out Hornbeck because of his position. You want to bracket him out because of his opinion. That does not line up with what you are saying here.

Mr. DENNETT. At that time Mr. Vincent was the director of the Office of China Affairs, or whatever it was then called.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know he was pro-Soviet?

Mr. DENNETT. I did not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether Currie knew he was pro-Soviet?

Mr. DENNETT. I had no idea what he knew or didn't know.

Senator FERGUSON. This letter, to me, up to this moment—you seem to know in this letter much about Mr. Currie.

Mr. DENNETT. I can assure you I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Was this letter really dictated by somebody else?

Mr. DENNETT. No, sir; that was by me. I saw Mr. Currie and asked him his opinions. Presumably Mr. Carter had talked with him earlier.

I went to Mr. Currie and said, "Well, now, here are the people that are coming that we know about so far. Whom did you suggest ought to come from the United States?"

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you not have this confidential talk with Grew? I notice a line up here that says you shied away from Grew.

Mr. DENNETT. Because at that point Mr. Grew stated, as is stated in the letter, that he thought it would be impossible for anybody to come from the Department of State.

We were particularly anxious to have someone from the Department of State because the British, the French, the Dutch, and others were sending officials.

Therefore, if I had asked Mr. Grew at that time and had a flat "No," we presumably would have had then nobody from the Department of State.

We, as host council, would have been in the position where we would not be giving a delegation of the same character as the other councils.

Senator FERGUSON. Here was the next to the top man that had the power to allow somebody to come, or not, and you were afraid of getting a direct "No"?

Mr. DENNETT. Quite right.

Senator FERGUSON. So, you go to somebody who has not any direct connection, as far as we know, Lauchlin Currie in the White House?

Mr. DENNETT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Why? To get him to engineer to get you someone so that Grew could not keep him from coming?

Mr. MORRIS. Did you not testify you were asked to go to see Mr. Currie by someone?

Mr. DENNETT. I probably was. I don't recall why or how I got to see him.

Mr. MORRIS. You don't know who sent you?

Mr. DENNETT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you see him?

Mr. DENNETT. I haven't the remotest idea. I don't know where his offices were.

Senator FERGUSON. Were they not in the White House?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't think they were, but I am not sure.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you think he had to do with Government?

Mr. DENNETT. I knew he was in the White House.

Senator FERGUSON. How did you get to see him?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't know. I have no recollection of whether I called him; whether I wrote him; whether somebody arranged the appointment. I have no recollection of that. It is perfectly obvious I went to see him. I saw him twice during the time I was with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. You were sent on both occasions?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't know. It is presumably in the files. If I wrote a letter, there may be a memorandum to Mr. Johnstone.

Senator FERGUSON. Was this an attempt to use influence through Currie?

Mr. DENNETT. I think it is a fair conclusion to draw that we wanted to get people from the Department of State and thought he could get them.

Senator FERGUSON. He was the one man you could talk confidentially with and get the people you wanted?

Mr. DENNETT. There were a number of people I could have talked confidentially with and did, including Mr. Grew.

I said, "We would like to have some people from the Department of State, Mr. Grew."

Senator FERGUSON. You did not talk confidentially with him because you say you shied away.

Mr. DENNETT. When he did not think anybody could come from the Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Up to that time you were careful in talking with Grew.

Who else could have talked to Lauchlin Currie and obtained influence to get these people?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't know I ever tried to obtain influence.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know of anyone higher than Currie nearer the throne?

Mr. DENNETT. (Nodding negatively.)

Senator FERGUSON. Did you try Harry White?

Mr. DENNETT. I think I saw Mr. White once.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever talk confidentially with him about some of these matters?

Mr. DENNETT. No. The only time I saw Mr. White was when I invited him to come to the conference.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you really get this idea of putting this in a letter?

Mr. DENNETT. I was reporting to the fellow in charge of our Washington office as to recent conferences in regard to the American delegation to the Hot Springs conference.

Senator FERGUSON. But the idea is that you put in here, it is rather significant to me, that you talked this way about Currie. You wanted to push that letter at the time?

Mr. DENNETT. I had no particular objection. I could talk to Currie, or anybody else about the American delegation.

Senator FERGUSON. This was not a confidential communication?

Mr. DENNETT. It is not labeled as such. I sent it to Bill Johnstone of the Washington office.

Senator FERGUSON. You think he would have wanted Mr. Grew and Mr. Hull to know about it?

Mr. DENNETT. Mr. Grew is a very astute man, and I had no doubt Mr. Grew knew I would like to have the Department of State people there. He may have concluded I did not want to ask him point blank.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think you would want Mr. Grew or Mr. Hull to know that you were going over to the White House to see Currie, who had influence with the President to do this?

Mr. DENNETT. Not particularly.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you think you would even want them generally to know it?

Mr. DENNETT. I had no doubt they knew somebody beside people from the Department could come.

Mr. MORRIS. You can't recall who it was who suggested you go to see Currie?

Mr. DENNETT. No.

Presumably it was Mr. Carter, but it may not have been because he saw a good deal of Mr. Currie.

Senator FERGUSON. You really accomplished your mission getting these people?

Mr. DENNETT. There was no final order that nobody could come.

Senator FERGUSON. You accomplished your mission?

Mr. DENNETT. Yes.

I think I may say that one of the factors in doing that—it may have been Currie—but one of the factors contributing to that was the list of people who came from the other countries as a result of which I think it was fairly apparent to the people in the department that it would be desirable to have some of their people present when other governments considered this sufficiently important to send people of the caliber they did.

So, it is entirely possible that the action of sending people from the department, or elsewhere, was not necessarily the result of any machinations by Mr. Currie, but a result of the discovery of who else was coming from the other countries.

There is another interpretation than that you suggested.

Mr. MORRIS. In connection with this list suggested by Mr. Currie, you will notice he has Harry White and Frank Coe as people recommended.

Mr. DENNETT. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you learn Harry White and Frank Coe were associated with the Communist organization?

Mr. DENNETT. A good deal after I left the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I think, in connection with this recommendation of Mr. Jessup's for the same conference, we had some testimony in the past that 10 of those people were connected with the Communists and Soviet organizations. I thought perhaps we might go into the testimony about some other people who were recommended and who were not identified as members of the Communist Party, such as Colonel Faymonville.

Mr. DENNETT. I was about to say—just so that the record will be straight—that, of all the people who were in the Institute of Pacific Relations and with whom I was associated, I think I would be doing a

disservice if I didn't state that the person whom I never questioned as having any connection with either the Communist Party or Communist sympathizers was Philip C. Jessup.

Mr. MORRIS. We were not asking you that. We are talking about the list of people recommended by Mr. Jessup. That question does not come up at all.

Mr. DENNETT. I wanted to get that in the record as to my feeling about Mr. Jessup, so you can then discuss this list.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us whom you were suspicious of having Communist leanings that were connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations, since you brought the subject up? Let us have the names of those you were suspicious of.

Mr. DENNETT. I made it clear earlier, I think, that I was primarily concerned with the objectivity of the staff.

Senator FERGUSON. That does not answer my question.

Mr. MORRIS. You brought your suspicions into it.

Senator FERGUSON. Let us have those that you were suspicious of being connected with, either directly or indirectly, the Communists or the Communist line.

We have got one that was not. What about all the others?

Mr. DENNETT. I would say, with the exception of Mr. Field, all the members of my executive committee.

Senator FERGUSON. You were suspicious of Field?

Mr. DENNETT. Yes. There was no question in my mind that—

Senator FERGUSON. That he was a Communist?

Mr. DENNETT. He was not.

The CHAIRMAN. What is that?

Mr. DENNETT. There was no question in my mind that Mr. Field was either a Communist or a Communist sympathizer. I think it was generally accepted he was. He was one out of 11 or 12 of the executive committee, and one member out of the 60 or 70 on the national board.

Senator FERGUSON. What about the writers for the organization?

Mr. MORRIS. How about the names of the people recommended by Jessup for the Hot Springs convention?

That would be more appropriate, Senator.

Mr. DENNETT. I had no suspicions in regard to any of them, Senator.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you not testify previously you were in no position to determine whether or not anybody was a Communist?

Mr. DENNETT. I certainly did. I was in no position to know. I had no way of knowing; and as I have always stated, even with the benefit of hindsight I am very reluctant to impute membership where it may not have been, to impute motives, and I do not know that the motives existed, because I just don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not wish to tell us you were naive on this question of communism back in these days; that you did not understand it; that it did not enter your mental processes?

Mr. DENNETT. Certainly it never occurred to me any of the people with whom I was dealing were Communists or Communist sympathizers.

Senator FERGUSON. When you read such articles as this book *The Land of the Soviets*—

Mr. DENNETT. I decided that was a person whom I did not regard as objective, and who may or may not have been sympathetic to the Communist side.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know there was a Soviet line?

Mr. DENNETT. Certainly.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not see any evidences of that line going through the Institute of Pacific Relations and leading over to Moscow?

Mr. DENNETT. There is a difference between seeing a line or a parallelism between two points of view and deciding as a result of that that the person taking this position is or is not a Communist or a Communist sympathizer.

As I suggested, in 1944 and 1945 there were millions of people in this country who really and sincerely believed that cooperation with the Soviet Union was the solution to postwar problems.

They were all guilty of bad judgment, but that does not necessarily mean that the millions who felt that way are all Communists, or were.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it not any wonder that was true when you read this book that was copyrighted in 1942, *Land of the Soviets*, which Mrs. Stewart had taken out to the public schools?

Mr. DENNETT. If the Institute of Pacific Relations had the influence you suggest, there would be a lot more Communists than there are in the country, I suspect.

You give me faith in education with that comment. I am now in the field of education. I wish I could be as effective as you imply.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you don't think this kind of a book sent to the public schools or to the armed services would have its effect on the thinking of the youth of America and as they grow into manhood they would carry on some of this thinking?

Mr. DENNETT. It may very well.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the hope of you as an educator?

Mr. DENNETT. It would be my hope it would have some impact; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. If that was not the fact that you wanted an impact, why were you publishing these books?

Mr. DENNETT. Disassociate me from publishing this one, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean the IPR.

Mr. DENNETT. I want to make it clear as to the distinction as to my position and the previous history.

Senator FERGUSON. I hope you do.

I have had a little trouble this morning on the Currie letter that you have not quite made clear to me.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, we will have to recess at this time until 1:30.

(Thereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 1:30 p. m. of the same day.)

#### AFTERNOON SESSION

The hearing reconvened at 1:30 p. m., upon the expiration of the recess.

Senator JENNER (presiding). Come to order.

Mr. MORRIS. Who else in addition to Mr. Jessup and Lauchlin Currie made recommendations for delegates to the Hot Springs convention?



Mr. DENNETT. I don't recall in detail. I know that in regard to the west coast branches of the Institute of Pacific Relations we pretty well decided to let them name their own. I presume there was some sort of a subcommittee of the executive committee which made suggestions.

There were, for example, a number of businessmen suggested. These would have come presumably from some sort of a committee which was set up for it.

Mr. MORRIS. But the outstanding recommendations apparently came from Jessup and Currie?

Mr. DENNETT. Those are the only ones of which there is evidence, but there may be others in the file.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I think while we are at this list of recommendations, I might say a letter had been introduced previously on Colonel Faymonville. I think Mr. Mandel will read it now for the record.

Senator JENNER. All right.

Mr. MANDEL. This is exhibit 32, introduced at open hearings on July 26, 1951. It is a letter addressed to Owen Lattimore from Edward C. Carter, dated June 21, 1941. The letter reads as follows:

DEAR OWEN: If you have time while in San Francisco, you and Bill Holland may want to arrange a private talk with Col. Philip R. Faymonville whose present address is Headquarters of the Fourth Army, Presidio of San Francisco, Calif.

He would, I think, have been thoroughly at home and at ease if he had lunched with us at the Mayflower on Wednesday. I think you get the idea. It may be if you get the same favorable impression of him which Harriet Moore and I have, he might be someone who could be exceptionally useful to you and the Generalissimo at some future time in Chungking. If you wish me to, I will wire him for an appointment.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you state what the reference is to the luncheon last Wednesday? The reference was to a luncheon with Oumansky?

Mr. MANDEL. I believe so.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I just had that stated in the record in connection with Colonel Faymonville.

The point is that Edward Carter in writing to Lattimore thought that Colonel Faymonville would be thoroughly at home at this Oumansky luncheon.

Carter goes on to say:

It may be if you get the same favorable impression of him which Harriet Moore and I have, he might be someone who could be exceptionally useful to you.

Harriet Moore has been identified by several witnesses as having been a member of the Communist Party.

What were your experiences with Harriet Moore, Mr. Dennett?

Mr. DENNETT. I saw her only four or five times, I think. She was acting secretary before I was employed. Immediately after my employment, she went to the American-Russian Institute which she was particularly interested in. She was also the author of a book published by the American Council on the Soviet Far East, I believe, which I did not at the time, and do not now, regard as a particularly objective study.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, at the Hot Springs convention, were there any advance caucuses?

Mr. DENNETT. We had a 1- or 2-day advance meeting, as many members of the American delegation could get together in Washington sometime in the fall prior to the Hot Springs conference.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read into the record excerpts from one of the conferences, the advance conferences, described by Mr. Dennett at this time?

And what is this you are going to read?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostatic copy of a document appearing in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations headed "Preliminary meeting of the American delegation of the Institute of Pacific Relations, October 28, 1944, morning session, 10 to 11:15 a. m., Carolyn Kaiser and Harriett Mills, recorders."

Recorders apparently are those who do not take a stenographic copy of what was said, but give a digest, which appears here.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that true?

Mr. DENNETT. That is correct. They take down in longhand the substance of what was said and type it up later.

Mr. MANDEL. I read some excerpts from this preliminary meeting:

Chairman, Mr. Jessup: In his introductory remarks, Mr. Jessup stated that this preliminary meeting of the American delegation was not called for the purpose of formulating a "party line" for the delegation, or to present a single point of view at the Hot Springs conference, but for the purpose of clarification of the major issues to be discussed, prior to Hot Springs, to discover points of agreement on opinions and the interpretation of facts.

He explained that the IPR had broken its long-standing precedent in regard to the exclusion of Government officials from the conferences because since Pearl Harbor so many of the authorities on far eastern affairs had accepted responsible positions in the Government. However, Government officials who represent any of the delegations do not speak as Government officials, but as well-informed private individuals.

The main point under discussion during this period of the morning's meeting was what the American attitude should be in regard to the discussion of the internal problems of China, at the Hot Springs conference. Mr. Jessup felt that if the American delegation could decide what "slant" to take in bringing forth a discussion of China's domestic difficulties, it would facilitate a free discussion of this problem at the conference. He pointed out that the Chinese delegates have not wished, and will not wish, to discuss the internal situation in China. The domestic China situation is covered in an indirect way in the agenda of the conference, as a diplomatic concession. He then asked Mr. Lattimore what factors in the Chinese internal situation were likely to come under discussion at the conference.

Mr. Lattimore: He thought that the method of including India as well as China in the topic on the agenda might cushion the Chinese discussion. He said that the Chinese delegation at Hot Springs may occupy the position formerly held by the Japanese delegation at IPR conferences. The Chinese will present the party line, well-cloaked in fog, and individual members of the Chinese party will hew to the party line although they may differ from it as individuals. They won't care to speak of their differences of opinion.

Owing to the scarcity of information about Chinese internal affairs, the discussion at Hot Springs is likely to boil down to a discussion of the Kuomintang and the Communists, although the actual situation is far more complex; there are many smaller groups who are playing active parts in the political picture whose roles will be ignored. Developments in China today will have important political consequences. One example: The development in southeast China, with the United States getting closer and closer to the Chinese coast. China's military leaders may decide to break through the Japanese lines to commandeer United States equipment when we land. The political affiliation of the Chinese commander who might make this move would influence the whole political set-up. The Chinese delegation will present no real data on China's internal situation.

even though this situation is of military as well as political importance in the whole international picture.

Mr. MORRIS. Who else gave their opinions at this conference?

Mr. MANDEL. We have here a digest of the opinion of Mr. Dennett, Admiral Yarnell, Mr. Chase, and Mr. Field.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is Mr. Chase?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't recall. He wasn't in the delegation, I don't think. I don't know who Mr. Chase was.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was Mr. Field?

Mr. DENNETT. Frederick Vanderbilt Field.

Mr. MANDEL. Mr. Coe.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was Mr. Coe?

Mr. DENNETT. Frank Coe.

Mr. MANDEL. Miss Farley.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is Miss Farley?

Mr. DENNETT. Miriam Farley.

Mr. MANDEL. Mr. Johnstone.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is Mr. Johnstone?

Mr. DENNETT. William C. Johnstone.

Mr. MANDEL. Mr. Bunche.

Mr. DENNETT. That is Ralph Bunche.

Mr. MANDEL. Mr. DeCaux.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that Len DeCaux?

Mr. DENNETT. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. As far as you can recall, what was the purpose of that advance session?

Mr. DENNETT. I think it is well described by the statement of the chairman; that is, to see what the attitudes of the members of the delegation were, many of them strangers to each other, and to discuss particularly at this session the degree to which it would be possible to examine as part of the discussions the internal developments in China.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you read that through completely?

Mr. DENNETT. I have read this through. There are a lot of others I have not read, however.

Mr. MORRIS. With the exception of Admiral Yarnell, would you not agree there was uniformity of opinion there?

Mr. DENNETT. I think that is a fair statement; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the underlying expression of the majority of people there with the exception of Admiral Yarnell, with respect to the Chinese question?

Mr. DENNETT. The underlying agreement was that we certainly should discuss the internal situation in China as it bore very definitely upon postwar situations in China.

Admiral Yarnell's position is, I think, best summarized in one statement, and I am quoting:

But if criticism leads to the overthrow of the Chungking government, what will take its place? No other party is strong enough at present to assume control.

Mr. MORRIS. Nobody agreed with him?

Mr. DENNETT. They seemed not to.

Are you entering this in the record?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. DENNETT. As long as it is in the record, I think I am free to make comments on it.

Senator JENNER. This will be received in the record.  
(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 293" and is as follows:)

## EXHIBIT No. 293

## PRELIMINARY MEETING OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION OF THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, OCTOBER 28, 1944

Chairman, Mr. Jessup: In his introductory remarks, Mr. Jessup stated that this preliminary meeting of the American delegation was not called for the purpose of formulating a party line for the delegation, or to present a single point of view at the Hot Springs conference, but for the purpose of clarification of the major issues to be discussed, prior to Hot Springs, to discover points of agreement on opinions and the interpretation of facts. He explained that the IPR had broken its long-standing precedent in regard to the exclusion of Government officials from the conferences because since Pearl Harbor so many of the authorities on Far Eastern affairs had accepted responsible positions in the Government. However, Government officials who represent any of the delegations do not speak as Government officials, but as well-informed private individuals.

The main point under discussion during this period of the morning's meeting was what the American attitude should be in regard to the discussion of the internal problems of China, at the Hot Springs conference. Mr. Jessup felt that if the American delegation could decide what slant to take in bringing forth a discussion of China's domestic difficulties, it would facilitate a free discussion of this problem at the conference. He pointed out that the Chinese delegates have not wished and will not wish to discuss the internal situation in China. The domestic Chinese situation is covered in an indirect way in the agenda of the conference, as a diplomatic concession. He then asked Mr. Lattimore what factors in the Chinese internal situation were likely to come under discussion at the conference.

Mr. Lattimore: He thought that the method of including India as well as China in the topic on the agenda might cushion the Chinese discussion. He said that the Chinese delegation at Hot Springs may occupy the position formerly held by the Japanese delegation at IPR conferences. The Chinese will present the party line, well cloaked in fog, and individual members of the Chinese party will hew to the party line although they may differ from it as individuals. They won't care to speak of their differences of opinion. Owing to the scarcity of information about Chinese internal affairs, the discussion at Hot Springs is likely to boil down to a discussion of the Kuomintang and the Communists, although the actual situation is far more complex; there are many smaller groups who are playing active parts in the political picture whose roles will be ignored. Developments in China today will have important political consequences. One example: the developments in southeast China, with the United States getting closer and closer to the Chinese coast. China's military leaders may decide to break through the Japanese lines to commandeer United States equipment when we land. The political affiliation of the Chinese commander who might make this move would influence the whole political set-up. The Chinese delegation will present no real data on China's internal situation, even though this situation is of military as well as political importance in the whole international picture.

Mr. Jessup: He then asked Mr. Lattimore if American interest in China rests chiefly on military grounds.

Mr. Lattimore: It does not. But American military interest will launch the discussion of Chinese internal affairs as they affect the military situation. They have a direct bearing on how soon the war can be finished. The situation is comparable to the situation which would exist if the Japanese had invaded India. Then we would have to take up the domestic situation in India as it applied to the military, and subject it to intense discussion.

Mr. Jessup: He pointed out the economic side to the picture. China's appeal for United States economic and industrial aid is effected by the political situation within China.

Mr. Lattimore: The Chinese party line will be that we cannot discuss the Chinese political situation because it can be clarified only if the United States gives China large funds with which to strengthen the Government, and that that will clarify the political situation.

Mr. Dennett: He stated that the American point of view might well be that America could reasonably object to giving China money to reinforce a form of

government with which we might not be in as much sympathy as some others. Our businessmen will not care to invest in a government whose situation is so unstable.

Mr. Lattimore: In answer to a query as to whether it is advisable to press the Chinese to express themselves on these problems, Mr. Lattimore said that it was a matter for regret that at previous conferences the other nations had not pressed the Japanese to express themselves on acute issues within Japan. It resulted in a sort of silent condoning of Japanese internal policy.

Admiral Yarnell: The Admiral expressed the opinion that nothing constructive could come from discussing the internal situation in China and India, and that we might serve only to antagonize the members of the delegation involved in these situations. He expressed doubt that we could learn anything from them which would aid in clarifying the situation anyway.

Mr. Lattimore: He stated the bad effect that such a hands-off policy had had on the Japanese delegates; they had gone home and reported that there was no cause to worry about American opinion, that America was "in the bag." There will be an equally destructive effect if the Chinese go home and tell their officials that America condones the Chinese political situation.

Admiral Yarnell: If we do not discuss these problems, the Chinese cannot interpret that to mean that the United States approves of their policy. The situation in China is known to us, the remedy is known; they cannot hope to believe that we do not realize what is going on.

Mr. Jessup: He stated that many people say that the Chinese desire a recording of adverse American sentiment, and that Chungking wishes to know about it.

Mr. Lattimore: Americans who have returned from China say that they are quietly taken aside in Chungking, and encouraged to continue the criticism of Chinese policies.

Admiral Yarnell: But if criticism leads to the overthrow of the Chungking government, what will take its place? No other party is strong enough at present to assume control.

Mr. LATTIMORE: The more reasonable Chinese feel that Chiang's Government is the only hope for a continuing and stable government in China, but that it will be continuing and stable only if it modifies its policy; otherwise it will be overthrown.

Mr. Chase: He stated that at the Hot Springs conference we could take up the discussion of internal factors in China only in relation to the aid which the United States will give her.

Mr. Field: He felt that if the domestic situations in other countries involved in the Pacific area, including the United States, were discussed—these questions which bear directly on the Pacific situation—it would be easier to bring about the discussion of China's domestic situation. If we are frank to discuss our own problems, and take the lead in discussing them before we reach the Chinese discussion, we can encourage the same thing in the Chinese when their turn comes. The point on the agenda which takes up the discussion of Chinese domestic issues comes too soon, Mr. Field felt. Our chances of leading gently and gradually into the Chinese discussion are poor. If we can wash some of our own dirty linen first we can more easily lead the discussion toward Chinese domestic affairs.

Mr. Jessup then asked whether the agenda should be modified.

Mr. Field: The discussion of India at the Atlantic City conference was skillfully skirted, so that a clash was avoided. If, before the conference, we can talk to the British delegates, perhaps we can agree to discuss the internal situation in India frankly. This also will help in leading into the Chinese discussion.

Mr. Coe and Miss Farley stated that the India situation was discussed fully at Mont Tremblant Conference, and could be done so again.

Mr. Field: If we can open up the discussion of pertinent internal topics, it will be of great help all the way around.

Mr. Johnstone: The discussion of domestic affairs at Atlantic City grew out of the discussion of economic aid to China. We said that our aid depended on the internal situation in China. The Chinese said that we had no business discussing the stability of the Chinese Government. What are the points of legitimate American interest to keep in mind in discussing the Chinese situation?

Mr. Jessup: He reminded the meeting that military and economic considerations had already been mentioned, and asked how far we could go in saying that American public opinion is concerned with the domestic Chinese situation. He asked if it was a matter of general informed interest.

Mr. Coe: He said that the number of articles and news stories in the American press concerning the domestic situation in China testified to American interest in the situation.

Mr. Lattimore: Many people ask, with great interest, whether China is in for a period of progress when the war is over, or whether she is in for 50 years of civil war.

Mr. Jessup brought out the point that the security question is involved in the discussion, as China is a member of the Big Four.

Mr. Dennett: Let us say that there is widespread American interest in the problem, and the question of the propriety of discussing it or not discussing it is immaterial. The interest and publicity exists, whether it should or not. The more of a problem it becomes to China, the more the United States will discuss it and ask questions about it. Then we remove the question from considerations of personal curiosity, and it becomes a matter of public concern.

Mr. Bunche: How can we divorce national policies from domestic conditions? We cannot avoid discussing internal conditions in China in relation to her future foreign policy, and all other countries as well.

Mr. Lattimore reminded the group of the British insistence on clarification of American foreign policy at Mont Tremblant, because it vitally affected the discussion of international policy.

Mr. Coe: He stated that it would be necessary to either bar the whole discussion of China's internal affairs from the conference, or recognize that pertinent angles with reference to them will crop up continually in the discussion.

Mr. Jessup: We must put the stress on the interest which is based on economic and military grounds. Admiral Yarnell has raised the question of the discussion being helpful or harmful. It has been said that it will crop up in the agenda in several places unless it is directly suppressed. The staff should circulate a memoranda stressing these points before the conference takes place.

Mr. de Caux suggested a redrafting of the agenda, including the questions on foreign investment and long-term security.

Mr. Jessup further suggested that all those present should make notes on the agenda to go to the American secretary who was in charge of drafting the agenda, to see whether they might be included.

Miss Farley: If we assume that the American delegation is responsible for the agenda, it may have to stand as it is. If this meeting is considered to be representative, we should decide when and where the Chinese problem should come up, following Mr. Field's suggestion.

Mr. Jessup said that the matter would be discussed at greater length, and that there would be correspondence on the subject.

Mr. Bunche thought that under section C-1 of the agenda, Dumbarton Oaks should play an important part. And also he brought out the fact that a United Nations conference might take place before the Hot Springs meeting, and that that too should be included in the agenda.

Mr. Jessup then stated that the agenda would undergo revision.

C. KIZER.

Mr. MORRIS. There were many conferences such as this?

Mr. DENNETT. There were a series of meetings. I don't know whether it was one week-end meeting, or whether there were a number of them which covered the major points on the agenda.

Mr. MORRIS. Were they all presided over by Dr. Jessup?

Mr. DENNETT. I assume so, because he was to be the chairman of the American delegation.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have a volume, Security in the Pacific?

Mr. DENNETT. I do.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like you to turn to that page which has to do with the make-up of the American delegation.

Mr. DENNETT. Page 157.

Mr. MORRIS. During the various round-table discussions, who, of all the delegates to the convention, was the most vocal?

Mr. DENNETT. The organization of the conference was such that there were three or four simultaneous round tables going on on differ-

ent agenda items. I therefore only attended the round table to which I was assigned.

I attended the plenary meetings. I would say on the basis of my recollection, the most vocal members were Professor Jessup as chairman of the delegation, Admiral Hart as vice chairman.

In regard to problems of southeast Asia and colonial problems generally, it was Ralph Bunche; Frank Coe very much so on economic matters, since that was what he was dealing with in FEA; Mr. Coons; Rupert Emerson; Frederick V. Field; William C. Johnstone; and Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you say Mr. Lattimore was the most vocal of them all?

Mr. DENNETT. Probably. He created a good deal of animosity.

Mr. MORRIS. Why?

Mr. DENNETT. There was one incident I recall where he commented that, "Just as Lincoln said the United States cannot exist half slave and half free, so the world could not exist half slave and half free until the metropolitan countries had freed their colonial territories."

This did not sit very well with the British, French, or Dutch, who thought he had overstated his case somewhat.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he express any views against the Chinese Government there?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't recall. My impression is that he was very doubtful as to their ability to continue without liberalization of their regime.

I was not in that particular round table, as I recall, and heard these comments only in plenary meetings, of which there were only four or five.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he comment on the necessity of having a Japanese Emperor?

Mr. DENNETT. You mean the necessity of not having one, I take it?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Mr. DENNETT. He did, at length.

Mr. MORRIS. What did he say? Can you recall the conversation?

Mr. DENNETT. No; except that his general theme was that the Japanese Emperor probably ought to be removed and he did not feel you could have a democratic Japan as long as you had the Japanese Emperor.

Mr. MORRIS. Did any of the members of the secretariat express themselves?

Mr. DENNETT. Yes; a few did, on the international secretariat, T. A. Bisson, and Andrew Grajdanzev.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it proper for them to have expressed themselves?

Mr. DENNETT. There was some argument on that. Mr. Carter felt it was perfectly acceptable. The British, French, Dutch, and other delegations thought that members of the secretariat should not participate in the discussion since they were not full delegates.

There may have been others.

I am looking over this list just to have a complete record on this.

There may have been others that participated in the discussion. I think Professor Corbett did by invitation. I know he gave a talk at one point by request. It is possible that one or two others joined in—Mr. Tamagna I think did.

I remember the opposition of the other delegations which arose, particularly to Mr. Bisson and Mr. Grajdanzev.

Mr. Morris, do you plan to put the list of delegates into the record at some point.

It bears on some of the discussion we had this morning.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; I think Mr. Mandel will put the list into the record in regard to the United States delegation.

Well, I will offer the full list of the United States delegation to the Hot Springs conference and may that be entered completely into the record, Mr. Chairman?

Senator JENNER. Do you want to identify the pages in this?

Mr. MORRIS. These are pages 157, 158, and two-thirds of the way through 159 of Security in the Pacific.

Senator JENNER. It may go in the record at this point.

(List referred to is as follows:)

#### UNITED STATES

Jessup, Philip C. (1933, 1939, 1942): Professor of international law, Columbia University; former chairman of the Pacific Council, IPR; Chief, Division of Personnel and Training, OFRRA; Secretary pro tem of council of UNRRA, 1943; legal adviser to American Ambassador to Cuba, 1930. Author, *The United States and the World Court*, 1929; *International Security*, 1935; *The Life of Elihu Root*, 1938; chairman.

Hart, Admiral T. C.: Navy General Board, Navy Department: former commander in chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, 1939-42; vice chairman.

Allen, Edward W.: Member, Allen, Hilen, Froude & DeGarmo, attorneys at law, Seattle; American member and chairman of the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission; member, Seattle Chamber of Commerce.

Bolton, Hon. Frances P.: Representative, Twenty-second Ohio District, United States Congress; vice chairman, National Republican Program Committee, 1938-40.

Bunche, Ralph (1942): Area specialist, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State; served with the United States group at Dumbarton Oaks Conference; substitute adviser on the United States delegation to the twenty-sixth session of the International Labour Conference at Philadelphia, April-May 1944.

Calkins, Robert D.: Dean, School of Business, Columbia University; dean, College of Commerce, University of California, Berkeley, 1937-41; vice chairman, San Francisco Regional Labor Board, 1934; chairman, Pacific Coast Regional Committee of Social Science, Research Council, 1939-41; chairman, executive committee, American council, IPR consultant, National Resources Planning Board, 1940-41.

Coe, Frank (1942): Assistant Administrator, Foreign Economic Administration.

Coons, Arthur G.: Dean of faculty and professor of economics at Occidental College, Los Angeles; visiting professor and research fellow at California College in China Foundation, in China, 1933-34; research chairman, southern California region, American Council, IPR, 1938-41.

DeCaux, Len (1942): Publicity director, Congress of Industrial Organizations; editor of the CIO News; Member, board of trustees, American council.

Emerson, Rupert. Director, Liberated Areas Branch, Foreign Economic Administration. On leave from Harvard, associate professor in the department of government. One year 1932-33, spent in Southeast Asia. Author, "Malaysia; a Study in Direct and Indirect Rule."

Fahay, Col. Daniel D., Jr., member of the Operations Division, War Department General Staff, assigned as working member with Civil Affairs Division.

Field, Frederick V. (1929, 1931, 1933, 1936, 1939, 1942). Executive vice chairman, Council for Pan-American Democracy. Secretary, American County IPR, 1935-1940. Author, "American Participation in the China Consortiums"; editor, "Economic Handbook of the Pacific Area," 1934. General editor, "Economic Survey of the Pacific Area," 1942.



Gerbode, Mrs. Frank A. (1929). Member, Executive Committee, San Francisco Bay Region, American Council, IPR.

Gilchrist, Huntington. Executive, American Cyanamid Co.; Chief of Department of Administrative Commissions, League of Nations Secretariat, 1920-25; Assistant Director of Mandates Section, League of Nations, 1925-28; instructor, Anglo-Chinese College, Foochow, 1913-14; Peking University, 1914-15; secretary of the second session of the UNRRA Council, Montreal, 1944.

Johnstone, William C. Director of Washington Study Program, IPE; professor of political science and dean of the School of Government, the George Washington University, Washington, D. C.

Keesing, Felix M. (1931). Professor of Anthropology, Stanford University, Calif.; professor and chairman, department of anthropology and sociology, University of Hawaii, 1937-43; author, "Modern Samoa," 1934; "The Philippines—A Nation in the Making", 1937; "The South Seas in the Modern World," 1941.

Kirk, Grayson. Research associate, Institute of International Studies, Yale University; professor of government at Columbia University; served with the United States group at Dumbarton Oaks Conference; author, "Philippine Independence," 1936.

Lattimore, Owen (1933, 1936, 1939, 1942), director, Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, Johns Hopkins University; consultant, Office of War Information; former political adviser to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

MacKay, J. A. Vice president, National City Bank, New York, in charge of far eastern district.

McCoy, Maj. Gen. Frank R. United States Army retired (1939, 1942). President, Foreign Policy Association. Member of Wood-Forbes special mission to the Philippines, 1921; in charge of American relief activities in Japan following the earthquake of 1923; American member of the League of Nations Commission of Inquiry in Manchuria, 1932.

Morrison, George Abbot. Vice chairman. Bucyrus-Erie Co., Milwaukee; chairman, Milwaukee Office, American Council IPR.

Salisbury, Laurence. Editor, Far Eastern Survey. American Council IPR; Former Foreign Service officer: 12 years in Japan, 5 in China, and 2 in Manila, 5 years in the Department of State.

Staley, Eugene (1939). School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D. C. Consultant United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration; formerly on faculty of University of Chicago, Institute Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales (Geneva), Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; author, "World Economy in Transition," 1939; "World Economic Development: Effects on Established Industrial Countries," 1944.

Thompson, Laura. Coordinator of research in administration, Society for Applied Anthropology; formerly consultant to the United States Naval Government of Guam. Author, "Guam and Its People," "Fifian Frontiers," "Steps Toward Colonial Freedom."

Van Zandt, J. Parker. Research associate, the Brookings Institution; observer at International Civil Aviation Conference in Chicago, 1944. Author, "Civil Aviation and Peace," "The Geography of World Air Transport."

Vincent, John Carter. Chief, Division of Chinese Affairs, Department of State.

Waymack, W. W. Editor and vice president, The Des Moines Register and Tribune; chairman, Economic Policy Committee, 1938-41.

Dennett, Raymond. Secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York 22, N. Y., secretary.

#### AMERICAN SECRETARIAT

Dorothy Borg (1939, 1942), temporary member, American Council staff.

Miriam S. Farley (1936, 1939, 1942). Editor, American Council Pamphlet Series; research associate, American Council, IPR.

Margaret Fischl. American Council staff.

Shirley Jenkins. Assistant editor, Far Eastern Survey, American Council, IPR.

Mrs. William C. Johnstone. Temporary member, American Council staff.

Carolyn Kizer (1936, 1942). American Council staff.

Bruno Lasker (1931, 1933, 1936, 1942). Research Associate, American Council, IPR.

Eleanor Lattimore (1936, 1939). Washington Office, American Council, IPR.

Charles F. Loomis (1925, 1927, 1929, 1931, 1933, 1936, 1939, 1942). Secretary, Hawaii Office, American Council, IPR; Chief, Morale Section, Office of the Military Governor, Hawaii.

J. J. Mickle. Temporary member, American Council staff.

Harriet Mills. American Council Staff.

Harriet H. Parker. Assistant to the Secretary, American Council, IPR.

Lawrence K. Rosinger (1939). Far Eastern Research Associate, Foreign Policy Association.

Frances Sharpe. American Council Staff.

Marguerite A. Stewart. Editor and secretary of the school department, American Council IPR.

Rose Yardumian (1942). Washington Representative, American Council, IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you turn to page 161 and describe the makeup of the conference secretariat?

Mr. DENNETT. The conference secretariat was composed, I would say, of three classes of people, perhaps four.

First were members of the staff of the institute, or the international secretariat.

Second were people who were very much interested in coming to the conference who were not quite important enough to be put on as delegates and were brought to take notes.

Third were a number of people who were obtained from the Government to act as recorders and to take notes. Some of these came from the Department of State; some from the Army and the Navy. Some, I believe, were brought by the Canadian delegation.

Mr. MORRIS. What was Michael Lee doing there, do you know?

Mr. DENNETT. Presumably he was acting as a recorder and taking notes. I don't recall him at all.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall the role of Lt. Andrew Roth?

Mr. DENNETT. He was a recorder taking notes.

Mr. MORRIS. I notice he was there as a naval officer.

Mr. DENNETT. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember anything about the background of his being there as a naval officer?

Mr. DENNETT. I believe Mr. Carter suggested to me at the time we were discussing the staffing of this conference that at Mont Tremblant the conferences had proved to be of sufficient interest so that we had been able to obtain recorders without cost to us by inviting the Army and Navy to send junior officers to attend.

Mr. Carter suggested that since the American Council was the host council that I should take this subject up, which I did do, writing to the appropriate people in the military and naval establishments drawing their attention to the nature of the conference, the people who were going to be there, the agenda which was to be discussed, and asking whether they wished to assign certain people there.

Most of the Army and naval officers on this list were so assigned.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, do we have any correspondence on this point?

Mr. MANDEL. We have an exchange of correspondence dealing with negotiations with Admiral F. J. Horne, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, and in the correspondence is listed those officers who were assigned by the Navy to the conference.

In a letter addressed to Admiral Horne from Raymond Dennett, dated December 4, 1944, as taken from the files of the Institute of

Pacific Relations are four officers listed, among whom is Ensign Andrew Roth.

I offer that for the record.

Senator JENNER. It may go in.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 294" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 294

DECEMBER 4, 1944.

Admiral F. J. HORNE,

*Vice Chief of Naval Operations,  
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR ADMIRAL HORNE: This will acknowledge with thanks your letter of December 1, in which you assign the following officers as recorders at the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations: Lt. Robert J. Bradley, Lt. (jg) Hugh D. Farley, Lt. (jg) William E. Franklin, and Ensign Andrew Roth.

It is my understanding that if there is any change in these assignments, you will notify me.

Invitations and information about the conference will be sent to these officers by Miss Hilda Austern of the international secretariat.

Thank you again for your cooperation in this matter. I hope the results of the conference will be of value to your department.

Sincerely yours,

RAYMOND DENNETT, *Secretary.*

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember such correspondence?

Mr. DENNETT. I remember having correspondence with Admiral Horne.

Mr. MORRIS. I think that is enough, Mr. Chairman.

However, do you remember the presence of Squadron Leader Fred W. Poland at the conference?

Mr. DENNETT. I do not, but I see his name here, so I assume he was.

Mr. MORRIS. This is the conference secretariat?

Mr. DENNETT. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that the international secretariat or the American secretariat?

Mr. DENNETT. It was a mixed bag. The conference secretariat was composed, as I have suggested, by a number of people. They were merely those who were doing the recording, the clerical work, and so on.

I was responsible for getting the military people, some of these people like Mr. Fairbanks, Knight Biggerstaff, and various others, who were people we would like to have had on the delegation, but there was not enough room for all of them.

Others were provided for by Mr. Carter, the international secretariat, or by the Canadian delegation, which was also asked to supply people.

Mr. MORRIS. They all seem to be Americans, but there are a few Canadians?

Mr. DENNETT. There were two Canadians, apparently; Squadron Leader Poland and Lieutenant Doull. Lieutenant Jan may have been an American.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I call attention to the fact that this is a conference secretariat list of a conference being held at Hot Springs in the United States in 1945.

I was wondering if this committee should take any testimony, or take an insert here about the political complexion of Squadron Leader Fred W. Poland. He does appear in our correspondence at other

places, and should the fact that he is a Canadian exclude the introduction of these opinions in our record?

Senator JENNER. I do not think so.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read an excerpt from the Canadian Royal Commission of the political complexion of Fred Poland, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. I read from the report of the Canadian Royal Commission, dated June 27, 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the Canadian Royal Commission?

Mr. MANDEL. It was a body set up to investigate espionage activities in Canada. One of the persons involved was F. W. Poland.

I read excerpts referring to him.

Mr. MORRIS. Is this the conclusion of the Royal Commission, or testimony taken by the Royal Commission?

Mr. MANDEL. The excerpts include testimony and sort of an introductory statement.

\* \* \* In general, the military espionage network in Canada, headed by Colonel Zabotin, was a self-contained unit directed from Moscow. At times, however, the documents from Colonel Zabotin's secret archives refer specifically to espionage networks in other countries. Some of these documents relate to the "handing over" from one espionage network to another of agents who have moved or are about to move to Canada from another country or from Canada to another country (p. 31).

Now, on page 163, it says:

F. W. Poland was born in the United States on the 20th of June 1909, of English parentage. In the spring of 1942 he became an administrative intelligence officer in the RCAF, Ottawa. He held the rank of squadron leader. As from November 10, 1944, he was seconded to the Armed Forces Section of the Wartime Information Board, and from May 1945 he was executive secretary of the Interdepartmental Psychological Warfare Committee. \* \* \*

Then further, on page 165, it says:

\* \* \* In Zabotin's notebook where he gives the outline of the organization of the Ottawa-Toronto group more fully dealt with in section III-1. (Sam Carr) we find the following entry, probably written in the fall of 1943:

"Poland. Department of Air Force:

"Works in Toronto in the Intelligence Branch. At the moment he has been transferred to Ottawa. He gave a map of the training schools. Is not yet working."

Mr. MORRIS. Please continue with the rest.

Mr. MANDEL. Here is testimony in regard to Poland:

\* \* \* We have only this evidence to indicate that Poland has given any information or documents to the U. S. S. R. He was, however, obviously well known to the Russians, and at a certain period it was thought that he would be more useful if transferred to the NKVD. Speaking of him, Gouzenko said: "Question. Had you heard of Poland other than what you say in that document? Had you heard his name mentioned?

"Answer. That is right.

"Question. What did you hear about him?

"Answer. I saw it in a telegram which was sent by Zabotin to Moscow in 1943 concerning Poland and he suggested to give Poland to the NKVD.

"Question. Just explain, will you please, what you mean by giving Poland to the NKVD.

"Answer. Poland was described as a clever man and Colonel Zabotin proposed to Moscow in a telegram to hand him over to Neighbours, which is the NKVD. Neighbours is the nickname for the NKVD. Moscow replied that it was not worth while; to wait a while; that he might develop into a good worker. I still do not know his real name or nickname. That was the only other time I saw the name of Poland and still I do not know whether it was his real name or his nickname.

"Question. Did you have any knowledge apart from exhibit No. 22 of what Poland was doing?

"Answer. The telegrams that were sent on this subject made no detailed mention of his activities."

This was probably in August 1943 when Poland had not yet been given a cover name, for in Zabotin's notes we see, in the margin, opposite the reference to Poland and to another: "New names not given." (p. 166.).

Heard as a witness, Boyer says of Poland:

"Question. How long have you known him?"

That is referring to Poland.

"Answer. Ever since he came to Montreal, which I think was in the summer of 1939—1938 or 1939, I am not sure.

"Question. And do you know anything about his political sympathies?

"Answer. Well, I know he is sympathetic to the old Communist Party and the present Labour-Progressive Party, or that he was when I last saw him, which is a few years ago now."

In Poland's notebook, which has an alphabetical index, we find the name of Corporal Lawson, W. T. This man has been identified as William Lawson who was formerly connected with the Communist Party of Canada in Toronto. In 1939 Lawson acted as a teacher in the Leadership School of the Young Communist League, and in the January 1, 1940, civic election in Toronto, was elected as the representative of ward 4 to the Toronto Board of Education. Later he publicly admitted that he was a Communist, and went into hiding for a certain period of time until he was eventually located and detained in 1942 under regulation 21 of the Defense of Canada Regulations.

Mr. MORRIS. Does that mean that Poland publicly admitted he was a Communist?

Mr. MANDEL. No, that is referring to William Lawson whose name was found in Poland's notebook.

In the same notebook we find the names of Nightingale and Agatha Chapman, the latter being one of the main organizers of Communist cells in Ottawa, from where were recruited many of Zabotin's most ardent agents.

Poland also had some correspondence with a man named Mark Frank. It has been established that this person was connected with a magazine named the New Advance, which was the organ of the Young Communist League. Other inquiries reveal that Frank had also received subscriptions for the Clarion, the official organ of the Communist Party in Canada.

Mr. MORRIS. May that be introduced into the record purely to show the make-up of a conference being held in Hot Springs, Va., in the United States, Mr. Chairman?

Senator JENNER. It may go in the record.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 295" and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 295

##### F. W. POLAND

\* \* \* In general, the military espionage network in Canada, headed by Colonel Zabotin, was a self-contained unit directed from Moscow. At times, however, the documents from Colonel Zabotin's secret archives refer specifically to espionage networks in other countries. Some of these documents relate to the "handing over" from one espionage network to another of agents who have moved or are about to move to Canada from another country or from Canada to another country (p. 31).

F. W. Poland was born in the United States on June 20, 1909, of English parentage. In the spring of 1942, he became an administrative intelligence officer in the RCAF, Ottawa. He held the rank of squadron leader. As from November 10, 1944, he was seconded to the Armed Forces Section of the Wartime Information Board, and from May 1945 he was executive secretary of the Interdepartmental Psychological Warfare Committee (p. 163).

\* \* \* In Zabotin's notebook where he gives the outline of the organization of the Ottawa-Toronto group more fully dealt with in section III-I. (Sam Carr) we find the following entry, probably written in the fall of 1943:

"3. Poland, Department of Air Force: Works in Toronto in the Intelligence Branch. At the moment he has been transferred to Ottawa. He gave a map of the training schools. Is not yet working" (p. 165).

\* \* \* We have only this evidence to indicate that Poland has given any information or documents to the U. S. S. R. He was, however, obviously well known to the Russians, and at a certain period it was thought that he would be more useful if transferred to the NKVD. Speaking of him, Gouzenko said:

"Q. Had you heard of Poland other than what you saw in that document? Had you heard his name mentioned?—A. That is right.

"Q. What did you hear about him?—A. I saw it in a telegram which was sent by Zabotin to Moscow in 1943 concerning Poland and he suggested to give Poland to the NKVD.

"Q. Just explain, will you please, what you mean by giving Poland to the NKVD.—A. Poland was described as a clever man and Colonel Zabotin proposed to Moscow in a telegram to hand him over to Neighbours, which is the NKVD. Neighbours is the nickname for the NKVD. Moscow replied that it was not worth while; to wait a while; that he might develop into a good worker. I still do not know his real name or nickname. That was the only other time I saw the name of Poland and still I do not know whether it was his real name or his nickname.

"Q. Did you have any knowledge apart from exhibit No. 22 of what Poland was doing?—A. The telegrams that were sent on this subject made no detailed mention of his activities."

This was probably in August 1943 when Poland had not yet been given a cover name, for in Zabotin's notes we see, in the margin, opposite the reference to Poland and to another: "New names not given" (p. 166).

Heard as a witness, Boyer says of Poland:

"Q. How long have you known him?—A. Ever since he came to Montreal, which I think was in the summer of 1939—1938 or 1939, I am not sure.

"Q. And do you know anything about his political sympathies?—A. Well, I know he is sympathetic to the old Communist Party and the present Labour-Progressive Party, or that he was when I last saw him, which is a few years ago now."

In Poland's notebook, which has an alphabetical index, we find the name of Corporal Lawson, W. T. This man has been identified as William Lawson who was formerly connected with the Communist Party of Canada in Toronto. In 1939, Lawson acted as a teacher in the Leadership School of the Young Communist League, and in the January 1, 1940, civic election in Toronto, was elected as the representative of ward 4 to the Toronto Board of Education. Later, he publicly admitted that he was a Communist, and went into hiding for a certain period of time until he was eventually located and detained in 1942 under Regulation 21 of the Defense of Canada Regulations.

In the same notebook we find the names of Nightingale and Agatha Chapman, the latter being one of the main organizers of Communist cells in Ottawa from where were recruited many of Zabotin's most ardent agents.

Poland also had some correspondence with a man named Mark Frank. It has been established that this person was connected with a magazine named the New Advance, which was the organ of the Young Communist League. Other inquiries reveal that Frank had also received subscriptions for the Clarion, the official organ of the Communist Party in Canada.

In Poland's office, room 309 of the New Post Office Building, a calendar pad was also found. The name of Pavlov, who is the head of the NKVD in Ottawa, appears on pages dated the 30th of October 1945; the 1st of November 1945; the 4th of November 1945; the 5th of November 1945 (plus a telephone number which is 5-4341); the 15th of November 1945; the 19th of November 1945; the 23d of November 1945; the 26th of November 1945; the 17th of December 1945; the 28th of December 1945; and the 5th of January 1946. The telephone number 5-4341 is that of the Soviet Embassy, 285 Charlotte Street, Ottawa (pp. 167-8) (the report of the Royal Commission, June 27, 1946).

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have here about four or five more exhibits. They are not particularly important. If you have to hurry, we can let them go.

Senator JENNER. Please proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, I offer you a copy of a letter which purports to be a communication from Mr. Carter to you and ask you if you can recall that letter?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't recall the letter, but as I testified earlier, I was continually getting memoranda from Mr. Carter.

I assume this is one of many.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you certify the authenticity of that letter?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat copy of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated December 29, 1944, headed "R. D. from E. C. C.," presumably Raymond Dennett from E. C. Carter.

It reads as follows:

When Michael Greenberg was in the other day he asked whether Irving Friedman, who has just returned from Chungking for the United States Treasury, was going to Hot Springs. I told him that I didn't know for sure, but would refer the matter to you.

From all accounts Friedman had a very successful experience in China and India. He is Harry White's right-hand man on the Far East in the Treasury. You will remember the exceptionally good book he did for the IPR in the Inquiry series when he was a member of the international secretariat.

I remember that Amco originally hoped to persuade Harry White to join the American group. I also know that your list is already over full and that this suggestion comes to you late in the day. I therefore do not anticipate that you will be able to act affirmatively in this matter; if so I know it will cause you and your colleagues great regret.

I sympathize with you in your difficult situation. I am in the same plight myself in that I am having to similarly turn down many applications, some of them from people who would be a real asset. Most of these people don't realize the limits that have to be put on the conference in order to get real discussion instead of the conference being a general town meeting.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like the letter introduced in evidence.

Senator JENNER. It may go in.

(The document referred to and read in full by Mr. Mandel was marked "Exhibit No. 296" and filed for the record.)

Mr. MORRIS. I show you a letter from Mr. Carter to you, dated October 19, 1945, and ask you if you can identify that?

Mr. DENNETT. That is in the same category as the others. I have no doubt I received it.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you authenticate that letter, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It appears to be an interoffice memorandum and is dated October 19, 1945, headed "R. D. from E. C. C."

It reads as follows:

I don't know whether you ever knew Duncan Lee. He was, I think, at one time a Rhodes scholar; then he went into OSS and has ended up a colonel. He is likely to return to Gen. "Big Bill" Donovan's law firm in Wall Street and certainly would be a useful member of Amco and might conceivably be a useful member of the Amco board and executive committee. He has a very deep interest in the Far East and has been there a good deal for OSS.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lee has been identified before this committee as being a Communist. I would like that introduced in the record.

Senator JENNER. It may go in.

(Document referred to and read in full by Mr. Mandel was marked "Exhibit No. 297" and filed for the record.)

Mr. MORRIS. I show you what purports to be a letter from yourself to Rose Yardumian, dated March 5, 1945, and ask you if you can identify that letter?

Mr. DENNETT. I can.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you authenticate that letter, please, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated March 5, 1945, addressed to Miss Rose Yardumian, from Raymond Dennett. It reads as follows:

Please make an appointment for me to see Dr. Ludwik Rajchman, 2300 Decatur Place NW, Washington, D. C. I have dropped him a note about wanting to see him and enclosed a letter of introduction from Huntington Gilchrist.

I should imagine that the best thing would be to try and get me an afternoon appointment at his home. I probably would want to spend pretty nearly an hour with him; so, you can plan things accordingly.

See you Monday. With cordial best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

RAYMOND DENNETT, *Secretary.*

Mr. MORRIS. I would like that letter introduced, Mr. Chairman.

Senator JENNER. It may go in.

(Document referred to and read in full by Mr. Mandel was marked "Exhibit No. 298" and filed for the record.)

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have a paper that will show that Mr. Ludwik Rajchman is presently a delegate of the Polish Communist Government to the United Nations?

Mr. MANDEL. Permit me to recall a letter previously introduced in evidence from the Department of State from H. J. L'Heureux, Chief of the Visa Division, to Senator Pat McCarran.

I read the last sentence in reference to Ludwik Rajchman:

The bearer of the passport was described as Polish Government delegate to and chairman of the Children's Emergency Fund of the United Nations.

Mr. MORRIS. That has been introduced already, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DENNETT. May I for the record say, as I recall, I was talking to Dr. Rajchman about League of Nations activities and public health in southeast Asia, so there will be no inference as to what I was doing with him on the basis of the record that has been made so far.

Mr. MORRIS. That is a fitting observation on the part of Mr. Dennett.

Mr. DENNETT. I want to be clear on that.

Mr. MORRIS. On the basis of your experience as secretary of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, whom would you describe as the leading forces in shaping policy for the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DENNETT. You are talking now about the American council?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. DENNETT. Rather than the Pacific council?

Mr. MORRIS. I am going to ask you about both. Please give the over-all impression.

Mr. DENNETT. The major policy formulation in the American council, my impression was prior to my time the staff had a great deal more to do with policy than they should have.

So, I would say from the point of view of the board of directors the most interested people in the American council were Owen Latimore and Dr. Jessup, with Mr. Huggins and probably Mr. Seymour as the No. 2 people.



Mr. MORRIS. Did the influence of Mr. Lattimore and Mr. Jessup even show during those periods when the staff did have a dominant influence in the affairs of the institute?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't think I would go quite that far, because Lattimore was engaged in Government work in the OWI and was seldom around on the council's activities.

Jessup I saw for a portion of the time he was there. I made him chairman of our research advisory committee, but he was not on the executive committee while he was there.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Jessup, as far as you know, was an influence in the Institute of Pacific Relations for a period of many years?

Mr. DENNETT. That certainly was my impression.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether Mrs. Ellen Atkinson attended the Hot Springs conference?

Mr. DENNETT. I think she did, but I am not sure.

Mr. MORRIS. Again, was that arrangement made through the War Department?

Mr. DENNETT. Presumably it was; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I have a letter here. Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate it?

Mr. MANDEL. There are two letters here from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, one dated December 24, 1944, from the War Department addressed to Mr. Raymond Dennett, coming from Clayton Bissell, major general. It reads:

Reference is made to your letter of December 12, 1944, in which you suggest that Mrs. Ellen Atkinson might be detailed to attend the discussions of the conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations to be held in Hot Springs from January 5 to January 19, 1945, because of her experience in the Far East.

Thank you for the suggestion. It is believed, however, that it is preferable to adhere to the original arrangement. I am sure you will be pleased with the four officers whose names were included on the original list.

Then the next letter is dated December 27, 1944, to General Bissell from Raymond Dennett, reading as follows:

Many thanks for your letter of December 24, stating that Mrs. Atkinson will not be assigned to the conference.

I had no intention whatsoever of requesting her assignment but merely wished to draw her to your attention in case you were disposed to assigning her.

I am sure the four officers you have assigned will prove most helpful to us. With sincerest best wishes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like those introduced in the record.

Senator JENNER. They may go in.

(The documents referred to and read by Mr. Mandel were marked "Exhibits Nos. 299 and 300" and filed for the record.)

Mr. DENNETT. Does that say she was or was not assigned, because I think I said she attended.

Senator JENNER. Was not.

Mr. DENNETT. Then my guess that she was there should be removed, because I was not sure.

Mr. MORRIS. In connection with the mention of Squadron Leader Fred Poland, and I think the record should show that on March 23, 1946, he had a habeas corpus proceeding filed for him, and on January 17, 1947, he was acquitted of charges of espionage in the County

Court of Ottawa on January 17; so, I would like the record to show that.

Senator JENNER. It may so show.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, was Gunther Stein, about whom we have had testimony in the past, present as a member of the United States delegation to the Hot Springs convention?

Mr. DENNETT. That is correct.

Senator JENNER. We will close at this time until 10 a. m., Friday morning.

(Whereupon at 2:15 p. m., Wednesday, September 26, 1951, the hearings were recessed until 10 a. m., Friday, September 28, 1951.)



# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL  
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met at 2 p. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. James Eastland presiding.

Present: Senators Eastland and Ferguson.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research. Senator EASTLAND. The committee will come to order.

Do you solemnly swear that the evidence you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. MCGOVERN. I do so state.

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM MONTGOMERY MCGOVERN,  
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

Mr. MORRIS. Before we commence the testimony, there is a letter from Prof. Rupert Emerson, of Harvard University, which I would like to read into the record. Mr. Mandel, will you read the letter or put it in the record?

Senator EASTLAND. It will be inserted in the record.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 301" and is as follows:)

HARVARD UNIVERSITY,  
FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES  
DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT,  
*Cambridge, Mass., September 26, 1951.*

Senator PATRICK MCCARRAN,  
*Chairman, Senate Internal Security Committee,  
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: It is reported in the New York Times today that Prof. K. W. Colegrove testified before your committee yesterday that at a State Department round table conference in October 1949 I fell into a group which he labels as pro-Communist. I believe that a glance at the record will demonstrate that I was not invited to this conference and did not participate in it. I refer you to page 280 of the Tydings report on the State Department employee loyalty investigation of July 20, 1950, which gives a list of those present at this conference. I find it dismaying that the procedures of your committee allow the publication of misinformation which is easily verifiable.

I was, however, for a brief time, a consultant to the State Department on far eastern matters. In that capacity, as in my teaching, speaking, and writing, I

freely expressed my views which were arrived at on the basis of independent study and conviction. The free expression of such views appears to me to be the right, and the obligation, of an American citizen. I have no doubt that from time to time these views were in disagreement with those of Professor Colegrove, and even with the official policy of the United States, but I am profoundly shocked that such disagreement can give rise to the loose and dangerous charge of procommunism.

For the sake of the record I should like to add I have never had any connection of any kind with the Communist Party nor, to the best of my knowledge, any association with Communist groups.

Since I have no other knowledge of what Professor Colegrove said than the Times report, I would appreciate it if you would have a transcript of the proceedings in which my name was mentioned sent to me.

Sincerely yours,

RUPERT EMERSON.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator McCarran's reply to Professor Emerson is also introduced in evidence.

Senator EASTLAND. That will be ordered.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 302" and is as follows:)

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT  
AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS,  
September 28, 1951.

Mr. RUPERT EMERSON,  
*Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.*

DEAR MR. EMERSON: I have your letter of September 26, 1951, in which you protest being mentioned by Professor Colegrove as being a member of a pro-Communist group that attended the State Department round-table conference in October 1949.

I write this to say that Professor Colegrove did not mention your name in his testimony, and, in fact, the list of people who attended the conference and which was inserted in our public record did not contain your name.

However, I will be glad to enter your letter and this answer into the record.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give us your name, please?

Mr. MCGOVERN. William Montgomery McGovern.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present address?

Mr. MCGOVERN. My private address is 1412 Judson Avenue, Evanston, Ill. My business address is care of Northwestern University.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present position?

Mr. MCGOVERN. I am professor of political science at Northwestern University.

Mr. MORRIS. How long have you held that position?

Mr. MCGOVERN. I have been at Northwestern since 1929, first of all as an associate professor and later, since 1936, as professor.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your education? Will you give us a brief sketch of it?

Mr. MCGOVERN. I would say a good deal is through travel. I was born in New York City of an American mother and father, but I spent a good deal of my boyhood in the Far East, in China, Japan, and the Philippines, attending various schools.

Later I completed my education in England, France, and in Germany at Oxford, the Sorbonne at Paris, and the University of Berlin in Germany.

Mr. MORRIS. What degrees do you hold?

Mr. McGOVERN. Ph. D.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did you obtain it?

Mr. McGOVERN. Oxford.

Mr. MORRIS. How many books have you written?

Mr. McGOVERN. I have written all together 10 books.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you sketch those notable ones dealing with the Far East?

Mr. McGOVERN. As a matter of fact, the first book I wrote was a book called *Modern Japan: Its Political, Military, and Industrial Organization*. I wrote a Japanese grammar called *Colloquial Japanese*.

I wrote a book called *Early Empires of Central Asia*. It took me about 7 years to write that, based on the Chinese and other sources dealing with the history of central Asia.

I also wrote a report for the congressional Committee on Foreign Affairs dealing with the political, military, and economic situation in Japan, China, and Korea.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, when did you first have occasion to study the political forces that were at work in the Orient?

Mr. McGOVERN. As far as that is concerned, when I was a young boy and young man in Japan and China I began studying them at first hand, talking to various Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Philippine people. So I kept my interest in them ever since.

For a while, I was in London at the University of London teaching Chinese and Japanese at the School of Oriental Studies. So naturally I had to keep up my contacts there.

Ever since I have been back in the United States at Northwestern University I have been professor of political science with a special reference to international relations, and I have had to try to keep in touch with developments both in the Near East and the Far East.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you first become aware of the existence of the Chinese Communist movement in China?

Mr. McGOVERN. Of course, I read about it in a general sort of way in the very confused period of Chinese influence in 1920, read about the early rise of the Communist movement there, but I began taking more serious and intensive interest in the Chinese Communist movement around 1935 and 1936.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you think then they were agrarian reformers and not Communists?

Mr. McGOVERN. No, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. That they were not connected with Moscow?

Mr. McGOVERN. No, sir. I went into it with an open mind. In the 1920's I had an open mind. In 1935-36 I began reading what the Communists were doing and saying in their published records. I became convinced they were really Communists. I am always willing to keep an open mind as long as possible.

I kept an open mind until 1937-38 when I was in the Far East studying the situation on the ground. By 1937-38 I was convinced they were Communists. And that they were in close cahoots with the Kremlin.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you think they were getting supplies and materials from Moscow?

Mr. McGOVERN. The amount was astonishingly small. The thing that interested me was how close they followed the party line.

Senator EASTLAND. Did they get any help from Moscow?

Mr. McGOVERN. I was never able to put my finger on any actual munitions that came from the Communists. In 1937 I was especially interested in that, and I was unable to see they were getting actual supplies, although in 1937 they were still following the party line. Why, it is mystery.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you read the Communist basic literature on the relation between the Chinese Communist Party and the Communist International?

Mr. McGOVERN. Yes; I have read it, both in Chinese and in various English translations. It so happens, having grown up in the Far East, I read Chinese and Japanese quite well, and I was not content with the English translation of it. I have studied very basic documents, books, and articles by Mao Tse-tung.

I have also read the various articles and addresses and speeches made by Chou En Lai, who to my mind is the most authoritative spokesman of the Communist group.

Senator FERGUSON. Your opinion is he is an international Communist and follows the Moscow line?

Mr. McGOVERN. Yes, sir; I am convinced of that. There was no sudden conversion. He has been a complete Marxist. He is a Marxist Communist, but not only a Marxist Communist but a Stalinist Communist as well.

Mr. MORRIS. Are these basic underlying doctrines that show the Chinese Communists as compared to the Communist International available to all scholars?

Mr. McGOVERN. Certainly anyone who reads Chinese should have no difficulty. Some of the translations of Mao Tse-tung of China's New Democracy are not very good translations. You might be in doubt if you read the English translation. If you read the Chinese you would have no doubt. If you read it carefully even the bad English translation seems to be clear and obvious.

Senator FERGUSON. Who translated that into English?

Mr. McGOVERN. I have forgotten. The best available translation is published in a publication brought out by the congressional House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Senator FERGUSON. I was wondering whether or not you saw any evidence in that translation that it was done poorly to conceal the real tie?

Mr. McGOVERN. Even with the poor translation I think it is very clear. After reading that English translation, I went back to the Chinese original. To my mind the Chinese original was more definite and clear.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you first meet Owen Lattimore?

Mr. McGOVERN. I first met Owen Lattimore for a few moments in 1928 or 1929.

Mr. MORRIS. At that time were you able to arrive at any substantial conclusion as to his political beliefs?

Mr. McGOVERN. No, sir; in 1928-29 it was purely a social occasion. He was going to central Asia, Outer Mongolia, so we talked about travel and travel conditions. I saw him much more in the winter of 1937-38 when I found him spending the winter in Peking, as was I. I was on leave of absence from Northwestern University, and I

found he was out there spending his winter there. I saw quite a good deal of him during that period.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was that?

Mr. McGOVERN. 1937-38.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he ever discuss with you during that period the political complexion of the Chinese Communists?

Mr. McGOVERN. Yes, sir. During the period 1937-38 in various luncheon parties and dinner parties at which we were guests he was frequent in showing his warm admiration for the Chinese Communists—that they were the future for China and that they represented the real people.

On several occasions he indicated they were not Communists, and that is where we had violent differences of opinion.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you give him your views they were?

Mr. McGOVERN. Yes, sir. I always like to keep an open mind. At that time my mind was getting more and more convinced they were Communists. I asked him for evidence to show they were not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you give him the evidence they were?

Mr. McGOVERN. I told him about the articles and essays of Mao Tse-tung and the other Communist leaders. I was certainly of the opinion that he could read Chinese and was going to read them.

Mr. MORRIS. On approximately how many occasions did you have these discussions with Owen Lattimore during the period late 1937 and early 1938?

Mr. McGOVERN. Without having my diary before me, I cannot answer exactly, but I would say certainly more than 10 times and less than 15; 10 to 15 times.

Mr. MORRIS. There was a uniformity of consistency to his views?

Mr. McGOVERN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he ever change those views?

Mr. McGOVERN. I was somewhat surprised, considering his general attitude and frequent remarks in 1937-38. I again saw him after an absence of some years in the winter of 1941-42. After December 15 when I was called to active duty here in Washington and before March and April, that is, I saw him five or six times here in Washington then. I was very much surprised when he was at that time rather enthusiastic about Chiang Kai-shek. He was expressing great admiration for him as a great leader and a great leader of a democratic movement, and considering the conversations I had heard in 1937-38, I was somewhat surprised at that change of attitude.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony now that after you heard Professor Lattimore express the views at great length in 1937-38 that he did, which views were consistent with the Chinese Communists' aims, you then heard him in 1941 praise Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. McGOVERN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you call that to his attention?

Mr. McGOVERN. No, sir. This was wartime. I thought he and I were both working for the Government. I did not think it was necessary to bring it up. I thought he changed his mind. I am now convinced it was more part of the general technique of the fellow-travelers to have a united front during that particular time.

You find in reading the writings of the Mao Tse-tung himself that was so during that period.



Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us why you think that was true?

Mr. McGOVERN. Merely because of the fact that from time to time various Communist and pro-Communist leaders and popular front leaders have changed their line of approach to fit the world situation both in Europe and in Asia and inside the United States of America, as far as that is concerned.

Mr. Browder at one time would say one thing, and a few weeks later say the opposite thing, according to Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that the Communist Party line with respect to Chiang Kai-shek changed in 1941?

Mr. McGOVERN. Yes, sir. After the attack on Pearl Harbor the Communist line definitely changed, as you can see in the writings both of Moscow and in the speeches of Mao Tse-tung.

Senator EASTLAND. You say you can tell from readings a man's work what kind of a Communist he is?

Mr. McGOVERN. Would you repeat that?

Senator EASTLAND. You say from reading what a person writes you can tell what kind of a Communist he is?

Mr. McGOVERN. Not invariably. There are some people who hew exactly to the party line. In other words, if you read the New York Daily Worker, you can tell what A, B, and C are going to say the next day.

Senator EASTLAND. You could tell whether one was a Trotskyite or a Stalinist?

Mr. McGOVERN. Those who follow the full-fledged Communists are those who essentially are Stalinists, and those you can tell.

Senator EASTLAND. You have always read what Owen Lattimore wrote?

Mr. McGOVERN. I will not say I have read every word he has written, but I have read several of his books.

Senator EASTLAND. What kind of a Communist did you think he was?

Mr. McGOVERN. I have no evidence whatsoever that Mr. Lattimore—

Senator EASTLAND. I know you have not seen his card. You have not been to a party meeting, but then what is your judgment now from reading his works?

Mr. McGOVERN. From reading him and hearing him talk, that he is a popular front man, either using or being used by the Communists.

Senator EASTLAND. Is he a Stalinist?

Mr. McGOVERN. He is not a Trotskyite. He is definitely following the Stalinist line.

Senator EASTLAND. He has always followed the Stalinist line?

Mr. McGOVERN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to show you a letter which is an exhibit and have you read two paragraphs. The original of this was written by Owen Lattimore to E. C. Carter. I have marked the paragraphs I would like to have you read.

Senator EASTLAND. Read them aloud.

Mr. McGOVERN (reading):

I think that you are pretty cagey in turning over so much of the China section of the inquiry to Asiaticus, Han-seng and Chi. They will bring out the absolutely essential radical aspects, but can be depended on to do it with the right touch.

For the general purposes of this inquiry it seems to me that the good scoring

position, for the IPR, differs with different countries. For China, my hunch is that it will pay to keep behind the official Chinese Communist position—far enough not to be covered by the same label—but enough ahead of the active Chinese liberals to be noticeable. For Japan, on the other hand, hang back so as not to be inconveniently ahead of the Japanese liberals, who cannot keep up, whereas the Chinese liberals can. So the chief thing is to oppose the military wing of Japanese aggression in China, counting on a check there to take care of both the military and the civilian components of aggression in Japan. For the British—scare the hell out of them, always in a polite way, but usually in a way that looks as if it might turn impolite. The British liberal groups are badly flustered, and being British, the way to encourage them to pull themselves together is to fluster the Tories. For the U. S. S. R.—back their international policy in general, but without using their slogans and above all without giving them or anybody else an impression of “subservience.”

Senator FERGUSON. That was written by Owen Lattimore to E. C. Carter, who was then the secretary of the IPR. Could you comment on that as to what that means?

Mr. MCGOVERN. I am not at all surprised. I did see this letter, but not until fairly recently when it came out in testimony. I am not surprised because I read Pacific Affairs rather closely and followed his editorials. That, I may say by way of comment, was the reason why I refused to join the IPR.

For many years past I have been teaching Chinese and Japanese affairs. Everyone wondered why I did not join. After having read several copies of Pacific Affairs, I felt they were taking a line which I could not sponsor, directly or indirectly, and my membership might seem I was.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that would be advocating the Stalinist party line?

Mr. MCGOVERN. There is very clear evidence that he was trying to advocate the Stalinist approach.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the normal way that these people act in concealing the fact that they are actually following that?

Mr. MCGOVERN. That is very true.

Senator FERGUSON. Deceive the public?

Mr. MCGOVERN. That has been true from the time of Karl Marx himself. If you remember The Life and Times of Karl Marx, in 1848-49, when he was the editor of the Rheinisch Zeitung in Cologne it had an open policy of liberal, and his secret policy of communism, and he was keeping the two. From time to time he would throw in a few suggestions in his newspaper and letters showing what his position was to fool people by false play, by pretending to be one and using camouflage.

Senator FERGUSON. This is a historic line of the Communists?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not change your mind about the fact that Owen Lattimore was favorable to Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. MCGOVERN. No, sir, I did not, in 1941-42. I was somewhat surprised, raised my eyebrows once or twice, but I began to look at what was the attitude of the Chinese Communists. When I found they favored the popular front and ceasing their attacks, I was not too surprised.

Senator FERGUSON. That did not lead you to the conclusion he had changed his mind on the Communists in China?

Mr. MCGOVERN. I was open-minded again on the subject. When I

first heard him I thought he changed his mind. When I heard the comments by Mao Tse-tung I realized there was no such change as I had imagined.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to put into the record two statements by Owen Lattimore. One is an excerpt from the publication *America and Asia*, by Owen Lattimore, published in 1943.

Senator EASTLAND. What is the next one?

Mr. MORRIS. I would like this one paragraph read by Mr. Mandel, please.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

One of the oldest historical controversies turns on the question of whether great men create the events of their time, or are created by them. The career of Chiang Kai-shek shows that the problem cannot be limited to such narrow terms. The truth is that great men and great events interact on each other in a subtle and close way that results in creating history. This is true of Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin as it is of Chiang Kai-shek. What may be called the functional test of the historical importance of Chiang Kai-shek is the fact that, throughout an already long political career, he has grown steadily greater and greater. The greater the crises through which he has led his people, the greater he has become as a symbol. The greater the decisions he has made, the greater the decisions he is able to make. In this he is a part of the contemporary history of all Asia.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that made part of the record together with this article from the *San Francisco Chronicle* dated July 6, 1941.

Mr. MANDEL. This is an article from the *San Francisco Chronicle* dated July 8, 1941. I read the first and last paragraphs:

Owen Lattimore, newly appointed political adviser to Chinese Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, said farewell to the United States last night in a speech that rang with faith and confidence in the China he is to serve.

Lattimore spoke before members of the Institute of Pacific Relations on the fourth anniversary of the opening of the Chinese-Japanese War. He leaves this afternoon by clipper for Chungking, President Roosevelt's nominee for the post as adviser to the Chinese leader.

The last paragraph reads:

Concluding, Lattimore praised the man he is to serve as a symbol of the growth of new China. "Among the handful of great world leaders, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek is conspicuous for the fact that he is not only a great leader, but a leader who has steadily grown in strength and stature in the last 4 years, a growth commensurate with that of the country itself."

Senator EASTLAND. That is received in evidence.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 303" and is as follows:)

[*San Francisco Chronicle*, Tuesday, July 8, 1941]

#### ADVISER TO CHIANG KAI-SHEK

#### CHINESE CANNOT LOSE, DECLARES OWEN LATTIMORE

Owen Lattimore, newly appointed political adviser to Chinese Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, said farewell to the United States last night in a speech that rang with faith and confidence in the China he is to serve.

Lattimore spoke before members of the Institute of Pacific Relations on the fourth anniversary of the opening of the Chinese-Japanese war. He leaves this afternoon by clipper for Chungking, President Roosevelt's nominee for the post as adviser to the Chinese leader.

#### *Cannot be beaten*

"It has become one of the standards of our belief," he said, "that China cannot and will not be beaten. Where 4 years ago we regarded China as only a

secondary power, today she is one of the major defenses against international chaos. Russia and China, linked geographically, are the land powers holding back the Axis forces as Britain and the United States are doing as sea powers.

"China does not have institutional democracy, but this difference from the western democracies is to China's advantage. We have been defending an established democracy. The Chinese have been pouring out their lives to defend a democracy they do not have, but are determined to win.

*Creating a new order*

"What is essential in a democracy is the creative spirit of change, growth, and development. The Chinese have more of that in their struggle than we. While the Japanese are talking on paper of their "new order," the Chinese, with the help of the United States are creating a real new order in Asia.

Concluding, Lattimore praised the man he is to serve as a symbol of the growth of new China. "Among the handful of great world leaders, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek is conspicuous for the fact that he is not only a great leader but a leader who has steadily grown in strength and stature in the last 4 years, a growth commensurate with that of the country itself."

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the one sentence on page 45, Mr. Mandel, of America and Asia?

Mr. MANDEL. On page 45 we find the following in the book, America and Asia:

Many people talk of the danger of civil war in China at the end of this war, but I think that the danger of civil war in China is probably less than the danger of civil war in many countries in Europe. One reason is that we have in Asia a world statesman, of real genius, in Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you see Owen Lattimore after 1940?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Late in the 1944 or early 1945 period. At that time there was a committee, an informal committee which met at the State Department and served as an advisory committee to the policy making of the OWI. You had various members from the State Department, various people from OSS, various people from OWI.

I was an unofficial liaison with the Joint Chiefs of Staff representing the military.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your position at that time?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Merely to listen to what they were saying and to report to my chiefs on one side. The other thing was to give my personal advice as to the line of propaganda that would be best pursued in dealing with broadcasts to China and Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. You were a naval officer?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You were assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. With the Joint Intelligence Committee?

Mr. MCGOVERN. At that particular time I was a member of the Joint Intelligence Staff but assigned to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee.

Mr. MORRIS. As such you would attend these advisory committees that would give advice on what particular policy should be adopted toward various things in the Far East?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. In what capacity did Owen Lattimore attend those meetings?

Mr. MCGOVERN. He attended as an official of OWI.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he ever express views toward Chiang Kai-shek at that time?

Mr. MCGOVERN. At that particular time most of the discussions were naturally how we can best approach the Japanese, how we can lower Japanese resistance. So we were talking about more means of defeating Japan than the future policy of China.

In those meetings he was very definitely thinking we should throw in our propaganda lot. We should play up to the Chinese Communists and through the Chinese Communists play upon the so-called liberal elements in Japan.

In other words, at that particular moment they already had the notion that the best way to overthrow Japan was to utilize the Chinese Communists and propaganda in the approach to Japan. Already at that particular moment some sharp differences of opinion came up as to the treatment of Japan and the Japanese Emperor. Those came out of the various meetings informally. No minutes were held, and I have no minutes to show what was done. A number of people were present—Mr. Dooman was present and can confirm what was said.

In these discussions it was very clear that Mr. Lattimore was very much in favor of overthrowing the Japanese Emperor and trying the Emperor as a war criminal. It was agreed it was not to be put in the official record as a part of the official propaganda.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the policy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the Emperor?

Mr. MCGOVERN. They had a different policy. I gave them advice that I thought the best way to bring about the surrender of Japan would be not to dispose of the Emperor. If we attempted to attack him and are going to use him as a war criminal, the Japanese resistance would have gone on indefinitely, and we might have lost another million lives.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the official policy with respect to the Emperor, Professor?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Actually there was no official policy. There was talk here and there. I would run up to the State Department once or twice a week trying to find out what the policy was. The policy was not decided until 1945 actually.

At one time the Joint Chiefs of Staff were willing to listen to the State Department on the matter, though they themselves felt, I know, individually and collectively that it would be unwise to depose the Emperor or announce that they were going to depose him.

The Joint Chiefs were not trying to run the political or diplomatic portion of the country. Therefore, they would listen to the State Department. They were firmly of the conviction, which I shared and wrote two or three papers on, that to get the surrender of Japan it would be much better to leave the Emperor out of it.

Mr. MORRIS. You did hear Lattimore express himself to the extent the Emperor should be eliminated?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir. I was somewhat shocked and horrified, not only as to his views with regard to the Emperor, but he wanted to have not only a strict and stern policy, but a bloody peace in Japan. If I may paraphrase his ideas, he wanted to impose a Morgenthau plan on Japan. He did not use that term, but he wanted to completely reduce Japan to beggary and impotence. He was bitter in his attacks upon Japan. He would reduce Japan and wipe out the bloody deeds they had done.

As far as that is concerned, the whole policy of this was to purge all the Japanese officials, to reduce Japan back to an agricultural country and destroy all Japanese industry.

Senator EASTLAND. Japan cannot raise enough food, can they?

Mr. McGOVERN. It was ridiculous as far as that was concerned, and Japan now has a population of 83,000,000. Then it was about 73,000,000. Japan in the best of times cannot live on her own food supply. She must import at least 25 percent of the food supply. Therefore, unless she can export something, she cannot pay for her own food.

The one way to bring on communism certainly in Japan was to have the Japanese starve and to deprive them of their industry.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know who the real author of the Morgenthau plan for Germany was?

Mr. McGOVERN. I have been told it was Mr. White. I do not know that.

Senator FERGUSON. How long ago were you told that?

Mr. McGOVERN. That was rumored around back in 1944-45, and at that particular time the Morgenthau plan came before the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Most of the Joint Chiefs were very vigorously opposed to it. They were not trying to interfere with the diplomatic decisions. I was told Mr. Roosevelt was influenced by Mr. Morgenthau, who was influenced by Mr. Dexter White. I have no official knowledge of that, however.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in connection with Professor McGovern's testimony about Owen Lattimore's views toward postwar Japan, I would like to refer to exhibit No. 139, introduced at our open hearings. That is an extract from the Daily Worker of September 5, 1945, reporting on a press conference given by Owen Lattimore. It bears the title "Allies Must Break Japanese Monopolist Grip," says Lattimore. It is Wednesday, September 5, 1945.

Mr. Mandel, will you read a few appropriate portions from that, please?

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

Owen Lattimore, former adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, said today that the Allies must free Japan of the Zaibatsu's grip before democracy can develop there. He declared that the Zaibatsu—or industrialists—merged completely with the militarists in controlling Japan for aggression and that the primary control always was civilian.

"Together," he said, "they are like a small octopus with huge tentacles which holds everything in its power. Their tool and front was the Emperor, owner of vast shares and estates, and he still is—although now they are loudly disclaiming the militarists \* \* \*."

Mr. MORRIS. That has already been introduced in the record, Mr. Chairman. I would like to make reference to it again.

Mr. Chairman, I have here a publication called the Spotlight on the Far East, which is published by the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, which has been identified by the Attorney General as a Communist-front organization. This contains an article by Mr. T. A. Bisson, who himself has been identified as a Communist before this committee.

I would like Mr. Mandel to read a few pertinent extracts from that in connection with Professor McGovern's testimony.

Mr. MANDEL. This is taken from the issue of Spotlight on the Far East, of February 1948, published by the Committee for a Democratic

Far Eastern Policy. This organization has been cited as a Communist front by the Attorney General.

Here is an article by T. A. Bisson. I will read some excerpts:

Keynoting the conference session on Japan, T. A. Bisson, writer and analyst, who recently returned from Japan where he was special adviser to the Government Section of General MacArthur's Headquarters, told how dominance by the empire-minded Zaibatsu (big business families) continues under MacArthur, in spite of nominal democratic reforms effected by the American occupation. It is true, Mr. Bisson pointed out, opposition parties can now exist, and that labor unions can now function and expand. But "two fundamental weaknesses of occupation policy are leading inevitably to what history will record as failure of the total operation."

\* \* \* \* \*

The second major failure of the occupation, the economic one, has had equally great significance. It was, Bisson said, "a direct outgrowth of the old guard's virtual monopoly of the Diet, the Cabinet, and the bureaucracy during the occupation's first 21 months."

Mr. MORRIS. I think that is enough, Mr. Chairman.

Will the entire article be introduced in the record?

Senator EASTLAND. It is ordered in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 304" and is as follows:)

#### OCCUPATION FAILS TO DEMOCRATIZE JAPAN, MACARTHUR'S ADVISER SAYS

Keynoting the conference session on Japan, T. A. Bisson, writer and analyst who recently returned from Japan where he was special adviser to the Government Section of General MacArthur's Headquarters, told how dominance by the empire-minded Zaibatsu (big business families) continues under MacArthur, in spite of nominal democratic reforms effected by the American occupation. It is true, Mr. Bisson pointed out, that opposition parties can now exist, and that labor unions can now function and expand. But "two fundamental weaknesses of occupation policy are leading inevitably to what history will record as failure of the total operation."

Mr. Bisson described first of these weaknesses as political and said it was clearly exposed by Japan's two post-war elections. The first or "trial run" election, Mr. Bisson said, "returned members of the Diet's (parliament) lower house, the house of representatives. What was the outcome? Representatives of the old regime, marshaled chiefly under the banners of the so-called Liberal and Progressive Parties, won three-fourths of the seats. It was the Yoshida Cabinet, formed as the result of the election which made inevitable the disastrous inflation of today."

Before the next election, the old guard found that new machinery would be necessary if it was to retain its power. A gerrymandering election law was the result, which Bisson called the clear responsibility of the MacArthur administration.

"It would have been easy," Bisson said, "for MacArthur to refuse to give Yoshida permission to introduce this bill. He could have rejected it as a tricky old guard maneuver concocted at the last minute."

But instead he gave his permission. In the election of April 1947, Japan again remained in the grip of its former rulers, though a plurality was returned by the Social Democratic Party.

"This," said Bisson, "was the outstanding example, although there were also others, of direct intervention by the occupation authorities to influence the election results."

The second major failure of the occupation, the economic one, has had equally great significance. It was, Bisson said, "a direct outgrowth of the old guard's virtual monopoly of the Diet, the Cabinet, and the bureaucracy during the occupation's first 21 months."

When the Japanese labor movement sought in February 1947, to protest inflation by political action, it was prevented by direct orders from General MacArthur. This was one of the clearest cases of direct American support for the economic and political program of the old guard.

## UNITED STATES PEOPLE GAIN LITTLE

The American people, on the other hand, have gained little from the occupation.

Bisson said, "If we could say that we have put the Japanese people in control of their Government and that it was now being run in their best interests, that this new democratic Japan will be a bulwark of peace and stability in the post-war Far East, that the United States has thus made a constructive contribution to the welfare and security of the American people; then I think we would say that the investment has been worth while.

"I do not believe we can say these things. As matters stand now, there is every chance that representatives of the old regime will maintain control of the Government of Japan; that this Government will run, not in the best interests of the Japanese people as a whole, but in the selfish interests of the old vested clique of bureaucrats, business tycoons, and party leaders." Those leaders made the war.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor McGovern, will you comment on that last article introduced in the record?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir.

May I again point out that the fact that people are in agreement with Communists does not necessarily prove they are Communists, but I have heard Mr. Lattimore and Mr. Bisson hold discussions on that thing, and I was very much surprised how again and again their views did coincide with Communist views. Those are the well-known Communist views.

If I may call your attention to the report which I made to the congressional Committee on Foreign Affairs, the position of the Emperor with Zaibatsu and reparations, in which I felt that the whole economy of Japan would go to ruin if they tried to have too abrupt a change—I am all in favor of equalizing the wealth—but too abrupt a change, the abolition of Zaibatsu overnight would wreck the Japanese industry and it is up to the American taxpayer to see that Japan is not wrecked, otherwise we will have to support Japan.

Senator EASTLAND. Not only that, but if the economy of Japan and Germany is wrecked, what would happen to our own economy? We have to have markets.

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes.

I would like to make it plain I am not pro-Japanese or pro-German, but simply as a student of international politics I know you cannot have a prosperous America if the rest of the world is wrecked.

I thought it was important to restore some level of prosperity within Germany and Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you heard Owen Lattimore express himself on whether or not the institution of the Emperor should be abolished in Japan?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes; on several occasions, he was very much opposed to the Emperor. He wanted him treated as a war criminal.

Senator EASTLAND. He wanted him murdered?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you ever hear him advocate the murder of the Emperor's family?

Mr. MCGOVERN. No, sir, I did not. All I can say is that he said they should be treated as among the worst of the war criminals.

Senator EASTLAND. His family?

Mr. MCGOVERN. The whole imperial family.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say that is all you heard him say?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes.



Senator EASTLAND. That is, the imperial family?

Mr. McGOVERN. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. That would mean his wife and children?

Mr. McGOVERN. I suppose so. I did not ask him.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear him advocate taking him and turning him over to the Chinese?

Mr. McGOVERN. That was said on one occasion, not to me but someone else, in my hearing. He thought the best way to dispose of him was to turn him over to the Chinese who would know how to deal with him. But that was a side remark that I happened to overhear.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore has set forth his views on the Emperor in his book *Solution in Asia*. I understand we do not have those expression in our records.

At this time, I would like to have a few of them inserted in the record, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MANDEL. These are views taken from Owen Lattimore's book, *Solution in Asia*:

Page 29:

\* \* \* Sacred Cow No. 1, and in fact the cow to end all cows, is the Japanese Emperor. \* \* \*

Page 30:

The orthodox "expert" approach to the position of the Emperor in Japan is all too often weakened by accepting the premise that in Japan the Emperor is officially holy. \* \* \*

Page 34:

\* \* \* Under this rigid structure of power the Emperor remained ritualistically the source which conferred a sanction on the real power held by the shogun. In spite of this venerability, however, neither the common people nor the nobles who enjoyed real power worked very hard at venerating him. The prevailing attitude toward the Emperor was a good deal like that of the many Christians who believe that of course God exists and religion is a good thing, but rarely go to church. \* \* \*

Page 40:

\* \* \* The Emperor was brought into the team by the investment of "imperial household" funds in the new enterprises. In this way the Emperor remained the ideological pillar of the feudal system and became at the same time a main pillar of vested interest in the new, capitalistic structure. \* \* \*

Senator EASTLAND. That will be admitted into evidence.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 305," and is as follows:)

#### EMPEROR

(*Solution in Asia*, by Owen Lattimore, Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1945)

"\* \* \* Sacred Cow No. 1, and in fact the cow to end all cows, is the Japanese Emperor \* \* \*" (p. 29).

"\* \* \* The orthodox 'expert' approach to the position of the Emperor in Japan is all too often weakened by accepting the premise that in Japan the Emperor is officially holy \* \* \*" (p. 30).

"\* \* \* Under this rigid structure of power the Emperor remained ritualistically the source which conferred a sanction on the real power held by the shogun. In spite of this venerability, however, neither the common people nor the nobles who enjoy real power worked very hard at venerating him. The prevailing attitude toward the Emperor was a good deal like that of the many Christians who believe that of course God exists and religion is a good thing, but rarely go to church \* \* \*" (p. 34).

"\* \* \* The Emperor was brought into the team by the investment of 'imperial household' funds in the new enterprises. In this way the Emperor remained the ideological pillar of the feudal system and became at the same time a main pillar of vested interest in the new, capitalistic structure \* \* \*" (p. 40).

"\* \* \* The militarists have forced crises abroad partly in order to seize and keep control at home; and since, in these crises, they have always professed to be defending the interests of the Emperor, the Emperor is now identified as the resort of final appeal against any democratic trend. The democratic potential is still there, but if it is ever to emerge we must first, in the words of Sun Fo, 'puncture the myth of the divinity of the Mikado' \* \* \*" (pp. 44-45).

"\* \* \* If the Japanese themselves decide to do without an emperor, well and good. If not, we should show that militarism has been so catastrophically defeated that we, the victors, do not need to use the Emperor. He and all males eligible for the throne by Japanese rules of succession and adoption should be interned, preferably in China, but under the supervision of a United Nations commission, to emphasize united responsibility. His estates, and estates belonging to members of Zaibatsu families and important militarists, should be made over to an agrarian reform program, conspicuously without his sanction and by order of the United Nations. Eventually, after his death and after a new civil service and a new management of finance and industry have taken hold, the remaining members of the imperial line can be allowed to go where they like. New vested interests will by that time be able to prevent the restoration of a monarchy \* \* \*" (p. 189)

Mr. MORRIS. Professor McGovern, before we finish this period of 1944-45 at the OWI advisory committees, did Mr. Lattimore ever express himself in disparagement of Chiang Kai-shek at those hearings?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir, "we have to build on the forward-looking elements in China."

When I asked him, he said the people in Yen-an.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, he had reversed himself again from the 1941 position?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes.

In 1944 and 1945, he was rather bitter in his expressions and opinions regarding Chiang Kai-shek, and very definitely in favor of cooperation with the Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he refer to them as Communists?

Mr. MCGOVERN. To the "people in Yen-an." I never heard him call Mao Tse-tung and his people the Yen-an people, but I never heard him use the expression "Communist." But there was no question about whom he was referring to.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with the numerous political reports submitted to the State Department by John Stewart Service and John Paton Davies, Jr.?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir. A great many reports came over my desk in the JCS. I did not see all State Department reports, but a great many reports sent to the State Department were sent down by the State Department to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and those came to my desk for comment.

My function there, serving with the Joint Survey Committee, was to follow political trends in different parts of the world and annotate those and call them to the attention of my boss. Therefore, I saw a number of the statements made, written by John Davies, when he was serving as political adviser to General Stilwell.

I saw some of the reports made by John Stewart Service when he was in China and I had several long talks with Mr. Service after his return from China, I am going to say early in 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, did these reports uniformly express a political point of view?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Very definitely.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the general nature of these reports, as you can now recall?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Both Mr. Davies and Mr. Service were whole-hearted in their dislike of the Nationalist Government and their theory was that we should support the Chinese Communists.

One thing that I objected to most seriously from the intelligence point of view, and I was serving as a member of the Joint Intelligence Committee—and that is intelligence should be to estimate the capabilities and intentions both of our allies and of our enemies—and to my mind they were quite wrong in emphasizing that the intentions of the Chinese Communists would be friendly toward the United States, and quite apart from anything else, I thought that was completely wrong.

There is no use arguing the rights and wrongs of communism on which I have opinions, but apart from anything else, will they be with us or against us? I was convinced at that time, and still convinced, that they would be definitely anti-American—not that I think the Nationalist Government is pure, sweet, and holy, but I thought that at least the Nationalist Government would remain friendly to the United States, and I was convinced that the Communist Government would be very unfriendly to the United States, and, for that reason, I made my report to General Embick along those lines.

I thought it was bad advice handed by the State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. What was General Embick?

Mr. MCGOVERN. General Embick was Chairman of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, and my immediate boss. The committee consisted of General Embick, Admiral Wilson, and General Fairchild.

Senator EASTLAND. Of course, what they were advocating was not a negative policy but the United States assisting the Communists in overthrowing the Nationalist Government and taking over China—that we just not send aid to the Nationalist Government.

Mr. MCGOVERN. But throwing our whole weight behind the Communists.

Senator EASTLAND. That we actually assist the Communists in overthrowing the Nationalist Government.

Mr. MCGOVERN. I was quite shocked at this for a peculiar reason. I knew Mr. Service had been sent back from China—in fact, he told me.

Mr. MORRIS. He told you that?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes. He was sent back and he was very violent against the way in which our foreign policy was going in China under General Hurley, the Ambassador, and General Wedemeyer, who was head of our troops over there.

I might say, in the summer of 1945, I was sent on this special mission around the world but Service spent some little time in China.

At that time I talked to General Hurley, and General Wedemeyer, whom I knew quite well. General Wedemeyer, for whom I had personal admiration both in regard to personality and his soundness and ability, discussed the situation and he was very much shocked with the kind of poor political intelligence that was being sent in by such men as Service.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you hear Service advocate any measures to implement the policy that he was advocating?

Mr. McGOVERN. No, sir. The only thing I heard him say was that we should throw our full weight behind the Communists, withdraw all assistance to the Nationalists, and throw our full weight to the Communists.

Senator EASTLAND. That meant aiding the Communists?

Mr. McGOVERN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. I was interested in the remark you just made. Did you say you were quite well acquainted with General Wedemeyer and his views and policies?

Mr. McGOVERN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was over a period of what time?

Mr. McGOVERN. Over a period of years. I first met him in 1942 when he was attached to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, serving with the Joint War Plans Committee on which I saw him many, many times then.

Then, he is the son-in-law of General Embick, my immediate boss. When I was out in China, General Wedemeyer was kind enough to ask me to stay at his house, so I got to know him quite well.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you any occasion to read the Kunming message or messages recently released?

Mr. McGOVERN. You mean those sent back by Mr. Wallace?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

Mr. McGOVERN. I have seen them recently.

They did not come over my desk during the war, but I have seen them recently, copies of them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you read them recently?

Mr. McGOVERN. Yes, sir; I looked through them again.

Mr. SOURWINE. I should like to ask for your opinion in particular and in general with regard to those messages, as to whether they are anti-Communist or pro-Communist, and if you do not mind, I would like to read just a few passages from the messages.

Senator EASTLAND. Give him the message and let him comment on it if he wants to.

Is that Wallace's report to President Roosevelt?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Recently released?

Mr. SOURWINE. There was a report which was delivered in person by Mr. Wallace. There were a few days prior to that, two cables sent from Kunming.

Senator EASTLAND. From Wallace to Roosevelt?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Are these the documents which have been recently released?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

Mr. McGOVERN. "Paraphrase of Vice President Wallace's message to the President."

There are one or two points here which I would like to just mention :

\* \* \* the attitude of Chiang Kai-shek toward the problem is so imbued with prejudice that I can see little prospect for satisfactory long-term settlement.

And again Mr. Wallace says—

I emphasized to him the importance of reaching an understanding with Russia. With regard to the economic situation, there is little that we can do and the Chinese appear incapable of coping with it \* \* \* Instability and tenseness characterize the political situation with a rising lack of confidence in the Generalissimo \* \* \*

The message is full of statements, as I now remember it, which shocked me, because Mr. Wallace said it was not at all pro-Communist, but certainly if it is not pro-Communist it certainly is giving aid and comfort to the Communists trying to disparage the Nationalist Government entirely and trying to throw his weight behind support of a pro-Russian policy.

Mr. SOURWINE. It has been said that this was an anti-Communist message because it transmitted the request as made by Chiang Kai-shek that General Wedemeyer be considered in connection with the appointment of a presidential liaison man between the President and the Generalissimo.

Could you say, sir, whether at that time such a recommendation with respect to General Wedemeyer was an anti-Communist recommendation?

Mr. MCGOVERN. No, sir; General Wedemeyer had never expressed himself on Chiang Kai-shek. He was not an unknown figure. He was a well known man as a military planner and strategist and had served as spokesman for General Marshall on several occasions in discussions with the British planners. He had never expressed his views on communism, or never expressed his views on China.

As a matter of fact, some people wrongly thought that Wedemeyer would go along with the Communists, because with the Joint Chiefs he thought we should not invade the Balkans or interfere with the Russian campaign in eastern Europe.

On that ground, some people thought General Wedemeyer would go along with the Communists.

Knowing General Wedemeyer personally, I knew they were completely wrong in their reading of him, but no doubt some felt or thought that, because he did attack the Balkan campaign and attacked Churchill on the Balkan campaign.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you aware that these so-called Kunming cables mentioned General Chennault and referred to his unavailability for the post?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say that if it were a choice between General Wedemeyer and General Chennault for the job in question, that one of the two would have been less anti-Communist than the other?

Mr. MCGOVERN. I am trying to think back to the thinking of that particular period. I am trying to think now what I knew about General Wedemeyer. General Chennault's opposition to the Communists was violent and emphatic. At that time there was an open mind as to where General Wedemeyer stood. He never committed himself and never made a formal position.

Knowing both people, I knew both were anti-Communist. I would say General Chennault was more anti-Communist. General Wedemeyer was brought in as a new man with no far-eastern background.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you hear any Communist objection to General Wedemeyer's being named?

Mr. McGOVERN. No, sir. But I again emphasize that I don't attend Communist meetings, so I am not aware of the inner circles.

Senator FERGUSON. I am wondering whether or not Mr. Mandel knows what attitude the Daily Worker took to the Wedemeyer appointment.

Mr. MANDEL. I think that will be brought out in a few days.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor McGovern, do the views set forth in that Kunming cable coincide with the views in the Service and Davies reports to which you have testified?

Mr. McGOVERN. I would certainly say they covered the same general point of view. Never having seen the cables until recently, I had no knowledge whether Mr. John Carter Vincent or Mr. Service or Davies actually saw these things beforehand. I would be unable to say. But they certainly correspond very closely with the views expressed by Mr. Davies, by Mr. John Carter Vincent, and Mr. Service, those three people who expressed the same kind of views that are expressed in here.

I must say that I never heard either one of them talk about General Wedemeyer one way or the other.

Senator FERGUSON. After your reading of that document, you say that it is not an anti-Communist document?

Mr. McGOVERN. Definitely it is not an anti-Communist document.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just prior to the time that the cables were sent, was there any agitation for the promotion of General Chennault in that regard? Was there any consideration of him as a successor to General Stilwell or in an improved position vis-a-vis Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. McGOVERN. There was some discussion of it. But may I summarize the situation? For personal reasons, General Chennault was not very popular with some of the brass hats at the Joint Chiefs of Staff building, and quite apart from any political considerations, his personality was such that they did not like him and therefore would have disliked putting him in unless forced to do so.

Mr. SOURWINE. I was wondering if you regarded this cable as in any way a counter move against the possible naming of General Chennault to a higher position.

Mr. McGOVERN. It may very well. Not having discussed the matter with Mr. Wallace, I have no notion what was in the back of his mind, but if Mr. Wallace had thought there was a plan to put General Chennault in, I would have told him there was very strong opposition on the part of my boss to putting General Chennault in.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know John K. Fairbank and Wilma Fairbank?

Mr. McGOVERN. Yes, sir; I have met them on several occasions. I first saw them in Harvard when I was teaching in Harvard. I again saw them in Peking, or at least I saw Mr. Fairbank in Peking in the same winter of 1937-38. He and Mr. Lattimore went to Peking at the same time for a very short period.

At the same time, Mr. Reischauer, Mr. Lattimore, and Mr. Fairbank were all in Peking. Mr. Bisson was also there. There was quite a gathering of the clan.

Again, I saw much more of Mr. Fairbank in the spring and summer of 1945 when I was sent on this mission out to China, and at that time I saw Mrs. Fairbank was working with OSS, I saw Mr. Fairbank was working with OWI, and had two or three fairly long discussions with

them. I was shocked with the fact that they thought of going even further to the left than had Mr. Service.

Mr. MORRIS. Were they critical of the Chinese Government?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Extremely critical of the Nationalist Government.

Mr. MORRIS. Did they give forth expressions favorable to the Chinese Communists?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Very definitely.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor McGovern, were you in China in 1947?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the occasion of your being in China in 1947?

Mr. MCGOVERN. In 1947, I was appointed a consultant to the Congressional Committee on Foreign Affairs and was sent out there to examine the conditions in Japan, in Korea, and in China.

I represented the Committee on Foreign Affairs, but actually I traveled out with the Armed Services Committee.

Senator EASTLAND. The House committee?

Mr. MCGOVERN. The Armed Services House Committee. They went on around the world. I stayed for some time in Japan and China, and I came back with the House Committee on Domestic and Foreign Commerce.

I mention these things because going along with these Members of Congress, was briefed officially, and unofficially briefed, by the various commanding generals and the ambassadors wherever we went. As a matter of fact, as I stayed on after they had left, I had much longer and more personal conversations with many of the same people.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you briefed at all in China?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir; we were briefed considerably at the time in China.

First of all, we stayed for some little time in Peking and saw the various local Chinese officials there. Then we went down to Chengtu to see the Navy mission there, and then we went to Nanking. I had long talks with the Ambassador, the then Ambassador, Mr. Leighton Stuart, whom I had known previously. We were also briefed by Mr. Ludden, of the Embassy.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is Mr. Ludden?

Mr. MCGOVERN. That is Raymond Ludden. He was either first secretary or consul of the Embassy. He was immediately under Mr. Leighton Stuart.

Mr. Leighton Stuart and I had a talk, and he said "Go down to the Embassy and be briefed by Mr. Ludden."

Mr. Ludden gave a speech and gave us a very dim picture of the possibility of the Nationalist Government surviving and a very strong briefing in favor of the ground movement in favor of the Communists.

While I was in Nanking I was very much interested also in the fact, which I had heard before, but it was not officially confirmed, we were also briefed by the then head of the Army Military Mission, General Lucas. He was telling us what he was doing. I asked what he was not doing. One of the things he was not doing was not giving tactical advice to the nationalists. He said they were allowed to give strategic advice to the Nationalist Government but always in such a way as not to have any effect on the war with the Communists. He was instructed not to train them how to man machine guns or tanks to fight Communists and never in any way to give effective aid in their fight against the Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. Who told you that?

Mr. MCGOVERN. General Lucas.

I inquired, "This is your own personal choice?"

"No, sir; these are orders from Washington."

I said, "Is that the orders of the Defense Department?"

He said, "I get it from the Defense Department, but I understand it is from the State Department."

Mr. MORRIS. Did you hear that view from anybody else?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir; I asked two or three of the other men, colonels, who were assistants. When I was down to Shanghai, the head of the naval mission went down to meet us in Shanghai.

I repeated the question to him and he said the same thing.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Solomon Adler in Nanking at that time?

Mr. MCGOVERN. At that time he was present at some luncheon parties, but I had no conversation.

Mr. MORRIS. You know he was there?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. In what capacity?

Mr. MCGOVERN. I don't know. I saw him at a luncheon party given by the Embassy for us.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you proceed to Japan from China?

Mr. MCGOVERN. I had already been in Japan. Then I returned to Japan. Mr. Judd was coming over and Mr. Judd telegraphed me and asked me to meet him in Japan. Congressman Judd knew very little of Japan. So, I gave him my briefing in addition to the briefing he was getting through SCAP.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you write a report for the congressional committee?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Is this your report, Professor McGovern?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir. This is the Economic and Political Conditions in the Far East: Japan, China, Korea.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, I would like to direct your attention to that portion which deals with reparations.

Mr. Chairman, we have had an acknowledgment by Mr. Lattimore that he was largely responsible for the preparation of the Pauley report. With that background, I would like to ask Professor McGovern questions relating to his report on reparations which he made to the Foreign Relations Committee of the Congress.

Mr. MCGOVERN. That was one of the things in which I was particularly interested.

Mr. MORRIS. By that you mean the Pauley report?

Mr. MCGOVERN. The Pauley report had called my attention to the great to-do over whether we should or should not have reparations and the amount of reparations. Therefore, having read the Pauley report, I then went in and examined with some care the various people, both Japanese and American officials there in SCAP.

After a long discussion with various groups, official and unofficial, I came out with the following conclusion:

Another major factor in retarding Japan's economic recovery has been the problem of reparations.

It is clear that the reparation demands by some of the Allied powers have been based upon political and psychological considerations rather than upon economic realities. A quite natural desire to wreak vengeance upon the hated



enemy, and an equally natural desire to build one's own industry in a cheap and easy way, have resulted in exorbitant demands upon Japanese plants and industrial equipment, which, if fully carried out, would permanently wreck the whole Japanese economy and make it impossible for the Japanese mission ever to become self-supporting again. (It would be equivalent to the application of an exaggerated Morgenthau plan to Japan.) It is equally clear that in many cases, if the plants were dismantled and transported elsewhere, it would result in permanent economic waste for everyone. The Japanese would be deprived of plants they urgently need, while the countries to which they were shipped would never be able to make use of them because of wastage in shipment, the lack of skilled workers and technicians in the receiving countries, and so forth.

May I bring out just one or two things in this support?

Mr. MORRIS. Is it pertinent to this particular discussion?

Mr. McGOVERN. Yes, sir; not about reparations, it is in connection with Korea I want to talk about.

Senator EASTLAND. Yes, sir; proceed.

Mr. McGOVERN. I felt then, and feel now, that I was rather good in my predictions as to what was going to take place. This report was printed in March of 1948.

Senator EASTLAND. 1948?

Mr. McGOVERN. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Go ahead.

Mr. McGOVERN. In dealing with Korea, I said:

At the same time it must be borne in mind that if we withdraw from the southern zone—

in Korea—

it is practically certain that the small but powerful and well organized Korean Communists, backed by the Russians, will seize control over the whole peninsula. There has already emerged in North Korea a ruthless and self-perpetuating Communist oligarchy which is fully prepared to extend its sway over the southern area. In the event of American withdrawal it is very likely that the Russian forces would directly aid in carrying out this coup. Even if this were not the case, the Communists should have little difficulty in forcibly seizing power, as the Russians have already organized and trained a Communist indoctrinated "North Korea People's Army" (of about 150,000) men while in the south the Americans have neglected to organize any indigenous native force capable of meeting invasion from the north.

I should like to bring out this point in connection with that thing, because of the statements that Mr. Lattimore and others have made that it would be to our advantage to let the Communists seize control of the whole of Korea, reverting to an earlier position here. I thought if we did withdraw, they would seize power; and we did, and they did exactly as I predicted.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, are you acquainted with Owen Lattimore's memorandum which he submitted in connection with the State Department round table conference in 1949?

Mr. Chairman, the last witness before this committee, Professor Colegrove, gave extensive testimony concerning the round table conference held by the State Department in October 1949.

I have here the text of Mr. Lattimore's memorandum, which was submitted in connection with that conference. I would like to call the attention of Professor McGovern to the first five points.

In the first place, Professor McGovern, have you seen this memorandum before?

Mr. MCGOVERN. I have seen this memorandum. I have heard about it some time. I was told the general contents. It was only recently that I saw the actual wording of it.

Mr. MORRIS. You will notice at the very outset he has made five distinct points.

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir; and I think this is so important, the first point:

The type of policy represented by support for Chiang Kai-shek does more harm than good to the interests of the United States. \* \* \*

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, at this time in 1949 when this memorandum was submitted, Mr. Lattimore clearly there is opposed to support of Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. MCGOVERN. It is very obvious here. At the same time I was making my report here to the congressional Committee on Foreign Affairs on the danger of Chinese communism undermining the whole support of the Nationalist Government, which was brought out.

The second point is:

China cannot be economically coerced by such measures as cutting off trade.

In other words, in this trade he wants to recognize Communist China and to trade with Communist China on the idea we will both benefit by it. It is perfectly impossible.

There is a third point which I think is very important:

It is not possible to make Japan a satisfactory instrument of American policy.

In other words, again he comes back to his old Morgenthau plan to keep Japan powerless and impotent.

As I tried to stress in my own report, written a year earlier, Japan is a pro-American bastion as a net result of which they attempt to keep a free Asia for the free Asiatics by the union of such free countries as Japan, Philippines, and Siam, of which Japan is the most important and strongest.

In the meantime, the Japanese became very pro-American through the wisdom of our administration out there, and certainly as to our support of a free and independent Japan not under Communist domination and make those the center of a new open-door policy for the Far East which will mean equal opportunity, with no special privilege, and integrity of the Far East.

There is one point here—

South Korea is more of a liability than an asset to the interests and policy of the United States.

In other words, let it slide. As Mr. Lattimore said, let it sink.

I think it is contrary to our own policy. If the Communists get control of the whole of South Korea, it will be a dagger pointed to the heart of Japan and will overthrow our whole foreign policy in the Far East.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest that in view of the questions which were asked the professor with regard to the Kunming messages, it might be desirable to have the text of those two cables in the record at that point or just preceding the professor's comments on them.

Senator EASTLAND. They are ordered in the record.

(The text of the two cables follows:)

## KUNMING MESSAGE

(Paraphrase of Vice President Wallace's message to the President drafted in Kunming June 26 and dispatched from New Delhi about June 28:)

## MESSAGE NO. 1

The discussions between the representative of the Chinese Communists and those of the Chinese Government are taking place in Chungking, but the attitude of Chiang Kai-shek toward the problem is so imbued with prejudice that I can see little prospect for satisfactory long-term settlement. Chiang has assured me that only "political" measures will be used to reach a settlement.

Chiang expressed a desire for an improvement in relations with Russia and for our assistance in bringing about a meeting of representatives of China and Russia. I emphasized to him the importance of reaching an understanding with Russia.

The economic, political, and military situations in China are extremely discouraging. The morale of the Chinese is low, and demoralization is a possibility with resulting disintegration of central authority. With regard to the economic situation, there is little that we can do, and the Chinese appear incapable of coping with it. However, a general collapse does not seem imminent. Instability and tenseness characterize the political situation with a rising lack of confidence in the Generalissimo and the present reactionary leadership of the Kuomintang. With regard to the military situation, I can only say that it might be worse. It is critical in Hunan Province. Potentialities and plans are in existence for stiffening China's defense south of the city of Hengyang, but there is a serious threat that east China may be severed from contact with west China. Morale in remaining free China would of course be affected by such a development.

*Calls Chiang discouraged or China military outlook*

Prior to the receipt of your message of June 23 on the subject of a United States Army observer group proceeding to north China to obtain military intelligence, Chiang had informed me of his agreement to the dispatch of the group as soon as it could be organized. After receipts of your telegram I again discussed the matter in detail with Chiang. General Ferris, chief of staff in charge of General Stilwell's headquarters at Chungking, was present, and we obtained what should prove to be the full cooperation of Chiang in arranging for the early dispatch and effective operation of the group.

Chiang Kai-shek seems to be unsure regarding the political situation, bewildered regarding the economic situation and, while expressing confidence in his army, distressed regarding military developments. Current military reverses are attributed by him to low morale caused by economic difficulties. He is convinced that a general offensive in Burma early this year would have bolstered the Chinese will to resistance and have prevented military reverses. He has assured me that the Chinese will continue to resist to the limit of their ability, but he displays discouragement rather than optimism.

Our need is vital for a more vigorous and better coordinated United States Government representation in China. In its military and related political aspects, our effort in China requires more positive direction and closer cooperation with the Chinese if this area is to be an effective basis of operations against the Japanese.

## MESSAGE NO. 2

*Loss of eastern China to Japanese predicted*

There is a strong probability that east China will be severed from west China in the near future. It is the general opinion that such a development can only be prevented by unforeseeable chance.

There are various estimates with regard to the rapidity with which the Japanese may be able to carry out their intentions. Although the time factor may be longer than most people seem to expect, I feel that we should be prepared to see all of east China in Japanese hands within 3 or 4 weeks.

The loss of east China will nullify our military effort in this area. It will also prove a violent political and economic shock to the Chungking regime.

China may be rendered almost valueless as an Allied military base unless determined steps are taken to halt the disintegrative process. Popular and military morale, both seriously impaired already, must somehow be strengthened. A new offensive effort must somehow be organized, primarily guerrilla in character, probably.

It is necessary also to consider political factors. Disintegration of the Chungking regime will leave in China a political vacuum which will be filled in ways which you will understand.

The foregoing picture has been drawn on the basis of the best available information to show you how serious is the situation. However, the situation is far from hopeless and may actually be turned to both military and political advantage if the right steps are taken promptly. The Generalissimo is alarmed, anxious for guidance, and, I believe, prepared to make drastic changes if wisely approached. Insecurity has undermined vested interests in the Government. It should be possible to induce Chiang to establish at least the semblance of a united front necessary to the restoration of Chinese morale and to proceed thereafter to organize a new offensive effort.

*Wedemeyer is proposed for liaison with Chiang*

As I took leave of Chiang, he requested me to ask you to appoint a personal representative to serve as liaison between you and him. Carton De Wiart occupies somewhat the same position between Churchill and Chiang. In my opinion a move of this kind is strongly indicated by the politico-military situation.

An American general officer of the highest caliber, in whom political and military authority will be at least temporarily united, is needed. It appears that operations in Burma make it impossible for General Stilwell to maintain close contact with Chiang. Furthermore, Chiang informed me that Stilwell does not enjoy his confidence because of his alleged inability to grasp over-all political considerations. I do not think any officer in China is qualified to undertake the assignment. Chennault enjoys the Generalissimo's full confidence but he should not be removed from his present military position. The assignment should go to a man who can (1) establish himself in Chiang's confidence to a degree that the latter will accept his advice in regard to political as well as military actions; (2) command all American forces in China; and (3) bring about full coordination between Chinese and American military efforts. It is essential that he command American forces in China because without this his efforts will have no substance. He may even be Stilwell's deputy in China with a right to deal directly with the White House on political questions or China may be separated from General Stilwell's present command.

Without the appointment of such a representative you may expect the situation here to drift continuously from bad to worse. I believe a representative should be appointed and reach Chungking before east China is finally lost so that he can assume control of the situation before it degenerates too far.

While I do not feel competent to propose an officer for the job, the name of General Wedemeyer has been recommended to me and I am told that during his visit here he made himself persona grata to Chiang.

I realize that my opinions are based on a very short stay and that the number of people who could be consulted has necessarily been limited. In particular, I regret not having been able to see General Stilwell and get his views. Nevertheless, I am convinced of the need for the decisive action summarized in the final paragraph of my previous message.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you finished the fifth point?

Mr. MCGOVERN. The final point is in connection with southeast Asia, such as Indochina, in which he is obviously saying we should back here Ho Chi Minh and Communists in southeast Asia, which I think would be perfectly disastrous. I think you have to make it a point in our national policy to realize that any place where you have a Communist government or a Communist-dominated government, it is going to be anti-American. And whereas I have absolutely no use for French interest in Indochina, it would be disastrous to allow Indochina to fall in the hands of avowed enemies of the United States and both the Chinese and the Russian Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, there is no need of introducing those in the record. In fact, they have already been introduced in the record as exhibits 280-A and 280-B.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is already in the record?

Mr. MORRIS. The memorandum.

Professor McGovern, did you have any dealings with Alger Hiss during your experience with the General Chief of Staff?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, purely informally and purely personal. Mr. Hiss served in a different capacity with the State Department. I saw most of him during the period when he was assigned to the creation of U. N. during the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and before and after the San Francisco Conference. I was then serving with General Wilson and General Embick.

On several occasions I had to go to the State Department and give documents to Mr. Hiss and receive documents from Mr. Hiss to bring back to the Chief of Staff.

I may add that General Embick, on three different occasions, hammered on the table and said, "Now be sure and don't discuss any war plans or any other military secrets with Mr. Hiss. I don't trust that man."

Mr. MORRIS. In what year was that?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Early in 1945. I saw him first in 1944. I have seen him, as a matter of fact, when he was with Mr. Hornbeck but only very casually, coming in and out of the room, but in 1944 and 1945 when I was at the State Department, two or three times a week, that was the time I saw most of Mr. Hiss, but after those words of advice from General Embick, I was careful to discuss only the weather with Hiss.

There are many people—my bosses, brass hats—in the Army and Navy, who had sincere doubts as to Mr. Hiss's loyalty. General Embick would not say he was or was not Communist. He thought he did not have loyalty to the United States. Therefore, I was warned not to discuss matters with him.

Senator EASTLAND. Did he attempt to get information from you?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Mr. Chairman, that is hard to say. He tried, on several occasions, to get into chit-chatty personal conversations. I was rather cold in my replies. I was so scared that we might have a general conversation that might lead me to divulge military secrets that I knew, I thought it was better not to discuss anything with him.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you judge he was attempting to get military secrets from you?

Mr. MCGOVERN. He knew I came from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He knew I had full possession of all military plans at that time, and I think he was interested in knowing what they were.

Senator EASTLAND. Your answer is that you thought he was attempting to get military information from you?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions to ask of Professor McGovern.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you trust him?

Mr. MCGOVERN. No, sir; I did not. I still have no knowledge whatsoever that he was a member of the Communists. I never met Mr. Chambers, so far as I know, I had no knowledge of a thing, but I certainly did not trust him at all and was very glad not to have official meetings with him.

Mr. MORRIS. Those are all the questions we have of Mr. McGovern.

I would like the record to show that we have sent out a letter today to President Truman asking for the loyalty file on a member of the staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations who served in military intelligence during the war.

Mr. Chairman, the purpose of that letter is that we have a letter from Robert Ramspeck, Chairman of the United States Civil Service Commission, which reads, in part, as follows:

Ellen Van Zyll De Jong Atkinson was employed by the War Department from October 22, 1941, to April 30, 1945, when she resigned. In connection with an application for a position with the Office of War Information, Mrs. Atkinson was the subject of an investigation as to her qualifications, including loyalty. Mrs. Atkinson was not appointed and the investigation of her was discontinued. Precautionary measures were taken to prevent Mrs. Atkinson's reemployment in the Federal service at a later date until the question of her loyalty has been resolved.

In view of that statement and in view of the fact that Ellen Atkinson was a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Senator McCarran sent a letter to President Truman asking that that file be made available to this committee. That reads, Mr. Chairman:

A letter from Robert Ramspeck, Chairman of the United States Civil Service Commission, dated July 13, 1951, contains the following statement about Ellen Van Zyll De Jong Atkinson: "Ellen Van Zyll De Jong Atkinson was employed by the War Department from October 22, 1941, to April 30, 1945, when she resigned. In connection with an application for a position with the Office of War Information, Mrs. Atkinson was the subject of an investigation as to her qualifications, including loyalty. Mrs. Atkinson was not appointed and the investigation of her was discontinued. Precautionary measures were taken to prevent Mrs. Atkinson's reemployment in the Federal service at a later date until the question of her loyalty has been resolved."

Inasmuch as Ellen Atkinson was a staff member of the Institute of Pacific Relations which is presently under inquiry, it would be appreciated if her file were made available to this committee.

May that go into the record, Mr. Chairman?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes, sir.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Chairman, as a footnote to my testimony, may I make one concluding remark?

Mr. MORRIS. May I ask what this request is about?

Mr. McGOVERN. This request was with regard to the policy of the Espionage Act, the difficulty that I had in uniform in discussing matters with the State Department, with the OSS, and with the OWI, that a good part of my time I had to go over to OSS and go up to the State Department and try to get information from them which I would feed to my bosses.

Again and again General Embick and others would point out certain specific persons he thought were dangerous, but in general, "Don't talk about any military plans with civilians."

I said, "Why?"

"Because the wording of the Espionage Act was so vague that even if they were caught telling news to the enemy, there is little we could do about it."

The net result is that in contrast with England, we were handicapped with that thing, that the British Espionage Act is much stronger than ours and therefore the British Foreign Office would and did discuss matters with the British Joint Chiefs of Staff and could discuss matters fully and freely, whereas over here in America, the Espionage Act was so weak we felt there were a number of leaks inside the State Department and nothing could be done about it, and therefore we decided not to discuss any military plans with them.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you think many of those leaks were pro-Communist?

Mr. McGOVERN. I think many of those leaks were pro-Communist. I say that under advisement because I was interested in investigating the record after our successful operations in Europe and our successful invasion of Japan, and we were able to check the German and Japanese records and they did not know of our plans and intentions.

On the other hand, it is now very clear that many of our plans and intentions were known to the Russians.

Senator EASTLAND. Whom did you suspect?

Mr. McGOVERN. That I could not say, sir. I just knew these leaks were taking place. The net result of it was that we just simply had to tighten up. It hurt our effort when you could not deal with responsible officials in high places and the State Department and elsewhere. It did hurt our war effort.

Mr. MORRIS. If this last letter from Mr. Ramspeck is placed in the record, we have nothing else.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 306" and is as follows:)

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,  
Washington 25, D. C., July 13, 1951.

Hon. PAT McCARRAN,  
*Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,*  
*United States Senate.*

DEAR SENATOR McCARRAN: Further reference is made to your letter of June 27, 1951, wherein you request information concerning 13 persons who you state have been employed by the Civil Service Commission.

The specific questions asked in your letter concerning these individuals are as follows:

1. Are they still employed by the Civil Service Commission? If so, in what capacity?

2. Have they severed their employment with the Civil Service Commission? If any questions of loyalty were involved, would you please indicate? What were the circumstances of their severance?

The records of the Civil Service Commission show that although all of these individuals have been employed in the Federal service, none has been employed in any capacity at any time by the Civil Service Commission.

A full report showing the Federal service of each of the 13 individuals you list is being furnished herewith for your information.

\* \* \* \* \*  
Ellen Van Zyll De Jong Atkinson was employed by the War Department from October 22, 1941, to April 30, 1945, when she resigned. In connection with an application for a position with the Office of War Information, Mrs. Atkinson was the subject of an investigation as to her qualifications, including loyalty. Mrs. Atkinson was not appointed and the investigation of her was discontinued. Precautionary measures were taken to prevent Mrs. Atkinson's reemployment in the Federal service at a later date until the question of her loyalty has been resolved.  
\* \* \* \* \*

If I can be of further assistance to you at any time, please let me know.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT RAMSPECK, *Chairman.*

Mr. MORRIS. We have another hearing at 2 o'clock on Monday.

Senator EASTLAND. All right.

We thank you very much, Professor.

Mr. McGOVERN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(Whereupon, at 3:45 p. m., Friday, September 28, 1951, the hearing was recessed until Monday, October 1, 1951, at 2 p. m.)

# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

---

**MONDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1951**

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL  
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met at 2 p. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran, presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, O'Connor, Smith, Wiley, Ferguson, Jenner, Watkins.

Also present: Senators Thye and Welker.

J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Will you stand and be sworn?

You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before the Committee on the Judiciary will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. STASSEN. I do.

## **TESTIMONY OF HAROLD E. STASSEN, PRESIDENT, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA**

The CHAIRMAN. Governor Stassen, you have been subpoenaed to come here to make such statements to this committee as may be pertinent to the subject before the committee. You are not asked to criticize or condemn anyone but to make a straight statement of the facts as you see them on any subject that is pertinent to the matter before the committee.

You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. STASSEN. Thank you, Senator.

May I say, in response to that, that I do appear in response to your subpoena and that it is my basis of appearing and my understanding that I am not here to make accusations against anyone, nor to give exoneration to anyone, but to answer the questions as to the facts that I know in the matter pertinent to your inquiry.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, Governor Stassen was subpoenaed to appear here today to testify primarily concerning a State Department round-table conference which was held on October 6, 7, and 8, 1949.

That conference is directly in the scope of our investigation of the Institute of Pacific Relations because we had observed that the majority of people in attendance at that conference were members of



the Institute of Pacific Relations and many of them were very active in that organization.

We had planned, Mr. Chairman, to have Mr. W. L. Holland, secretary general of the Institute of Pacific Relations, to be present today to identify exactly how many of the 25 in attendance at that conference were members of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Mr. Holland was not able to appear, but has sent in a letter which indicates that of the 25 in attendance 17 were members of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Then he proceeded to give the degree and the extent of activity of each one of these 17.

Mr. Chairman, subject to being verified by Mr. Holland when he appears here under oath, will you accept this list of people at that conference who were connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

The CHAIRMAN. It may be filed with the committee and identified, and Mr. Holland may further identify it when he comes.

Senator FERGUSON. Will it not speak for itself as to what it is? It is a memorandum, rather than a statement under oath, and it will complete our record. Could it not be received on that basis?

The CHAIRMAN. It will be received and placed in the files of the committee, and we can insert it in the record at a later time.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, when did you first become interested in problems of the Far East, Far East political problems?

Mr. STASSEN. About 25 years ago, when I was a student at the University of Minnesota.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell us to what extent you have followed up your study of Far East developments?

Mr. STASSEN. I followed them quite actively ever since that time. I studied Far East policy and Far East history as a student at the University of Minnesota, and then followed it in a general way in subsequent years, and then, of course, became very closely touched with it during the war when I was on Admiral Halsey's staff; and during the major part of the war I was the assistant chief of staff to Admiral Halsey, and thereby, of course, knew all of the intelligence and other information of both General MacArthur's and Admiral Halsey's command and of the Washington headquarters.

In fact, it was my responsibility to follow it at that time.

Then, toward the end of the war, I was appointed by President Roosevelt as one of the Republican delegates to the San Francisco Conference of the United Nations.

Mr. MORRIS. As such, you encountered many of the problems confronted, looking into the Far East situation?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes. In fact, then, in the delegation, I was assigned to be in charge of the trusteeship portions of the Charter, and the trusteeship portions, of course, dealt in very great measure with the islands of the Pacific, with the areas of the Pacific and other parts of the world, and I had then assisting me Mr. Ralph Bunche and Benjamin Gerig, assigned to the staff at San Francisco.

Subsequent to the end of the war, I was in Japan during the liberation of the prisoners, and then have followed and traveled in that direction since the war.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you first take cognizance of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. STASSEN. My earliest recollection is that sometime after I was

elected Governor of Minnesota I was invited to membership, and I declined.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony you have never been active in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. STASSEN. I have never been active in the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, do you recall a 3-day round-table conference held by the United States State Department, presided over by Philip C. Jessup, in October 1949?

Mr. STASSEN. I do. It was October 6, 7, and 8 of 1949, presided over in part by Dr. Jessup and in part by Dr. Fosdick.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you attend that conference?

Mr. STASSEN. I did; about two-thirds of the conference.

Mr. MORRIS. When were you invited, Governor Stassen?

Mr. STASSEN. I was in London in September—

Mr. MORRIS. September 1949?

Mr. STASSEN. Of 1949, and about the 17th of September Mr. Julius Holmes, of our London Embassy of the United States, told me that he had a cable request to ask whether I would attend a conference on Far East and Asiatic and China policy to be held October 6, 7, and 8.

Mr. MORRIS. Who had invited you?

Mr. STASSEN. The American State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. No one particular person?

Mr. STASSEN. It was just Mr. Holmes who, at that time, was Minister of our Embassy in London, and he was conveying the cabled invitation from the State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know why you were being invited, Governor Stassen?

Mr. STASSEN. I have an assumption in that regard, but I had previously conferred with Mr. Jessup, following an earlier activity on my part in Asiatic policy. In other words, I had been openly very critical of the trend of Asiatic policy in this country and particularly on April 1 of 1949 at MIT, when I appeared with Mr. Churchill, in my address there I was very specific and very emphatic on the need of a change in our Asiatic policy.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you publicly expressed yourself on that, Governor Stassen?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you say at that time?

Mr. STASSEN. It was a background of interpreting our clash with the Communists on the world scene, and then I said:

Relating this inescapable situation to the specific China problem, we must conclude that by our inaction and by our withdrawal of aid we are foolhardy thus to contribute to the Communist domination of China. We should move and move promptly to bolster the southern half of China, to assist by materials and by counsel in maintaining the independence of Canton, the four southern provinces of Kwangtung, Kiangsi, Fukien, and Yunnan, and the outlying islands of Hongkong and Formosa. Giving due consideration to our economic situation and capacity, we should regularly invest a portion of our resources in Asia for the resistance to communism.

I went on further in a further description of a major program in Asia. Because of the deterioration there and the delay, the vacuum that existed, I considered to be very serious.

From that speech at MIT, from that period on, I was very active

in the public discussion of need of a change in Asiatic policy and a certain amount of controversy over it.

Following that, then came the appointment of the Jessup committee. That, as I recall, occurred on July 27 of 1949. At that time, Secretary Acheson announced that a thorough review of the United States policy toward the Far East would be made under the guidance of Ambassador at Large Philip Jessup, and then on July 30 he announced that Dr. Case and Dr. Fosdick would act as consultants in an objective appraisal of Far East problems in general, with a view to making recommendations to the Secretary of State for the formulation and implementation of policy concerning those areas.

When I saw that announcement in the paper, having been advocating that there must be a new policy in Asia, I called Dr. Jessup up, and I congratulated him on his appointment and told him I felt it was tremendously important that they move forward promptly on the matter of Asiatic policy.

Mr. MORRIS. What month was this, Governor Stassen?

Mr. STASSEN. This would have been the end of July, the first part of August of 1949.

I told him I would be glad to talk to them about it. He then invited me to come to Washington. So, on the 7th of September of 1949, I came down to Washington with Mr. Ed Larson of my staff, and met with Dr. Jessup, Dr. Fosdick, Dr. Case, and a few members of the State Department staff; and there I made a presentation of what I urged should be done and done promptly in Asia. We came down with our maps, with our documents, and spent considerable time urging this change in policy.

Mr. MORRIS. Did the recommendations that you made at that time coincide with the recommendations you made at the conference yourself, Governor Stassen?

Mr. STASSEN. They did.

Mr. MORRIS. Did the State Department people express themselves in response to your recommendations?

Mr. STASSEN. In that conference, no. They were only asking questions and probing various aspects of my recommendations in the September 7th conference.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the first manifestation to you of the fact that a review of foreign policy was in fact being undertaken?

Mr. STASSEN. The public announcement on July 27, Secretary Acheson's announcement.

Mr. MORRIS. The consummation of that plan took place when, for the first time? When was the first overt act undertaken?

Mr. STASSEN. Insofar as the October conference—

Mr. MORRIS. Was the October conference the first thing that that committee did?

Mr. STASSEN. I do not have information of what they did between their appointment and the October conference.

I do not remember any public statement of what else they were doing during that period of time.

Mr. MORRIS. As far as you know, the first manifestation of that activity was the 3-day conference that was held on October 6, 7, and 8?

Mr. STASSEN. When you say "first manifestation," I am not sure of what you mean. I know they were in Washington. I know they were spending some time down here. I know they were in the State Depart-

ment. But, so far as I have ever heard, the October conference was the first major grouping and discussion of the thorough study of Asiatic policy that they had been appointed to perform.

Senator FERGUSON. Governor, I would like to go back to the July 27th notice in the press. Did that indicate to you that it was to be a study so that there would be a change, or what did it indicate?

Mr. STASSEN. Well, there had been considerable advocacy of a change, in the Senate, in the House, in the press, by myself personally, and out of that controversy before the public over the advocacy of the change; and then came the announcement that there was going to be—and this is a literal quotation from the stories—“an objective appraisal of Far East problems in general with a view to making recommendations to the Secretary of State for the formulation and implementation of policy concerning those areas.”

That was the announcement in quotation marks.

Senator FERGUSON. So, it was indicated that there was going to be at least a study which might lead to a change; is that correct?

Mr. STASSEN. Furthermore, on October 6, which is 10 days after the announcement, Senator Arthur Vandenberg said publicly that the review of policy by the Jessup group should not overlook the possibility of finding a way to aid the non-Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know at the time that Senator Vandenberg had insisted that he had not been consulted on the previous policy in the Far East?

Mr. STASSEN. Senator Vandenberg told me so, and I have also seen his public announcements to that extent.

Senator FERGUSON. You were familiar with that?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you appear in Washington, Governor Stassen, to attend this conference?

Mr. STASSEN. At about 9 o'clock on the morning of October 6. In other words, I returned to this country on October 4th from England and then came down here to the opening of this conference on the morning of October 6.

Mr. MORRIS. You had no preliminary discussions with anyone prior to the actual conference?

Mr. STASSEN. None whatsoever except my own staff, of course.

Mr. Robert Matteson, who is here with me, is my research assistant and has been for years.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Governor Stassen, who presided on the first day of the conference?

Mr. STASSEN. Dr. Fosdick.

Mr. MORRIS. He was Ambassador Jessup's assistant at that time, was he not?

Mr. STASSEN. He was an associate on this committee of three that had been appointed.

Mr. MORRIS. Was a transcript taken of this conference?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes, a Stenotype transcript was taken.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you request that a copy of the transcript be given to you?

Mr. STASSEN. As the conference opened and when I observed the stenotypist, I stated that I wished a copy of the transcript of everything that I, myself, said during the conference, and that I would not participate unless I was assured of receiving that transcript. There

was some demurring and some discussion and then it was agreed that I would receive a transcript of everything that I said during the three days.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, did you, as a matter of fact, receive such a transcript?

Mr. STASSEN. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you receive it?

Mr. STASSEN. I received it immediately following November 29, that is, it was forwarded on November 29, and reached me on the 30th or on the 1st of December, after I had followed up the failure to receive it by a telegram to Secretary Acheson.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Governor Stassen, did you, in addition, take notes at this conference?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the transcript that Governor Stassen has received and about which he was just speaking, together with his notes, will form the basis of the questions that will be addressed to him in this session.

You will recall, Mr. Chairman, that we had requested that a full copy of the transcript be made available to this committee, but that transcript was denied us, and for that reason it is necessary for us to have witnesses testify as to what took place at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I ask the witness one question?

Did your notes, Governor, unlike the transcript which was furnished you, cover what was said by others than yourself at the conference?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes; although I am never a person who takes extensive notes. I rely mostly on my memory.

Mr. SOURWINE. They were to remind you, and not verbatim?

Mr. STASSEN. My own notes are to remind me of what I want to rebut or in answering something, and my memory is what I primarily rely on, but the transcript is a stenotype record of what I said at the various times during the conference.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not just desire the transcript for corrective purposes?

Mr. STASSEN. No; not at all for that.

Senator FERGUSON. You desired it so that you might have a transcript of what you had said?

Mr. STASSEN. Right.

Senator FERGUSON. And, therefore, you did not make any corrections and send it back?

Mr. STASSEN. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You have the original of that transcript?

Mr. STASSEN. I have the original transcript of my statements.

Senator FERGUSON. I assume, then, that your statements would refresh your memory as to what others said?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes, certainly.

Senator FERGUSON. So that you feel that you now have a memory of what took place at this conference?

Mr. STASSEN. I do.

Senator FERGUSON. And I assume that recently, after you were subpoenaed, at least you have gone over your notes and also your transcripts?

Mr. STASSEN. After I received the subpoena, I went over my notes and the transcript, and I prepared a memorandum for my own assistance in this conference.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, briefly for background purposes, I wonder if you could describe the condition existing at that time with respect to the various problems that were about to be discussed at the conference? I think it would be better if we had a little background of these facts before we begin.

Mr. STASSEN. Yes.

In thinking of the conference itself, it is very important to keep in mind what the circumstances were at the time. Of course, one of the most important things to keep in mind is that this was 9 months before the Korean war. The Korean war did not break until 9 months later.

About 4 months or 5 months before this conference, the Peiping radio had broadcast a statement that the Red Chinese would fight on the side of Communist Russia in the event of another world war.

Then on July 27, 1949, Secretary Acheson had announced this review that we spoke of a moment ago.

On August 5, 1949, the State Department had issued the white paper on China. You are all familiar with that.

I might say that a copy of that was mailed to me when I was asked to attend this October conference. In other words, that is just 2 months before the conference concerned, the white paper was issued.

On August 6, 1949, Senator Vandenberg had made this statement that I referred to, that it should not overlook the possibility of finding a way to aid the non-Communists of Asia.

On September 12, 1949, a little less than a month before, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Armed Services Committee had recommended 20 to 3 the \$1.3 billion military assistance program including \$75 million for the general area of China, and Congress passed the measure on September 28, 1949.

On October 1 of 1949, the Chinese Communist People's Republic was proclaimed. In other words, this is just a week before the conference when the Chinese Communist People's Republic was proclaimed in China.

On October 2, 1949, the U. S. S. R. recognized the Chinese Communist People's Republic. Bulgaria and Rumania followed with recognition on October 3. Poland and Czechoslovakia followed with recognition of the Chinese Communist People's Republic on October 4.

On October 5, 1949, the line of the internal war in China extended across the nation at a point about 120 miles north of Canton, with the four southern provinces and approximately 40 percent of the people of China not under Communist control.

So that was the picture as the conference opened on the morning of October 6.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Kenneth Colegrove testified here last week. He stated that a group of people at that conference were able to loosely band themselves together and form a prevailing point of view, that their point of view prevailed throughout the 3-day conference.

Governor Stassen, did you notice while you were present at this conference the tendency of any group of people present to dominate the conference or to lead the conference?

Mr. STASSEN. Mr. Morris, before proceeding as to what took place in the conference itself, I should like a specific ruling of the chairman on this point. In other words, I am perfectly willing and in the national interest will go forward to answer thoroughly all your questions with all facts, but I would like to have the record show and the chairman to rule that you are aware that the State Department has called this a confidential conference. You are aware that the transcript is stamped "confidential" and you are aware that the transcript is also stamped that it contains information affecting national defense, and so forth, and that it has taken the position that it, itself, will not release the transcript, and that knowing those things, as I understand it, Senator, you are now asking me to proceed to discuss what took place in this conference in your own pursuit of the national interest in your functioning of the United States Senate.

The CHAIRMAN. You have correctly stated the position taken by the committee.

What is more, aside from what may be matters that would affect the national security, it is the chairman's opinion that you are entirely free to discuss anything and everything that went on in that conference except that which would affect national security. I think your own judgment is sufficient when that is in question.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to know whether or not, since the conference, you have been notified in any way that this was a confidential conference and therefore everything in it was secret. Have you been so notified by the State Department?

Mr. STASSEN. No. When I received the transcript, it carried on each page a stamp "Confidential." Of course, I am also aware of the issue that came up on the same transcript in the so-called MacArthur hearings when Secretary Acheson was on the stand.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you tell us what part of the transcript has this notation about security? Is it typed in there?

Mr. STASSEN. It is typed in at the top of the page.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you please read that to us?

Mr. STASSEN (reading):

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act or information of vital interest to the Federal Government and is transmitted for official use only.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I inquire whether or not that was mentioned at the time?

Mr. STASSEN. It was not.

Senator FERGUSON. The Espionage Act was not mentioned?

Mr. STASSEN. No. And in Mr. Holmes' invitation to me and in the follow-up letter of September 27 to Mr. Russell, there was nothing said that the conference would be confidential. That was announced at the opening of the conference and that is what led me to insist that I have a transcript of my own remarks.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you, as a former governor, and with your knowledge of foreign affairs and domestic affairs, have knowledge of anything in this document that you believe would be adverse to the United States security?

Mr. STASSEN. It is apparent from the transcript and it will be apparent from the total transcript—it was apparent from the conference—that the national security would, in fact, be served by the

release of the transcript rather than by holding it classified, and that the national security would have been served by the publication of the proceedings the day after the conference closed so that the American public and the Congress then could have had its say on it.

Senator FERGUSON. And could have seen the whole picture that took place at this conference?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, are you familiar with the fact that on October 26, our Government sent to the Nationalist Government notice that we would not give military aid to the Nationalist Government as far as the defense of Formosa was concerned?

Mr. STASSEN. I am aware of that, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. And if this had been released between the time of the conference and that date, public opinion could have operated and acted upon any such policy?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So you feel now that the national interest would have been served and still served by a release of what took place at that conference?

Mr. STASSEN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. I may say just a little further with respect to the ruling on the matter submitted by Governor Stassen: The Governor is here under subpoena. He has been interrogated aside from this public hearing. The committee is not inclined to elicit anything that would be detrimental to the national security. The Governor has wide experience which would justify him in saying that any answer he might give might be detrimental to the national security. Other than that, the Governor is here under subpoena and is under the direction of the committee to answer the questions propounded.

Senator WATKINS. Governor Stassen, in line with the question that has just been asked, did I understand you to say that at this conference questions were asked of those who had been called in from outside of the Government by the State Department?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. Rather than any information being given to you by the State Department?

Mr. STASSEN. There were both. There was a briefing, so-called, and then the discussion of the participants.

Senator WATKINS. As I understand it, you gentlemen were there at the invitation of the State Department to give advice and counsel with respect to policy to be adopted?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

Senator WATKINS. One which was sought to probably be a reversal or change of what had been going on?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

Senator WATKINS. I got the impression from what you said that probably the State Department officials were in the position more of listeners and questioners rather than revealing anything to you that might affect the security.

Mr. STASSEN. That is predominantly true.

Mr. SOURWINE. Governor Stassen, do I correctly understand your testimony that at the time of this conference there was no oath of secrecy imposed on those who attended?

Mr. STASSEN. There was not.



Mr. SOURWINE. And at the time you requested this transcript of your own testimony there had been no condition imposed on you that you might not discuss what you had said outside the conference?

Mr. STASSEN. They had announced at that point that there was not to be any press release on the conference and that they did not wish us to discuss publicly what took place in the conference.

At that point I insisted then that I have a transcript of my own statements.

Mr. SOURWINE. Up to the time you received this transcript of your statement bearing the usual security note classifying it as confidential, did you feel up to that time that you would have been prohibited from discussing, say, in this committee, what you had said at that conference?

Mr. STASSEN. No; I would not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you, then, take the classification notice as an imposition, in connection with the transmission of that transcript, of a security ban which, prior to that time, did not attach?

Mr. STASSEN. No, I take it as a matter of my response to this committee under proper subpoena; so that is the basis, in other words.

You had asked a question and then I asked for this clarification.

Your question was as to whether or not there was a leading group in the conference, and there was.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was the leader of that group, Governor Stassen?

Mr. STASSEN. There were two leaders in this, one perhaps senior, Mr. Owen Lattimore, and Mr. Lawrence Rosinger. They were the leaders in the discussion of the prevailing group.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, as we have pointed out, during the course of the testimony of Prof. Kenneth Colegrove, each of those two men mentioned by Governor Stassen have been identified in each case by more than one witness as being members of the Communist organization.

Mr. STASSEN. I have no comment on that statement of yours, of course. That is your own statement.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct. That is a statement of the record made before you came on.

Mr. MORRIS. It was understood, Governor Stassen, you would not be qualified to say whether or not Lattimore or Rosinger is a Communist.

The CHAIRMAN. He is not called upon to state.

Senator FERGUSON. He is not being asked.

Mr. STASSEN. Unless I had the FBI files.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, would you in a concrete way set forth some of the recommendations that you recall those two gentlemen and the group that was, roughly, associated with them, made during the conference?

Mr. STASSEN. The group that was led in the discussion by these two gentlemen recommended 10 points for American policy in China and in Asia.

Mr. MORRIS. What were those 10 points, Governor Stassen?

Mr. STASSEN. I would summarize them, first, and then if you wish, go further into them.

The first point was that Asia should be approached as a long-term problem to be studied and deferred; that the Russian Communist attention was concentrated first on Western Europe with its indus-

trial strength; that the United States should likewise give priority to Europe.

Their second major point was that an aid-to-Asia program should not be started by the United States until after long and careful study because of the complexity of Asia and the dangers of a Communist charge of United States imperialism.

The third major point was that the Russian Communists were not as aggressive as Hitler and would not be apt to take direct military action to expand their empire.

Their fourth major point was that the United States should recognize the Communist Peoples Republic government of China under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung at an early date.

Their fifth point was that the United States should encourage the recognition of the Communist Peoples Republic government by Britain and India and follow with its own recognition soon thereafter.

Their sixth point was that it should be United States policy to turn Formosa over to the Chinese Communist government.

Their seventh point was that it should be United States policy to permit the Chinese Communists to take Hong Kong if they insisted.

Their eighth point was that Premier Nehru had shown reactionary and arbitrary tendencies and should not be leaned on or assisted as a leader of non-Communist forces in Asia.

Their ninth point was that the United States should not approve of the blockade of the Communist Chinese coast by the Chinese Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek, should assist in breaking it, and should send economic aid to the area of China under Communist control.

Their tenth point was that no aid should be sent to the non-Communist Chinese guerrillas in the south of China, nor to the Chiang Kai-shek forces, and the military supplies en route to them should be cut off.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, did you and other members attending that conference oppose those views as they were expressed by this prevailing group?

Mr. STASSEN. I opposed each and every point in this 10 group and had considerable support in the conference in opposition, but a minority support, and in the force and repetition of argument, the Lattimore-Rosinger group prevailed.

Mr. MORRIS. How frequently did Lattimore speak while you were present, Governor Stassen?

Mr. STASSEN. I would say 8 or 9 times.

Mr. MORRIS. And Rosinger?

Mr. STASSEN. About 5 or 6 times.

Mr. MORRIS. You say that you were there 2 of the 3 days; is that right?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I inquire, Governor, whether or not it became apparent after the meeting started that there was a group advocating these 10 points?

Mr. STASSEN. It was very apparent that Mr. Lattimore and Mr. Rosinger would fit their comments in together and then others would come in and you would not know, of course, so clearly whether that was just the thing that would happen or there was any prearrangement of discussion.

Senator FERGUSON. But it did appear that after you got started, there was a rather distinct agreement among the group as advocating these 10 points?

Mr. STASSEN. There was a prevailing agreement on the points. You wouldn't have every member of any distinct group expressing agreement with every point, but as the discussion went on there would be supporting comment and in turn critical comment directed at the position which I and others had taken.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that the 10 points were advocated by Lattimore or Lattimore and Rosinger or a larger group?

Mr. STASSEN. Lattimore, Rosinger, and the group that was as a whole joining in with them.

Senator FERGUSON. Advocating the 10 points?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

Senator WATKINS. Was there any comment by the State Department officials on the 10 points that were advocated by this group?

Mr. STASSEN. Not at the time that the formal discussions were taking place.

Senator WATKINS. There was no indication of how the State Department representatives felt about those recommendations?

Mr. STASSEN. Not at that time during the conference. There was subsequently.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to know how long after you did find that the State Department was approving or disapproving of certain of these 10 points.

Mr. STASSEN. We went on and I opposed these and advanced my position as to what we ought to do and I had support.

Then at a recess, around noon of the third day, I spoke to Dr. Jessup. I said I certainly hoped that they would not make the tragic mistake of following this recommended program that had been advocated by Mr. Lattimore and his group.

Senator FERGUSON. What did he say?

Mr. STASSEN. He responded that he felt that the greater logic was on that side.

Mr. MORRIS. That is, the side of Lattimore and Rosinger?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right, and then I pleaded with him that he should not follow that view and urged that before he moved in that direction, that he should go to Tokyo and see General MacArthur to discuss the whole situation with him. I told him I had not seen General MacArthur or had any communication with him since the end of the war, but that I knew from the whole wartime experience that he was extremely brilliant and well informed about these very problems we were dealing with in this conference, and that it was, in my judgment, tremendously important that he go promptly to see General MacArthur and discuss with him the recommended Lattimore program.

Senator FERGUSON. What did he say about that?

Mr. STASSEN. He said he may do that, and that was the end of that conversation.

Senator JENNER. Did he ever go, Governor, that you know of?

Mr. STASSEN. He went 3 months later. He arrived there, I believe, on January 6 of the next year.

Senator JENNER. In his public statements had he changed when he went over there?

Mr. STASSEN. Well, changed—

Senator JENNER. Changed from the Lattimore line back to your line regarding the problems of the Orient and the Far East.

Mr. STASSEN. I do not know of him ever taking a stand in accord with my position. I do not know of him ever really expressing publicly in any definitive detail his position on these problems. I may have missed some of his speeches, but I was watching it quite closely.

Senator FERGUSON. Governor, on the one point of this Nation of ours giving notice to Chiang Kai-shek's government on or about the 26th of October 1949, that we would not furnish the Nationalist Government any more aid as far as Formosa was concerned, that would indicate, at least on one of these principles, that they were following the Lattimore line?

Mr. STASSEN. There was much evidence in the succeeding weeks that the State Department and the United States Government was proceeding to implement the Lattimore program. I was following that, of course, very closely out of this situation.

Senator FERGUSON. You saw no signs of our acts that indicated they were following what the other group with you were advocating?

Mr. STASSEN. Not until after the Korean war broke, which was 9 months later, then there was some different evidence. During the 9 months' period, from October until the Korean war broke, I was following it very closely, very anxiously, and there was no indication that they were implementing anything that I had urged, and, on the contrary, the indications were that they were implementing the Lattimore proposals.

Senator WATKINS. May I inquire if there was any expression of the situation in Korea at this conference?

Mr. STASSEN. I understood on the third day that there had been a bit of it on the second day, but I do not know the details of it. It was not a major part of the conference.

The CHAIRMAN. In that respect, you attended 2 days?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right, at least the major part of 2 days. You see, I was on short notice with a schedule already planned and I had to readjust.

I remember on one of those evenings, I had to go to Harrisburg to speak to the Pennsylvania newspaper editors and I think I had to leave a little early on that day; things of that kind.

The CHAIRMAN. Your principal attendance was on the first and third days?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, would you accept testimony from this witness showing that each one of these 10 points, inasmuch as the governor has made them as definite and as precise as that, was opposed and ineffectively opposed, and there was an implementation on the part of the Government in each of the 10 cases subsequent to that time?

The CHAIRMAN. I think he has already testified in substance to that.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you take testimony on each particular point, Senator?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Senator FERGUSON. First, I think we also seem to have notes and I move that the governor's minutes of what he said in the conference be received as part of our record.

The CHAIRMAN. That motion will be granted. He has not dealt on those minutes yet.

Mr. MORRIS. I was proposing that we take each point singly and discuss them in detail.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. The witness is capable of saying what opposition was expressed to each of the points and whatever implementation was subsequent to that.

The CHAIRMAN. He is testifying of his own knowledge; he being present and on the ground, has a perfect right to do so.

Senator FERGUSON. My idea was to have the notes to implement his testimony. He would not want to read his notes.

The CHAIRMAN. Notes that he made himself?

Senator FERGUSON. That have been sent to him, his memorandum plus the notes.

The CHAIRMAN. The notes are one thing and the stenographic report is another.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to move that we make both the notes and the stenographic report part of this record.

The CHAIRMAN. The notes, I understand, are to enable the governor to testify. The stenographic transcript is a correct transcript?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And the notes you made yourself?

Mr. STASSEN. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be received as evidence in this case.

Senator WATKINS. I take it you would like to have the governor go into each point?

The CHAIRMAN. They are now before the committee and they are in evidence, and you may inquire.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Governor Stassen has stated that this document is a copy of the notes made by himself at this conference.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 307," and is as follows:)

MEMORANDUM PREPARED BY HAROLD E. STASSEN, AFTER BEING SUBPENAED TO TESTIFY BEFORE THE INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C., ON OCTOBER 1, 1951, AT 1 P. M.

Subject: Conference on Asiatic policy, called by and held at the State Department, on October 6, 7, and 8, 1949.

I appear in answer to your subpoena. I will answer your questions thoroughly because of the importance of your inquiry. But I wish to make it clear that I do not intend to make accusations against anyone, nor do I intend to give exoneration to anyone. I will simply and directly state facts. It is your province to form opinions and to reach conclusions.

A complete stenotyped record of the proceedings of the conference was taken by the State Department so that everything I testify to about the conference discussions can be verified from this record.

Before I began to speak at the conference I insisted upon a copy of the transcript of my own statements in the conference and I have this transcript in my possession for verification of my own statements and my own position in the conference.

In considering this matter it is important to have in mind the background at the time.

The conference was held 9 months before the Korean war began.

On April 3, 1949, Peiping radio broadcast a statement of the Red Chinese that:

"China would fight on the side of Communist Russia in the event of another world war.

On July 27, 1949, Secretary Acheson had announced that a thorough review of United States policy toward the Far East would be made.

On August 5, 1949, the State Department issued the white paper on China.

On August 6, 1949, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg said that the review of Asiatic policy should not overlook the possibility of finding a way to aid the non-Communists of Asia.

On September 12, 1949, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Armed Services Committee recommended 20 to 3 the \$1.3 billion military assistance program including \$75 million for the general area of China, and Congress passed the measure on September 28, 1949.

On October 1, 1949, the Chinese Communist Peoples Republic was proclaimed.

On October 2, 1949, the U. S. S. R. recognized the Chinese Communist Peoples Republic; Bulgaria and Rumania followed on October 3, and Poland and Czechoslovakia followed on October 4.

On October 5, 1949, the line of the internal war in China extended across the nation at a point about 125 miles north of Canton, with the four southern provinces and approximately 40 percent of the people of China not under Communist control.

On October 6, 1949, the conference began.

The prevailing group in the conference was led in the discussions by Mr. Owen Lattimore and Mr. Lawrence Rosinger. They recommended 10 points for American policy in China and in Asia as follows:

1. That Asia should be approached as a long-term problem to be studied and deferred; that the Russian Communist attention was concentrated first on Western Europe with its industrial strength; that the United States should likewise give priority to Europe.

2. That an aid to Asia program should not be started by the United States until after long and careful study because of the complexity of Asia and the dangers of a Communist charge of United States imperialism.

3. That the Russian Communists were not as aggressive as Hitler and would not be apt to take direct military action to expand their empire.

4. That the United States should recognize the Communist Peoples Republic government of China under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung at an early date.

5. That the United States should encourage the recognition of the Communist Peoples Republic government by Britain and India and follow with its own recognition soon thereafter.

6. That it should be United States policy to turn Formosa over to the Chinese Communist government.

7. That it should be United States policy to permit the Chinese Communists to take Hong Kong if they insisted.

8. That Premier Nehru had shown reactionary and arbitrary tendencies and should not be leaned on or assisted as a leader of non-Communist forces in Asia.

9. That the United States should not approve of the blockade of the Communist Chinese coast by the Chinese Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek, should assist in breaking it, and should send economic aid to the area of China under Communist control.

10. That no aid should be sent to the non-Communist Chinese guerrillas in the south of China, nor to the Chiang Kai-shek forces, and the military supplies en route to them should be cut off.

During the conference I opposed all of these 10 points, and as the stenographic transcript will show I urged the following:

- A. That American Asiatic policy should be given immediate attention as I considered Asia to be the No. 1 priority of the Russian Communists and that they would move into the vacuum in Asia at an early date. That this was true because Asia was the vast underbelly of the Soviet Union, and the Communists would not move aggressively toward either Europe or Alaska so long as they were uncertain about Asia.

- B. That an American aid-to-Asia program should be promptly established under able men with a headquarters in Bangkok, to assist the non-Communist peoples and that study and action should move forward together as in the Marshall plan.

- C. That the Russian Communists were potentially just as aggressive as Hitler and that America should consider aggressive action by the Soviet Union as one of the definite alternative possibilities.

D. That the United States should not recognize the Communist government in China, and that to do so would be one of the most tragic moves the United States could make in long-term world strategy.

E. That the United States should announce that it considers Formosa a vital part of our perimeter and that we would not permit an armed assault from the mainland on Formosa.

F. That the United States should back up the British at Hong Kong, and that if the British, who must be our close partner in the world, decided to stand and fight at Hong Kong we should back them up with planes and ships.

G. That Nehru was an important leader of the non-Communist areas of Asia, that India should receive economic aid, that he should not be opposed in his effort to develop his third position in the world struggle.

H. That for the sake of world peace and our own security, high American policy should be to prevent Russian Communist imperialistic consolidation of Asia, that every move of opposition to the Communist advance in Asia should be made, and that all forces resisting communism in Asia should be aided militarily as well as economically.

There was considerable support in the discussion for my position, but the Lattimore-Rosinger group prevailed.

Near the conclusion of the sessions I said, directly across the conference table (sec. D, pp. 6 and 7 of the original transcript p. 15 of transcript of Stassen remarks) that the steps advocated by the opposing group could best be characterized as steps that would hasten the victory of the Communists and that these steps would be a very sad mistake in American world policy.

Mr. MORRIS. The second, the witness has testified, is a copy of the transcript which was sent to him by the State Department at his request.

The CHAIRMAN. And is a correct transcript, he testified.

That also will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 308," and is as follows:)

TRANSCRIPT OF COMMENT OF HAROLD E. STASSEN AT A SPECIAL CONFERENCE IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT REGARDING ASIATIC POLICY HELD ON OCTOBER 6, 7, AND 8, 1949, TO WHICH HE HAD BEEN INVITED BY CABLE TO LONDON ON SEPTEMBER 16, 1949.

(Minor editing for grammar and stenographic corrections have been made without change in substance. All discussion was informal without manuscript. Upon first being called upon for views by Dr. Fosdick at about 12 o'clock October 6)

Thank you, Doctor. I might say that it is with considerable reluctance that I explain my position before all these experts. I am willing to do it with the same motives I discussed with Dr. Jessup's committee in September. I state my views in the hope that I might contribute something toward thinking through to a new policy in Asia. I understand that is the process now going on.

I might say that my reluctance to state my views is increased by the fact that present at this table is the man who many years ago attempted to give me my first information about China and Asia, Dr. Harold Quigley, I add, with a smile that he will in no sense be responsible for what I say today even though he did stimulate my original interest in Asia many years ago at the University of Minnesota.

I am willing to give my tentative views very frankly and precisely in order that it might contribute toward seeing where we are at in Asiatic policy.

I have been listening with a great deal of interest to the discussion thus far and will participate as much as I can throughout the remainder of the conference. I am gravely concerned about the future of our American policy in Asia—perhaps more so than I should be—but I give you the basis for my deep concern for your own evaluation.

In my judgment Asia is No. 1 on Russia's board. I think that Russia puts Asia up in first place in her considerations. I say that, notwithstanding the other recognized centers of industrial power in the world that Mr. Kennan discussed this morning. I say that, because the geography of the situation is such that Asia is the underbelly of vast Russia. Russia has one projection out

toward Europe, and the other projection out toward Alaska, and the underbelly is Asia. The Russians are very security conscious, but I do not agree with Mr. Kennan that you can consider that their thinking is different from Hitler's; that is, I do not feel it is correct to say the Communists are less aggressive in their tendencies than Hitler was.

While it is true the Communists consider that capitalism has the seeds of its own destruction, I understand their doctrine to be that when capitalism sees it is about to be destroyed by those seeds, capitalism will begin an imperialist war. The Communists have demonstrated before, in the case of Finland, that they will take aggressive advance action, in an effort, as they see it, to prepare themselves for an inevitable capitalistic imperialistic war. Thus I say that in our world strategy we should consider aggressive action by the Soviet Union as one of the very definite alternative possibilities. In that sense I put a different interpretation than Mr. Kennan does on the world picture.

Looking at the over-all objectives of our country on a world basis, it seems to me that clearly these objectives are to advance the standards of living and the freedom of peoples throughout the world, and to do so in a world at peace. We are going to have peace, for a generation at least, unless Russia commits aggression. I see very little possibility that there would be any war on this earth of any consequence in the next generation unless Russia commits an act of aggression. Therefore, the great problem of peace in the atomic period focuses down to our key consideration of what will affect the policies of the leaders of the Soviet Union. I believe that so long as the Kremlin leaders are uncertain about the future of Asia and of Asia's attitude, they are not very likely to commit aggression. That is why they are at this time giving great concentration to Asia.

They are starting with their infiltration methods throughout Asia—and not just in China.

I do not feel that within a generation anyone will draw from Asia any great forces or any military potential to play a part in aggressive action toward some other continent. But I do feel that the question of whether the military forces of Asia, limited in their military effectiveness though they may be, need to be contained by one side or the other in a world struggle, might be crucial in a future war. That status of these Asiatic military forces, therefore, might be crucial in a decision by the Kremlin as to whether or not a war should be attempted. That is one reason why there are many indications of concentration on the part of Russia upon Asia as No. 1. They are now in the early stages of their concentrated attempt to consolidate the vast area of Asia.

Moving on from that analysis it, therefore, follows that very high American policy should be the determination to prevent Russian consolidation of Asia. I have the strong feeling that we are spending altogether too much time thinking of a China policy as a separate matter. I think that is a very unfortunate aspect of our thinking in these recent months and years. I emphasize also that as I see it we are not meeting to either approve or condone any past act, but the question is, Where do we go from here?

I think it is of vital importance that our country adopt a comprehensive Asiatic policy, of which the Chinese situation is an important part but definitely a subordinate part of the whole Asiatic approach. It is not quite so significant how far the Communists advance in China, or just exactly what happens in the Nationalist government or the Communist government of China. The question is, rather, How does all this affect the whole vast area of Asia? As we all know more than half the peoples of Asia are outside of China—in Malaya, Siam, Burma, India, Indonesia, Indochina, and the Philippine Islands.

Looking at the total situation, our country should at the earliest date, which presumably would be after Congress meets in January, initiate an economic aid-to-Asia program. The exact framework and details must be developed as time goes on, but I think some comment could be made on details at this time.

If we continue for a long period an atmosphere that the United States is waiting to see what happens in Asia, the result is a vacuum. Certainly all the lessons show that the Communists thrive on vacuums. They push into a vacuum with rapidity. So far as possible we must not permit vacuums to be present in Asia. Therefore we should establish an aid-to-Asia program, and we should decide, considering all the total demands upon our resources, what we can afford to spend in Asia. Clearly our own defense forces, the Marshall plan, and the arms for the Atlantic Pact members must all be firm and prior commitments. Our own internal problems of social security for our own people and of expenses of our Government are also demands upon our resources.



Furthermore, there is a limit to our resources. But it seems to me when you add all those things up, and look at the world picture, we not only can afford up to one-fortieth of our national budget for Asia, or one two-hundredth part of our year's annual income, which is \$1 billion a year; but we cannot afford not to do it. We should also establish a headquarters in Asia for the program.

It is my feeling that Bangkok in Siam would be the best headquarters for an American office for an aid-to-Asia program. From this headquarters this affirmative aid program for whatever area remains not under Communist domination in China and in the rest of Asia should be carried on.

In many respects it should be similar to that superb plan in Europe which is named for the distinguished American that sits at this table—the plan that has done so much for the advancement of the world's peace—the Marshall plan. Of course, in other respects it must be very different because the conditions in Asia are so different.

I would say it should be a firm rule of that plan that we do not hand out any aid to or through any governments in Asia because of the experience and the knowledge of the corruption and weakness of those governments. We should consult with governments as to what is to be done, and we should have joint committees for operation; but the aid must be handed out directly through American agents, having in mind not only the corruption, but also the great importance of evidence of aid from the standpoint of good will among the peoples.

In this positive program for China and for the rest of Asia, I would try to do such things as the drilling of wells in those plateaus that have good water—with good well-drilling equipment—the development of land use in conservation and fertilization. Admittedly this would make a small dent on that vast area but those are the types of constructive things that should be carried on. A portion of the program should include underwriting American private capital in going in and developing some of the natural resources of Asia. Underwriting under point 4 or a clause similar to the Marshall plan provision would be appropriate. From the special headquarters in Bangkok, selected for its central location and stability, an air service should be instituted with planes with American flags on them flying once again throughout Asia, carrying officials and some of the minor supplies. Some newsprint and informational services throughout the whole of the Asiatic area should be provided. Of course, measures having to do with health and with education would be included.

In other words, the immediate and the long-term to me are not two separate problems in Asia because there is only one kind of program you can have in Asia and that is a long-term one because it is a long-term continent as I see it in its position with reference to Russia.

Now, then, this economic aid to Asia program I would put up first and carry on regardless of what happens in China. From the military side, which clearly should be a separate program and should be under the direction of our own military leadership, I would emphasize here that there may well be intelligence information on which I do not have, and do not seek to have, which would vitiate the position I take.

I do not feel anyone can be certain that you can write off non-Communist China at this time. I think there should be encouragement to opposition to the Communist advance anywhere in Asia and, with the rough terrain to the south, you might well find there would be considerable pockets of opposition that would continue on for a number of years. During those years of time the problems of the Communists in the rest of China will clearly multiply.

Mr. Kennan has correctly said that China is the most have-not of the have-not nations. This is the first time that the Communists have taken over a have-not nation. We all recognize that Russia has tremendous resources. When the Communists took over Russia with its great fields of grain, and mineral resources, and coal mines, they had within their borders a lot of natural resources. Now they are taking over in China what clearly should be characterized, in relation to the numbers of population, a have-not nation. The likelihood is that in these next 2 or 3 years, while the pockets of resistance would continue in the non-Communist China, a great amount of difficulty will arise in those areas under Communist domination, possibly leading to starvation within the Communist area and riots causing great difficulties that no one can foresee.

I had a conversation with one of the men most informed about the whole of China and of Asia. When I asked him at the end of the war what would happen in China, he said: "Governor, if anybody asks you what will happen in China, don't answer him." There is a lot to that kind of advice. Nobody can draw a blueprint for the future of China.

I do know that in some respects the Communist advance through south China has been slower than was estimated; the advance up in northwest China is faster than was estimated. We are inclined to think, from our standpoint, that the withdrawal of forces show weaknesses. But if you are facing a million men with 250,000 men and with lack of morale maybe the best thing you can do is try to keep your men intact and keep on withdrawing until you get to the very nethermost areas of your country. I mean, China is so different that you should not attempt to appraise it from our standards. I think there is every indication that if we have a basic policy of opposition to the Communist advance, and opposition to the Communist consolidation of Asia, that then we should play out every card of opposition. That, of course, means that it would be unthinkable to recognize the Communist government in China and to withdraw recognition from the Nationalist government. Even though the last vestige of military opposition disappear, in my feeling, very strongly, a number of years should still go by before we recognize that new government. We must remember that the recognition of the new government would have a tremendous impact throughout Asia. It would place the new government with a seat on the Security Council of the United Nations, with full veto power. In my judgment it would be one of the most tragic moves we could make in the long-term world strategy. I feel very strongly that we should not recognize the Communist government in China even though they go on and consolidate the remaining area, which may still be a long way off in the very rugged terrain of the south of China. I am thinking again from an Asiatic and world-wide policy rather than exclusively the China policy.

On the other military question, I am inclined to feel that Formosa is an important strategic area for our own outer perimeter. Here again the military judgment should carry. There are excellent airfields in Formosa. If antagonistic air bases exist on Formosa the Philippine Islands and Japan are quite effectively severed from each other. Formosa is immediately astride of the airway and direct seaway. We should have in mind the psychological effect of a firm position and the fact that Formosa is still in an uncertain legal position because when the war ended, Formosa was not given the Nationalist government.

China was only given the right to go on Formosa to disarm the Japanese. There had been no peace treaty, no decision handing Formosa to China. The legal situation as to Formosa is an uncertain one and an undecided one. In view of that and in view of the picture in China, I feel that we ought to ask the United Nations to take the position that an attack on Formosa would not be countenanced at this time. Obviously, the United Nations could not take such action under the veto of Russia. We should then announce that we consider Formosa a very vital part of our perimeter and that we would not permit an exterior armed assault on Formosa. That is a very firm position to take. I think the whole picture requires some of that kind of firmness. If Formosa falls by internal infiltration, I feel we should not and cannot take action to counteract that. We should not land troops on Formosa, but we should take a firm position against assault from the mainland of China upon Formosa.

I think if the British take a stand in Hong Kong we ought to back the British up with everything they want us to back them up with in Hong Kong. These are matters of alternative, and if the British, who must be our close partner in this world picture, decide they are going to stand and fight, what do we do? Do we appear before the world as weak and indecisive? Do we back away from our British friends, or do we send ships and give them some air cover and do that sort of thing and indicate that we stand with them in a firm position against the Communist assault on Hong Kong? I grant these are grave decisions, but I think the whole picture demands that kind of very firm action. This military side leads to the question of Pacific pact. I know of these statements of Quirino and Rhee, and others. I cannot see that an affirmative Pacific pact of the nature of the Atlantic pact can be solidly formed at this time because I do not believe that India could join such a pact now, and I think that India must be a major consideration in our Pacific policy.

Therefore I think we ought to say to Quirino and Rhee that we do not think they should take action unless Nehru joins in it, and that will automatically defer it and cause a more gradual policy in that area. It ought to be our position that as far as association of the non-Communist area of Asia, it should not move any faster than Nehru is willing and India is willing to go along with it. We should develop an economic relationship in India which, I understand, the British have made more open to us now, by sending in equipment to assist in the development of hydroelectric power and of dams, engineers and capital and

supplies and all that that involves. With these measures should be included constant pressure—not too great, but definite—upon the Dutch and the French to work out their situations in Indochina and in the Indies on a favorable basis. Perhaps if the Dutch policy now evolves into fair stability that pattern might be the basis of pressure on the French to try to move in the same direction. It will be slow and difficult; there will be set-backs; but I think it is the unending kind of thing we must do in Asia. I do feel strongly that adopting an over-all coordinated policy and putting it under able men who are out there in a headquarters at Bangkok, and who will then give it body and sinew and detail—much as did General Marshall and then Paul Hoffman in the Marshall plan—that kind of a development out of the beginnings of a broad policy will lead to a hopeful situation. I am perfectly willing to contemplate that the Communist advance might go a lot farther before it subsides, and the question of its subsiding is really the question of our own fundamental future.

That's an outline of my thinking and I state it not with an attitude that here are the answers, but more to expose in definite form a set of thinking that has developed over a period of years so that it might be differed with, it might be modified, and we might contribute toward an answer. I have purposely refrained from discussing the situation publicly since the white paper was published because I felt that by direct conferences with Dr. Jessup and such as this there might be a better chance of developing governmental policy than by any public debate at this stage, at least, on the situation.

[Later in the conference after a question:]

We might focus on the economic program for a bit. Suppose, as I envisage it, that in various areas of south Asia American economic aid is coming in and getting some results in improved crops, in slightly better living conditions, in improved water and irrigation, and all that goes with it; whereas up in the Communist area of China they are going into a real economic tailspin. Is not that the kind of circumstance that over a period of a few years would begin to make some sense and give some answer to the great promises and claims of the Communists in Asia. I do not see where you have really differed in your specifics to that kind of an approach, and I do emphasize that if we pour in large sums of money in the hands of governments it is very unlikely that it gets out to the peasants. So what I am emphasizing is that what we do should be in terms of simple farm implements and of well-drilling equipment and of the simplest kinds of things put directly in the hands of the people without charge. Then it would be very hard for them to label that as imperialistic.

I agree that you should not require that they have an affirmative anti-Communist program politically as a prerequisite for economic aid; you should simply require that they be non-Communist-dominated and on that basis move on your economic aid.

Dr. Fosdick, to answer that I would say that it is very important, but I don't say that it is a prerequisite. In other words, I feel that the whole of Asia is such a vast problem that you cannot say anything is a prerequisite to the program. Just as the matter of studying just how you do these economic things, granted they need continuous study, but if we wait until we conclude our studies until we act, why we will all be dead before there is any action. So my feeling is that nobody could have painted out the Marshall plan when Dr. Marshall made that great presentation at Harvard. But after an exchange of views men were placed in charge of a program. Then study and action went forward together. That's what I feel is needed in Asia—study and action going on at the same time.

I, of course, do not mean to go in in spite of local governments or use American power to force our way in on the economic program. I mean that we go in with the permission and with joint working arrangements with the local governments, as we have in fact done in some of the South American countries. But there should be this distinction in the actual distribution of material—that is, that the prerequisite of our reaching agreement with the local government is that we be on hand in the distribution, so that it does not go into the black market and does not get dissipated as happened to so much of the former economic aid in Asia.

Dr. Fosdick, I want to clarify my position. I think Mr. Lattimore was under a misapprehension. By what I said regarding American aid, I did not mean to indicate that Asia was an exclusive problem of our country. I fully realize the interrelation of Europe and Asia and the whole world. But what I wish to emphasize is that when we are the country that has the most; when we actually, with about one-sixteenth of the world's people, produce one-third of the world's

goods and services, we do have a very heavy responsibility toward this great continent and its have-not peoples there.

It has key relevance in the world security aspect with reference to Russia. I do not indicate that we try to pass upon whether there are any Communist tendencies in any country before giving economic aid, but I do feel strongly that if there is Communist dominance of a country, we should not go in with an economic aid program.

I feel that there is a grave clash of ways of life that has far-reaching implications for the future, and it is foolhardy for us to pour what is admittedly a limited resource into the area under Communist dominance. I not only feel that from a positive program but I think that in fact it would be quite academic to argue to the contrary. We must remember the realities: That we are talking about a program that will require congressional action for money and you will never get through Congress.

Question from the floor: Would you condone the Yugoslav policy?

I will get to that in a minute. You will never get through Congress a program that would permit the giving of economic aid to the Communist-dominated sectors of China. There are those who advocate aid to the Communist areas of China in the hope there would develop a form of Communist Titoism there. That has a false promise. Tito did not move away from Russia because of any promise of aid on the part of this country toward him. As a matter of fact, he moved away at a time when we had been very firm with him following the shooting down of United States planes. As long as he could follow a position of in effect taking directions from Russia and taking resources from us, that was the role he played. But when he had to choose, and chose Moscow, then came up against the result of his choice and the tightening of the screws by Russia, then the famous break came.

I actually asked Tito in March of 1947 whether he was going to take his economic direction from the Soviet Union and he got up from the luncheon table and paced up and down and said, "We are learning much from the socialist experience of the Soviet but Yugoslavia is a sovereign country. We all fought in the mountains—General Velebit (his interpreter) fought in the mountains." He was agitated on the nationalist angle. Now having made the break, I think it is right that we should be able to give some limited aid. But I think we should couple it with some insistence that there be a gradual moving toward more freedom in Yugoslavia, even though it be very slow and very gradual. The direction of movement of a government while receiving American aid should be toward the freedom of its people. Clearly American aid should not go in when the direction of the movement of a government is to the contrary and against the freedom of its people.

When it is the over-all aspect of security and the problem of Russia, then we need to think of the world strategy that is involved. I definitely do not agree that any softness toward the Communists of China will give a better prospect of Titoism developing. I say it should be firm and clear: If a country is under Communist dominance, it does not qualify for American generosity. If a country breaks with communism, then there will be American generosity. I think that should be clearly our action in this economic aid struggle.

As to being accused of imperialism, I think it is elementary that as long as we are producing more than the rest of the countries and living at a higher standard of living, we are going to be accused of imperialism in every argument that comes up all over the world regardless of what you do. If you let the accusation of imperialism stop you from a clearly indicated program of action, it would be a sad day.

Thus we need to move carefully, with all possible consideration of utilizing the nationalism Mr. Taylor emphasized, but definitely move. In the movement try to negate the charge of imperialism, but do not let that charge stop you from moving.

Mention has been made of India as a center of Asiatic operation. As I indicated before, I agree on Nehru and India being of great importance. But it would be a mistake to put our Asiatic headquarters in India, because on the one hand there is the sensitivity of India toward the British, just having come out from under, and a greater sensitivity there toward others coming in than there would be in other areas of Asia.

You would also get into the question of India and Pakistan, and the Hindu and Moslem religious issues in having our headquarters in India.

Someone suggested that our headquarters should be in Manila. The atmosphere then would be that we were returning to Manila rather than beginning

a new Asiatic program. There is not the degree of democracy you would ideally desire in Siam. The strong man's record with reference to the Japanese in early 1942 is not good, but when you consider that Siam with approximately 17,000,000 people has one of the least dense populations and best food resources and greatest element of stability and a good location for travel by sea and air, I think you will come to feel that Bangkok is the logical center on the mainland of Asia for a long-term American aid program. Also, you have the fact that the terrain is additional security as to both Burma and Malaya, so for the greatest possible Communist onslaught, Bangkok would apparently be the last place to fall either by attack or infiltration, even if you take a black look at the future. That is why I am inclined to urge Bangkok as a center of Asiatic economic aid.

I emphasize that it is not to be a unilateral program and not to be one that we in America will do alone. It must be an aid to the people in Asia that help themselves. But let us be sure it will get to the people and not to corrupt elements in the governments. It will be a delicate operation. Let us also be certain we do not become involved in a joint operation with the British or French in a way that would bring to us the onus of their past colonial position. We do have a more favorable reputation in most of Asia than they do. While we must work closely with them in the world picture, let us not give ourselves this handicap in a new aid program by tying ourselves too closely to them.

Dr. Fosdick, I would say that clearly there should be consultation with the United Nations agencies and the utilization of them at every possible turn, but I cannot conceive that you could turn over the substance of American aid to be decided by United Nations agencies in Asia for a number of reasons. One is the aspect of the colonial powers being in there. The other is the amount of aid we give would fall so far short of what could well be used that I do not feel you could have the division of allocation that would parallel the OEEC in Europe. I think we would need to keep a more detailed control of the funds and of the goods in Asia than we do in Europe. I do grant and would urge that the United Nations agencies should be used to every degree possible.

I just want to say that I associate myself with Dr. Talbot and others who say that we must not try to have the Indians take positive sides between the Communists and ourselves. I think we must let that picture develop on pretty much their own pattern, and I also emphasize the view that you should try to get the greatest amount of the business approach into the situation, more of the underwriting and self-respect approach to the people of India. That is why, too, the Pacific Pact proposal, which might cause India to be outside of it, would be a very bad move, in my judgment.

Dr. Jessup, I might say first that I regret very much that I have not been able to sit through the entire conference. I made the greatest possible readjustment of my schedule when I received the invitation to be here and I will address myself very concisely to the point now under discussion and through the kind assistance of Dr. Talbot, I had some briefing of the discussion, and particularly of General Marshall's able presentation this morning.

I stated on Thursday that I was opposed to recognition of the North Government in China at this time and not at least for a question of a couple of years. I want to go into that a little more thoroughly because at that time I merely stated my position on it.

My first comment is on some of the related discussion this morning that has been advanced that along with recognition other steps we ought to take were proposed. I say, frankly, these steps, to me, could be best characterized as steps that would hasten the victory of the Communists in China and hasten the complete liquidation of the Nationalist Government. I think that would be the correct characterization of the related steps that have been advanced along with the urging of recognition at the earliest possible date.

To me that would be a very sad mistake in our world policy. If we recognize the Communist Government of China now, clearly that does mean we must at the same time not only withdraw recognition of the other Government—the Nationalist Government—but that we must then join in affirmative action to throw the Nationalist Government out of the United Nations. There are no halfway measures on this. You cannot be recognizing a government in one way and then in the United Nations tribunal, in which we a great leading nation, take a different position to that. Nor should we possibly abstain. That would be a cowardly and weak position to take. So, we would then be in the position of going into the United Nations, with our great prestige, and throw out from that United Nations the representative of whatever you may wish to call them—the remnants of a former government that still has now, and I think

will for some foreseeable time, the effective jurisdiction over one-third of the area of China and one-third of its people and that is continuing to put up some form of resistance to the Communist areas.

Now, to put ourselves in that position in my mind, cannot be countenanced and I might urge, as I go forward, and respectfully submit that there have been some implications that perhaps those that oppose recognition are trying to play the popular tune in America, and the high view of statesmanship is the contrary and difficult and unpopular course. I will not attempt to draw any cloak of statesmanship about me this morning, or any other time, but I would modestly state that the steps that I took in the early days of opposition to Hitler and lend-lease and the whole question of isolation and world trade have not been popular courses at the time they were taken particularly in my home part of the country. To the greatest degree, it is possible, I approach these policies from the standpoint of what is right in the long view for our country and our ideals rather than what is the current popular view. In fact, I have such faith in democracy that if a policy is right, then I am certain you can interpret it to the American people and convince the majority of them it is right.

Going to the specifics of recognition, it seems to me that taking the affirmative stand of ejecting the Nationalist Government from the United Nations and placing in its stead the Communist Government of the north would be a clear invitation to a disregard of our fundamental ideals and objectives in the world picture. Whatever else may be said about the Nationalist Government, it seems to me that there has been a greater measure of democracy, a greater measure of individual freedom, the right of free expression, of a free press, of the communication of news in that area than there has been in any of the Communist areas of the world.

I might project my views of the Communist Government of north China. I believe that in the early stages they have brought in some of those who are not Communists into leadership—some of those we might call moderates. In the early stages they will say to the American businessman, if your country treats us better and recognizes us that will facilitate your doing business here. However, you will find quite rapidly as they consolidate their control over the country, and as they introduce people into these industries and businesses who learn something about them, they will proceed to throw out the moderates from the Government and will tighten up and possibly expropriate and take over the businesses, and that process will move forward steadily.

In saying that I anticipate that the pattern followed in Communist China will be the same as the Communist pattern in the Balkan area. I have a vivid recollection of a conference with President Benes of Czechoslovakia 2½ years ago in which he stated that Czechoslovakia was cooperating with the Soviet Union. He thought it was the best policy and that they were seeking to build a bridge between east and west and he had been pledged cooperation by Stalin. Benes thought it was the right policy for his country, and Stalin had pledged to him that Czechoslovakia could work out its solution in a broad democratic framework.

I think it is quite clear now that approach was used to Benes and other people of Czechoslovakia as a means of getting control, first, of the police and of the Department of Industries. After getting the Communists into the various industries they took over completely. Now week after week and month after month they obliterate more human rights and they bring the country under iron-handed dictatorship. The record in Poland has been similar to that.

If that effort is made in China, I believe you will find then disaffection of some of the generals in the Communist armies of China which will have to be met by rapid liquidation and new leaders being set in. Or it might involve a real split up and further division within the vast area of China in its leadership. This process, as I vision it, while the armies are in being and still moving about, would take place within the next few years, and I would think it would be regretted if we added to the prestige of the Communist Government of China, and then a process of this kind began to take place and we in fact would be in the position of always strengthening the hand of the new Communist government, which would be successively wiping out the liberties, freedoms, and opportunities of the Chinese people and would be putting down the efforts of those who wanted some nationalism in China and who wanted some independence and who were breaking away from the Communist leadership.

In my mind the plusses are very large on the side of saying that we want to watch this picture for a couple of years before we recognize the Communist Government of China. We may well find that just as the experts' anticipations

have been unfounded so many times in China, that the anticipation and prediction now that the Communist armies can consolidate all China on their own timetable may meet many a reverse in some of the mountain passes by some of the troops who begin to defend their own territory as compared with defending an area far away from home.

Nobody knows the future under the frailties of the human race. Chiang Kai-shek in more recent months and years has had an unfortunate conclusion of what in many respects was a brilliant and remarkable career. Who knows but that Chiang at his age may pass from the picture and others may rise in the uncertain period of a few years and that in that we might find grounds perhaps; first, for a withdrawal of the full powers of the Nationalist Government in the United Nations, and perhaps even a request for a United Nations commission to study the situation in China, and that we might thereby gain time. We might serve notice that we are watching what the new government is doing in the matter of observing the recognized international amenities, and how it is treating American businessmen and missionaries; and how it is going about the obligations of international treaties; before we move in to recognize and to urge their seating in the United Nations.

I regret that I have not heard in detail the other arguments, but just what could be gained in that kind of a picture by a rapid recognition, I cannot evaluate as a counterbalance. It seems to me that after some period of time a group of men such as this could be assembled again to reevaluate the situation as to recognition and then analyze Russian dominance. In the meantime, let it be known that we are studying their independence on each of it.

Certainly the situation as to Tito is no indication that you move people away from the Soviet Union by being generous to them. He moved away at a time when we were being most firm and clearly classifying him in that area. On the other hand he was professing his association with the Soviet Union at a time when he could do that and still retain full American aid and full American assistance under UNRRA. There was no reason then for him to take any other position. But when he had to make a choice with the increasing tightening up of domination by the Soviet Union, he made the choice to move away.

If there are indications in China in the future of moving away from Moscow and of a greater recognition of rights of people within North China, that would be the moment at which we might decide to recognize and send assistance. But at a time when all statements being made by the leaders and the Communist Government are insulting and attacking our country, when the treatment of nationals is at a low ebb, clearly that is not a time to think of recognition. I think our prestige is involved in all of Asia and all we have done and all we will do.

I make the further point on this that by all means we should have a new aid to Asia economic program under way and functioning before we recognize the Communist government of the north of China.

If at a stage such as the present when the world says, what is America's Asia policy; the one outstanding fact was to be that we recognized the Communist Government of North China and joined in throwing out of the United Nations the Government that stood firm in the years of Japanese invasion; I think the result would be very sad. But if we start a new affirmative approach of aid to Asia in a positive way, and if our new American program and policy begins to project itself and be understood, if at that stage we find the intelligence officers' reports are of complete consolidation, and if at that stage we find there is an element of increasing stability and respect for rights rather than the reverse in the north of China, then at that stage I think recognition should be given after a full consideration—but not before.

**Mr. MORRIS.** Governor Stassen, I wonder if you will address yourself to the first of those 10 points and tell us what opposition was expressed at this conference.

**Mr. STASSEN.** The first point that they had urged was that Asia should be approached as a long-term problem to be studied and deferred; that the Russian Communist attention was concentrated first on Western Europe with its industrial strength; that the United States should likewise give priority to Europe.

It was my view before and expressed at the conference and since that American Asiatic policy should be given immediate attention be-

cause I considered that Asia was the No. 1 priority of the Russian Communists at that time and that they would move into the vacuum in Asia at an early date. I said that in no uncertain terms in this transcript that you have.

I said this was true because Asia was the vast underbelly of the Soviet Empire and that the Communists would not move aggressively toward either Europe or Alaska, so long as they were uncertain about this vast underbelly below their great projection. In fact, in the conference with Dr. Jessup in September, we brought down the maps from the university to explain that whole situation and our basic analysis of it.

The CHAIRMAN. That was with Dr. Jessup?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. That was your September meeting with him?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right, when we used the maps, but the same points were made as the transcript will show, in the October meeting. But at that time we had official State Department maps on the wall and we did not bring our own maps down.

Mr. MORRIS. For what purpose did you use the maps, Governor?

Mr. STASSEN. To give emphasis and clarity to our analysis of the world strategic situation, that it was foolhardy for America to be thinking only in terms of Europe and to leave a vacuum in Asia in which I was positive the Communists would move in, and that would upset the whole world situation. That was the plea I was making at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it not seem apparent to you that if it was deferred and only studied that the Communists might take over all of China, and southeast Asia, for that matter?

Mr. STASSEN. Exactly. If you deferred and studied that, then you left a vacuum and an atmosphere of hopelessness and you fitted in then with the Communist charge that America was neglecting and didn't care about what happened to the people in Asia, so that you left that weakness in Asia and weakness in American position during these crucial months.

Remember now, this is the point when the civil war is going on in China with approximately half the people on each side of the line, and these are the crucial months that you are going through. That was why I urged so strongly that I was certain that Asia was No. 1 on Russia's board and that America must countermove promptly.

Senator FERGUSON. Was this the beginning of the let-the-dust-settle policy?

Mr. STASSEN. That was in the middle of it, and I was trying to change it, and I was trying to get a positive policy instead of that.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you been in a position to observe any implementation of that recommended policy?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes. From that time on, and again on up into the Korean war, and specifically through the conference that was held in March of 1950, at the State Department, in which they had leaders of many organizations present, there was always a sort of general discussion of doing something in Asia and never a concrete moving ahead, always a continuing general talking back and forth and not a specific implementation and moving on a countering program.

Senator FERGUSON. On the second item, if we waited and did nothing to avoid the Communist charging us with imperialism, that also would



play into the hands of the Communists much better and in a much stronger manner than their charge of imperialism; would it not?

Mr. STASSEN. It would leave the same vacuum there that the others could move into; yes. I can recall that part of the discussion very much, and I had told them then, and it will appear in the transcript, that as long as we were a nation of great success and great resources the Communists would always be charging us with imperialism, whatever we did, and that the real way to answer it was to have a broad world-wide approach to the economic gain of other peoples. That was the answer that I made at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. That is point No. 2, Governor Stassen?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right, point No. 2. There was this extended discussion on their part that you did not know just what would happen in one country or another and the relations between them, and therefore you had to do a lot of studying; that you could not start anything unless you did a lot of studying, and they constantly brought that up. I insisted that you should establish the program, put able men in charge of it, just as Paul Hoffman was put in charge of the Marshall plan, and then have the study and the action go forward together. Of course, you should study, but you just should not sit still and study and leave a vacuum in Asia.

I stated specifically a headquarters should be established in Bangkok to show that America meant business, and then go forward studying and acting at the same time to assist the non-Communist portions of Asia.

Mr. MORRIS. Has there been any implementation of that particular recommendation on the part of this prevailing group, Governor Stassen?

Mr. STASSEN. After Korea, long after Korea—in fact, in December of last year—the first recommendation was brought up by the State Department for aid to India in the form of wheat, which was then acted on a couple of months later. The first tangible moves on the point 4, which is partially in this area, but is not the direct kind of program that was then recommended, came forward; but from the time of this conference until Korea broke there was just a continuation of the delay and the study which had been recommended by the Lattimore group and no positive implementation such as our group had recommended.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, will you address yourself to the third point?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the third point?

Mr. STASSEN. The third point was that the Russian Communists were not as aggressive as Hitler and would not be apt to take direct military action to expand their empire.

I contended that the Russian Communists were potentially just as aggressive as Hitler—I pointed out Finland as an example—and that America should consider that aggressive military action by the Soviet Union was one of the definite alternative possibilities and that we should have that in mind in our policy.

But then, again, between that conference and the outbreak of the Korean war, there was no action taken to strengthen the military readiness or alertness of this country on the Soviet perimeter, but rather that attitude that they were not going to move by military

force persisted until they proved when they went across the line at Korea that our analysis was right and that the analysis they urged was wrong.

Senator JENNER. When were our troops taken out of Korea?

Mr. STASSEN. In June 1949, just before this conference; June 29, 1949, the last 1,500 troops of the United States Army left South Korea, leaving a military mission to aid in training South Koreans.

Senator FERGUSON. Governor, it appears now that you were correct in your views because aggression did take place in Korea, and of course they would be correct if you did not do anything about it and created the vacuum and allowed them to penetrate without force, which was their first two points, was it not?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, will you address yourself to the fourth point?

Mr. STASSEN. The fourth point was that the United States should recognize the Communist Peoples Republic government of China under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung at an early date.

That, of course, has continued to be an issue up to this time with the declaration since Korea on the part of the officials of our Government that we would not recognize the Chinese Peoples Republic.

Senator JENNER. Has not our Government taken the attitude that we are not going to permit Red China to fight its way into the United Nations?

Mr. STASSEN. That is one of the statements that was made. I think General Marshall said, "Shoot its way in."

Senator JENNER. That does not preclude the fact that if you could stop the war, and so forth, and Great Britain and the other nations recognize them, then we could recognize?

Mr. STASSEN. There has been much public discussion since Korea of this issue.

Senator FERGUSON. That was a very live subject at that time because just 5 or 6 days before the Communist government claimed this sovereign power.

Mr. STASSEN. It was a very hot subject at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. The country was evenly divided both as to people and territory; is that not so?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. So, about 6 days afterward, they were advocating that we recognize the Communist Government, which would have been, of course, withdrawal of our recognition from the Nationalists?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, would you care to comment under the heading of implementation of that point?

Mr. STASSEN. The fourth and fifth tie in together.

In the discussion it was urged by the Lattimore group that the United States should encourage the recognition of the Communist Peoples Republic government by Britain and India and then follow with its own recognition soon thereafter. Of course, in the implementation, which we were following at the time, that is exactly what happened.

On November 16, Mr. Bevin, in the House of Commons, said, on

the question of recognition of Communist China, they were waiting for the United States and others to make the same decision. Then on January 5, 1950, in other words a few months after this conference, Britain did recognize Red China, which, on the surface, indicates the implementation of the recommendations of the Lattimore group in the October conference.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know when India recognized them?

Mr. STASSEN. India recognized them on December 30, of 1949, in other words, just 5 days before Britain.

So these two recognitions, which were in the conference urged as the way to lead it off, did take place.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what public opinion was around that time or after Britain and after India did recognize Communist China? In your opinion, was there a strong public opinion here in America against our recognition?

Mr. STASSEN. It was a divided opinion. I don't remember any polls at that particular period on it. In fact, I haven't followed the polls so much on it.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, did you hear any person publicly identified with the policy making of the United States Government express a prediction or a recommendation that the United States should recognize Communist China?

Mr. STASSEN. Did I hear them publicly express?

Mr. MORRIS. Or privately express.

Mr. STASSEN. In the conference, Mr. Butterworth of the State Department said that when the Communist Chinese crossed the Yangtze River, which, as I recall, would have been about April of 1949, that then this Government had approached these other governments as to their views about recognizing the Chinese Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. We have had testimony before this committee, Governor Stassen, by General Fortier of General MacArthur's staff that Ambassador Jessup early in January 1950 expressed the view to him that the United States was about to recognize Communist China in a period of 2 or 3 weeks.

I was wondering if you heard publicly or privately such a prediction or such an expression of opinion.

Mr. STASSEN. No; I did not, but that testimony would tie in exactly with what the Lattimore group had said in the October conference. In other words, in the October conference they had said that the United States should encourage India and Britain to act first and then the United States should follow a couple of weeks afterward so that that would exactly relate to the testimony you recite to me from Mr. Fortier, but I do not know that first-hand from Mr. Fortier or from Mr. Jessup.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know what date Mr. Jessup arrived in Japan?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes. He arrived in Japan on January 6th of 1950, 5th or 6th. There is a change in date line between Japan and here and I am not just positive what date line applies here.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there any expression of policy made in connection with that particular visit of Ambassador Jessup to Japan?

Mr. STASSEN. The day that Ambassador Jessup arrived in Japan, the President of the United States announced that the United States had no intention of providing military aid or advice to the Nationalists on Formosa or of using its Armed Forces to interfere there, which was

widely characterized as the abandonment of Formosa by the United States, which was another one of the public indications of the implementing of the Lattimore group's policies which we followed in these succeeding months. That occurred before Ambassador Jessup saw General MacArthur.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, Governor, that policy was announced before General MacArthur's opinion was made known, at least verbally, to Jessup?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right, before there was an opportunity to make it known.

Senator FERGUSON. You had indicated that your opinion was that Jessup should see General MacArthur?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. About the Far East?

Mr. STASSEN. About the whole series of recommended points, which I said would be tragic for America.

Senator WATKINS. Do you remember who represented the State Department at this conference?

Mr. STASSEN. Not all of them. There were, I would say, eight or nine officials in and out on the different days. Of course, on the opening day, as I said, Dr. Fosdick presided. Later on, Dr. Jessup presided. Some came in for briefing. A number were sitting there taking notes that never were identified, so I do not know who they all were.

Senator WATKINS. Was Secretary Marshall there?

Mr. STASSEN. General Marshall was there but he was not then Secretary. General Marshall sat on the extreme right end of the table and Mr. Jessup at the extreme left end of the table.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether General Marshall expressed himself on any of these points?

Mr. STASSEN. General Marshall, on the opening of the third day, before I arrived, gave a statement which was then briefed to me and it was then indicated—it will show, of course, in the transcript—he did not go into any of these specific points, as it was then indicated to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether he was present at the time Lattimore was advocating some of these points?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes; he was.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it to Lattimore or Jessup that you expressed your hope that the policy put out by the Lattimore group would not be carried out?

Mr. STASSEN. To Dr. Jessup.

The CHAIRMAN. I caught it to be to Lattimore.

Mr. STASSEN. No, it was to Dr. Jessup that I said that. I pleaded with him not to implement the Lattimore policy. This, you understand, was at the recess of the third day when I saw the way the discussion was going, and when I felt strongly as to the tragic implications of it for our country.

The CHAIRMAN. He expressed himself contrary to your views?

Mr. STASSEN. He said he felt the greater logic was on the position advanced by the Lattimore group.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, we have partially covered point No. 6, namely, that it should be United States policy to turn Formosa over to the Chinese Communist government, but lest we miss anything that

may appear in your notes or in the transcript, is there anything more you can add by way of expression of opposition to that or by way of implementation to that?

Mr. STASSEN. I discussed that extensively in the conference. I took the position that the United States should announce that it considered Formosa a vital part of our perimeter of defense and that we would not permit an armed assault from the mainland on Formosa. That will be found at the bottom of page 7 of the transcript as given to you. It starts out:

On the other military question, I am inclined to feel that Formosa is an important strategic area for our own outer perimeter.

Remember, this is 2 years ago, before all of this military discussion, but I felt it from knowing it during the war. You see, we sailed all around Formosa with Admiral Halsey's fleet and I knew the information as to the strategic position of Formosa.

Then I referred to the maps, and I said:

If antagonistic air bases exist on Formosa the Philippine Islands and Japan are quite effectively severed from each other. Formosa is immediately astride of the airway and direct seaway. We should have in mind the psychological effect of a firm position and the fact that Formosa is still in an uncertain legal position because when the war ended, China was not given the Nationalist Government—

I mean Formosa was not given to the Nationalist Government.

There has been no peace treaty, no decision handing Formosa to China—and so forth.

Then when they could not count me on the analysis of the perimeter, they said, furthermore it will do no good to defend Formosa from attack on the mainland. Formosa is going to fall from interior infiltration inside Formosa because of the weakness of Chiang's generals and the greater amount of communism on Formosa.

I said that is contrary to my information and I did not believe that Formosa would fall by internal infiltration.

That was the argument they pushed on the matter of giving up Formosa at that time.

Then in the implementation of that position in the ensuing months, on December 23 of 1949, in other words, a little over 2 months after this conference, the State Department sent a memorandum to foreign personnel throughout the world playing down the importance of Formosa. That memorandum has been entered into the records of the Armed Services Committee in recent weeks, but it went to everybody, the Voice of America, and all our representatives all over the world, in effect preparing the way to giving up Formosa.

That was another evidence to me, as I was following it, that the Lattimore policy was being implemented in the ensuing months.

Senator JENNER. Governor, if Dr. Jessup had followed your suggestion before he went out to confer with General MacArthur, he could easily have ascertained that General MacArthur determined that Formosa was the main key to the chain of defense for the security of this country; is that not correct?

Mr. STASSEN. It is clear now. As I said, I had not talked to General MacArthur before I said these things. We now know from General MacArthur's testimony that he at all times felt that way, that For-

mosa must be held, and he said that to everyone who asked him in these various conferences, both military and diplomatic, since the war.

Of course, you see, in following this thing through in trying to analyze it, it is a fact that Dr. Jessup took the boat from San Francisco to Japan to see General MacArthur. In other words, he went by boat and not by air. He left San Francisco, I believe, on December 21. He arrived in Japan on January 6. During the time he was en route on the sea, the State Department memorandum on Formosa was issued around the world. India recognized Red China. Britain recognized Red China, and President Truman announced we had no intention of defending Formosa. Then the day after that Mr. Jessup arrived for the conference with General MacArthur.

Senator FERGUSON. Governor, did you know that even prior to the issuing of the note on the 23d to the world, in fact, that is, the State Department in various parts of the world, that they were at the first part of December, or around the 1st of December, circulating the report that China was going to fall, that Formosa was going to fall from within, and therefore could not be defended? Did you ever hear that?

Mr. STASSEN. We were told that in this October conference. We were argued against on that, and the so-called briefing of an intelligence basis attempted to give credence to it. Of course, I have had enough experience during the war with intelligence briefing to know that we were not really given an intelligence briefing. We were given a sort of presentation to fit in with what was being recommended.

Senator FERGUSON. There is no doubt that is what was happening in the various embassies in the Far East?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

Senator WATKINS. Governor, did you follow the testimony given before the Foreign Relations Committee when the hearings were held on the Atlantic Pact?

Mr. STASSEN. Quite closely.

Senator WATKINS. Do you recall the questions that were asked of General Bradley with respect to our defenses in the Far East when he outlined the Territory of Alaska, the Aleutians, Japan, Okinawa, the Philippines, and left out Formosa?

Mr. STASSEN. That was Secretary Acheson's speech to the Press Club.

Senator WATKINS. What I am calling your attention to is General Bradley's testimony given for the Foreign Relations Committee. He responded to a question I asked him with respect to our far-eastern line. He had already stated that the defense line in Europe was on the Elbe, and I asked him then where it was in the Far East. He left out Formosa.

I wondered if that had any significance.

Mr. STASSEN. I am not aware of that testimony. I do not know anything about it.

Senator WATKINS. As I remember, that is what he said.

Mr. STASSEN. I do not know.

Senator WATKINS. If that is true, that would indicate that the State Department was probably acting in conjunction with the Defense Department.

Mr. STASSEN. I would rather not attempt to characterize something, particularly if I have not seen the original testimony, and I have not seen that testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, would you care to develop the next point for us, please?

Mr. STASSEN. That it should be United States policy to permit the Chinese Communists to take Hong Kong if they insisted.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there opposition to that point expressed?

Mr. STASSEN. Definitely. I insisted that we must back up the British in the then Asiatic picture and show strength rather than weakness. I said, and it will show on page 8 of the transcript—

I think if the British take a stand in Hong Kong we ought to back the British up with everything they want us to back them up with in Hong Kong. These are matters of alternative, and if the British, who must be our close partner in this world picture, decide they are going to stand and fight, what do we do? Do we appear before the world as weak and indecisive? Do we back away from our British friends, or do we send ships and give them some air cover and do that sort of thing and indicate that we stand with them in a firm position against the Communist assault in Hong Kong? I grant these are grave decisions, but I think the whole picture demands that kind of very firm action.

That, of course, was one of the hot arguments of the conference. I just felt that if we showed that kind of weakness and backed away from the British, as they were urging, that it would have a very deteriorating effect throughout Asia and throughout the world.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything to be said by way of implementation of that recommendation on the part of the group?

Mr. STASSEN. There was a statement, one of these sort of official information, from the State Department, in November of the following month, that the United States had no intention of defending Hong Kong.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, will you develop point No. 8?

Mr. STASSEN. That Premier Nehru had shown reactionary and arbitrary tendencies and should not be leaned on or assisted as a leader of non-Communist forces in Asia.

I insisted then, and I had a great amount of support on this point in the conference, that Premier Nehru was an important leader in the non-Communist areas of Asia, that there frequently would be difficulty in understanding him because of the difference of the Hindu background and all of the multiple problems of India, but that in my judgment he definitely was non-Communist, he was being attacked by the Communists, and that India should receive economic aid and that Nehru should not be opposed in his effort to develop his third position in the world struggle. That position that I took in that respect was then ridiculed by the Lattimore group in the conference.

Mr. MORRIS. Actually, subsequent to that time, the attacks on Nehru were discontinued, were they not, Governor Stassen?

Mr. STASSEN. No. Months subsequent to that, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any information or any evidence to give us which would indicate why this change had taken place? That is, why the Communists were criticizing Nehru at this particular time, and today apparently they seem to be taking a different position?

Mr. STASSEN. They are not really taking a different position at this time.

Mr. MORRIS. They are not?

Mr. STASSEN. The Communists are still attacking Nehru. They play various angles in time, but the basic Communist approach is still trying to tear down Nehru and to get Communist leadership in India, but at any time that Nehru takes a position that is opposed to something that the United States is doing, then the Communists will back him on that particular thing; but as far as the continuing leadership of Nehru, the Communists continue to endeavor to undermine him and oppose him in this and to weaken him. That is very extreme.

In the *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, which is a Russian Communist publication, you will find this language:

In India Nehru has turned from a left-wing congressite and exposé of imperialism into a nimble servant of two masters, Britain and the United States, into an ally of the Indian princes and landowners, a bloody strangler of the progressive forces of India.

In other words, that is the attack the Communists make on Nehru.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the date of that attack?

Mr. STASSEN. That is October 26, 1949.

There has been no basic change in that on the part of the Communists except as they will play a particular issue versus the United States.

You understand further that the Lattimore group's opposition to Nehru in the October 1949 conference was not on the basis that he was pro-Communist. It was on the basis that he had shown reactionary tendencies, reactionary and arbitrary tendencies, and therefore should not be backed by the United States.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you address yourself to the next point, point No. 9?

Mr. STASSEN. That the United States should not approve of the blockade of the Communist Chinese coast by the Chinese Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek, should assist in breaking it, and should send economic aid to the area of China under Communist control.

I had strong support in the conference that for the sake of world peace and our own security, high American policy should be to prevent Russian Communist imperialistic consolidation of Asia, and that every move of opposition to the Communist advance in Asia should be made, and that all forces resisting communism in Asia should be aided militarily as well as economically.

In other words, that we should have a consistent unending policy in opposition to the Communist advance.

Subsequent to the conference, on this point, I noted that on November 16, in other words, 6 weeks after the conference, Secretary Acheson publicly protested the Nationalist Chinese firing on the *Flying Cloud* which was running the Nationalist blockade and taking supplies in to the Communist Chinese, which, of course, appeared to me to be an implementation of the view that had been advanced in the conference by the Lattimore group.

Then on December 3 Secretary Acheson said that the United States did not recognize the legality of the Nationalist Chinese blockade and protested the shelling of the United States ship of the Isbrandtsen line, which was a further indication of following those recommendations.

Then when Korea broke, and the United States intervened in Korea, at the same time the United States Seventh Fleet was told to prevent



the Chinese Nationalists' Navy from blockading the Chinese Communist coast, so at that point when the Korean war broke out the Chinese Nationalist blockade was ended and war supplies began once more to move into the Chinese Communist area.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, do you know of any attempt made on the part of the United States Department of State to impose a complete blockade on the Chinese Nationalist Government during the time that they were still struggling on the mainland with the Chinese Communists?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you relate what you know about that particular subject, Governor Stassen?

Mr. STASSEN. I know what Senator Arthur Vandenberg told me.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what he told you about it?

Mr. STASSEN. When I saw Senator Vandenberg, for whom, as you know, I have the very highest regard, for the last time in his home in Grand Rapids, Mich., in November of 1950 just prior to my last trip through Asia and around the world, he told me of a White House conference on this question of stopping supplies for Chiang Kai-Shek.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you develop that for us, if there is any more to develop?

Mr. STASSEN. Senator Vandenberg told me in this conference he was called in to, which he said was the only conference that he had been called in to on Asiatic policy, it was there proposed by Secretary Acheson and Dr. Jessup to the President that the supplies which were then being loaded in ships in Hawaii and San Francisco for the Chiang Kai-shek government be dramatically stopped as a move toward world peace.

That is that all armaments should be immediately cut off from the Chinese Nationalists and that the ships that were then on the way and then being loaded, as I recall—he said there were five such ships that would be carrying supplies to the Chinese Nationalists—they should all be stopped in a dramatic and direct announcement to stop the supplies that were continuing the internal war in China; that he then vigorously opposed it and analyzed it, and that after discussion with members of the Cabinet who were present, the President decided not to go ahead with the recommendation of Secretary Acheson and Dr. Jessup in view of Senator Vandenberg's statement he would publicly oppose it, and he was certain he would get the majority of the United States Senate to join with him in the opposition to that policy.

Mr. MORRIS. Were these supplies purchased by the moneys appropriated by Congress during the 1946-48 period?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Were they the supplies referred to by Senator Vandenberg?

Mr. STASSEN. They would be purchased by various sources, by the Chinese Nationalists. It was to be all arms en route to the Chinese Nationalists, just a complete stoppage of all supplies of a military nature for the Chinese Nationalists, whatever their source of purchase had been.

Mr. MORRIS. That in effect would have been a complete blockade?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, may we give consideration to point

No. 10 here? That is, if you have finished the implementation of point No. 9. I am not sure you have.

Mr. STASSEN. I think I have.

That no aid should be sent to the non-Communist Chinese guerrillas in the south of China, nor to the Chiang Kai-shek forces, and the military supplies en route to them should be cut off.

That again was a subject of intense discussion, and as I earlier indicated, I had urged and supported that everyone opposing the advance of communism should have had American help, and that if we did that it could well be in this argument as to what Chiang Kai-shek's ability was, et cetera, that other leaders would come up in China opposing communism, and we might find new leaders in some of these provinces in the south, so it would be worthy of continuing support, and that you would begin to develop countermoves to the Communists.

So that we ought to assist everybody that showed some effectiveness and some willingness to oppose the Chinese Communists. But that was ruled out in this Lattimore group approach; that we should turn toward giving aid to the Chinese Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the date of the White House conference that Senator Vandenberg told you about?

Mr. STASSEN. I do not know the date. It can be traced down at the point when these ships were going to sail from Hawaii and San Francisco with these supplies.

Mr. MORRIS. I ask you that by way of determining whether or not that instrument would be an implementation of point No. 10.

Mr. STASSEN. It was. It was so discussed with Senator Vandenberg on that basis.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you add anything else by way of implementation of this recommendation?

Mr. STASSEN. At the time the Korea war broke out the Seventh Fleet was also directed to stop the airplane flights from Formosa over to supply the Chinese guerrillas still fighting in the south of China, and they were stopped at that time.

In other words, the guerrillas' supplies were stopped by the United States Seventh Fleet at the time of the beginning of the Korean war.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, we had testimony last Friday by Professor McGovern, of Northwestern University, that while he was an adviser, a consultant to the congressional committee that was reviewing foreign aid for Congress, that he was advised by the United States military missions in China in 1947 they were prohibited from giving any tactical recommendation or tactical assistance whatever to the Chinese Nationalist forces.

In your experience have you heard of anything that would be such to corroborate his testimony along those lines?

Mr. STASSEN. I have not heard of that particular matter, but I have not talked to the United States military missions that were in China at that period, so I wouldn't have had an opportunity to hear it.

Mr. MORRIS. Such a policy, if it took place subsequent to this 1949 conference, would have been implementation, however, of the recommendations of Lattimore and Rosinger, would it not?

Mr. STASSEN. You said this was in 1947. That would have been prior.

Mr. MORRIS. If it had taken place subsequent.

Mr. STASSEN. Yes; but I had no knowledge of it.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor, you have expressed extensively the views that you set forth in opposition to the 10 points proposed by Lattimore and Rosinger. Did you make any over-all conclusion? In other words, a general conclusion that would not be addressed particularly to any of the 10 points?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes, I did, near the close of the conference.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you say, Governor Stassen?

Mr. STASSEN. I had better give you that exactly from the transcript.

Mr. MORRIS. Please do.

Mr. STASSEN. On page 15 of the transcript in the middle of the page. This is the last time I spoke in the conference.

My first comment is on some of the related discussion this morning—this is the morning of October 8—

that has been advanced that along with recognition other steps we ought to take were proposed.

This is the group of steps I have been discussing with you.

I say, frankly, these steps, to me, could be best characterized as steps that would hasten the victory of the Communists in China and hasten the complete liquidation of the Nationalist Government. I think that would be the correct characterization of the related steps that have been advanced along with the urging of recognition at the earliest possible date.

To me that would be a very sad mistake in our world policy. If we recognize the Communist government of China now—

this is October 8, 1949—

clearly that does mean we must at the same time not only withdraw recognition of the other Government—the Nationalist Government—but that we must then join in affirmative action to throw the Nationalist Government out of the United Nations. There are no halfway measures on this. You cannot be recognizing a government in one way and then in the United Nations tribunal, in which we are a great leading nation, take a different position to that. Nor should we possibly abstain. That would be a cowardly and weak position to take. So, we would then be in the position of going into the United Nations, with our great prestige, and throw out from that United Nations the representative of whatever you may wish to call them—the remnants of a former government that still has now, and I think will for some foreseeable time, the effective jurisdiction over one-third of the area of China and one-third of its people, and that is continuing to put up some form of resistance to the Communist areas.

Now, to put ourselves in that position in my mind, cannot be countenanced—and then I went on from there.

That was my final attempt to break through this related policy that was being advanced. I said these things to them right straight across the conference table. They are in the official transcript.

Mr. MORRIS. It was subsequent to all of this that you say that Ambassador Jessup said that he thought that greater logic was on the side of Lattimore and Rosinger?

Mr. STASSEN. I think you might have sensed somewhat of my feelings. Then the conference recessed. I stepped up to Dr. Jessup and the conversation I earlier described took place.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, is there anything else in your notes or in your transcript that has not been covered by our going over each of the 10 points and by our taking that general conclusion? Is there anything else which we should have in our record bearing on this point?

Mr. STASSEN. You have the whole transcript. Obviously there are

the things you had not gone into that are necessary. The whole transcript is full of important statements, but I think you certainly covered the main outline of the clash of policy that existed at that time in that conference.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you notice anything about the make-up of the personnel attending this conference? In other words, Governor Stassen, did you have the impression there was a predominance of Institute of Pacific Relations people present?

Mr. STASSEN. I did not have any knowledge then and had not attempted to define who were members and who were not. I had declined membership in the institute way back 10 years before and had not followed the institute. So I did not know as to that part of it. I did notice the absence of some people that it seemed to me should have been present, among them, for example, Dr. David Rowe of Yale University, who is one of the great authorities on Asia and China and the Far East; Dr. Arthur Steiner of UCLA, on the west coast, a very eminent writer and a distinguished scholar; Dr. Norman Brown of our own University of Pennsylvania, who is the director of our southeast Asia area study group.

It is the only southeast area study group in the United States in any university. There are other parts in other universities, but it is supported by the various grants. General Wedemeyer I thought clearly was in a position to give much light in a reexamination of policy. Admiral Nimitz clearly would have been from the Pacific standpoint. General Frank McCoy of the Far Eastern Commission; Maxwell Hamilton of the Far East Commission, and those are entirely apart from the question of whether you are going into the senatorial side.

I know many Members of Congress, such as Walter Judd and others, are very well qualified, but entirely apart of whether you go to the congressional side, there were many distinguished scholars and students of far eastern affairs who were not present.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, did you attempt to make known your views when you saw that our foreign policy was taking a course different from what you had recommended and a course you felt was basically wrong?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell us what steps you took to express yourself on that subject?

Mr. STASSEN. As I watched these implementations unfold I described to you, it was of grave concern as to what they would mean to our country. I felt so certain the Communists would move into that vacuum with tragic consequences to our country. After it appeared to me apparent that you could not get results on it in any of these conferences with the State Department people, I then sent a wire to Senator Connally and asked whether I could appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on it.

I will see if I have that letter here.

On April 22 of 1950 after watching this implementation of Lattimore and being more and more concerned as to what that would mean to our country and the world situation, I wired Senator Connally on April 21, 1950, as follows:

I am gravely concerned with the status of American foreign policy in Asia and the deteriorating situation in that continent in the cold war. I would

deeply appreciate an hour in which I might present to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee constructive proposals for American action in Asiatic policy and a concise analysis of the current situation. As you know, I was a participant in the State Department conference last October 6, 7, and 8 on Asiatic policy. I concentrated on Asia and on dependent territories in large measures at the San Francisco Conference of the United Nations, and I spent most of the last war in the Pacific. My knowledge of the urgency of the situation and my sincere belief I have information which would be helpful to you and to our country motivates this request.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you get a reply to that, Governor?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes. Senator Connally replied on April 26:

Re telegram: Foreign Relations Committee this week is busily engaged on the ECA bill. We shall endeavor next week to find time to hear you in executive session. Signed, Tom Connally, United States Senate.

Then I waited a week. On May 8 I sent another wire. I said:

Supplementing our previous communications I of course understand that the ECA bill kept you engaged all last week. I trust a convenient hour can be set this week. Sincerely yours.

On May 10 he replied:

Re telegram: Committee is still busily engaged in conference with House on ECA bill, and it will not be possible to hear you this week.

That was on May 10. I heard nothing further.

Then Senator Vandenberg was ill. I felt so certain this thing was very serious. On June 8, 1950, I wrote to Senator Vandenberg:

DEAR ARTHUR: I have been delighted with reports of your regaining strength and of your reappearance at the Capitol. I hesitate to write to you on this matter, and yet I cannot find rest easily unless I do. I am greatly concerned about the course of our policy in Asia and believe I can make some constructive contribution, and as a result of many years of study of that area. I feel this can best be done through an hour with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. As the enclosed copies of communications will show, Senator Connally indicated that they would hear me in executive session after the ECA bill was completed. I have heard nothing further from him. I know I need not assure you that my presence will be affirmative and thoughtful. I believe we are moving in the wrong direction now, and only a conviction on the part of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee can change the policy. If you wish and felt able to do so, I would be pleased to come to Washington at your convenience for a personal discussion of my analysis and recommendations. Sincerely yours.

Then Senator Vandenberg's secretary called me and said she was sorry to report the Senator was not able to handle the situation, was not able to see me because of his illness. She called me about a week later. Then the Korea war broke.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, you mentioned in the first part of your testimony you had some experience with Japanese prisoners at the end of the last war. In that connection did you encounter any undue or inappropriate courtesies extended to the Japanese Communists who had been held in prison by the Japanese Government on the part of the occupying forces?

Mr. STASSEN. I had no experience with Japanese prisoners, sir. I was the chief staff officer in the liberation of American, British, and Australian prisoners under Admiral Halsey at the end of the war in Japan. My entire experience was with liberating the American and allied boys and not with the Japanese prisoners.

Mr. MORRIS. We had testimony along the lines of my questions. I thought perhaps you had encountered such courtesies.

Mr. STASSEN. I had no knowledge of that.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you attended any subsequent conferences in connection with formulation of far-eastern policy, Governor Stassen?

Mr. STASSEN. No; I have not. I mentioned the one when they called in the heads of organizations, about 200 or so. That was not a policy-formulation session. That was in March 1950. That was when they made various speeches to the group.

Senator WATKINS. What was the purpose of that meeting?

Mr. STASSEN. Apparently to present the State Department's view on various subjects to the leaders of various national organizations.

Senator FERGUSON. They do not really ask you for views at those meetings; they tell you what their program is and back it up?

Mr. STASSEN. It would be more accurate to say they do not tell you their program.

Senator FERGUSON. What do they give you?

Mr. STASSEN. They make talks that are somewhat of the nature of public talks. They tell you some parts of the program. They are not really comprehensive or specific.

Senator FERGUSON. They are not complete and show what the program actually is?

Mr. STASSEN. No.

Senator WATKINS. I have heard of those meetings. Could you tell us how they are conducted, who is invited to take part, and what happens?

Mr. STASSEN. They invite the chairman or representative of various national organizations to come in. That basic thought is a good one. As a matter of fact, it started at the San Francisco Conference. There we met with them as consultants. It was a give-and-take. It was a good approach.

The only ones since the San Francisco Conference that I was a delegate to was this one in March 1950.

Senator FERGUSON. Then they did not use both parts of the program, give and take; they only gave the information. Is that correct?

Mr. STASSEN. They broke up into some sections for a while and opened up a chance for questions. In the section on India which I went into I asked why they were not moving forward with a program for aid to India and for wheat for India. There was no answer given. It was sidestepped and general talking around. You did not come to grips with these matters. There were subordinates in the State Department there, so it was not a conference in which you could advance a consideration of policy, but more it was an informational policy from the State Department to these leaders of national organizations.

Apart from that I have attended no conferences in the State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any questions?

Senator JENNER. Governor, have you been invited after your appearance on October 6, 7, and 8, 1949, back to any conference?

Mr. STASSEN. No; I have not.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, there is just one point I would like to make. We introduced into the record what may appear from the record to be the notes of Governor Stassen. May the record show that

that is a memorandum prepared by Mr. Stassen on the basis of his notes. I think that is accurate.

Mr. STASSEN. Notes and transcript.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Thank you, Governor, very much for your presence here.

(Whereupon, at 3:55 p. m., Monday, October 1, 1951, the hearing was recessed subject to call.)

# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 5, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL  
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.  
Present: Senators McCarran, Ferguson, and Watkins.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read into the record a request made by you to the Honorable Dean Acheson in connection with the transcript of the minutes of a conference held in September 1949.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read that letter in full?

Mr. MANDEL. The letter is as follows:

OCTOBER 5, 1951.

HON. DEAN ACHESON,  
*Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.*

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Will you make available to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee a transcript of the minutes of a conference held by the Jessup commission, presided over by Philip C. Jessup, on September 14, 1949, in Washington, at which were present Messrs. Meaney, Delany, and Lovestone, of the American Federation of Labor, and Messrs. Carey and Ross of the CIO?

Your cooperation in this matter will be appreciated.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, we had requested the minutes of the meeting of October 6, 7, and 8, or maybe the 5, 6, and 7, being the meeting where Harold Stassen and Professor Colegrove were with Mr. Jessup and others in the State Department, and we were denied the minutes.

After that, Professor Colegrove and Governor Stassen both testified as to what took place at the meeting. I understand that Mr. Lattimore has requested that the State Department furnish those minutes.

I ask that you again, by letter, request that those minutes be delivered to this committee, so that we may have the entire matter before us tomorrow morning when Governor Stassen appears before the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, have you reliable information that Mr. Lattimore has requested that the minutes be furnished?



Senator FERGUSON. All I have is in the press, and I take it the press report is accurate on that.

I see no reason at all, from the contents of the testimony, why there could be any question now of security.

Also, Mr. Rosinger and Mr. Lattimore have both made statements as to what took place.

Therefore, the minutes would be the best evidence, under all rules of court procedure, at least.

The CHAIRMAN. I am entirely in agreement with your ideas, and your request will be made.

Senator WATKINS. I would like to say that I also favor the suggestion made by Senator Ferguson.

The CHAIRMAN. The request will go down to the Department just as soon as I can prepare it.

Senator FERGUSON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Morris, you may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have gotten an answer to one of our requests of Mr. Dean Acheson on the question of the letter of transmittal of the white paper. Our letter of September 25, 1951, reads as follows:

HON. DEAN ACHESON,  
*Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.*

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: According to an analysis made in testimony by Prof. Kenneth Colegrove, a well-known authority on the Far East, the letter of transmittal dated July 30, 1949, under your name as a foreword to United States Relations With China, bears the earmarks of having been prepared by one or possibly more individuals other than yourself. In view of the heavy demands made upon your time as a public official, it is felt that it is quite possible that you may have had this material prepared by others for your signature.

Would you therefore kindly inform us as to the name or names of the individual or individuals who prepared this letter of transmittal. This question is asked by me in accordance with a motion adopted at a meeting of the Internal Security Subcommittee held on September 25, 1951.

The answer is dated October 2, 1951:

HON. PAT MCCARRAN,  
*United States Senate.*

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: I have your letter of September 25 requesting "the name or names of the individual or individuals who prepared" my letter of July 30, 1949, transmitting United States Relations With China to the President.

As I remember the circumstances, several drafts of a letter of transmittal were submitted to me prepared by various persons. None of these drafts was satisfactory; and, using one or another of them as a basis, I rewrote the letter myself. Inasmuch as the letter expressed my views and because it represented my best judgment, the responsibility for it is entirely mine.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON.

I think both of those should be introduced into the record, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be inserted in the record.

(Documents referred to and read in full were marked "Exhibits Nos. 309 and 310," respectively, and filed for the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. We have communications from Professor Rishauer, of Harvard University, and Maxwell Stewart, of New York City. They have transmitted to us, in the first case, a letter, and in the second case a telegram, asking they be inserted in the record.

I ask that they go into the record, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. What are they?

Mr. MORRIS. Rishauer was named in the Colegrove testimony, and he would like to make a statement addressed to that testimony.

The same is true in the case of Maxwell Stewart. Maxwell Stewart is concerned with other testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I agree that these communications ought to go into the record, but I also think that these people should also be given the opportunity to make statements under oath because the other testimony is under oath.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct. That is the reason why I paused on admitting them into the record. We will hold them.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Budenz has been called back to complete his testimony. He is sworn, and I think we can continue.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Proceed.

### TESTIMONY OF LOUIS FRANCIS BUDENZ, CRESTWOOD, N. Y.—

#### Resumed

Senator FERGUSON. You understand, Mr. Budenz, that you are under oath now, because of having been previously sworn.

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes. I understood when I left the stand here at the hearings that I was under continuing subpoena.

Senator FERGUSON. That is correct, and you are still under oath.

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you know a woman, who was the wife of Isidore Schneider, by the name of Helen Schneider?

Mr. BUDENZ. I did. I knew both of them personally; that is, Mr. and Mrs. Schneider.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Helen Schneider a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. She was a very active member. Indeed, at one time she was in what was considered to be quite a key position, a receptionist at the Daily Worker. She has also been active in the party in other capacities.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you give us as much detail as possible on that score, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. I can say that she was interested in various front organizations and the like; their names, I can't give you.

But I have met Isidore Schneider and Helen Schneider over the years while in the Communist Party a great number of times, and know them quite well, on a personal basis.

From that meeting, I can say that she was a Communist during the entire time I was in the Communist Party. In fact, she was a Communist when I joined the Communist Party, being then located at the Daily Worker.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, two witnesses before this committee have identified Lawrence K. Rosinger as a member of the Communist Party. Did you know Lawrence Rosinger as a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. I did not know Mr. Rosinger personally, but I did know, from official communications, that Mr. Rosinger was a member of the Communist Party.

Specifically, I can recall during 1944, in a discussion of some of his writings on the Far East, that he was so mentioned officially in the Politburo.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you testify to this fact before any senatorial committee?

Mr. BUDENZ. I did. Before the previous committee, headed by Senator Millard Tydings.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the connection of Mr. Rosinger to the Institute of Pacific Relations has already been established.

Are we prepared to introduce documents, Mr. Mandel, showing Helen Schneider's connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations, at this time?

Mr. MANDEL. Our files show that Helen Schneider was a member of the staff of the IPR, and we are supporting that with documentary evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. Your documentary evidence is what? Where is it contained?

Mr. MANDEL. From the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have had testimony in executive session on that.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that, in making a statement of that kind, it would be best to have your documents present.

Senator FERGUSON. I agree with the Chair that we ought to have it first.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you know Harry F. Ward to be a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. I knew Dr. Ward very well and over a great number of years.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us the circumstances that enabled you to conclude that he was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Dr. Ward has been active in a great number of Communist fronts, including the American League for Peace and Democracy. As a matter of fact, he was the head of that organization. In that connection, and also in connection with many other activities of Dr. Ward, he was—I won't say frequently, but not infrequently a visitor to the national headquarters of the Communist Party, consulting with members of the Politburo, sometimes in my presence.

Senator FERGUSON. A consultant in your presence?

Mr. BUDENZ. Consulting them in my presence.

Senator FERGUSON. Thank you.

Mr. BUDENZ. I also know, from conversations with Dr. Ward personally, of his Communist affiliation.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Harry F. Ward's name will be turning up in forthcoming testimony, and it is for that reason that we had Mr. Budenz identify him as a member of the Communist Party while he is here today.

Mr. Budenz, did you testify before this committee about the association or lack of association of John Stewart Service with the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you restate that testimony for us, please?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, as I recall it, in brief, the testimony was that I did not know officially that Mr. Service was a member of the Communist Party; that is, he had never been specifically referred to in that

respect; that he had, however, in Politburo meetings, particularly in connection with the Amerasia case, been referred to as Lattimore's pupil.

The CHAIRMAN. Lattimore's what?

Mr. BUDENZ. Pupil.

That was a political term, since it didn't indicate that he was a student of Mr. Lattimore, but a pupil of his politically.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you testify to that fact, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. At the recent hearing of this committee.

I also testified substantially to the same thing in the hearings before the committee chaired by Senator Millard Tydings.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, have you identified John Carter Vincent to be a member of the Communist Party before this committee?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; from official communications.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you testify that John Carter Vincent was a member of the Communist Party before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, before which you appeared a year ago?

Mr. BUDENZ. No, sir; I did not. I asked leave in the executive session to have more time to place Mr. Carter on the list, where I could explain in detail what I knew about his political affiliations.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say "Mr. Carter," you mean Mr. Vincent; do you?

Mr. BUDENZ. Mr. Vincent. Excuse me.

Senator FERGUSON. What were you told?

Mr. BUDENZ. May I read the extract here, because it is better than my interpretation?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. BUDENZ. This was after I was queried about Donald Hiss and John Davis, Senator Hickenlooper asking me.

The CHAIRMAN. You are reading from what record, please?

Mr. BUDENZ. This is the record, Senator, of hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-first Congress, second session, the chairman of which was Senator Millard Tydings. This is page 613 of that record in executive session:

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Senator McMahon mentioned three names, three other names. I mention here Ruby Parsons and John Carter Vincent, who is now Minister to Switzerland.

Mr. BUDENZ. I would prefer not to discuss those at the moment, until I can file the list with the committee. That will permit—I feel this is quite a responsible obligation—without being more careful in my statements.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I shall not press—

Mr. MORRIS. What did you do subsequent to that in connection with making that testimony available to the committee, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. I wrote to the committee; that is, the counsel of the committee, Mr. Morgan, and Mr. Morris, the minority counsel, with carbon copies to Senator Tydings, Senator Hickenlooper, and Senator McMahon, among others, stating that this list, which didn't only include John Carter Vincent, but many more names on which I had been questioned, would be prepared by September.

I explained that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had kept me engaged on going over the list of 400 concealed Communists, which had been brought up at that time, and that it would require until September to complete this list.

The committee did not avail itself of my offer because it ended its sessions before September came around.

Mr. MORRIS. What else did you do, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. I also advised Robert Morris, who was minority counsel of that committee, even before the hearings that John Carter Vincent was known to me, from official communications, to be a Communist. I advised Mr. Morris of this because I had had an acquaintance with him, knowing him to be a Naval Reserve Intelligence officer.

It was under those circumstances that I first met Mr. Morris. And he assured me that he would file a report on Mr. Vincent in accordance with my communication to him.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, there is such a report in existence, and I think it is appropriate that we ask that that be made available to our committee, to establish the fact that Mr. Budenz did make such a report.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you mean the Tydings committee official files?

Mr. MORRIS. No. There is a report in the Intelligence files that Mr. Budenz reported Mr. Vincent to be a member of the Communist Party a year ago.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire?

The CHAIRMAN. It is all right.

Senator FERGUSON. In what files?

Mr. MORRIS. It should appear in the files of the Naval Intelligence and the FBI.

Senator FERGUSON. So when you were a Naval Intelligence officer you put a report in the files, did you?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, Mr. Chairman, I ask that we obtain this report from the proper officials of the Naval Intelligence.

The CHAIRMAN. We will try.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I point out that there is nothing confidential being violated here, because the source of our information in that report is Mr. Budenz, who appears before this committee. So there is no question of security whatever involved.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. BUDENZ. I also reported, Mr. Senator, to the Federal Bureau of Investigation on Mr. John Carter Vincent a considerable time ago, the exact time of which I cannot tell you at the moment.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you tell us the year?

Mr. BUDENZ. It was the year 1950, so far as I can recall. It may have been earlier; it may have been slightly later.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it before the Tydings testimony?

Mr. BUDENZ. That I can't be sure, Senator. It is my impression that it was.

In regard to the case of Mr. Morris, I am very clear, because I remember his stating that he was to make a report on the matter.

The CHAIRMAN. I am at a loss to get the connection of Mr. Morris.

Senator FERGUSON. He was a Naval Intelligence officer.

The CHAIRMAN. It was at the time that he was in the position of a Naval Intelligence officer, was it?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is what I understood, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Or was it after his severance?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I can answer that question.

Mr. Budenz reported to me, as a Naval Intelligence officer, the fact that John Carter Vincent was a member of the Communist Party, and I made a report on that fact.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that report in writing?

Mr. MORRIS. There is a written report on it. I transmitted mine verbally, and a written report was made. So there is one in existence.

The CHAIRMAN. Who made the written report, if you transmitted yours verbally?

Mr. MORRIS. It is an official record of the Naval Intelligence Office.

The reason why I know there is one there is because, there was a follow-up on it, Senator. Several people subsequently came around to see me about it.

The purpose of this testimony, Mr. Chairman, is to show that Mr. Budenz did report at least a year ago that Mr. Vincent was a member of the Communist Party.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it was before the Tydings investigation?

Mr. MORRIS. It was about the time of the Tydings investigation.

Mr. Budenz, I wish you would address yourself to a copy of the Kunming cable that Henry Wallace sent in 1944. I am going to ask you, Mr. Budenz, if you will take that cable and analyze it, paragraph by paragraph, and let us have the benefit of your interpretations of that particular cable.

This is message No. 1.

The CHAIRMAN. What was his position with reference to that cable, by reason of which he can authoritatively testify to this committee?

Mr. MORRIS. The background, Mr. Chairman, of this series of questions is the following:

Testimony of Mr. Budenz has been disputed in several sources, the testimony of Mr. Budenz that John Carter Vincent was a member of the Communist Party. It has been stated by unsworn testimony that John Carter Vincent saw and approved the particular cable that we are now addressing ourselves to.

The argument is then made that this cable is so demonstrably anti-Communist that anyone acceding to it and going along with it would necessarily not be a Communist, and therefore, Mr. Budenz' testimony was impeached.

I think we should address ourselves to this because so much of it has been made, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a few preliminary questions before the witness testifies.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Budenz, I suppose that you have seen by the public press and the official records, that is, the records of the United States Senate which it has had inserted in newspaper articles, that your testimony could be false. In fact, it indicates that your testimony was false in certain respects.

Have you seen those articles?

Mr. BUDENZ. I have looked through them: yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Budenz, you are again called to the witness stand this morning, and I want to ask the question whether or not you want to change any of your testimony.

Mr. BUDENZ. Absolutely not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You now again reiterate, do you, under oath, that the previous testimony is true?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And I assume that you understand the value of an oath.

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, most decidedly.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I mean. You have sworn to these articles that are not under oath, the Senator has inserted them in the record, and you again reiterate that that testimony is true; is that right?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes. And I can explain why, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, I wish you would give an explanation.

Mr. MORRIS. I think the explanation, Senator, could take the form of our addressing ourselves to the cable itself.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I mean.

From now on, explain it.

Mr. MORRIS. The point of it is this: The contention has been made that these cables are demonstrably anti-Communist.

Mr. BUDENZ. In order to explain those cables, I should review the period briefly in which these cables occurred and the attitude of the Communists at that time.

It is common knowledge, public knowledge, that the Communists not only changed their line, but changed their interpretation of their line.

What they are seeking at some specific moment, 1 year later they will have emphasized much more, or not have emphasized much more.

What were the Communists seeking during this period? They were seeking:

1. What they call Chinese-Soviet friendship, and under the guise of that, they had hoped that they would be able to advance the Communist Chinese and also the Soviet domination of Chinese policies;

2. They were not pressing—although they had raised the question of a coalition government, they did not begin to press that until a year later. They did not feel that they were in a position to press it at that time.

Indeed, at that time, as point No. 3, they were urging that Chiang Kai-shek withdraw his troops from what they called the blockade of the Communists in order, as they contended, to war upon the Japanese; but, in reality, to be able to allow the Chinese Communists to act at their own will.

That is, there had been a civil war in China, and Chiang Kai-shek cautiously was trying to prevent the Chinese Communists from attacking in what we might call the rear while he had the Japanese situation on his hands.

They demanded an end to what they called this blockade.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand, then, that the Communist line at times takes a line—

Mr. BUDENZ. May I get the fourth one in, Senator, so that the whole picture will be in?

Senator FERGUSON. I beg your pardon.

Mr. BUDENZ. Fourth, preliminary to pushing the coalition government on a big scale, they wished to have Washington receive the impression that Chiang Kai-shek was an inefficient, incompetent, and

more or less blundering personality, who could not exist long in control of China.

That, by the way, is a tactic used in every country where the Communists have taken over. They brought Mikolajczyk back to Poland and represented him in such capacity, to a greater or lesser degree, according to circumstances. And we could recall other roles of leaders of this type who have been given this treatment.

So we have the fourfold objective of the Communists, which was particularly centered on sending to Washington the idea that Chiang Kai-shek was incompetent and that he was incapable of controlling the situation for a long period of time.

They did not demand immediately that Chiang Kai-shek be deposed; no Communist literature at that time did. Nor did the discussions in the Politburo.

But they were preparing for a big campaign of the coalition government, and the first essential of that was the necessity of showing Chiang Kai-shek to be incapable of leadership in the situation.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand now that the Communist Party then at times does change its party line and even the underlying principles of that party line to acquire a long-distance, far-away future objective? Is that correct?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is the secret of its success.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the secret of its success?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And words do not mean anything to it; facts do not mean anything. They lay down their own line and go along that line to acquire their success in the future; is that correct?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

And the Communists know that you have to take the line by stages very frequently. That is to say, in this case of the coalition government, they understood that they couldn't sell to the United States the idea of coalition government or Communist China at once; that first they had to belittle Chiang Kai-shek.

At that time they even expressed fears that there be a coup against Chiang Kai-shek, publicly, I mean, within the Kuomintang. They even looked like they were solicitous about him, to show that he was a weakling. They didn't in that respect, through their propaganda, let the public know that Chiang Kai-shek had put up a very stiff fight against the Japanese, when you consider he had a civil war on his hands, and did a better job perhaps than France did against Hitler.

Now, it is in the light of this that I would like to call attention to some of the items in these cables.

Senator FERGUSON. Go ahead.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you read each paragraph that you address yourself to, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes.

The first paragraph is in message I:

The discussion between the representatives of the Chinese Communists and those of the Chinese Government are taking place in Chungking, but the attitude of Chiang Kai-shek toward the problem is so imbued with prejudice that I can see little prospect for satisfactory long-term settlement.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that an anti-Communist expression, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Most decidedly not. It helps the Communists. If some person visiting the United States, of a diplomatic character, were-



to be represented to the American authorities today as prejudiced against the Communists, that would be of a kind, except that in this case Chiang Kai-shek has had civil war on his hands for a number of years, and Chiang Kai-shek's experience shows that he could not trust the Communists, and events proved he was correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you address yourself to the second point in that cable, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. The second point is the sentence:

I emphasized to him the importance of reaching an understanding with Russia.

This was the first point in the Communist drive at that time, in their literature and in the discussions with the Politburo. The necessity for what they called Russian-Chinese friendship.

And that was an authority purchasable, when you come realistically to consider it, only by the Chinese Communists coming to the front in China. That is what they understood.

Incidentally, this isn't exactly what the Communists were stressing at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. You feel, no nation that is anti-Communist could have friendly relations with Russia?

Mr. BUDENZ. I think history has proved it is impossible.

Senator FERGUSON. So a friendly relationship between China and Russia, real friendly relations, would have to be on the basis of both being Communists?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

This is particularly true of small nations, as we see in the case of the Baltic countries, who were promised that they were going to be liberated and then were taken over by the Red army.

There are plenty of examples now.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, what is the date of those cables of Henry Wallace there?

Mr. BUDENZ. June 28, 1944.

However, the point I make here, Senator Ferguson, is that, regardless of that, I am just showing what the Communists had in mind. This was in accordance with the Communist drive at that time, these recommendations.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, at the time these were sent, you are talking about a policy when you were in the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. I was in the Communist Party very decidedly and present in the Politburo meetings in which they were discussing and giving instructions in order to convey it through the pages of the Daily Worker.

Senator FERGUSON. You were right in the inner circle and knew the policy from official sources?

Mr. BUDENZ. As far as could be the case of any individual.

The CHAIRMAN. This cable that you are reading from, or these cables, are they cables of Henry Wallace?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you contend, or is it your position here, that these are pro-Communist cables?

Mr. BUDENZ. My contention is that they were in accord with the Communist policies at that time. Whether Mr. Wallace was aware of that, I am not stating.

The CHAIRMAN. That is exactly what I wanted to bring out now.

From what source would Mr. Wallace get these thoughts and this policy if he did not have them himself?

I think that should be cleared up.

Who were his advisers? Where was he getting the advice that gave rise to these expressions?

Mr. BUDENZ. I testified, Senator, before the committee before, that the Communist Politburo was very pleased with the fact that Mr. Lattimore and Mr. John Carter Vincent were present on Mr. Wallace's mission, which not only included, by the way, China, but Soviet Asia.

They considered these two questions together.

As a matter of fact, if I may mention it, in Soviet Asia Mission, Mr. Wallace says, on page 156:

On my mission in China I was fortunate to have along an adviser who had served in 1942-43 as President Roosevelt's personal envoy to Chiang Kai-shek. He was Owen Lattimore, a State man in Pacific affairs, and a scholar in the Chinese language.

And Mr. Wallace refers in like language more or less to Mr. Lattimore in this book.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I wanted to clarify at this point.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, was it the mission that Mr. Wallace was cabling about that he mentions in his book?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. This was the mission to Soviet Asia and China. This is called Soviet Asia Mission, but the whole trip was the same trip.

Senator FERGUSON. And these were messages coming back officially from him on that mission, were they?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Thirdly—and I consider this very important, in view of what the Communists were driving for at that time—

Instability and tenseness characterized the political situation, with a rising lack of confidence in the generalissimo and the present reactionary leadership of the Kuomintang.

That, again, I think very emphatically represents Chiang Kai-shek as incapable of coping with the situation.

This is stressed still further when it says:

Chiang Kai-shek seems to be unsure regarding the political situation, bewildered regarding the economic situation, and while expressing confidence in the army, distressed regarding military developments.

That is the picture the Communists were trying to have presented of Chiang Kai-shek, as incompetent and incapable of handling the situation. There is no mention here of the long struggle of Chiang Kai-shek against the Japanese in any definite terms, and the picture is out of focus. That, therefore, confirms to what the Communists wanted presented to Washington.

In message No. 2, we note:

It should be possible to induce Chiang to establish at least a semblance of the united front necessary to the restoration of Chinese morale and to proceed thereafter to organize a new offensive effort.

Now, the term "united front" is not a popularized Communist term, but it is well known, and was well known, at that time that "united front" is a term used by the Communists historically to represent their coalition efforts with other governments, or with other groups; and

the fact that in this report there is no reference made to "united front" within the Kuomintang or "united front" of the Kuomintang and other forces which are not found to exist here, but a "united front" in itself, is in accord with the campaign being conducted by the Communists.

The only "united front" you could have in China which would be of any substantial character would be a "united front" with the Chinese Communists.

Therefore, these messages, in light of the period, were what the Communists wanted presented.

Senator FERGUSON. Could it be possible, Mr. Budenz, that the reason that this document has been classed as non-Communist and absolutely opposite to the Communist line is that the people who criticize it as such or say that it is not Communist, were not familiar with the Communist line as of that date?

Mr. BUDENZ. That may possibly be.

Senator FERGUSON. But you are swearing under oath now as to what the line was, and it is your opinion that this document is not anti-Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Decidedly not. It gives aid to the Communists in the policies they were forwarding at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you continue, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. There is also a reference here to General Wedemeyer.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. Will you address yourself to that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

General Wedemeyer, when he first came into public attention, was not opposed by the Communists. Indeed, the Communists felt that the compromise made with Wedemeyer was a good compromise. They were not opposed to Wedemeyer. They thought he was nonpolitical.

By the way, I am quoting.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you mean by the compromise made with Wedemeyer? Who compromised with Wedemeyer?

Mr. BUDENZ. The compromise made by bringing Wedemeyer into the situation.

Mr. SOURWINE. There was not any compromise with Wedemeyer.

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, no.

Did I say with Wedemeyer?

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't mean to imply that he ever compromised with the Communists; do you?

Mr. BUDENZ. No; not at all. I meant to say, if I didn't say it, the compromise by which Wedemeyer came to his position in China. The Communists were very much opposed to General Chennault and didn't want him in the picture at all. They thought Wedemeyer was a better choice. He was not political and, in addition to that, he was supposedly, according to their discussions, of a school in the Military Establishment friendly to General Marshall.

Without any reflection on General Marshall, the Communists felt that that group would be more reasonable toward the Communists in various countries.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you discussed the Wedemeyer reference?

Senator FERGUSON. How was he mentioned in this report, in other words?

Mr. BUDENZ (reading) :

As I took leave of Chiang, he requested to ask you to appoint a personal representative.

Then it recommends that General Wedemeyer be appointed. I have it marked off right here where the reference is made.

These facts are hinted at in my report to Roosevelt on July 10, in which it is noted as "significant" that "T. V. Soong took no part in the discussions (with the generalissimo) except as interpreter" while Gen. Chen Cheng is mentioned along with Gens. Chiang Fa-kwei and Pai Chung-Hsi as the sort of men who might rally the Chinese armies to greater efforts.

I don't find here the reference to Wedemeyer which I had marked off.

Unfortunately, I used two or three copies, and that one I have neglected to mark. There was a reference to General Wedemeyer, a recommendation.

What I wish to say is that General Wedemeyer in 1944 was not unacceptable to the Communists. Indeed, to a certain degree, they thought he was a good compromise, since it excluded General Chen-nault.

It wasn't until 1945 that the Communists began their real attack on General Wedemeyer when they discovered his position, and also, of course, this was intensified by the fact that they were beginning to organize a cold war in addition.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have brought up into this part of the record the testimony of Prof. William Montgomery McGovern, given September 28, 1951. This is the testimony of Professor McGovern on this particular point.

We had shown Professor McGovern the particular cables we are discussing, Senator, and his testimony is the following:

The message is full of statements, as I now remember it, which shocked me, because Mr. Wallace said it was not at all pro-Communist, but certainly if it is not pro-Communist it certainly is giving aid and comfort to the Communists trying to disparage the Nationalist Government entirely and trying to throw his weight behind support of a pro-Russian policy.

Then there is a question by Mr. Sourwine:

It has been said that this was an anti-Communist message because it transmitted the request as made by Chiang Kai-shek that General Wedemeyer be considered in connection with the appointment of a Presidential liaison man between the President and the generalissimo.

Could you say, sir, whether at that time such a recommendation with respect to General Wedemeyer was an anti-Communist recommendation?

Professor McGovern:

No, sir. General Wedemeyer had never expressed himself on Chiang Kai-shek. He was not an unknown figure. He was a well-known man as a military planner and strategist and had served as spokesman for General Marshall on several occasions in discussions with the British planners. He had never expressed his views on communism, or never expressed his views on China.

As a matter of fact, some people wrongly thought that Wedemeyer would go along with the Communists, because with the Joint Chiefs he thought we should not invade the Balkans or interfere with the Russian campaign in eastern Europe.

On that ground, some people thought General Wedemeyer would go along with the Communists.

Knowing General Wedemeyer personally, I know they were completely wrong in their reading of him, but no doubt some felt or thought that because he did attack the Balkan campaign and attacked Churchill on the Balkan campaign.

I would like that testimony correlated with the testimony given by Mr. Budenz.

The CHAIRMAN. That is already in the record.

Mr. MORRIS. It is, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You are just bringing it forward.

Senator FERGUSON. And McGovern was a professor.

Mr. MORRIS. At Northwestern University. But he worked with the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, connected with the military campaign.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, have you any documents to back up your testimony on this score?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you mean you have documents showing the party line as of that time?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, and their attitude toward Wallace's expedition through China and Wallace's attitude on the Pacific.

In the first place, almost coincident with these reports, on June 24, 1944, by order of the Politburo, Frederick Vanderbilt Field has a column on Vice President Wallace's pamphlet on the Pacific, published by the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. You say almost coincident with these reports. I take it that you mean coincident with the Wallace cables?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. BUDENZ. Just for a few quotations:

Vice President Wallace's pamphlet, *Our Job in the Pacific*, just published by the Institute of Pacific Relations, is a progressive and statesmanlike approach to problems of our foreign policy.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Budenz, when the *Daily Worker* printed that kind of language, can we assume and should we say that it meant the *Daily Worker* was approving? They did not just write factual news.

Mr. BUDENZ. The Communists must write under the most rigid discipline, and in a case like this, on such a vital question, either by orders of the Politburo or in consultation with the Politburo, and Frederick Vanderbilt Field was the man who had the chief responsibility for the far eastern situation, so far as the Politburo was concerned, that is, immediately. He was an authority on the question from the Communist viewpoint.

Senator FERGUSON. So that he was writing not news; he was writing propaganda.

Mr. BUDENZ. He was writing not only propaganda; he was writing a directive. The *Daily Worker* is an agency for directives of the conspiracy. It is not a daily paper in the normal sense of the word.

Every Communist studies the *Daily* to know what he should do.

This meant Wallace's pamphlet should be expanded, put into organizations and the like by the concealed Communists.

Here is the important point about this:

I have studied and compared these sections of the Wallace pamphlet with the chapter on National Liberation in Asia in Earl Browder's *Tehran. Our Path in War and Peace*. Both stand for the most rapid reconstitution of the colonial system consistent with the maintenance of unity among the United Nations. \* \* \*

And the reason I am giving this for political purposes is to emphasize Mr. Wallace's high standing among the Communists, which verifies my testimony on the question.

The reason I am giving this is that these two publications, namely, Wallace's *Our Job in the Pacific* and *Tehran, Our Path in War and Peace*, is to show the highly controversial problem of the colonies.

Mr. SOURWINE. You referred to Mr. Wallace's high standing with the Communists at that time, do you?

Mr. BUDENZ. At that time.

Mr. MORRIS. And this is now Frederick V. Field writing in the *Daily Worker* of what date?

Mr. BUDENZ. June 24, 1944; page 7.

To compare Wallace with Browder favorably was the highest compliment that the Communists could pay any public figure. Browder was always hailed as the greatest Marxist-Leninist in the Western Hemisphere—at that time, I must again, during that period—and to compare anyone to Browder was, I say, the highest compliment that could be paid, in so far as the Communists were concerned.

Secondly, I would like to call the committee's attention to the *Daily Worker* of July 11, 1944.

Mr. MORRIS. Excuse me, Mr. Budenz.

Mr. Chairman, may that article, the previous one, go into the record?

Senator FERGUSON. The whole article.

Mr. MORRIS. It is the article by Frederick V. Field in the *Daily Worker* of June 24, 1944.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

That is the article read from by the witness.

Mr. MORRIS. We would like the whole article to go into the record, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The whole article will go into the record.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 311," and is as follows:)

#### TODAY'S GUEST COLUMN

#### VICE PRESIDENT WALLACE'S PAMPHLET ON THE PACIFIC

(By Frederick V. Field)

Vice President Wallace's pamphlet, *Our Job in the Pacific*, just published by the Institute of Pacific Relations, is a progressive and statesmanlike approach to problems of our foreign policy.

The question of the future of the British, Dutch, and French colonial empires in the Pacific is given conspicuous attention. Mr. Wallace does not come out for the immediate freedom of India, Malaya, the Netherlands Indies and the other colonies, as certain newspaper headlines would have us believe. He says there is a "Free Asia" and a "Subject Asia" or "Colonial Asia." "It is to our advantage," Mr. Wallace writes, "not to perpetuate this division but to see an orderly process of transition so that the area of free Asia will grow and the area of subject Asia continually diminish."

In order to accomplish the orderly process of transition, the Vice President envisages the drawing up of a system of training and preparation for self-government and the acceptance by the sovereign government "of a definite date for the termination of trusteeship and the beginning of independence and self-government." All of this is to take place within the framework of the international organization projected at the Moscow Conference.

Mr. Wallace advocates a positive United States policy on the colonial question not only because of our special relation to the Philippines, whose independence is already guaranteed, and possible military bases which we may acquire elsewhere among the Pacific islands, but also "because in southeast Asia there are conflicting forces in operation which have in them the seeds of future wars."

I have studied and compared these sections of the Wallace pamphlet with the chapter on National Liberation in Asia in Earl Browder's *Tehran, Our Path in War and Peace*. Both stand for the most rapid reconstitution of the colonial system consistent with the maintenance of unity among the United Nations. Mr. Browder, however, carries the analysis several steps beyond where the Vice President leaves off.

The United States, Mr. Browder points out, requires the release of national energies in the prewar colonies because after the war our internal economy will depend in good part upon the markets provided by the rapid development of the areas previously stifled by colonialism. "Colonial or semicolonial regimes provide narrow and restricted markets, while independent, self-governing nations provide expanding markets." This leads to a potential basic conflict with the British and other colonial powers who, in a desperate effort to compete against the more powerful American capitalism, cling to their colonial monopolies. This is a conflict the solution of which cannot be relegated to the postwar period. Unity during the war is affected by the proposals being made on both sides even though these proposals may not come into operation until after hostilities.

How can this conflict be reconciled? Mr. Browder provides a concrete solution within the framework of the United Nations. In return for a progressive colonial policy on the part of Britain, perhaps one such as Mr. Wallace advocates, the United States must provide a *quid pro quo*. This should take the form of "an economic concord which will limit the play of free competition between them on the world market," providing a guaranteed proportionate share to the weaker capitalist power, Great Britain. And the agreement must be of such a character that it would gain the support and participation of the Soviet Union.

\* \* \* \* \*

These two publications mark an advance in the American thinking on the highly controversial problem of colonies. It is an advance made possible by harmony between leaders representing traditionally divergent economic and political interests which are now coming together to win the war and to carry forward the spirit of Tehran.

Mr. BUDENZ. These are being introduced merely to show that the Communists consistently had more than a friendly attitude toward Mr. Wallace in 1944 and 1945, and therefore my testimony that they were pleased with his Soviet and China mission is verified.

Wallace's charter for our self-interest in Asia.

This is from the *Daily Worker* of July 11, 1944, page 8. There they declare in this statement by Mr. Wallace, which was his first statement after returning from China and Soviet Siberia, in which he recommended aid to Soviet Siberian China, but with certain conditions. They declared that:

It is vision of a great American statesman—this insight that Wallace has into American-Soviet-Chinese collaboration \* \* \*.

And they go on to say that—

many of these ideas are contained in Wallace's pamphlet *Our Task in the Pacific*, published last month by the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Then they point out something very significant:

Wallace attached only one condition to the help which "thousands of technical and businessmen in the United States" are ready to give China and the U. S. S. R. And this is the only reference to the immediate political situation.

"They want to be certain" he said, "before they lay the foundations and make the necessary outlay, that there is no foreseeable likelihood of conflict within China or between China and Russia."

The Vice President is referring, of course, to the danger of civil war in China because of the Kuomintang's blockade of the Communists. He is also referring, no doubt, to certain anti-Soviet moods that he encountered "behind the scenes" in Chungking.

He is very right in this warning, but also very right in placing the issue of China's unity and Sino-Soviet friendship within the framework of America's own interest \* \* \*.

Then down below a little further :

Wallace has shown the way. If we don't have the intelligence and understanding of our own interests to follow it, the fault won't be his.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Budenz, do I understand you correctly that you are attempting to make the point that because of these nice things the Communists were saying about Mr. Wallace at that time, it indicates that they approved these Kunming cables that you just read and the report that he had filed with it recommending Wedemeyer?

Mr. BUDENZ. Not necessarily; no, sir. It is in confirmation of my testimony that the Communists were pleased with the Wallace mission, which I gave at the last hearings of the committee.

Mr. MORRIS. That was not your testimony, was it, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, that they were satisfied that he would be guided into the right channels; which means the same thing.

That is, I didn't say specifically that they were pleased, but I said that they were satisfied that Mr. Wallace would be guided correctly in the mission.

And it is in order to show that they continued their support of Wallace on the Far East and elsewhere after his mission was completed that I introduced this evidence.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Budenz, do you know whether or not the Communist Party was able to get copies of these messages and this report that was kept secret? Is that the kind of a document that they would want?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, they would want the document. But I have heard no reference to any written documents by Mr. Wallace. I have heard discussion of his attitude on Soviet Asia and China which are along the lines of these cables, so the cables don't surprise me.

That is to the effect that he was disgusted with Chiang Kai-shek and that his recommendations had the effect of weakening Chiang Kai-shek's prestige in Washington.

As a matter of fact, there was an almost remarkable knowledge of those documents, though I have not heard any reference to written documents.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to ask the counsel whether or not these documents appeared in the white paper, the Chinese white paper, or the State Department's releases or white papers.

Mr. MORRIS. My recollection on that point, Senator, is that they did not, and I believe there was a statement in the footnote that these things did not exist.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I recall speaking on the floor about this so-called report. Senator O'Connor had in some way obtained a memorandum either of the report or about the report. The question was as to the accuracy of that document.

So I wondered whether or not you had any evidence to indicate that the spy system was able to get these particular secret documents that have been secret until just a few weeks or—

Mr. BUDENZ. Not to my knowledge.

Of course, there were gaps in my attendance at the Politburo. There were no references that I can recall, to written documents. There was a very elaborate recommendation from Frederick Vanderbilt Field and it was discussed by the Politburo on several occasions as to Mr. Wallace's attitude and to his possible recommendations or even



possibly to his recommendations. I just can't recall, of his possible recommendations, or possibly recommendations.

Mr. MORRIS. In answer to Senator Ferguson's question, I am now reading from the white paper, page 549, footnote 11. It says here:

By John Carter Vincent, Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs, who accompanied the Vice President to China. The files of the Department do not contain any indication of the existence of a report in written form made by Mr. Wallace to President Roosevelt or of the nature of any oral report made.

Senator FERGUSON. Which is an unusual thing to appear in the so-called white paper of this country which was published in its United States Relations With China.

The transmittal letter is as of July 30, 1949. So that the State Department then indicates that there are no such reports as we now have produced at this time.

Is not that correct, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. In the State Department?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

It seems to be a strange thing that they appear at certain times, but they cannot be found at other times.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a little strange also that they evidently constitute the background for publications in the Daily Worker under the byline of Frederick Field and others.

Mr. BUDENZ. May I, violating chronology, call your attention to another column by Frederick Vanderbilt Field, on December 2, 1944.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, before we proceed to the next one, may that entire article go into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. You are referring to the article just testified to by the witness under what caption?

Mr. MORRIS. The Daily Worker, Tuesday, July 11, 1944, page 8, under the heading "Wallace's charter for our self-interest in Asia."

The CHAIRMAN. That article may go into the record.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 312" and is as follows:)

#### INTERPRETATION, PLEASE—WALLACE'S CHARTER FOR OUR SELF-INTEREST IN ASIA

When Vice President Henry A. Wallace returned from his tour of Latin America just a year ago, he was attacked on all sides as a "visionary" and a "dreamer." But only 2 months ago, a commission of North American and Latin American government and business spokesmen at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York endorsed in essence Wallace's ideas.

Industrialization of our neighbors to the south of us, Wallace had declared, is in our own self-interest. It means a truly united hemisphere, based on rising living standards everywhere. Now Wallace returns from his historic trip to Soviet Siberia and China, and again he brings back the same message.

#### OUR OWN INTERESTS

America's self-interest, he says, in a very good example of vision and hard-headed practicality, demands unity and friendship with our neighbors of the North Pacific.

Convinced that the American way of life is best for us, Wallace nevertheless stresses "cooperation with other nations and other peoples whose way of life is different from ours, but who need our cooperation, quite as much as we need theirs, and who are not only willing, but eager to cooperate with us."

What Wallace saw in his visit to Soviet Siberia and China convinced him that the "main area" of new development after the war—"new enterprise, new invest-

ment, new trade, and new accomplishments—will be in—the North Pacific and eastern Asia."

#### A POSTWAR VISION

It is vision of a great American statesman—this insight that Wallace has into American-Soviet-Chinese collaboration. It is a vision of vast trade with the already industrial growing industrial civilization which the Russian and-Mongol peoples have built on their soil.

China is on a much different level, he says, but with China also we can look forward to immense trade once that country enters "the machine age," as the Soviet people have already done.

Many of these ideas are contained in Wallace's pamphlet, *Our Task in the Pacific*, published last month by the Institute of Pacific Relations. What he has added are the insights of his own travel and observation.

All in all, it makes for a great document, a charter for peace and development in Asia, and stamps its author as a man who could be entrusted to lead American destinies.

#### A WARNING

Wallace attached only one condition to the help which "thousands of technical and businessmen in the United States" are ready to give China and the U. S. S. R. And this is the only reference to the immediate political situation.

"They want to be certain," he said, "before they lay the foundations and make the necessary outlay, that there is no foreseeable likelihood of conflict within China or between China and Russia."

The Vice President is referring, of course, to the danger of civil war in China because of the Kuomintang's blockade of the Communists. He is also referring, no doubt, to certain anti-Soviet moods that he encountered behind the scenes in Chungking.

He is very right in this warning, but also very right in placing the issue of China's unity and Sino-Soviet friendship within the framework of America's own interest. Yes, our businessmen for the sake of their own future have a stake in China's unity, and China's good neighborliness with Soviet Siberia.

Wallace has shown the way. If we don't have the intelligence and understanding of our own interests to follow it, the fault won't be his.

Mr. BUDENZ. In order to indicate the nonhostile attitude toward General Wedemeyer on the part of the Communists, December 2, 1944. This represented, however, previous discussions in the Politburo, but it is a summing up by Frederick Vanderbilt Field:

I disagree with those who take an entirely pessimistic view regarding recent developments in China. On the contrary, for the first time in several years that situation shows signs of improving. Those who argue that the recall of Stilwell indicated nothing but the intransigence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek or those who interpret the recent Cabinet shifts as a mere reshuffle designed to camouflage the continuance of reaction are failing to see the movement of history.

Then this is the important part I wish to call to your attention. He mentions three conditions, but the third is the one that is important to the question of General Wedemeyer:

\* \* \* as to the third, we know only that there was a breakdown over the particular person nominated as commander in chief, General Stilwell, and that President Roosevelt wisely and quickly compromised on that point. There is no indication that the general proposition for an American commander has been refused.

Then he goes on to say about evidence of progress in China :

\* \* \* another is Major General Wedemeyer's reaffirmation on November 23 that it would be necessary to engage Japanese forces on the Chinese mainland and his further statement that Chiang Kai-shek had approved his recommendations for redistribution of the forces in China for more effective operation, and that these plans were already being carried out.

That sounds like cooperation to me.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that go into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. It may go into the record.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the Daily Worker column by Frederick V. Field, appearing in the Daily Worker, December 2, 1944, page 7.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 313" and is as follows:)

#### TODAY'S GUEST COLUMN

#### SOME STEPS FORWARD IN CHINESE SITUATION

(By Frederick V. Field)

I disagree with those who take an entirely pessimistic view regarding recent developments in China. On the contrary, for the first time in several years that situation shows signs of improving. Those who argue that the recall of Stilwell indicated nothing but the intransigence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek or those who interpret the recent cabinet shifts as a mere reshuffle designed to camouflage the continuance of reaction are failing to see the movement of history.

As I write this I have before me the AP dispatch from Chungking which appeared in newspapers Thursday morning and in which P. H. Chang, Chinese cabinet spokesman, said: "It would be necessary for the Government to reach an agreement with the Chinese Communists," and added that "the Government is sparing no effort in trying to reach a settlement."

The latter part of that statement is not likely to impress anyone, because for years Chungking spokesmen have been saying the same thing while "sparing no effort" to accomplish the very opposite. What is worth noting is that Mr. Chang conveyed the impression that the Chinese Government now has no choice except that of reaching an agreement with the Communists. In other words, the situation has reached the point where it is either death for the Chinese nation or a progressive solution of their internal difficulties.

The Chinese people, backed as they are by the influence of the United States, will see to it that a solution is reached before the final breakdown occurs. And the recent cabinet shifts were made in order to make possible the negotiations leading to some sort of solution.

At the time of General Stilwell's recall the press reported—reliably, in my opinion—that the United States had conveyed to the Chinese Government three conditions for effective coalition warfare against Japan. These were, first, that the Chinese high command undertake a thorough reorganization of its armies in order to make them effective fighting units; second, that the military effort of the Kuomintang and Communist-led armies be unified; and, third, that an American be named commander in chief of all allied forces in China.

What is the status of these conditions—not ultimata—for coalition warfare? I believe that the first two remain intact and that progress is being made to carry them out. As to the third, we know only that there was a breakdown over the particular person nominated as commander in chief, General Stilwell, and that President Roosevelt wisely and quickly compromised on that point. There is no indication that the general proposition for an American commander has been refused.

The evidence that progress is being made is found in several very recent events. The Cabinet shifts, eliminating Ho Yin-ching, H. H. Kung, and Chen Li-fu from their most important posts, and bringing Gen. Chen Cheng, who had cooperated closely with Stilwell, into the Ministry of War is one of these events. Another is Major General Wedemeyer's reaffirmation on November 23 that it would be necessary to engage Japanese forces on the Chinese mainland and his further statement that Chiang Kai-shek had approved his recommendations for redistribution of the forces in China for more effective operation, and that these plans were already being carried out. That sounds like cooperation to me, and cooperation based upon the need to develop coalition warfare between American and Chinese forces.

Then a day or two before the announcement of his appointment as the new United States Ambassador to Chungking, Major General Hurley gave a public and publicized banquet in honor of Chou En-lai, who had just arrived in the Chinese capital to reopen unity negotiations with the Government. That could hardly have been done without the acquiescence of the generalissimo.

Mr. MORRIS. At this point, Mr. Chairman, I might say we have found the reference in the Wallace cable to General Wedemeyer. The paragraph reads as follows:

While I do not feel competent to propose an officer for the job, the name of General Wedemeyer has been recommended to me, and I am told that during his visit here he made himself persona grata to Chiang.

The whole cable has been introduced into the record, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BUDENZ. Mr. Chairman, without wishing to intrude on the time of the committee, I would like to introduce one or two more documents here.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. BUDENZ. One is a critical reference to the report publicly made by Chiang Kai-shek and Henry Wallace publicly in China, in Chungking. The criticism is that it didn't include the question of raising the blockade of the Chinese Communists.

But the Daily Worker hastens to say:

But there is no focus on these events in Wallace's statement, for which I do not, of course, blame the Vice President \* \* \*

And he goes on to indicate why the Vice President should not be blamed.

The CHAIRMAN. Who says that?

Mr. BUDENZ. This is Joseph Starobin in the Daily Worker.

Mr. MORRIS. What was Mr. Starobin's position, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. He was foreign editor of the Daily Worker, and that is a responsible position because the foreign editor is knee deep in international intrigue, I might say.

I would like to point out that Mr. Starobin seems to know here what is on Mr. Wallace's mind, because he says that his statement at Chungking in regard to relations between China and Siberia, which the communists applauded, leads to this conclusion:

He—

that is, Mr. Wallace—

is clearly perturbed with the many hostile expressions against the Soviet Union which he heard in Chungking, and in saying this I am telling no special secrets. \* \* \*

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, this writer indicated that he was getting information as to what Mr. Wallace's real thinking was.

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct, although he said he is telling no special secrets.

Mr. MORRIS. This is the Daily Worker of June 28, 1944, page 6.

The column is headed "Between the Lines—Wallace learns about China," by Joseph Starobin.

May that be introduced into the record, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted into the record.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 314," and is as follows:)

#### WALLACE LEARNS ABOUT CHINA

(By Joseph Starobin)

Henry A. Wallace is probably on his way home now after his dramatic visit to Soviet Siberia and China. The most important document summarizing his week-long stay in Chungking has gone before him. I mean the joint statement signed with Chiang Kai-shek, and published last Sunday.

On the face of it, Wallace and the Chinese generalissimo say some excellent things. It would appear that their discussions have been "informal, frank and friendly." Special emphasis is placed on the "cornerstone position of China in Asia," in a system of Pacific security, built upon Chinese, Soviet, British and American collaboration, and the "permanent demilitarization" of Japan.

As for the realization of Sun Yat Sen's three principles, the statement speaks of "national sovereignty" as something already achieved for China, of "democracy" as something apparently not yet achieved but "implicit in the plans for a new constitution," and economic reconstruction as something for the future.

The order in which these principles are discussed is significant; I suppose we must be grateful that the long-delayed constitution is mentioned at all.

#### WALLACE ANXIOUS FOR CHINA-SOVIET TIES

A curious feature of the joint statement is its emphasis on the relations between China and the Soviet Union. Wallace and the generalissimo consider it "axiomatic" that the future peace of Asia must rest on a "continuation of the ties of friendship that have characterized American-Chinese relations for over a century." And then in the same sentence, virtually on an equal basis, they place the importance of "mutual understanding" between China and the Soviet Union—"China's nearest great neighbor."

It is nothing short of historic that Chinese-American and Chinese-Soviet relations should be discussed in the same breath and on the same plane. Yet it must be noted that in the case of our own country the statement speaks of a century-long friendship, whereas in the case of the Soviet Union is pleads only for mutual understanding.

If we bear in mind the Vice President's excellent remarks upon arriving in Chungking to the effect that the borders between China and Siberia ought to be as free and peaceful as the borders of Canada and the United States, we have a right to conclude that something is preying on Wallace's mind.

He is clearly perturbed with the many hostile expressions against the Soviet Union which he heard in Chungking, and in saying this I am telling no special secrets. In Cairo last December many a hardboiled British and American diplomat was shocked to hear vigorous anti-Soviet opinions from leading Chinese officials. The Vice President has now heard them also. He has gone out of his way to emphasize his own view of the Soviet Union's importance to China. Let us hope that the generalissimo's signature to the same statement will have its effect in Chungking.

But weighing the excellent, long-range implications of this document, one must also pause on the fact that they are so long-range.

Nothing is said on the one question that must surely be uppermost in everyone's mind: the extremely difficult military situation in central China and its connection with the extremely serious and continuing blockade of the Chinese Communists in the northwest border region.

The Wallace-Chiang statement is therefore more interesting for what it does not say than for what it says. Perhaps not all Americans realize that 120,000 Japanese soldiers are at this moment plunging from captured Changsha toward the vital junction of Hengyang, threatening to control the key railway from Peking in the north clear down to Canton in the south.

This is a terrific offensive designed to cripple China, to trap our inland air bases, to force a coup d'etat against the generalissimo and an effective separate peace.

So far the Japanese have had their way. The only redeeming feature of the dark picture lies in the fact that sections of Hunan and Honan province used to be guerrilla strongholds in times gone by and guerrilla warfare will undoubtedly revive there on a large scale.

But there is no focus on these events in Wallace's statement, for which I do not of course blame the Vice President. The immediate picture could not have been discussed without noting that 500,000 Chinese soldiers are all this while blockading the northwest in a futile, treacherous, "frozen" kind of civil war. The fact that Wallace could not (even by implication) comment on this overshadowing problem reflects the gravity of the problem itself.

#### TWO PICTURES—AND THE STAKE FOR AMERICA

The most striking fact about the world picture today is the contrast between the military and political crisis in China as against the heartening military and political successes everywhere else among the United Nations.

Without losing our sense of perspective, it must be said that very alarming things can happen in China, affecting the whole course of the war unless unity is achieved between the Kuomintang and the Communists, and in a hurry.

It is the job of conscientious Americans to leave no stone unturned in facilitating that unity. History has a way of forcing its pound of flesh for the mistakes and errors of the past. In this case, Japan will be the Shylock. And Uncle Sam, among others, would be the loser.

**Mr. BUDENZ.** Mr. Chairman, now, if I may be permitted, I would like to show very briefly that this Communist applause of Mr. Wallace—and this is not for the purpose of pillorying Mr. Wallace but for the purpose of showing that his mission was not regarded by them as to be considered as very hostile to the Communists—led them into the big campaign to support Mr. Wallace for Vice President in 1944, and then led to the big campaign for Mr. Wallace for Secretary of Commerce in 1945.

I was knee deep in both of these campaigns and know very thoroughly of the almost hectic and extensive campaigns conducted by the Communists on behalf of Mr. Wallace, which meant approval of all that he stood for.

Now, I would like to introduce just a sample of this approval.

**Senator FERGUSON.** Do you mean to say, then, that the Communist Party was interested in the domestic policies in the United States, as far as the Secretary of Commerce was concerned, and that they were carrying on certain programs?

**Mr. BUDENZ.** They conducted the biggest campaign of any group or political unit on behalf of Mr. Wallace for Secretary of Commerce.

**Senator FERGUSON.** How did they do it? Out in the open, we Communists advocate this, or how do they do it? Both ways?

**Mr. BUDENZ.** They advocated it in the sense it was in the columns of the Daily Worker, which meant transmission to the Communists everywhere.

It also took the form of getting unions to be for Mr. Wallace; getting Negro groups for Mr. Wallace; of getting other groups to be for Mr. Wallace, and then publishing that in the Daily Worker to show a tremendous popular campaign for him.

In that connection, I just want to bring a couple of these items to your attention, of scores that I could have brought before this committee.

The first is the editorial "The People Want Him"—referring to President Roosevelt.

But in that connection, they say:

Thus, the fight on Wallace has become the vehicle for the anti-F. D. R. resurrection within the Democratic Party.

Because of this, and because of Wallace's policies and his great services to the Nation, he should be continued in office.

That was only an opening gun of an official editorial.

**The CHAIRMAN.** That is when he was up for Vice President, was it?

**Mr. BUDENZ.** That is right.

**Mr. MORRIS.** The date of that, Mr. Chairman, is July 13, 1944. That is 2 weeks after the cables.

**The CHAIRMAN.** When was that with reference to the Democratic Convention in Chicago?

**Mr. BUDENZ.** That was on the eve of the convention.

**Mr. MORRIS.** Mr. Chairman, may that whole article go into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. The article may go into the record.  
(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 315" and is as follows:)

#### THE PEOPLE WANT HIM

The proverbial man on the street is breathing easier today now that all doubt concerning the President's candidacy has been resolved.

In Democratic and labor circles there was, naturally, wholehearted approval of the President's announcement. And quite as naturally, the insurrectionists within the Democratic Party were displeased. For they are not only fifth columnists within that party but enemies of the national interest as well, and that interest can be served by the President remaining in office.

The anti-Roosevelt newspapers, and they remain the great majority, have performed in the accustomed manner. Their cry is that F. D. R. has remained too long in power. There is a note of contempt for the people in that argument. For, as the President says, the people are sovereign and they will determine whether he has remained too long in office.

#### DIVERSIONARY TACTICS

Any cry of opposition today based on a fourth term is pure smokescreen. The problem today is the winning of the war, the establishment of a secure, democratic United Nations peace, the reconversion to a peacetime economy of prosperity. Anyone who dares put up against these issues that of length in office is clearly practicing diversionary tactics because he doesn't want to face them.

The military problems are still terrific. The war is far from won. And despite Governor Dewey's position, it is the business of the President to serve as Commander in Chief and to be thoroughly familiar with those problems. Otherwise he is abdicating his responsibilities.

The problem of relations with the United Nations is a complex and delicate one. Not only is the President's familiarity with it a factor in the elections, but who can honestly compare Governor Dewey with him as the American spokesman on a world scale?

Suppose the President were not to run. The Democratic Party would immediately be torn between various factions with naked defeatism and reaction organized to take over or to ruin. The G. O. P. would win the election hands down and would no longer find it necessary even to cover itself with the pretense of supporting a war for complete destruction of the Axis, in collaboration with the Soviet Union and England. There would be fear and suspicion generated abroad, and rightly so. In place of the ideals for which the world is fighting would be substituted the cynical imperialism of the G. O. P. spokesmen. The Axis would be encouraged to continue resistance.

For the Republican Party, as now constituted, would not represent a continuity of leadership in America if it should win the election. This is obvious from the speeches of its present leaders, from its candidates, from its platform and from its activities in Congress and elsewhere. It is evident in its rejection of Wendell Willkie and his program.

The danger of this leadership coming into power is reason enough to rule out the argument that F. D. R. has been in office too long.

#### THE VICE PRESIDENCY

The problem of the Vice Presidential nomination still remains to be decided. That office has undergone a transformation in the last 4 years. It is no longer a place for a "Throttlebottom," as Walter Lippman has described Governor Bricker. Henry A. Wallace has made it an important cog in the Federal machine.

With the President immersed in military and foreign policy problems, the job takes on important aspects. The country needs a Vice President who is both capable and a consistent supporter of the President's policies.

There are several who might fill the bill. But those who are fighting Wallace would also fight them, because the anti-Wallace movement is essentially an anti-Roosevelt movement that has become diverted because the President is too popular. Thus, the fight on Wallace has become the vehicle for the anti-F. D. R. resurrection within the Democratic Party.

Because of this, and because of Wallace's policies and his great services to the Nation, he should be continued in office. We are not greatly impressed by the argument that he is unpopular. Every poll taken among the people and

among Democratic leaders has shown him leading by a wide margin among prospective candidates.

We feel that a change in the Vice Presidency could be considered only if there were an opportunity for a coalition ticket such as President Lincoln organized in 1864.

Lacking that, we are sure that the people will not only plunge into the fight to reelect the President, but will give full support to Vice President Wallace, as well.

Mr. BUDENZ. Then on June 18, 1944—and I say I am only making selections—we have this editorial: "Renominate Wallace," which I wrote personally.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that in the Daily Worker?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. And in it they say that—

The decision will be made in the next 48 hours. We suggest that the people back home everywhere let the delegates to the Democratic convention know at once that they desire the nomination of Henry Wallace for Vice President.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why did you write that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. I wrote that upon request of Earl Browder, who was the leader of the party, and because the Politburo was convinced that Mr. Wallace represented those views, whether he was aware of it, or not, which the Communists thought should be forwarded.

In that connection, there was a great, extensive debate, and Mr. Wallace's whole record of having declared in public addresses that Soviet Russia had many features of democracy superior to our own, although he also said we had features superior to theirs, such as ethnic democracy of Soviet Russia and women's democracy, sex, and his speech in 1943, where he had said that if peace is ever broken, it will be solely due to the American double-cross of Soviet Russia; those things were debated at that time, and it was on the basis of that record of Mr. Wallace and his entire career that this stand was taken.

Senator FERGUSON. You were writing the Communist line at that time and praising Mr. Wallace and advocating his selection, were you?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And claiming that it would be great for the United States.

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not claim much pride this morning in that work that you did back in '44, do you, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, Senator, I wouldn't want to discuss Mr. Wallace in person here.

Senator FERGUSON. No. I mean as to carrying out the party line?

Mr. BUDENZ. I think I have endeavored to make amends, as much as I could, under great difficulty.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, you have.

Mr. BUDENZ. It has been my feeling that the damage that I did to the United States must be compensated for by my service to the Government insofar as I can do it today.

Senator FERGUSON. And to the people of the United States.

Mr. BUDENZ. And to the people.

But I certainly am ashamed, very bitterly ashamed, of my whole career as a Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; and that you attempted to carry out the party line as you did in this editorial.

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.



Of course, I wish to say here, without wishing to introduce extraneous matters, that the Communists were encouraged in this by instructions or representations from abroad; also from Mr. Wallace, as a result of his Soviet-Asia visit.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by from abroad?

Mr. BUDENZ. I mean from Moscow, from the Communist international representatives.

Here is one sample of day-after-day campaigning of the Daily Worker for Mr. Wallace, merely to indicate their deep interest:

Drive to renominate Wallace gains at Democratic convention—

in which we must understand that in the Daily Worker these articles are also directives as well as just observations. They are also directions and they constantly are endeavoring to inspire or whip up the Communists to the campaign.

I didn't give the date, Senator, but it is quite obvious there.

The CHAIRMAN. Wednesday, July 19, 1944.

Mr. BUDENZ. Right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you accept this into the record, this article by Adam Lapin, which appears on page 2 of the Daily Worker of Wednesday, July 19, 1944, entitled "Drive To Renominate Wallace Gains at Democratic Convention"?

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted into the record.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 316" and is as follows:)

#### DRIVE TO RENOMINATE WALLACE GAINS AT DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION

(By Adam Lapin)

CHICAGO, July 18.—Upsetting predictions by professional politicians and many newspapermen that Henry A. Wallace was out of the running, the Roosevelt and labor forces backing the Vice President for renomination made significant gains today.

The powerful Pennsylvania and California delegations, with 72 and 52 votes respectively at the convention, both went on record overwhelmingly for renomination for Wallace.

Former Gov. Culbert L. Olson introduced the resolution to back Wallace which was enthusiastically approved by the California delegates. CIO, AFL, and railroad brotherhoods delegates spoke in favor of the resolution.

At the Pennsylvania caucus, the fight to back Wallace was led by CIO President Philip Murray and Senator Joseph Guffey.

Other significant developments showing the stubborn strength of the Wallace forces among rank and file delegates included:

A resolution passed by Negro leaders and delegates to the convention last night insisting on Wallace.

Statements by W. Murray and CIO Political Action Committee Chairman Sidney Hillman at a huge press conference that "It's Wallace" and "We have no other choice, as far as labor is concerned."

#### TORY MANEUVER

Reactionary southern delegates and some of the politicians opposing Wallace attempted to make capital out of the statement in the President's letter that he did "not wish to appear in any way as dictating to the convention."

But the fact that Roosevelt said that he would vote for Wallace's "renomination if I were a delegate to the convention" clarified the President's position and actually strengthened Wallace's position.

With his campaign picking up, Wallace was scheduled to arrive here tomorrow to take personal charge of the forces backing his nomination.

There were also persistent reports that in the event of a deadlock Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas would have influential support.

One story which was current was that Senator Harry Truman of Missouri, who has been prominently mentioned for the Vice Presidential spot, had agreed to place Byrnes in nomination.

Truman was reported to have asked the CIO for support but was flatly turned down by Hillman who said that Byrnes would not be satisfactory.

#### CIO SOLID FOR WALLACE

Hillman confirmed at the CIO press conference late this afternoon that he had breakfasted with Truman this morning.

"We're not discussing other delegates," Hillman said, emphasizing that Wallace was the only choice of the CIO.

Murray declared that "the strength of the rank and file is behind Wallace."

He expressed the hope that the delegates would come to appreciate "the strength which will be given by putting Wallace on the ticket."

Murray confirmed reports that two Cabinet members had voted against Wallace on the first ballot in the Pennsylvania delegation, but said that one of them later switched over.

The two Cabinet members were Attorney General Francis Biddle and Postmaster General Frank Walker.

The vote in the delegation was 41 for Wallace, 6 against and 15 abstained.

Mr. BUDENZ. Then in regard to the campaign for Secretary of Commerce, in which I was deeply involved, because I directed the publicity specifically for the Communist Party—and, indeed, my name appeared on many articles on behalf of Mr. Wallace—I would like to present two exhibits of many that could be presented.

This was even a bigger campaign in some ways than the one for Vice President, because they had more time to carry it through.

The CHAIRMAN. What date is that?

Mr. BUDENZ. The date I am presenting first is January 27, 1945. They had "Wallace's Program for Postwar America" in detail, but it is to the editorial that I direct attention:

All United States has stake in Wallace fight.

In speaking about Wallace's testimony which clashed with that of Jesse Jones, they make a contrast between the two, and then they say about Mr. Wallace:

There was grandeur about the Wallace testimony, a grandeur imparted to it by the vision of the man, by his profound concern for the future of the people—all of the people—of America, by his understanding of the interconnection between the economic welfare of the people and the maintenance of American democracy, by his grasp of America's position in a postwar world, by his boundless confidence in the Nation's ability to go ahead.

There is much more to the same effect, in which they conclude by urging that Henry Wallace be confirmed as Secretary of Commerce.

Mr. MORRIS. That is page 4 of the Daily Worker, Saturday, January 27, 1945; an editorial, "All United States Has Stake in Wallace Fight".

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. May that go into the record, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Were you connected with the Daily Worker as an editor on that date?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; I was directing that campaign specifically. I was assigned by the Politburo to the Wallace campaign to see it was effected.

The CHAIRMAN. It may go into the record.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 317," and is as follows:)

## ALL UNITED STATES HAS STAKE IN WALLACE FIGHT

## AN EDITORIAL

All Americans must have been impressed with the profound contrast in the testimony presented to them by Jesse Jones and Henry Wallace.

Where Jones sneered at those who want to build a prosperous postwar America as "impractical dreamers," Wallace presented a sound, concrete program for building that kind of America.

When Jones attacked those who would "remake America," Wallace placed his faith in the ability of America to "remake" itself so that there would be no more starvation, mass business failures, recurrent crises.

There was a grandeur about the Wallace testimony, a grandeur imparted to it by the vision of the man, by his profound concern for the future of the people—all the people—of America, by his understanding of the interconnection between the economic welfare of the people and the maintenance of American democracy, by his grasp of America's position in a postwar world, by his boundless confidence in the Nation's ability to go ahead.

His testimony revealed that this was no "impractical idealist" talking, but one who had full command of the realities facing postwar America. His "practicality" was evident from the brief review of his own experience as Secretary of Agriculture, when he administered successfully several huge Federal farm programs. And he appeared as a thorough exponent of the policies of President Roosevelt. Those who would attack Wallace as a "dreamer" for projecting that kind of postwar program would also have to indict the President. Yet who, in his sense, would today call FDR an "impractical idealist," after his immense achievement in peace and in war?

Wallace noted that the attack on his "inexperience" was subterfuge; that the only true issue involved in the controversy over his confirmation was whether or not the resources of the Government should be used to guarantee prosperity for all Americans. The President and Wallace say they shall be so used. The foes of the Wallace appointment say they shall not.

Is there any doubt where the American people stand? Is there any question that all of us, whether worker or farmer or large- or small-business man, want a prosperous postwar America? Will anyone dare say openly that the people want a return to Hooverism? Yet this is what the foes of Henry Wallace are saying by indirection.

And when we say that the people want such a program as outlined by Wallace, we include the bulk of the 22,000,000 who voted for Dewey. Whether they voted Republican for partisan reasons or whether they were taken in by Dewey's demagoguery, these 22,000,000 did not vote for a return to Hooverism.

In his statement to the Senate committee, Wallace made it clear there is no issue of "big business versus small business" involved in his appointment, any more than there is an issue of "socialism versus capitalism." Big business and small business alike will profit from the kind of America to which he aspires. And it will be an America where private enterprise will be stronger and healthier, not weaker.

Thus, the President's appointment of Henry Wallace advances national unity. Wallace's program provides the economic foundation for advancing the interests of all groups and classes in American life. Worker, farmer, big-business man, and small-business man have a common stake in seeing that Henry Wallace is confirmed as Secretary of Commerce.

Mr. MORRIS. And you say the Soviet Union and Moscow had cognizance of this particular drive?

Mr. BUDENZ. They have cognizance of all drives. The drive I specifically referred to was the drive for Vice President.

Mr. MORRIS. I see; not this one?

Mr. BUDENZ. Not this one.

This is the Daily Worker, New York, Thursday, January 25, 1945:

CIO, AFL unions rally to Wallace; Anti-Wallace press aims at F. D. R.

There are two articles here, almost a whole page devoted to it, Negro Leaders Rally Behind Wallace, and the like.

Then there is another article here, and another by myself, under my byline, in which I take a review of the Nation's press and show that the Fascists and reactionary press is against Mr. Wallace. That was the line of the Daily Worker at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. What relationship does the Daily Worker bear to the Communist Party in America?

I think you have testified to that before, but I would like to have you testify again.

Mr. BUDENZ. The Daily Worker is the official daily organ of the Communist Party in the United States, completely controlled by the party and unable to make a move without the approval of the Politburo.

This is a literal matter, Senator. There is a representative of the Politburo always as a liaison representative of that organization in the editorial board of the Daily Worker.

This personnel is changed from time to time.

Secondly, the Daily Worker, from that position as daily organ, is the telegraph agency of directives to the conspiracy. That is, every morning a Communist leader out through the country opens up the Daily Worker, from it decides what campaigns to carry forward, whom to support, whom to attack, what organizations to rout.

That is one of the sources of the success of the Communist conspiracy in this country: the quickness with which they can operate.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the party line, is it not?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is the party line as it is delicately interpreted from day to day by the Daily Worker, because even in the party line there are certain changes from time to time, emphasis to get certain things out more rapidly, to get certain organizations into activity quicker, and the like.

The Daily Worker, for example, once had a circulation of 8,000. That didn't bother the Communist Party, from information I have received. That wasn't while I was connected with it.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the circulation when you were there?

Mr. BUDENZ. The daily circulation was around 29,000, and the Sunday circulation ran about up to a hundred thousand on the Worker, but it ran up and down from seventy-five to a hundred.

That was not the concern of the party, though, of course, the more circulation they got, the better they liked it. But their concern was that it reached quickly those Communists who could transmit what it said out in waves to others.

The CHAIRMAN. How is it supported? By its subscriptions, or by its advertising, or by what means?

Mr. BUDENZ. It is largely supported by what is called a financial drive every year for the Daily Worker, in which several hundred thousand dollars is raised, because neither its subscriptions nor its advertising would, of course, bring it any substantial revenue.

The main advertising it has is from such organizations as the International Workers Order, which is an adjunct of the Communist Party and which from time to time, as a gift, but in the form of an ad, gives large ads to the Daily Worker.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that go into the record, that article of January 25, 1945?

The CHAIRMAN. It may go into the record.  
(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 318" and is as follows:)

# CIO, AFL UNIONS RALLY TO WALLACE; ANTI-WALLACE PRESS AIMS AT FDR

(By Louis F. Budenz)

Rallying behind President Roosevelt in his selection of Henry A. Wallace as Secretary of Commerce, the Greater New York CIO Council yesterday wired Senators Wagner and Mead urging them to work for Wallace's confirmation. Joseph Curran, president, and Saul Mills, secretary, asked the Senators to oppose unequivocally any attempt to divorce the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) from the Department of Commerce.

The Wayne County (Detroit) CIO Political Action Committee also pressed for approval of the President's appointment. The Detroit PAC wired the President that his action "will further cement our national unity front against the fascist Axis."

In Washington, CIO president Philip Murray and presidents of the largest AFL unions and railroad brotherhoods also spoke for confirmation.

Murray said that the CIO "hails with delight the nomination of an outstanding American in the person of Henry Wallace to the position of Secretary of Commerce. I am hopeful that the Senate will confirm him without quibbling."

Dan Tobin, president of the AFL, Brotherhood of Teamsters, asserted that "there isn't a man better fitted for this job than is Henry Wallace."

Tobin said he was aware of the move to separate the Department of Commerce from its more important RFC activities and added:

"So when I say I favor Mr. Wallace's appointment as Secretary of Commerce, I naturally include these newer functions of the Department."

Harvey Brown, president of the AFL International Association of Machinists, commented that the former Vice President "will be able to make a very real contribution toward solving our postwar problems, especially since everything must be done to promote continuity of employment. \* \* \*

## RAIL UNIONS

E. E. Milliman, president of the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, said he favored the appointment and "without question the Senate should confirm it."

Felix Knight, president of the Brotherhood of Railway Carmen, said he favored confirmation on the grounds that "a person in a position of responsibility should have the right to choose his assistants."

George M. Harrison, president of the Brotherhood of Railroad Clerks, largest railroad union in the country, said he was highly pleased with the Wallace appointment and looked forward to confirmation.

Wallace's appointment will be tremendously helpful because of the program of readjustment required for the postwar, H. W. Fraser, president of the Order of Railway Conductors, said. He predicted Wallace would prove to be a very able Secretary of Commerce.

Nothing lets us know so dramatically that the opposition to Henry Wallace for Secretary of Commerce is in reality a battle against President Roosevelt as the opinions on the controversy expressed in the Nation's press.

In the recent election campaign about 85 percent of the commercial newspapers of the country were against FDR for the fourth term, as Secretary of the Interior Ickes put down for the record immediately after November 7. Approximately the same percentage is hounding Wallace now. The same purpose of scuttling the national-unity position represented by Mr. Roosevelt exists in this anti-Wallace campaign.

There are some voices of opinion, of course, which have learned something from the Roosevelt coalition's victory. Among these is the Des Moines Tribune, owned by the Cowles brothers. Backing the GOP in the 1944 elections, it is now out in strong terms for the former Vice President.

"Henry Wallace," it says editorially on January 23, "knows more about the economics of trade and finance in an interdependent world than Jesse Jones will ever suspect."

And it says sarcastically that it is not impressed by the argument that no man should be in public office "who hasn't at one time or other made vast sums of money."

On the banks of the Mississippi, the independent St. Louis Post-Dispatch is winning national fame again in its pro-Wallace attitude. This paper states that Jesse Jones "failed in the crucial test; was still pinching pennies instead of buying strategic materials in a desperate period of the war."

The defeatist press, as was to be expected, is 100 percent on the other side. The Chicago Tribune, leader of the subversive gangs in America, tears its hair in opposition to Wallace. It sees a new Red plot in his appointment, but, in its ranting talk of Communist slavery, lets us know the true basis of its barrage by bitterly saying that Wallace is a fit companion for FDR. The pro-Fascist New York News echoes the same thoughts.

The New York Times, which grudgingly came out for FDR just before November 7, and then only because of his foreign policy, is now saying things to hurt Wallace. Its reasons for not liking his appointment are the same as those that cause it to be against the President's domestic policies.

The Republican Herald Tribune likewise follows the pattern of the election period. Then its partisanship betrayed it into supporting the Dewey ticket, and caused it to resort to arguments that must have made the editorial writers blush. Now it follows the same course, talking stupidly about "socialism" being the only way to get full employment, implying that Wallace is therefore a "Red" and that full employment is undesirable in America.

The issues therefore are sharply drawn in this contest; they are Mr. Roosevelt's view of prosperity and enduring peace versus those people who oppose such objectives.

As in the national election campaign, some danger that the scene may be messed up comes from the liberals. The newspaper PM would like to make the fight for Wallace a battle on a white horse against "big business" monopolies.

The New York Post, as it did before November 7, spends much time in whining about the words used by the President in the Wallace appointment. Were either of these attitudes to become widespread, it would be injurious to the Wallace appointment.

Seeing the line-up, the people can make the fight for the former Vice President a clear-cut one for FDR and national unity.

#### NEGRO LEADERS RALLY BEHIND WALLACE

(By Eugene Gordon)

Negro leaders in all walks of life are rallying to the support of Henry A. Wallace, in the struggle around Wallace's appointment as Secretary of Commerce.

Wallace's appointment brought the decisions of Tehran "several steps nearer to the people," declared Miss Daisy George, business agent of local 6, Hotel and Club Employees Union, AFL.

The appointment "is proof that the President means business in his plan to put America to work," declared Charles A. Collins, executive secretary of the Negro Labor Victory Committee. He added:

"The disappointment felt by the Negro people when Wallace failed to get the Vice Presidential nomination has been more than compensated for by his inclusion in the President's Cabinet. He'll be associated with his chief on the program for 60,000,000 jobs. The Negro people want him."

Mrs. Ada Jackson, chairman, Brooklyn Interracial Assembly, expressed her feeling in the story of the women who, riding in a buggy along a narrow road overhanging a precipice, retorted, when asked whether she was scared:

"Scared. Why, how could I be scared? Isn't Brother Jones holding the reins?"

#### MAN OF VISION

The Reverend Charles Y. Trigg, pastor of Salem Methodist Church, 209 West One Hundred and Twenty-ninth Street. He said:

"The Secretary of Commerce should be a man of great vision and of unwavering courage. Wallace is that man. It would be a gloomy day for us all if he were sidetracked by the reactionaries. That must not happen."

Ludlow Werner, editor of the New York Age, traditionally a Republican paper but which supported Roosevelt last November, saw the Wallace appointment as a "boon to the forgotten man in business in the professions and everywhere else."

The Negro people, Mr. Werner added, certainly constitute the largest segment of America's forgotten men."

The Department of Commerce is "basic to the welfare of the Nation's economy," said the Reverend James B. Johnson, pastor of the Church of the Master, 86 Morningside Avenue.

Mrs. Dorothy Robinson Homer, librarian, One Hundred and Thirty-fifth Street branch, New York Public Library, said the appointment "means a feather in the President's cap." It means a great deal "for the colored people, whom he knows so well and who have such a high regard for him."

Alpheus Hunton, educational director, Council on African Affairs, said:

"The basic question confronting the United States is postwar economy in international trade. Wallace's presence in the Cabinet as representative of the Department of Commerce will give us all a feeling that our interests are being looked after."

Mr. BUDENZ. If I may be permitted, Mr. Chairman, may I add one more thing here?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. BUDENZ. That is: To cap off the attitude of the Communist Party toward Mr. Wallace in the 1944-45 period, in the famous article by Jacques Duclos, the general secretary of the Communist Party of France, attacking Earl Browder as a revisionist, and which led to Browder's demotion from leadership, Henry Wallace was commended to Browder as an example on two different occasions.

Now, this was a very unusual thing, and immediately the Communists understood that they should adopt Henry Wallace as a substitute for Browder, not as a Communist leader, but as a united front leader, which eventually, within a very short time, they proceeded to do, through the Progressive Party.

It is very significant that an international document such as that written by Jacques Duclos, in effect demoting Browder, and in which Browder said in its introduction that it represented the mind of all the leading Marxists in Europe, should have twice commended Wallace to Browder's consideration as having a more correct view of how to proceed than what Browder had.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that article available?

Mr. BUDENZ. It is available. It was published in Political Affairs and in the Daily Worker and in many other places by the Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. We have the article, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Mandel is now getting it. It will be made a part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. Is this your book, Soviet Asia Mission?

Mr. BUDENZ. It is, Senator.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say it is your book, you mean you own the book; it is the Soviet Asia Mission, by Henry Wallace?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes. It isn't mine.

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would read a memorandum there on page 32. It is underscored. Then I think the same thing is referred to on page 172. That is one of the men mentioned there.

I would like to have you read it aloud.

Mr. BUDENZ. Do you want the whole paragraph?

Senator FERGUSON. That part.

Mr. BUDENZ (reading):

When we arrived at Seimchan, it was the early evening of our first day in Soviet Russia. We were put up for the night at the Airport Hotel. On the walls

of the large pleasant room assigned to me were Soviet oriental rugs. An official banquet of welcome was arranged for us. The master of ceremonies was a Georgian, Sergei Arsenevich Goglidze, an intimate friend of Marshal Stalin. He is president of the executive committee of Khabarovsk's territory, under which this far northern area is governed, and he had flown up 1,500 miles from the Amur River region to greet us.

Senator FERGUSON. Page 172 shows who was at the meeting and what this Russian was thinking about. Will you read that?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, Senator. I think this was read before in the proceedings, but I will read it again:

At dinner, after our return from China, Goglidze offered a significant toast to "Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent, American experts on China, on whom rests great responsibility for China's future."

Senator FERGUSON. I am trying to place how the responsibility for China's future was placed upon these two men.

At that time, what was Vincent's mission? As I understood, at that time he was the United States employee representing the United States to carry out the United States policy; was he not?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. What was Lattimore's mission?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, he was sent as an adviser, because of his knowledge of China and Soviet Asia, particularly of China.

Senator FERGUSON. But he was really representing the United States?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. But this Russian, who was a personal friend of Stalin and represented really one of the republics of the Soviet Union, said there was a burden on them in relation to China. How do you account for that?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, I only accounted by my own knowledge of these Soviet toasts.

First of all, a Soviet toast to an individual is not necessarily a sign that he is a Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. No; I did not mention that.

Mr. BUDENZ. But when he puts a responsibility on them, that does indicate that he expects them to deliver the goods—if I may use an American phrase. He expects them to deliver the goods.

Senator FERGUSON. It was more than a toast of good health. It was an indication that they had a certain responsibility.

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you account for that? They were also advisers to Mr. Wallace, were with him at the time that he was going along on this mission; is not that true?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, I account for it by the fact that my official information is that they were Communists, and I think that is the interpretation that is most to be drawn from that statement.

The future China the Communists had in mind was a Communist China, to be attained through a coalition government, and the responsibility for that future China was placed on their shoulders.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, let us proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have at this time noted the author's note on this volume that we have been having testimony about, Soviet Asia Mission.

Mr. Mandel, will you read the author's note?



Mr. MANDEL (reading) :

Author's note : In acknowledgment of invaluable assistance in preparing the manuscript of Soviet Asia Mission, my sincere thanks are extended to John Hazard, Owen Lattimore, and Capt. Kenneth Knowles, for intimate observations of life in east Asia today; Joseph Barnes, Harriet Moore, Albert Rhys Williams, Dr. Tredwell Smith, and Myra Jordan for reading the text and offering editorial suggestions; and to Andrew J. Steiger, who compiled the book from the diary I wrote during the trip and from other factual materials supplied him by me.

HENRY A. WALLACE.

Mr. MORRIS. In addition to Mr. Lattimore, you had two people who served as secretaries, who have been affiliated with the Institute of Pacific Relations, Joseph Barnes and Harriet Moore, making a contribution to this particular volume.

Mr. Chairman, we have here an article in Political Affairs, about which Mr. Budenz gave testimony.

First, I wonder if Mr. Budenz would want to refresh his recollection on the article that he testified about and, secondly, how much would you like to have go into the record?

Mr. BUDENZ. It requires very little refreshing on this historic document on the dissolution of the Communist Party in the United States, by Jacques Duclos, which was reprinted and issued as the theoretical organ of the Communist Party in France, in which Browder, who was held to be the leading Marxist-Leninist in the Western Hemisphere, was renounced as a revisionist and demoted eventually, in accordance with Duclos' directives as general secretary of the Communist Party.

In this connection Mr. Duclos refers Mr. Browder and the Communist Party to Mr. Wallace:

The former Vice President of the United States, Henry Wallace, present Secretary of Commerce, said rightly that one cannot fight fascism abroad and tolerate at home the activity of powerful groups which intend to make peace "with a simple breathing spell between the death of an old tyranny and the birth of a new."

The Yalta decisions thwarted these plans, but the enemies of liberty will not disarm of their free will. They will only retreat before the acting coalition of all the forces of democracy and progress.

And it is clear that if Comrade Earl Browder had seen, as a Marxist-Leninist, this important aspect of the problems facing liberty-loving peoples in this moment in their history, he would have arrived at a conclusion quite other than the dissolution of the Communist Party of the United States.

Mr. MORRIS. That is taken from Political Affairs, of July 1945, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

It is my impression there was still another reference to Mr. Wallace here, but I can't find it in the short time we have before us.

At any rate, this created a certain definite repercussion within the leading ranks of the Communist Party, because it was an unusual and, in fact, unheard of precedent that a non-Communist, such as Mr. Wallace is, should be used as an example or an imitation for a Communist leader, and should have been shown to have been more in line with the Communist thinking than the Communist leader was.

It was immediately understood and so analyzed at the Politburo that Mr. Wallace was to be the leader of the united front forces as formulated by the Communists, in the immediate future, at least.

And so it turned out to be.

Senator FERGUSON. But the Communist Party does not hesitate to take advantage of a person's thinking, even though he is not a Communist, if it is in line with their philosophy.

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes. They have referred to many people.

But in this case, this was an official act demoting a Communist leader and, in addition, was quoting a non-Communist leader as having clearer thoughts on the questions from the Communist viewpoint than the Communist leader.

That, I state, is where the precedent is remarkable, and it was immediately seized upon in the Politburo discussions and acted upon, as history shows, in the fact that they understood that Mr. Wallace was destined to be the leading united front figure for the Communists before the American people, during that period.

Senator FERGUSON. I would just go back now to the first part that I asked about.

Again, you have testified before this committee and gave your reasons this morning for your belief that your testimony was true and accurate, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

Do you now again say that it was?

Mr. BUDENZ. I say it with more assurance than ever, because these documents I presented, as I have said, are only part of what could have been presented to this committee, and they confirm my contention, which was that the Communist Party Politburo, from its vantage point, thought that the Wallace Mission to Soviet Asia and China was being properly guided and would end in the way they wished it would end.

We have to appreciate what that objective of theirs was, knowing their objective during that particular period of time.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you feel their objective was carried out?

Mr. BUDENZ. Absolutely, it was carried out.

In addition to that, this is demonstrated by the Communist attitude toward Mr. Wallace. The Communists are not modest people who shrink before public personalities. If they disagree with someone they attack him, and very vigorously.

In this case, we have a rising crescendo of commendation for Mr. Wallace, up to the Duclos article.

Senator FERGUSON. You come back to the proposition, then, that the cables and the report to the President, that is now before you, were not adverse to the Communist line at the time they were written?

Mr. BUDENZ. They were certainly not adverse; they were helpful to the Communist line at the time they were written, for example, where it says that—I don't want to go too far afield, but where it says that Chiang Kai-shek can only be viewed as a short-term investment.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we addressed ourselves only to the Kunming cables because they are the only issues before this committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. There has been a good deal of discussion about that, and the connotation makes it appear that Mr. Budenz is testifying that the Communists were approving Mr. Wallace in spite of the Kunming cables and therefore the Communists concurred in the Kunming cables, but I do not think we have any testimony that the Communists knew anything about that.

How about that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. To my knowledge, there was no discussion in the Politburo cables, or any official report of Mr. Wallace.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any knowledge that the Communist leaders knew anything about those reports?

Mr. BUDENZ. I know that they knew Mr. Wallace's attitude. They discussed it, and it was in accordance with these cables.

That is to say, they knew that Mr. Wallace stood for Soviet-Chinese close relations, and that he also stood for a criticism of Chiang Kai-shek as ineffective and inefficient.

I said they had a remarkable knowledge of what later develops appeared apparently in these cables.

Senator FERGUSON. I agree with you, Mr. Sourwine, that there is no evidence in the record that shows that the Communist Party knew of the contents of the cables or the report to the President.

The CHAIRMAN. That has been testified to on 2 occasions now.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further?

Senator FERGUSON. I was directing my questions to what the cables show now and his opinion on them in the light of his knowledge of the Communist line as of the date they were written.

Mr. BUDENZ. And I so addressed myself to the question.

Senator FERGUSON. And you understood my question?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, inasmuch as there is no indication whatever that John Carter Vincent concurred in the so-called Wallace report, as opposed to the Kunming cables, I suggest that we not accept Mr. Budenz's testimony at this time on that report.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you made yourself clear so that you know what you have?

Senator FERGUSON. I think, Mr. Chairman, the purpose of Mr. Budenz's coming here was to be sure the record was complete on the score of his testimony.

Since the record is irrelevant on that point, I think we would be going too far afield in our inquiry on the Institute of Pacific Relations if we went into that. So that is all we have on that score, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Is the witness to be excused indefinitely, or is he to be held under subpoena?

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, he has agreed to have an executive session with the committee on another matter we have under inquiry. That will be the next assignment for the witness.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

The committee will stand in recess until tomorrow morning at 10:30.

(Thereupon, at 11:50 a. m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 10:30 a. m., Saturday, October 6, 1951.)

# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL  
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE JUDICIARY,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Wiley, Ferguson, and Watkins.

Also present: Senator Knowland; J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel, Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

The record discloses that Governor Stassen wired the chairman requesting an opportunity to return before the committee. The chairman replied to his wire that if it was satisfactory he might appear this Saturday morning, to which he replied it was satisfactory and he would appear.

The governor is still under oath so far as presenting his testimony to this committee is concerned. If there is any question as to that, he will be sworn again.

Mr. STASSEN. I might as well be sworn again so there will not be any question.

The CHAIRMAN. You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before the Committee on the Judiciary, of the United States Senate, will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. STASSEN. I do.

## TESTIMONY OF HAROLD E. STASSEN, PRESIDENT, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, you have requested that the record will show the two letters that you sent yesterday pursuant to the decision of the committee after yesterday's session. They are now in the possession of Mr. Mandel.

Will you read those into the record?

Senator FERGUSON. What replies have we had?

Mr. MORRIS. They only went out late yesterday.

Senator FERGUSON. If it were possible this morning to call up the State Department, Mr. Chairman, and see whether or not we can get all of the minutes this morning in compliance with your letter, it would allow the governor to have an opportunity to see them.

I wonder whether that could be done.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know. I would make a guess that this being Saturday morning you would not get very much.

Senator FERGUSON. Would it be possible to try?

The CHAIRMAN. I would not hesitate to try; no.

Read these into the record.

Mr. MANDEL. October 5, 1951:

Hon. DEAN ACHESON,  
*Secretary of State.*

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have your letter of September 12, 1951, in connection of the State Department round-table conference of October 6, 7, and 8, 1949.

In that letter you state that you would not make the transcript available because you wish to honor a commitment made to the participants and not make their remarks public.

In view of the extensive comments made concerning the remarks of the participants, I write this to renew my request that the transcript be made available to the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate.

Very sincerely yours,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

OCTOBER 5, 1951.

The PRESIDENT,  
*The White House.*

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: There was testimony before the Internal Security Subcommittee today that a report was made by a Naval Intelligence officer, reporting that John Carter Vincent was a member of the Communist Party. The estimated date of the report is sometime during the summer of 1950.

The source of that information was Mr. Louis Budenz who testified today before the Internal Security Subcommittee.

The committee decided today that it would like to have this report in its record. Inasmuch as there is no security involved because the source of the information has publicly testified to the fact of his reporting, it is requested that this report be made available to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

The report went through the district intelligence office of the Third Naval District.

Sincerely yours,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

The CHAIRMAN. I am now sending a communication to the State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may both of those letters be made part of the official record?

The CHAIRMAN. They will.

(Documents referred to and read in full were marked "Exhibit Nos. 319 and 320," and filed for the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Governor Stassen.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, subsequent to your testimony here before this committee last Monday, have you learned anything more, any more facts, that would be relevant to our inquiry?

Mr. STASSEN. I have, Mr. Morris and Senator McCarran, and before proceeding, I would like, with your permission, to say again that I appear following through from the earlier hearing in which I was subpoenaed that day, and I do not appear to make any charges against anyone nor to give any clearance to anyone.

I appear to answer your questions and to directly and simply state facts.

I feel, as I said then, it is your province to form opinions and to reach conclusions.

Mr. Morris and Senator, following my appearance on Monday, my attention was called to a State Department denial of certain important aspects of my testimony.

Starting in on that question, I might refer back to the transcript of what I said on Monday. I have in my hand the official transcript of the committee in which you say:

Will you tell us what he told you about it?

That is with reference to Senator Arthur Vandenberg.

I might further indicate, as you are aware, this recollection developed in the course of my testimony. This was not something on which I had prepared my advance memorandum, nor did I have any documents with me. It developed as you explored further the consequences of my first testimony which I did have outlined and prepared.

So this is what I then testified when I said:

When I saw Senator Vandenberg, for whom, as you know, I have the highest regard, for the last time in his home in Grand Rapids, Mich., in November of 1950, just prior to my last trip through Asia and round the world, he told me of a White House conference on this question of stopping supplies for Chiang Kai-shek.

You said:

Will you develop that for us, if there is any more to develop?

I said:

Senator Vandenberg told me in this conference he was called into, which he said was the only conference he had been called into on Asia policy, it was there proposed by Secretary Acheson and Dr. Jessup to the President that the supplies which were then being loaded in ships in Hawaii and San Francisco for the Chiang Kai-shek government, be dramatically stopped as a move toward world peace. That is, all armaments should be immediately cut off from the Chinese Nationalists and the ships that were then on the way and then being loaded—as I recall, he said there were five such ships that would be carrying supplies to the Chinese Nationalists—they should all be stopped in a dramatic and direct announcement to stop the supplies that were continuing the internal war in China; that he then vigorously opposed and analyzed it, and that after discussion with members of the Cabinet who were present, the President decided not to go ahead with the recommendation of Secretary Acheson and Dr. Jessup in view of Senator Vandenberg's statement he would publicly oppose it and he would certainly get a majority of the United States Senate to join with him in the opposition to that policy.

That is the essential part of that testimony.

The next day in my office in Philadelphia a representative of the United Press brought from the ticker a release ticked out of Washington, which I will now present for this record and in referring to it, it states that the State Department said Stassen's memory was playing him tricks.

It says that neither Acheson nor Jessup had recollection of such a meeting and it said further that there has never been any proposal to abolish aid to Nationalist China by Secretary Acheson, by Ambassador Jessup, or by any other authorized official of the State Department.

I present that for the record.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it continue with the other part of the release:

Insofar as military aid is concerned, this was covered by the President's statement of January 5, 1950, and exhaustively covered by Secretary Acheson and others during the course of the MacArthur hearings.

Mr. STASSEN. The ticker does not go to that extent, but I have subsequently obtained the official department of State press release No. 895.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will that ticker release be made part of the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. I will look it over while the witness is testifying.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 321" and is as follows:)

(Teletype copy, United Press story)

WITH JESSUP

WASHINGTON, October 3 (UP).—The State Department and far-eastern expert, Owen Lattimore, both have contradicted statements by Harold E. Stassen on China and Asian policies.

Lattimore accused the former Republican Governor of Minnesota of "fantastically inaccurate" statements. He asked the State Department to make public "all remarks made by me" at a 1949 conference on Asia.

The State Department said that Stassen's memory was playing him tricks. In considerable detail it disputed statements made by the now president of the University of Pennsylvania to Senate investigators on Monday.

Stassen testified that Lattimore gave the 1949 round-table conference 10 recommendations "best characterized as steps to hasten the victory of the Chinese Communists and liquidation of the Chinese Nationalists."

Stassen said the recommendations included United States recognition of Red China and turning over Formosa and Hong Kong to the Communists.

Lattimore denied last night that he urged such action. He said Stassen's testimony before the Senate Internal Security Committee gave "an entirely misleading impression" of the conference.

The State Department said Stassen's memory was "playing him tricks" when he testified that the late Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, Republican, Michigan, told him that Acheson and Ambassador at Large Phillip C. Jessup proposed cutting off United States aid to the Chinese Nationalists as a dramatic gesture to achieve world peace.

Stassen told the Senate committee that Vandenberg said the proposals were made at a White House conference. However, State Department press officer Michael J. McDermott said an "exhaustive search" of records failed to uncover any evidence of such a conference. Neither Acheson nor Jessup, McDermott said, had "recollection of such a meeting."

"There has never been any proposal to abolish aid to Nationalist China by Secretary Acheson, by Ambassador Jessup, or by any other authorized official of the State Department," McDermott said.

Referring to the 1949 conference on Asia, McDermott said the stenographic transcript of the meeting showed that 18 members of the panel spoke. He said Lattimore and Lawrence Rosinger, a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations, urged recognition of Red China, and that 11 others believed 'recognition could not be withheld for an indefinite period.'

"Five, including Mr. Stassen, recommended that recognition not be considered at that time," McDermott said.

Rosinger, whom Stassen testified joined Lattimore in offering the 10-point program, said in New York last night that Stassen's statement was "simply untrue."

Mr. STASSEN. I will present this official release for a part of the record, but it says in it, and, of course, the press is familiar with it:

Secretary Acheson has no recollection of such a meeting. Ambassador Jessup has no recollection of such a meeting. We have checked the records at the White House thoroughly. We have checked the Secretary's records and find nothing.

Then it goes on:

Moreover, there has never been any proposal—  
et cetera.

Senator, of course, when that ticker was brought to me I realized that I faced a very grave and very fundamental situation, a matter that I had testified to before this committee that was of great consequence, and it had been directly denied and denied from records.

Of course, that went in the press across the country. There was just a trace of double talk in the release and so what I immediately did at 10:15 a. m., on October 1, when this was brought to me, I said this to the press:

My attention has been called to the State Department's release of October 2. I will make a more complete statement later, but I immediately ask this direct specific question of Secretary Acheson:

"Do you deny that you were at the conference with President Truman and Senator Vandenberg in 1949, at which you recommended cutting off all military supplies for the China Nationalists and at which Senator Vandenberg opposed such action?"

The CHAIRMAN. That was a wire from you to the Secretary of State?

Mr. STASSEN. That was a statement to the press immediately when they brought this ticker to me.

Mr. MORRIS. Excuse me, Mr. Stassen.

Mr. Chairman, we have here the press release Mr. Stassen read from. Should that be made part of the public record?

The CHAIRMAN. I think this is a matter that Mr. Stassen has testified to and I do not know whether the whole wire should be made a part, or not.

I already put the ticker in. It illustrates the testimony of the witness.

In regard to the press release, I will pass on that later.

Mr. MORRIS. The last is the question addressed to Secretary Acheson. I think the testimony covers that completely.

The CHAIRMAN. It was a statement given to the press, according to the witness, in which it propounds a question through the press to the Secretary; is that correct?

Mr. STASSEN. That is correct.

Senator WATKINS. There would not be any necessity for putting that in the record. He has read it.

Mr. STASSEN. I read it. It is just there for reference.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you get an answer, a direct answer to this, Governor?

Mr. STASSEN. No, I have not received a direct answer to it. There is an indirect answer that I will refer to.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Governor.

Mr. STASSEN. Then, of course, realizing this was a grave situation, I immediately relived in my memory that conference with Senator Vandenberg in order that I might there explore for sources of confirmation and corroboration. At the same time I asked my secretary to look in our files with reference to the conference itself with Senator Vandenberg.

Since the basic statement that my memory was playing tricks was involved, I felt that was material. They immediately came back from the files with a copy of a telegram from Senator Vandenberg to me on November 17, 1950, which reads:

Anent your visit tomorrow, are you arriving by plane? Happy to have my chauffeur meet you if you will advise the hour.

Sincerely,

A. H. VANDENBERG.



This is sent from Grand Rapids.

My secretary also produced the stub of my airline ticket which shows my routing to Minneapolis, to Milwaukee, to Grand Rapids, to Ypsilanti, to Pittsburgh, and back to Philadelphia, and also a copy of the letter that I wrote then a week later to Senator Vandenberg saying:

I deeply appreciate having had the opportunity to see you. My visits with you are always stimulating and inspiring.

I will look forward to seeing you again upon my return from Asia.

My very best wishes.

That is a comparatively minor point, but it definitely corroborates what my memory was, that I had seen him in November of 1950, the exact date being November 18, 1950.

I present these three things for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. I think they may go in the record.

(Documents referred to and read in full were marked "Exhibits Nos. 322, 323, and 324," and filed for the record.)

Mr. STASSEN. Then as I reflected and relived in my memory this conference, I recall Senator Vandenberg had said that it had been subsequent to some serious reverses of Chiang's forces and that it was at a time when an effort was underway to establish unity between the China Nationalists and the China Communists in the war.

Therefore, referring out our own chronological memorandum regarding the development of the war, I placed that as being in February, March, or April of 1949, although I emphasize Senator Vandenberg had not told me when it was, but he said it was in 1949, as I testified here.

Then, in reflecting, I further recalled he said that the meeting had documentation; that is, that when he arrived for the meeting some of the members of the Cabinet were present; that there was a formal presentation of the proposal; that the documents were ready to put it into effect, and there was documentation to support it.

With these two clues, I then said to my secretary, "Locate Arthur Vandenberg's son, Arthur Vandenberg, Jr., and get him on the phone."

In due course, perhaps an hour, my secretary said that Arthur Vandenberg, Jr., was in South America.

I said, "Try to reach him there."

Then he came back and said they had located him at another place. He had just recently returned and that he was on the phone.

So I told him of my testimony here; told him that it would involve, as I saw it, February, March, or April of 1949, and asked him if Senator Vandenberg had any diary or memorandum that might bear on this situation.

Within a short time he advised me that the Senator did have such a diary; that the date was February 5, 1949; that the conference was held in the White House; that the essential facts that I testified to could be corroborated in Senator Vandenberg's diary.

He told me further that Senator Vandenberg's diary was kept by the Senator himself, typing it on his own typewriter with his own hands, following conferences such as this, and that the specific reference for February 5, 1949, is there in these documents; that it is there in Senator Vandenberg's own typing, and that he had the document.

I then asked as to getting it, or getting a copy of it. He said that he has sold the rights on it to the New York Herald Tribune and to the Houghton, Mifflin Book Co. and that, therefore, it would be necessary that it be subpoenaed to produce it.

The CHAIRMAN. That would have to be subpoenaed?

Mr. STASSEN. It would be necessary, as I see it, to subpoena Arthur Vandenberg, Jr., the syndicate editor of the New York Herald Tribune, and the book editor of the Houghton, Mifflin Co., and ask that they produce the Vandenberg diary for February 5, 1949.

Senator FERGUSON. Then the owners have the copyright.

The CHAIRMAN. I was wondering who had possession. Whoever has possession should be subpoenaed.

Mr. STASSEN. I assume it is a situation in which Arthur Vandenberg, Jr., is working on the papers, but they are in the legal custody of those who have purchased the rights. So I think the subpoena must be joint. I would request that it be done and that this committee and the public might have that vital corroborating evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is Mr. Arthur Vandenberg, Jr.?

Mr. STASSEN. He is in New York City.

Let me consult my secretary.

My secretary will check and get the phone number at which he is finally reached and locate him.

Mr. SOURWINE. The address would be more helpful.

Mr. STASSEN. He undoubtedly could also be reached through the New York Herald Tribune syndicate editor because they are in active work on the diary.

My secretary will get the exact location where he can be reached.

The CHAIRMAN. The matter of issuing a subpoena will be submitted to the committee.

Senator FERGUSON. Governor, the other day you testified I think in the record that Senator Vandenberg had stated as part of the conversation that this was the only consultation he had on the Far East.

Do you recall that?

Mr. STASSEN. On Asiatic policy.

Here are my exact records and this is what he told me. Senator Vandenberg told me in this conference that he was called into, which he said was the only conference he had been called into on Asiatic policy,

It was there proposed by Secretary Acheson—  
et cetera.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, do you care to make a ruling with regard to the Department of State release to which Mr. Stassen referred?

The CHAIRMAN. I think the release should be submitted. I think the members of the committee will agree it should go in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. I see one thing in the release that I would like to say something on.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me rule on this first.

Senator WATKINS. I think it ought to be in.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 325," and is as follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE—FOR THE PRESS—No. 895, OCTOBER 2, 1951

ORAL STATEMENT BY MICHAEL J. M'DERMOTT REGARDING TESTIMONY OF MR. HAROLD STASSEN ON OCTOBER 1 BEFORE THE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY

I have been getting questions all day about the testimony yesterday of Mr. Harold Stassen and his allegations, which summarized were—

1. That Secretary Acheson, according to the late Senator Vandenburg, proposed in November 1950 the cutting off of aid to Nationalist China in a dramatic move "toward world peace."

2. That at the October 1949 round table, Lattimore and Lawrence K. Rosinger headed the "prevailing group" which recommended the recognition of Red China at an early date and other moves favorable to Red China.

3. That the State Department tended to "implement" the "Lattimore-Rosinger recommendations" and to ignore those presented by Mr. Stassen and others.

4. That Ambassador Jessup, who presided at some of the meeting, told Mr. Stassen, who appealed to him against the "recommendations" of the "prevailing group," that there was "greater logic" on the Lattimore side.

In taking them up, one by one, with respect to the allegations of Mr. Stassen that Secretary Acheson and Ambassador Jessup at a White House meeting proposed the cutting off of aid to Nationalist China in a dramatic move "toward world peace," I fear that Mr. Stassen's memory is playing him tricks. An exhaustive search of the records has been made and no record can be found of any such meeting ever having taken place. Secretary Acheson has no recollection of such a meeting. Ambassador Jessup has no recollection of such a meeting. We have checked the records at the White House thoroughly. We have checked the Secretary's records and find nothing.

Moreover, there has never been any proposal to abolish economic aid to Nationalist China by Secretary Acheson, by Ambassador Jessup, or by any other authorized official of the Department of State. Insofar as military aid is concerned, this was covered by the President's statement of January 5, 1950, and exhaustively covered by Secretary Acheson and others during the course of the MacArthur hearings.

2. About the "prevailing group": While the Department must, in fairness to the confidential pledge given participants in the round table, adhere to that pledge, it can state—following a close study of the stenographic transcript—the following:

Eighteen members of the panel spoke on the subject of recognition of Red China. Of these, two—Messrs. Lattimore and Rosinger—recommended that recognition be extended to Red China. The consensus among 11 others was that the situation obtaining at that time (1949) was such that recognition could not be withheld for an indefinite period. In general, they expressed the view that this was largely a matter of timing in the light of future developments. Five, including Mr. Stassen, recommended that recognition not be considered at that time.

3. Mr. Stassen's allegation that the Department tended to implement what he (Stassen) refers to as "the Lattimore-Rosinger recommendations" not only is not confirmed by history, but history proves that the policy of the Department tended in the opposite direction. One may quibble over impressions, but there is no quibbling with facts. These are—

The United States has not recognized Red China. As you gentlemen know, the Secretary at various press conferences stated that nothing would be done with respect to that question without full consultation with the appropriate committees of the Congress. Similar assurances were given the committees themselves.

Mr. Stassen admits that the point in the "Lattimore-Rosinger proposal" regarding United States recognition of the Chinese Communists was not implemented. He charges that a "collateral Lattimore proposal" that this country encourage the British and others to give that recognition was carried out. This charge is absolutely without basis in fact. The record shows that this Government not only made it clear to the British Government that in the United States view recognition of Communist China was unwise and could not be given consideration by the United States, but it repeatedly instructed United States diplomatic representatives abroad to make this view known to governments to which they were accredited.

Another point which, according to Mr. Stassen, was proposed by Lattimore and Rosinger and, by implication, adopted by the State Department was that "it should be United States policy to turn Formosa over to the Chinese Communist Government." It has at no time been United States policy to turn Formosa over to the Chinese Communists and the Department of State has at no time suggested or advocated this policy.

Here again the facts of history refute such an implication. As the Secretary and others pointed out in great detail during the course of the MacArthur hearings the policy of this Government was to prevent the fall of Formosa to the Chinese Reds. The decision of the Joint Chiefs, however, was that no United States forces should be used in this undertaking and that, therefore, the implementation of this policy must rest upon diplomatic and economic means.

Under the circumstances set forth by the President in his statement of January 5, 1950, and subsequently set forth in greater detail, a decision was made not to provide additional military aid to Formosa. The accent there is on the word "additional"—not to provide additional military aid to Formosa. However, existing programs of military assistance were continued to completion and the press carried stories and photographs of shipments of military supplies under existing programs shortly following the President's statement.

Until the assignment of the Seventh Fleet to the protection of Formosa, and the provision of additional military aid to Nationalist forces on the island, the policy of preventing the fall of Formosa to Communist hands was pressed with vigor through diplomatic and economic means. The indisputable facts are that Formosa remains in Nationalist hands and that the United States lent diplomatic economic, and military aid in assuring the retention of the island in Nationalist hands.

Nor is there any basis in fact for the implication by Mr. Stassen that "it should be United States policy to permit the Chinese Communists to take Hong Kong if they insisted." I can state categorically that this has never been United States policy, and the State Department has never advocated that it should be.

Now, with respect to "breaking the Chinese blockade," I think you gentlemen are fully aware of our position on that. The port-closure orders of the Chinese National Government did not meet the legal requirements of a blockade and the United States did not recognize it as such. Moreover, the Chinese National Government itself did not claim that it constituted a blockade. The United States Government, in accordance with its obligations to protect American shipping, protested to the Chinese Government certain cases in which it considered these rights violated.

The United States Government, in accordance with its obligations to protect American shipping, protested to the Chinese Government certain cases in which it considered these rights violated. However, and I should like particularly to emphasize this: The United States Government repeatedly warned American masters of the danger of entering closed ports and in practice followed the general policy of doing nothing to lessen the effectiveness of the Chinese Government's port-closure order.

4. That Ambassador Jessup, who presided at some of the meetings, told Stassen, who appealed to him against the recommendations of the "prevailing group," that there was "greater logic" on the Lattimore side; with respect to that, Ambassador Jessup has no recollection of ever having made any such remark. When questioned about this, Ambassador Jessup pointed out that the purpose of the round table was to get the independent views of a well-rounded group of consultants with varying points of view. Accordingly he did not consider it appropriate, nor did he express any opinions, regarding the views expressed by individual members of the panel.

Mr. Stassen, by implication, alleges the adoption by the Department of other points which he described as the Lattimore "proposals." These were that Asia should be considered as a long-term problem to be studied and deferred, that priority be given to Europe, and that aid to Asia not be started until after long and careful study.

The record is clear that the United States has exercised and is now exercising through the Marshall plan, NATO, and the European defense force its leadership in welding the forces of free Europe against the threat of Soviet aggression. But that does not for an instant mean that it has adopted a policy of deferring coming to grips with the problems of Asia. You will recall the efforts of the administration, and particularly of Secretary Acheson, in getting through the Congress the aid bill for Korea. You will recall that that bill was defeated in the House over the vehement protestations of the Secretary. It was subse-

quently passed. You will recall the Griffin mission to the Philippines and south-east Asia in the spring of 1950 in preparation for a program of economic aid to the countries of that area. You will also recall the MDAP mission to the same area in the summer of 1950.

Again Mr. Stassen implies that United States policy was based on the assumption that the Russian Communists were not as aggressive as Hitler and would not be apt to take direct military action to expand their empire. This implication is refuted by the facts. The Marshall plan, the NATO, MDAP, the security treaties with the Philippines, with Australia and New Zealand, the bilateral agreement with Japan, all go to show the concern of this country against the threat of Communist subversion and actual hostilities. Moreover, it should be clear to all that this Government recognized and now recognizes that the fifth-column activities of the Communists were and are more menacing than the fifth column activities of the Nazis.

Finally, it is obviously not appropriate for me to comment on any implications of how this Government should regard the Prime Minister of India. Suffice it to say that the policy of this Government with respect to India is well known.

Senator FERGUSON (reading) :

Insofar as military aid is concerned, this was covered by the President's statement of January 5, 1950, and exhaustively covered by Secretary Acheson and others during the course of the MacArthur hearings.

I would like to have the committee get in touch by subpoena, or otherwise, with the State Department to get a copy of the message that was sent to the Nationalist Government in the month of October 1949. It was along the line that no further military aid would be given to the Nationalist Government so far as Formosa was concerned, and that message was sent to the Nationalist Government.

I can now state upon the record that I first learned of that message from the Vice President of China in the month of November 1949. He described it to me and the contents in Hong Kong in a hospital room where he was ill. I then saw a copy of that message in the Embassy office in Hong Kong.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean our embassy?

Senator FERGUSON. The American Embassy in Hong Kong.

So that it is in conflict with this.

The CHAIRMAN. You are requesting a subpoena be issued for this document?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. This press release says the only thing done in relation to that was in January 1950.

If Louis Johnson, the Secretary of Defense, kept notes, a report was made of this document and this meeting with the Vice President when I returned from my trip from the Far East.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been suggested we ask the State Department for the delivery of a foreign affairs document. I think, Senator, we had better take it up in executive session. It will be the intent of the chairman to issue the subpoena if it can be issued properly. If not, we can get at it some other way.

Senator FERGUSON. I just want the record to show information concerning the press release.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, have you any further information with respect to that particular conference which you learned about from the late Senator Vandenberg?

Mr. STASSEN. I have further corroboration which I will now develop.

Might I first state that the essential points of that conference, as I see it, are these, and I give them because I believe our issue here concerned is much broader than any one individual or any two individuals.

We are dealing with grave questions of policy of our country with relationship to 300 millions of people and with relation to the whole world.

So, I think the essential points of the February 5, 1949, meeting are these:

Was the meeting held?

Was it conducted by the President?

The CHAIRMAN. You are referring to the meeting that is related to have taken place in the White House?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The Executive Office?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

Was it conducted by the President?

In that respect, I might say the President is reported to have said in his press conference the day before yesterday he had no recollection of such a meeting.

Third, at that meeting was the proposal made that all further military aid to the Chinese Nationalists be stopped?

Four. Did Senator Vandenberg there oppose the proposal with vigor?

Five. Was the proposal then not ordered?

The CHAIRMAN. There is a little bit greater significance than that. The question involved here is: Who proposed it and what movement was behind the proposition?

Mr. STASSEN. I will now develop that, Senator.

I think further in understanding it it is important to recall the situation as of February 5, 1949. In this respect, Senator, Mr. Robert Matteson, of my staff, has prepared a rough map of the situation in China on February 5, 1949.

I would like permission now to present it before the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. STASSEN. I think we might first present it on the table and then put it up on the easel.

I now have before you a map of Greater China and the lines of red and blue alongside are approximately the lines of the status between the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Nationalists in February 5, 1949, the date of the White House conference.

You will note that the line here is north of the Yangtze River. They had not yet driven down to the Yangtze River.

You will note that the line cups up here across the Yellow River near Kuei-sui and takes in only the border Provinces here.

So all of south China, a part of the central Yangtze Basin, all of west China, Singkiang, Chinghai, all of those that border on Tibet specifically were still in Nationalists hands.

This was the situation on the night of February 5, 1949, when the White House conference was held. That means that about two-thirds of the peoples of China were in Nationalist hands and about one-third were in Communist hands.

The CHAIRMAN. I think, gentlemen of the committee, that the map used by the witness at this time is of great importance and if it is pos

sible to have the map reduced so that it may become a part of the record of this committee, the Chairman intends to have it inserted in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. If it is necessary to have a motion, I so move that it be incorporated into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know whether we can have it done, or not, but I think that we can.

(Map referred to is Appendix I and faces p. 1250.)

Mr. STASSEN. As I indicated, I recall Senator Vandenberg telling me there was documentation that the proposal was ready for action if he approved that night. So, therefore, as I sought avenues of corroboration, again on that day still facing the situation of the denial that even such conference had taken place, I thought of Secretary Forrestal still having been Secretary of Defense. I thought of the Forrestal Diaries. So then I obtained through a book reviewer the information of the editor of the Forrestal Diaries. I phoned Walter Millis, got him on the phone in New York City. I said to him that I was on the trail of documentation with reference to stopping of aid of a military nature to Nationalist China in late 1948 or early 1949, and did the Forrestal Diaries, which are not yet published, give any light on that matter, and could I see the Forrestal Diaries.

He told me the diaries themselves had been returned to the White House and are in the custody of the White House under the original arrangement of the estate and the White House and the screening for security.

He said he had gone through them and from them had prepared the book, which would soon be out, about a week, I believe he said.

Then he read to me certain passages he had reduced into the book from the diaries themselves.

I think that about carries me through Tuesday, then up to the point where the State Department said they were making a new search.

Then came their subsequent partial admission that I was right about the conference; that it had occurred on February 5, 1949, and I do not have a copy of that release, but that then indicated that the presentation of the proposal was made by a General Barr and seemed to endeavor to place—I will let the release speak for itself.

I would ask the committee to secure, or my staff will secure—we have not been able to yet—the transcript of that next State Department conference with reference to Barr.

I see that I have an unofficial report of it. I had a person take it down.

The CHAIRMAN. We will suspend at this time for a few minutes. I have a call from the State Department.

(A short recess was taken.)

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Pursuant to the direction of the committee, the chairman has just talked with Secretary Webb in the Department of State. He stated that in keeping with my letter and with an idea of whether or not there would be a compliance with my request, a conference was held yesterday in the State Department and that certain individuals of the State Department were directed to communicate with the several people who had been present at the conference to determine whether

or not they would consent to have the minutes of that conference released, and that they would let me know either this afternoon or Monday.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, two people have stated in the press, Rosinger and Lattimore, as to their statements, and Lattimore specifically, that he wanted his released. So I think then there should be no question. If anybody objects, at least we ought to have Rosinger's and Lattimore's statements.

I think it would be advisable that we try to have that accomplished this morning so that the Governor would have those releases before him so that we may complete the hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. I take it, Senator, from the statement made to me by Mr. Webb just now, it would be impossible to get a conference with those who have the matter in hand down there today, this being Saturday, but that they will call me either this afternoon or Monday and let me know.

I want to say that statement to me by Mr. Webb over the phone was confirmed by another individual from the State Department earlier this morning.

In other words, to make it specific, the State Department is now endeavoring to get a release from the various participants in that conference.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the conference of October 6, 7, and 8, 1949?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, the conference to which Governor Stassen has testified.

I told Mr. Webb that the Governor was here before the committee and testifying, and that we would be glad to have the minutes if we could get them.

You may proceed.

Mr. STASSEN. Senator, my secretary has now brought in the information in regard to Mr. Arthur Vandenberg, Jr.'s address. His office is 5101-30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York. His private office phone is Judson 6-2560. His home telephone is LeHigh 46-689.

The CHAIRMAN. I will ask the committee to pause just a minute until I take another phone call.

(A short recess was taken.)

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

You may proceed.

Mr. STASSEN. Senator, the press and radio news comments that I last referred to was on October 3, 1951. This is now the follow-up from the State Department.

I would like to file later when we can get a hold of one, an official copy of it. I have an unofficial transcript which does indicate that the press stated to Mr. McDemott that he still had not answered my question; that he had partially reversed himself, but had not answered my specific question of Secretary Acheson.

Following, as I indicated, my search for corroboration in the grave picture I found myself, and recalling Senator Vandenberg's reference to the documentation and the preparation for an order to carry out the recommendation, and getting a hold of the Forrestal Diaries, having followed that lead as I earlier indicated to you, I found that on page 534 of the book "The Forrestal Diaries," which has not yet been released—it is to be out some time in a week, edited by Walter



Millis with the collaboration of E. S. Duffield, issued by the Viking Press, there is a significant item.

Mr. Chairman, I fear you should have this item. I wired the publisher for permission to present it, notwithstanding copyright.

The publisher phoned and said he had no objection, but that it must be cleared with the newspaper syndicate. So I called the New York Herald Tribune Newspaper Syndicate. They advised that the rights had been sold to 109 newspapers. Obviously I could not get permission in 24 hours from 109 newspapers to release the copyright.

Of course, the book is almost off. It is to be out in a week. I got a hold of a review copy.

Now I am under subpoena and I am at this committee's command. I have ready to present to you a photostatic copy of page 534 of the Forrestal Diaries and then certain other pages as we go along.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I have a copy which I have sent for. If there is any question about the use of this copy that came from a reviewer that may feel he did not want this copy used, I would be glad to see that my copy is made part of the record, this page and these photostats.

Mr. STASSEN. I think the legal situation is clearly these newspapers would give their consent, and I think we can assume it.

But I think the committee should specifically request me to present it.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, what is your pleasure?

Senator FERGUSON. My copy has no strings on it.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not see why any copy should have.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not, either. It may be the reviewer.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand, the reviewer gives his consent.

Mr. STASSEN. The publisher, provided you clear it with the newspapers. I could have gotten that if it had not been sold to 109 newspapers.

The CHAIRMAN. If the Senator from Michigan has it, that makes 110 newspapers.

Senator WATKINS. Probably some more Senators have copies.

Senator FERGUSON. I move we go ahead with this photostatic copy.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

You may proceed.

Mr. STASSEN. I then proceed with a copy of page 534 of the Forrestal Diaries.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson, my remark might have appeared to be offensive, but I did not mean it that way. I meant it to be a compliment.

Senator FERGUSON. I did not take any offense at it.

Mr. STASSEN. Senator, in the middle of page 534 of the Forrestal Diaries in the part that is underlined by me, we read this:

Marshall read a paper from some office people in the State Department who advocated going to the American public now to explain the inadequacies of the Chiang Kai-shek government. This paper stated we had two alternatives: (1) To follow this course, or (2) to continue to do all we can to support Chiang and accept the embarrassment that will accompany the disintegration of China.

With the President's approval, Marshall said that he felt that he would reject his department's paper advocating criticism of Chiang. He felt that this would administer the final coup de grâce to Chiang's government, and this, he felt, we could not do.

This is of the date of November 26, 1948.

Now, Mr. Chairman, this is a corroboration of the existence of documentation on this subject and the other stories and Senator Vandenberg's report indicate that this matter, subsequent to Secretary Marshall leaving the State Department, then was reactivated, came up before the National Security Council and came from there to the conference on February 5, 1949.

Secretary Marshall left the State Department on January 21, 1949.

In other words, it is about 7 weeks after Senator Marshall rejects this recommendation. Then it is about 3 weeks later under Secretary Acheson that the February 5, 1949, conference is held.

Then in the surrounding circumstance there is another important matter. That deals with the Secretary of Defense.

The CHAIRMAN. Right at that point, Governor Stassen, the significant part of this is the first three lines:

Marshall read a paper from some office people in the State Department who advocated going to the American public now to explain the inadequacies of the Chiang Kai-shek government.

It seems to me those lines are the significant lines as far as corroboration is concerned.

Mr. STASSEN. Yes. Then it is very significant that Secretary Marshall rejected that proposal and that he characterized it—you understand these are the words written in his diary by Mr. James Forrestal at the time it happened and are now in the diary in the White House.

In other words, I should explain that the format of this book, the matter that is in the size type such as I have outlined is the matter that is in Mr. Forrestal's words in his diary. The smaller type which you see below is Mr. Walter Millis' comment, and is not from the Forrestal diaries themselves.

Then you go down below to further explain a conversation—"The President." That, again, is Mr. Forrestal's words for his diaries.

A further relevant and corroborating fact affecting this entire situation is found on page 532 and page 533 of the book, the Forrestal Diaries, and I now present those two pages under the same understanding of the previous pages.

On these pages you have the reports of these reverses that Chiang Kai-shek had suffered which Senator Vandenberg had told me had been in that conference.

Then you have the reference to the Cabinet meeting on November 26, 1948.

At the bottom of the page you have this:

Marshall referred to the suggestion that I—  
and that is Forrestal—

made to Lovett on Thursday evening that we explore the reactivation of the AVG (American Volunteer Group, the Flying Tigers, who provided air support for the Chinese armies prior to Pearl Harbor), and that we get a formal invitation from the Chinese Government to remain at Tsing Tao. Marshall said the latter would be easy to get, but he was fearful of the conditions that might accompany such an invitation.

Now, then, Senator, we have this situation established, but before I say that, let me further refer to Secretary Forrestal.

Secretary Forrestal was notified by the President that his resignation was going to be accepted on January 28, 1949. He actually then

stepped out of office on March 28, 1949, at a brief ceremony in the central court of the Pentagon Building.

Now, we have established I believe beyond denial by anyone that on the 5th of February 1949 the Secretary of Defense was opposed to any stoppage of aid to China Nationalists and was, in fact, exploring in that period reactivation of greater aid in some such steps of even going to the extent of reactivating the Flying Tigers of General Chennault.

Mr. MORRIS. The Secretary of Defense being Mr. Forrestal?

Mr. STASSEN. Mr. Forrestal through this period.

We have further established that Under Secretary Lovett was conferring with him in a similar vein and that Under Secretary Lovett of the State Department had left the State Department at about the same time that General Marshall left the State Department, he then being succeeded by Mr. Webb as Under Secretary.

It is thus a simple fact that a proposal to stop military aid to the China Nationalists would not have been presented to Senator Vandenberg and the President in form ready for order unless it had the support of and was presented by the State Department.

I think that is elementary in the governmental structure of our country.

Senator FERGUSON. Governor, is it not a fact that Secretary of State Acheson became Secretary on January 11, 1949, which was right before this meeting?

Mr. STASSEN. I think it was the 21st. It is right in there.

Senator FERGUSON. In January of 1949?

Mr. STASSEN. He might be announced on the 11th and sworn in on the 21st, or something of that kind.

Senator FERGUSON. So, this relation to Secretary Marshall, he was then Secretary of State?

Mr. STASSEN. Secretary Marshall was Secretary of State in November of 1948 when he turned down this recommendation.

I respectfully request the committee to request of the President the minutes of the February 5, 1949, conference held in the White House.

I further request this committee to request of the President the minutes insofar as they refer to China, the minutes of the November 26, 1948, meeting of the Cabinet.

I respectfully request the committee to request of the National Security Council the minutes of the meeting between November 26, 1948, and February 5, 1949, at which the documentation that was presented on February 5, 1949, was acted on.

I further respectfully request of the committee that they request of the National Security Council, of the State Department, and of the President, copies of the documentation that was prepared in connection with the Cabinet meeting of November 26, 1948, affecting China and the Vandenberg conference of February 5, 1949.

The CHAIRMAN. Your request in that respect will be made before the committee in executive session, and the chairman will abide by the order of the committee.

Mr. STASSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I further say, Mr. Chairman, that if it is your wish when those documents are produced, that I should return for further examination upon them, I would, of course, be at your command because of the double reason of the very great importance of this whole matter of

policy, and because of the reason that I am now completely confident and I feel I have demonstrated that my testimony before this committee was exactly right and true, and that I have been wrongly assailed by the State Department as being a man whose memory plays him tricks.

The CHAIRMAN. I wish to say in that regard, so far as the Chairman is concerned, it would be my judgment that the request of the witness be carried out and that the request be made on the executive branch for the instruments suggested.

I, however, will submit the matter to my committee in executive session. I think the whole matter should be made clear to the American public. I do not think the State Department, or any other department, should deliberately accuse any witness before this committee of falsifying unless they know what they are talking about.

It looks to me in this instance they did not exactly know what they were talking about.

Senator FERGUSON. They should be willing to bring the evidence before the committee and show what the facts are.

The CHAIRMAN. In justice to the committee and justice to any witness, they should be perfectly willing to bring the matter before the committee. They should not brand a witness before this committee, or any committee as testifying falsely when, as a matter of fact, they have the facts and documents in their possession which would give them access to the truth.

Senator WATKINS. You have in mind bringing it before the full Judiciary Committee, or just this subcommittee?

The CHAIRMAN. This subcommittee is handling this matter.

Senator FERGUSON. Might we have an executive meeting at the close of this meeting?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

I would like to have some more members present, but it is all right. Those who are present will act on the matter.

You may proceed if you have anything further to state.

Mr. STASSEN. I do have further evidence, Senator. In fact, I am prepared to develop the evidence which I believe will convince any impartial person of the truth of everything I said to this committee on Monday.

Senator, the State Department release which is now in evidence endeavors to indicate that the references to recognition of Communist China in the October 1949 conference were rather incidental to a discussion of all of Asia policy.

I, of course, testified that there were many other points discussed, and I presented the 10 points that were there recommended by them and the 7 points concerning those that were associated with me, without any prearrangement whatsoever; but during the course of the discussion, I might say specifically for the record, that I did not confer in advance of that October 1949 conference with any of the members.

The CHAIRMAN. You made a statement in your testimony on Monday, Governor, that has lingered in my mind, as I recall it. I at that time intended to question you about it. My recollection is you stated that before that meeting certain briefing took place.

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you kindly develop that? Who did the briefing, and where, and what was done and said?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes. At the opening of the conference there was a briefing by Mr. Butterworth, who at that time had a responsible position in the State Department in the Asiatic Section. I testified on Monday with reference to his briefing, as follows:

On page 1999 of your own official transcript:

Mr. STASSEN. In the conference Mr. Butterworth of the State Department said that when the Communist Chinese crossed the Yangtze River, which as I recall would have been about April of 1949, that then this Government had approached these other governments as to their views about recognizing the Chinese Communists.

May I respectfully call your attention, Senator, to the fact that the reason the State Department has given for not releasing this transcript has been that nonofficials of the Government had been called in on a confidential basis for consultation.

Now, clearly, that reason then does not apply at all to what Mr. Butterworth said in his briefing. So that I would suggest, without waiting to find out whether 25 private citizens will all consent, those portions of the transcript that showed what Mr. Butterworth told that conference—he then being an official of the State Department; he now being an official of the State Department—would clearly not have any justification from being withheld from this committee or any other committee of the Congress.

Mr. Butterworth went at some length into the matter of recognition and the various theories of recognition. Mr. Kennan gave a broad briefing on the policy of the Soviet Union and their analysis of it, our own objectives.

An officer, whom I did not know and whose name I do not recall, gave a briefing on the then military situation, as he described it, in China.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that a military officer?

Mr. STASSEN. He was presented to us as a military officer; yes.

As I recall it, he was a junior officer, or he might have been as much as a colonel. But I think he was of lower rank than a colonel.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he in uniform, sir?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes; I did not know him. I do not recall that his name was mentioned or understood.

Then, after that briefing, the discussion opened and proceeded. So, there is a whole early part of this transcript in which there are no statements of any private citizens and to which, clearly, would not apply their own rule of withholding.

I think the only thing you will find in that early part of the transcript is my personal insistence that I be promised a copy of my own remarks before I would participate.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us make it clear that, from the beginning and during the briefings until the conclusion, a record was made?

Mr. STASSEN. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether a stenographic record was taken, Governor, of these briefings?

Mr. STASSEN. A stenotype was operating at all times on the table. In fact, the stenotypist was near my seat. I was a little bit to the head table side of center, and on Dr. Jessup's right I would say about four seats down on the right-hand side of the table, and General Marshall was on the other extreme end of the table just opposite Dr.

Jessup and Dr. Fosdick. The stenotypist was along about half way down the table, right up against the table, much as this young man has been here.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, there is some testimony by Professor Colegrove which bears on this point of briefing, and I think it might be appropriate at this time if we addressed a question or two to Governor Stassen on this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. During the open session of September 25, 1951, when Prof. Kenneth Colegrove was on the stand, the following colloquy took place:

Senator FERGUSON. I want to go back to this question of the experts being briefed at the meeting in the State Department. Was that briefing before you were asked to give your opinion?

Mr. COLEGROVE. It began with a briefing by George Kennan on the very first day, and the rest of it was interspersed. I was very much disappointed in the briefing by George Kennan. This was a conference upon the Far East, and George Kennan didn't tell us anything that we hadn't known or thought about for years and years and years. I thought George Kennan just wasted the time of the conference.

Senator FERGUSON. You got a kind of feeling that the briefing was to give you some propaganda to take back to the people?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I felt distinctly that the briefing by Cora Dubois was of that kind. The briefing done on the military situation by Colonel McCann didn't give us anything we had not already read in the New York Times.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you get an impression from this conference on the Far East, which you said was in your estimation propaganda, that it was the desire of the State Department to have a policy of great leniency at least toward the Communists in China?

Mr. COLEGROVE. The State Department didn't tip its hand in this respect. I indicated that Ambassador Jessup—

Senator FERGUSON. I am not talking about his action but the lady who briefed you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, I would like to have him conclude his sentence there. It would be interesting. You said "didn't tip its hand"?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Didn't tip its hand, and Ambassador Jessup is a very clever and able presiding officer. He didn't disclose his own views, but the briefing by Cora Dubois was a briefing very sympathetic toward the Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. Those were the kind of questions that were being brought up in the meeting?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know when her briefing took place?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I think her briefing took place in the second session.

Senator FERGUSON. When was the question discussed on the recognition of China by the United States?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Curiously enough, that was discussed in every session but particularly emphasized in what would be the second session.

Senator FERGUSON. How did this lady who briefed you stand on that question? Did she express herself?

Mr. COLEGROVE. She was talking only about southeast Asia and did not cover other subjects.

Mr. STASSEN. Mr. Morris, may I say, since you have read that testimony, that I do not associate myself with Dr. Colegrove's remarks about Mr. Kennan's briefing. In other words, I thought that Mr. Kennan's briefing was worth while. While I didn't agree with every particular of it, I thought it was a good briefing.

Also, I want to point out, in accordance with my previous testimony, I was not present on the second day when apparently Cora Dubois did her briefing. So I cannot comment upon that.

But I do want to make it clear that I am not adopting or associating myself with the words of Dr. Colegrove, one way or the other.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not know that he was criticizing what Mr. Kennan said, but he indicated here that he knew it.

Mr. STASSEN. I didn't want any inference to draw from the reading of the testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I think in the transcript, if we ever get it, there should be included the statements by Cora Dubois in connection with this testimony by Mr. Colegrove.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Governor, you may proceed. I think you stepped off your line a little.

Mr. STASSEN. That is right, Senator.

Senator, in this matter of what the nature of the discussion was on recognition and as to whether my description of it as having been the prevailing view that had developed under the leadership in the discussion of Mr. Owen Lattimore and Mr. Lawrence Rosinger, in the presentation to me of the transcript of my remarks there are a few instances in which there is some material of the transcript on the same pages stated by others, and it just so happens, as I reviewed this matter after the challenge by the State Department on Tuesday, that I found two significant examples of that.

I now present to you page D-6 of the official State Department transcript of this October 1949 conference.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a transcript of your own participation?

Mr. STASSEN. On the top three lines you will see three lines with a pencil mark drawn through them. That pencil line was drawn through by me when I asked my secretary then to run off just my own testimony. In other words, the top three lines are not my words. You read there:

\* \* \* the conditions are that condition our foreign policy, so I doubt if there would be a very serious explosion upon recognition if that were proposed in this country.

So that is confirmation that by this third day of the conference the prevailing talk was so much in the direction of recognition, that one of those who associated with me in objecting to it, said that you would get a very strong public adverse reaction to recognition. This, then, was an argument that they doubted if there would be a very serious explosion upon recognition if that were proposed in this country.

Now, then, that led to my really insistent appeal, which is then found on the following pages, that we should not recognize, and you find that going on through these next pages.

I think that then my remarks with that opening introduction, with those first three lines, are an important corroboration of the whole analysis that I presented to the committee on Monday.

So I present to you photostats of the following pages, D-7, D-8, and D-9, which follow along and you can see how I picked up and went forward from that point.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, you do not know whose testimony is concluded at the top of page D-6?

The CHAIRMAN. On page D-6, referring to the three lines through which pencil marks have been drawn, the transcription shows this:

Governor STASSEN. Dr. Jessup, I might say first that I regret very much that I have not been able to sit through the entire conference \* \* \*

which would indicate that the three lines that were not the words of the witness were the words of Dr. Jessup. Is that a fair inference?

Mr. STASSEN. Not necessarily, Senator. I could have addressed the chairman even though some other participant had been immediately preceding. So I do not present that as evidence that those former three lines were stated by Dr. Jessup. The transcript itself in full will show. You see, I do not have the preceding page; it was never given to me, therefore I do not know for certain whose words those were. They are corroboration of what I said of how the discussion went, of such a prevailing nature that we were going to recognize in a comparatively short time, and that it is corroborated by that little pickup of three lines, and then it is corroborated, I think, as you can see, by my plea from that time on that we must not make this tragic mistake, and so forth.

I do not think that any impartial person could read those pages without realizing that they do reflect the kind of circumstance that I described on Monday.

Senator FERGUSON. They indicate clearly that someone in the meeting had used the language other than you.

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. That it was proposed there would not be very serious explosions in this country. I think that is clear, Mr. Chairman, from the memorandum.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Governor.

Mr. STASSEN. Now, then, it has also been contended in these State Department statements and denials issued since I testified that after all, in effect, this was just a consultation with a group of people and that it was not really a part of policy formation.

I have here a newspaper story of Monday, November 21, 1949, in the St. Paul Pioneer Press, which refers to an official State Department release. I have photostatic copies of that, the significant language of which I have underlined. This is the first disclosure by the State Department that this October 1949 conference had taken place and it is an announcement by the State Department that it had taken place, that General Marshall and myself were present, and then it says, down at the bottom of the first column:

There were among a group of 25 men who participated in a recent closed-door, 3-day session called to aid the work of shaping a current revision of American policy, which now is apparently in its final stages.

What to do about recognizing the new Communist regime and halting the advance of communism to the rest of the Far East were among questions put up to them by Secretary Acheson.

Now, then, have in mind that it has been testified that our Government never considered recognizing Red China and it has also been testified or stated by others that this conference really was just a place where a group of outside people were talking.

Here is a story from an official State Department release which said they "were called to aid the work of shaping a current revision of American policy, which now is apparently in its final stages."

It says:

What to do about recognizing the new Communist regime and halting the advance of communism to the rest of the Far East were among questions put up to them by Secretary Acheson.

Now, then, I think it is significant to look at what was the circumstance when this release—



Senator FERGUSON. Might we make this a part of the record at this point?

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record in facsimile.

(The document referred to, in facsimile, is as follows:)

STASSEN, DR. QUIGLEY SIT IN AT CHINA POLICY PARLEY

[Monday, November 21, 1949, St. Paul Pioneer Press]

WASHINGTON (AP).—State Department officials disclosed Sunday former Secretary George C. Marshall, Harold Stassen and other American leaders outside the Government have been called in to help find answers to the Chinese Communist upheaval.

Another Minnesotan, Dr. Harold S. Quigley of the University of Minnesota's department of political science, also took part in the conference.

These were among a group of 25 men who participated in a recent closed-door 3-day session called to aid the work of shaping a current revision of American policy, which now is apparently in its final stages.

What to do about recognizing the new Communist regime and halting the advance of communism to the rest of the Far East were among questions put up to them by Secretary Acheson. Their views were not disclosed but officials said they were taken fully into account by Acheson and others involved in the China problem.

SETS PRECEDENCE

The State Department has had frequent meetings with representatives of organizations concerned with foreign policy, beginning with the Dumbarton Oaks Conference on the United Nations in 1944 when there were 44 civilian consultants. But calling in leading Americans for advice while the specific policy is in a formative stage is a new departure.

In addition, a 3-day conference under direction of Francis H. Russell, Director of the Department's Office of Public Affairs, on means of strengthening the United Nations was concluded Saturday at the State Department.

MEETING IN OCTOBER

The China meeting was held October 6-8. Aside from Marshall and Stassen, those taking part included university specialists on oriental affairs, officials of international business firms, bankers, and a representative of the Army War College. Stassen, former Governor of Minnesota, is now president of the University of Pennsylvania. Another college president who served as a temporary consultant was Arthur G. Coons, Occidental College, Los Angeles.

They were asked to make no formal recommendations but to state their views fully and frankly.

This conference was independent of the specialized study of the problem being made by a three-man group of consultants to Acheson, headed by Ambassador-at-Large Philip Jessup.

Senator WATKINS. I call your attention, Governor, to the paragraph following which indicates this is a new departure from the policy and they are calling them in now for advice. This is in the article from the newspaper to which you have just called our attention.

Mr. STASSEN. Now, the situation that existed on November 21, 1949, is important in that it says it is now approaching a final determination.

On November 16, 1949, Mr. Acheson protested the China Nationalists' firing on the *Flying Cloud* ship which was running the blockade. That, I pointed out the other day, was one of the things that had been recommended by this conference in the prevailing group but which was objected to by me and by others.

And on that day or the next day—I am not clear—Bevin, in the House of Commons, said they were waiting for a decision of the United States and others to join on the question of recognition of

Red China. Mr. Acheson said that recognition was out of the question until the Communists released Angus Ward.

Then on November 21, you have the release of the story about the study.

On December 3, Mr. Acheson said the United States did not recognize the legality of the Nationalists' blockade and protested the shelling of another United States ship of the Isbrandtsen Line.

On December 30, India recognized Red China. On January 5, Britain recognized Red China, and on December 23, right in that period just immediately in advance of that, that memorandum about Formosa was issued by the State Department to all of its embassies and the Voice of America all over the world.

Senator FERGUSON. Governor, were you familiar with General Fortier's testimony that he had a conversation with Dr. Jessup when he was out in Japan in January?

Mr. STASSEN. I was told of it here in my hearing the other day.

Senator FERGUSON. About the recognition that might take place?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. In 2 or 3 weeks?

Mr. MORRIS. In 2 or 3 weeks was the testimony.

Mr. STASSEN. Now, then, I have another item. Even though I stated that I would be meticulous to stay within the exact statement of facts and not to make characterizations or conclusions, it has been said that when I testified here on Monday there was inference of the intentions of this prevailing group under Mr. Lattimore and Mr. Rosinger which was false and unfair. I do not wish to be unfair to any one but I do feel that I must state the facts in this vital matter, and I did point out that during the conference and in Mr. Lattimore's presence, I said to Mr. Lattimore and the others that the steps that they were advocating could best be characterized as steps that would hasten the victory of the Communists in China and hasten the complete liquidation of the Nationalist Government. So that right in the conference in 1949, and the transcript shows it and you now have page D-6, as a photostat that statement is made and relevant to this question of what the intention was in advocating these things.

As a matter of fact, I think it is a document of value to this committee to note the cover on Mr. Owen Lattimore's book, *Solution in Asia*. It is regular publishing practice that the cover of a book is cleared with the author as to its contents.

I have here a photostatic copy of the cover of the book and on this matter of characterization there is this one sentence which says:

He inclines to support American newspapermen who report that the only real democracy in China is found in Communist areas.

This book was published in 1945. So that the characterization that I gave to his testimony in his presence and which I reported has a relevancy in its fairness to this document which I now present to you, and I emphasize that except in reference to what I said at the conference in his presence, I have not, and I will not make any characterization of what any of these gentlemen did, because it is, of course, true that men can for perfectly good motives and men can for a perfectly justified judgment on their part of what facts mean and policies ought to be, take divergent positions.

My situation is that I have been reporting to this committee on the facts as I knew them and not in any instance testifying as to characterization or conclusions or as to accusations or to clearances.

The CHAIRMAN. I think there are a number of exhibits you have that have not been inserted in the record.

Those pages, D-6, D-7, D-8, and D-9, it seems to me, should go into the record.

Mr. MORRIS. The whole transcript did go into the record the other day.

Mr. STASSEN. A mimeographed copy of it but not the transcript itself. There you have photostats of the State Department documents themselves.

Mr. MORRIS. This is different from the one introduced in the record the other day.

Senator FERGUSON. I move, Mr. Chairman, that they be made a part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. I point out one sentence in support of Mr. Stassen's testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. You are reading from page D-6.

Mr. MORRIS (reading):

I think that would be the correct characterization of the related steps that have been advanced along with the urging of recognition at the earliest possible date.

And, Mr. Chairman, that would indicate that there had been advance testimony, recommendations along the lines of Governor Stassen's testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. The four pages, D-6, D-7, D-8, and D-9 of the State Department transcript and the book cover of Mr. Lattimore's book *Solution in Asia*, will be inserted in the record.

(The documents referred to are as follows:)

Governor STASSEN. Dr. Jessup, I might say first that I regret very much that I have not been able to sit through the entire conference. I made the greatest possible readjustment of my schedule when I received the invitation to be here and I will address myself very concisely to the point now under discussion and through the kind assistance of Dr. Talbot, I had some briefing of the discussion, and particularly of General Marshall's able presentation this morning.

I stated on Thursday that I was opposed to recognition of the north Government in China at this time and not at least for a question of a couple of years. I want to go into that a little more thoroughly because at that time I merely stated my position on it.

My first comment is on some of the related discussion this morning that has been advanced that along with recognition other steps we ought to take were proposed. These steps I say, frankly, to me could be best characterized as steps that would hasten the victory of the Communists in China and hasten the complete liquidation of the Nationalist Government. I think that would be the correct characterization of the related steps that have been advanced along with the urging of recognition at the earliest possible date.

To me that would be a very sad mistake in our world policy. If we recognize the Communist Government of China now, clearly that does mean we must at the same time not only withdraw recognition of the other Government—the Nationalist Government—but that we must then join in affirmative action to throw the Nationalist Government out of the United Nations. There are no half-way measures on this. You cannot be recognizing a government in one way and then in the United Nations tribunal, in which we are a great leading nation, take a different position to that. Nor should we possibly abstain. That would be a cowardly and weak position to take. So, we would then be in the position of going into the United Nations, with our great prestige, and throw out from that

United Nations the representative of whatever you may wish to call them—the remnants of a former government that still has now, and I think will for some foreseeable time, the effective jurisdiction over one-third of the area of China and one-third of its people and that is continuing to put up some form of resistance to the Communist areas.

Now, to put ourselves in that position in my mind, cannot be countenanced and I might urge, as I go forward, and respectfully submit that there have been some implications that perhaps those that oppose recognition are trying to play the popular tune in America, and the high view of statesmanship is the contrary and difficult and unpopular course. I will not attempt to draw any cloak of statesmanship about me this morning, or any other time, but I would modestly state that the steps that I took in the early days of opposition to Hitler and of supporting lend-lease and on the whole question of isolation and world trade have not been popular courses at the time they were taken particularly in my home part of the country. To the greatest degree it is possible, I approach these policies from the standpoint of what is right in the long view for our country and our ideals, rather than what is the current popular view. In fact, I have such faith in democracy that if a policy is right, then I am certain you can interpret it to the American people and convince the majority of them it is right.

Going to the specifics of recognition, it seems to me that taking the affirmative stand of ejecting the Nationalist Government from the United Nations and placing in its stead the Communist Government of the north would be a clear invitation to a disregard of our fundamental ideals and objectives in the world picture. Whatever else may be said about the Nationalist Government, it seems to me that there has been a greater measure of democracy, a greater measure of individual freedom, the right of free expression, of a free press, of the communication of news in that area than there has been in any of the Communist areas of the world.

I might project my views of the Communist Government of North China. I believe that in the early stages they have brought in some of those who are not Communists into leadership—some of those we might call moderates. In the early stages they will say to the American businessman, if your country treats us better and recognizes us that will facilitate your doing business here. However, you will find quite rapidly as they consolidate their control over the country and as they introduce people into these industries and businesses who learn something about them, they will proceed to throw out the moderates from the government and will tighten up and possibly expropriate and take over the businesses and that process will move forward steadily.

---

#### SOLUTION IN ASIA

(By Owen Lattimore)

Mr. Lattimore has at last taken the lid off his vast and exclusive knowledge of Asia. What he says will have a direct effect on the war and the peace since it will be read in foreign offices throughout the world. (Mr. Lattimore's right to speak for Asia will be readily apparent from the biographical sketch printed on the back of this jacket.)

In this book he points out the road American policy must take to achieve a victory for democracy in Asia. He discusses China, Japan, and all the other eastern areas from their real basis, the people in them. He shows how the "experts" have covered their ignorance with such dogmas and clichés as the myth that the Chinese are enigmatic, that the Japanese Emperor is an ancient Japanese deity, that the Chinese are incapable of democratic government. He says bluntly that Japan's exploitation of China was aided and abetted by the United States and Britain on condition that they receive their share of the loot. He shows that all the Asiatic peoples are more interested in actual democratic practices, such as the ones they can see in action across the Russian border, than they are in the fine theories of Anglo-Saxon democracies which come coupled with ruthless imperialism. He warns us that if we help the European powers revive *sahib* rule in the colonies, we shall be classed as imperialists no matter what we do in the Philippines. He inclines to support American newspapermen who report that the only real democracy in China is found in Communist areas. Finally he shows what United States policy should be in Asia and why the solution is political and economic rather than military.

JACKET DRAWING BY EDWARD A. KARR

(Atlantic-Little, Brown books are published by Little, Brown & Co., in association with the Atlantic Monthly Press)

The format of this book is designed to save paper, which is now rationed, as well as other materials. In 1941 this volume would have been larger, or thicker, or heavier, and perhaps all three of these, and might have been set in a larger type face with wider margins to the page. The size and the weight of books have increased steadily since the end of World War I; now, in World War II, the process must be reversed. But the value of a book is not to be measured by its dimensions or its weight, though it is important that it be printed in clear, readable type. What does count is its content, whether it provides good entertainment or sound information to the reader, whether it stimulates the mind, whether it is first class of its kind.

This company's policy of publishing "fewer and better books" has never been more strictly followed than during this period of world crisis. We hope you will find this book helpful or entertaining. If you do not wish to add it to your permanent library, why not give it to a member of our Armed Forces?

The Council on Books in Wartime, an organization made up of publishers, book-sellers, librarians and other groups believing that some books are weapons in the war of ideas, from time to time recommends books which it considers important to the war effort or the planning of a proper peace. We urge you to read these books.

## OWEN LATTIMORE

Mr. Lattimore is often called "the best-informed American on Asiatic affairs living today." For 22 years he has been absorbing knowledge about Asia as businessman, newspaperman, editor, traveler, scholar, and research scientist. In the last 4 years he has held official positions in both the American and the Chinese Governments:—

1. As political adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, on the recommendation of President Roosevelt, for two war-torn years (1941-42).

2. Until recently as Director of Pacific Operations for the OWI.

The following shows how well his career had fitted him for these important posts:—

Engaged in business, Shanghai, 1920.

Newspaper work, Tientsin, 1921.

In export business, Tientsin and Peking, 1922-26.

Social Science Research Council, Manchuria, 1929-30.

In Peiping under Harvard-Yenching Institute, 1930-31; under Guggenheim Foundation 1931-33.

Field work in Mongolia and research in Peiping for Institute of Pacific Relations, 1934-35.

Editor Pacific Affairs, 1934-41.

Director Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, Johns Hopkins University, 1938—

Mr. Lattimore is the author of seven previous books on the Far East and has written widely for the Atlantic Monthly, National Geographic magazine, Asia, and other periodicals.

Mr. STASSEN. Senator, I have presented now, I believe, supporting evidence on every point on which my testimony was challenged, at least in its main aspects, and I have indicated the documents which I hope the committee will decide to ask for and my willingness to return further at your call and again under oath at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. May it be understood that if we are successful in getting any of the transcripts of either the State Department officials or Mr. Lattimore, or Mr. Rosinger, who have apparently consented, that we allow the Governor to see them and then determine at that time whether or not he is to return for testimony.

As was indicated, it does appear at least to the Senator from Michigan that if we are going to conduct our hearings and have the State Department, who have the record, dispute the testimony that we are

receiving in evidence, at least they ought to be willing to come up and produce the official records rather than a statement from some one in the State Department not under oath that the records do dispute the witness. I think that is only fair to the committee and fair to the witnesses that they at least do that.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in that connection, we have requested, after the committee made the decision, the State Department for a transcript of another conference, a conference that was held in September 1949 at which were present three officials of the American Federation of Labor and two officials of the CIO.

The CHAIRMAN. That request has gone down?

Mr. MORRIS. That has gone down, and again that would be particularly appropriate, Senator Ferguson's request would be particularly appropriate, so that we do not now have to proceed to take testimony on what happened at that conference.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

There were some requests that have been suggested this morning by the witness that, of course, have not been made up to date.

Mr. MORRIS. I have made a record of those.

Governor Stassen, you testified on Monday that at the termination of the conference you had a discussion with the presiding officer, Dr. Jessup, and that during that conference he stated to you that the greater logic was on the side of what you characterized as the prevailing opinion.

Mr. STASSEN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. In view of any subsequent developments, do you care to affirm your testimony on that score?

Mr. STASSEN. My memory is very clear upon it, and of course, all of these subsequent events which I have verified this morning by corroborating evidence all give further evidence that Mr. Jessup did act in accordance with a judgment on his part that the greater logic was on the other view.

You do have the protests of the shelling of the ships, you do have General Fortier's testimony as to his statements when he arrived in Japan a few months later, you do have the statements of Senator Alexander Smith before the committee yesterday that it was his distinct impression—and I do not quote him exactly but I think I accurately paraphrase it—that in November 1949, Dr. Jessup gave him the distinct impression that they were moving on recognition; and I do not know of anything that has been presented by anyone between October 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean war that would indicate that Dr. Jessup did anything other than act in accordance with what I say he told me, that the greater logic was on that other view. My own recollection of that conversation is very clear.

The CHAIRMAN. That, of course, would not be a part of the record?

Mr. STASSEN. No; that was at recess.

Mr. SOURWINE. There is no possibility, is there, that you are assuming that he took the position of where the logic lay because of any other actions or because of any other answer; that is a recital by you of words that he spoke to you; is that right?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes; because, further, as I testified, when he said that, then I pleaded with him to go and see General MacArthur before they acted in accordance with that other prevailing group's view.

I don't know whether he was asked whether he recalled my suggestion to him to go see General MacArthur. I don't know whether that was gone into with him, but my memory is very clear on that and the following circumstances and all the surrounding bases show it.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further?

Mr. STASSEN. I think I should add to that that in so stating I am simply stating the fact of a conversation as I recall it. I do not state anything as to what the motivation of Dr. Jessup was in making that statement to me at that time. I only state the fact that he said that.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are stating that he did make that statement to you?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is not something that he might have said to you; it is something that you remember he did say?

Mr. STASSEN. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions, Senators?

All right, Governor. Thank you.

Mr. STASSEN. Thank you. I shall be at your call if these documents arrive.

(Whereupon, at 11:45 a. m., the hearing was recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.)

# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

---

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 10, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL  
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met at 11:20 a. m., pursuant to notice, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. James O. Eastland, presiding.

Present: Senators Eastland, O'Connor, Smith, and Watkins.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator EASTLAND. The committee will come to order.

You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before the Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. HOLLAND. I do.

Senator EASTLAND. Mr. Morris, you may proceed.

Mr. CROSSMAN. I should like to show in the record that I am appearing for Mr. Holland, as well as the Institute of Pacific Relations.

**TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM L. HOLLAND, SECRETARY GENERAL OF  
THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, AND  
EXECUTIVE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF  
PACIFIC RELATIONS, ACCOMPANIED BY EDGAR G. CROSSMAN, OF  
DAVIS, POLK, WARDWELL, SUNDERLAND & KIENDL, COUNSEL**

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, may I ask your permission to make, sometime during the course of the hearings today, a somewhat extended statement?

I have just reported to Mr. Morris my desire to do this as a matter of courtesy, and I now ask this request of you.

Senator EASTLAND. When was it filed?

Mr. MORRIS. It was not filed.

Senator EASTLAND. Under the Reorganization Act, Mr. Holland, it has to be filed 24 hours in advance.

Mr. CROSSMAN. I have just looked at that part of the statute, which does not say anything about 24 hours. It says:

Each such standing committee shall so far as practicable require all witnesses to appear before it to file in advance written statement of their proposed testimony.

Senator EASTLAND. What is the committee rule?



Mr. SOURWINE. Twenty-four hours, Mr. Chairman, under the theory that less than that would not be in substantial compliance with the statute.

Senator EASTLAND. That is the committee rule?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the Judiciary Committee?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

It has been waived by the committee when the committee considered the circumstances warranted.

The language of the statute permits waiving.

Could I inquire by question or two with regard to this statement, Mr. Chairman?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Has the statement been released to the press yet, or given to the press for future release?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; it has not.

My purpose in asking the question is that I do not wish to give it to the press in advance.

May I also assume for your own reasons you do not wish me to read the statement now?

Senator EASTLAND. It is simply a matter for the committee to determine. I could not determine.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I was talking to someone else when I came in.

Senator EASTLAND. He has an extended statement that he wanted to read during the course of his testimony. I knew that under the Reorganization Act it was a rule of the committee that it has to be filed 24 hours in advance.

Now, I judge the committee has the authority to waive the rule. It is something that as acting chairman I could not pass upon. The committee has to pass upon it.

Senator SMITH. Is Mr. Holland under subpoena of the committee, or testifying at his request?

Mr. SOURWINE. He is under subpoena.

Senator SMITH. It seems to me, first, he should be required to answer the questions asked by the committee. Certainly we have no control over Mr. Holland's giving any statement to the press.

Senator EASTLAND. He desires to read his statement.

Mr. HOLLAND. I wish to read the statement to the committee at sometime during the testimony.

Of course, the committee would determine when that time comes.

Senator SMITH. I would not be insistent on the 24-hour rule if it seems that is something that Mr. Holland wanted to do, and it is fair to him.

Mr. SOURWINE. The purpose of the law is to permit the staff of the committee, which is by law directed to do it, to analyze the statement and boil it down for the benefit of the committee, so they might inquire regarding the statement.

Senator SMITH. I imagine it is so the witness may be cross-examined on the statement because it takes at least 24 hours for a staff member to see whether or not such a statement is borne out or has any information in it.

Senator O'CONNOR. I do not think we ought to stand on the 24-hour rule providing the witness submits the statement to the committee in

advance, because entirely apart from this instant case, it may very well be that the witness could come here and could talk about things entirely irrelevant and foreign to the matter under consideration and we do not feel that that should be permitted, but I think if the witness submits the statement and a proper opportunity given to the staff to analyze it and the committee to see it, that the rule should not be pressed.

Senator EASTLAND. Suppose we just pass the matter over for a while.

Mr. SOURWINE. Might I inquire further, Mr. Chairman?

Senator EASTLAND. Proceed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you hold a press conference this morning, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, I did not, Mr. Chairman. I spoke to two members of the press at my hotel this morning, telling them briefly I intended to make this request. I did not give them a copy of this statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you aware that it was on the news ticker yesterday evening that you were having a press conference?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, I announced it at the time of the press conference given by my chairman in New York. I announced that I would appear this morning here.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you make any announcement to anyone that you were holding a press conference at 9:15, or any time this morning?

Mr. HOLLAND. To the best of my knowledge, I said I would like to meet two representatives of the press at my hotel room this morning to tell them what I wished to request.

Mr. SOURWINE. To whom did you say that?

Mr. HOLLAND. I spoke to the representatives of the Herald Tribune and the Washington Post.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who were the two people to whom you spoke?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Marder and Mr. Irwin.

Mr. SOURWINE. They were the only two that you notified of the conference this morning?

Mr. HOLLAND. I do not consider it a conference, but I notified my counsel here, Mr. Crossman.

Mr. SOURWINE. I meant newspapermen, sir.

Mr. HOLLAND. I asked a friend here in Washington to say that I wished to speak to a number of newspapermen about this.

Senator EASTLAND. I will say this right now, that while it is a matter that the committee has to determine, I think it is very improper for a witness who is under subpoena and brought down here to be asked questions, to try to break into the press and discredit the investigation.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I quite agree with you, because it is perfectly apparent to anybody who has had experience in public life at all, that one of the objectives of some people is to try to discredit this investigation.

Now, I am not accusing anybody for the moment. I would not hesitate to when some particular individual appears to me to justify criticism. But we subpoena a man to come here to give testimony along the lines we want to inquire about.

Now I think every one of us wishes to be absolutely fair to everybody. I think we have demonstrated that to the satisfaction of fair-minded people.

When a witness is subpoenaed to answer a certain line of questions, I do not think it is a fair thing for a witness to try to catch the attention of the public press and get his story of the things he wants to tell in print ahead of the hearing.

I do not think it is a fair thing to do, and I do not think we should be a party to it.

When he asks to be allowed to testify, then I concede he can give anything he wants to the press.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have one or two questions.

Would you tell the committee who it was you asked in your behalf to give notice of the conference this morning?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, I asked Mrs. Owen Lattimore if she would speak to one or two of the newspapermen. The names I recall, besides the two I spoke of, were a representative of the Associated Press and a representative of the New York Times.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you testify whom you wanted notified on behalf of the Associated Press?

Mr. HOLLAND. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you specify whom you wanted notified on behalf of the New York Times?

Mr. HOLLAND. I said preferably Mr. White.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you had specified Mr. Marder and Mr. Irwin?

Mr. HOLLAND. I said someone from the Washington Post and the New York Herald Tribune, preferably Mr. Marder and Mr. Irwin.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you call anyone yourself?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You limited your request to the four you mentioned?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. She was not instructed to call the United Press?

Mr. HOLLAND. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. She was not instructed to call the International News Service?

Mr. HOLLAND. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why did you select the four you named?

Mr. HOLLAND. Because these happened to be people I had had the privilege of meeting personally.

Mr. SOURWINE. Wait a minute. You had not specified any person. You mean you have met the entire staff of the Associated Press?

Mr. HOLLAND. I have seen these people and read their reports and spoken to them casually in previous hearings of these sessions.

Mr. SOURWINE. So you had confidence in them?

Mr. HOLLAND. I believe their reports have been fair and they have seemed to take an interest in the proceedings of this subcommittee.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not think that is true of the United Press and International News Service?

Mr. HOLLAND. I have not had the privilege of speaking to the other gentlemen.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am trying to find out why you did not notify the other two news services.

Mr. HOLLAND. Simply because I am not well in touch with the others.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was this your own idea to call this press conference?

Mr. HOLLAND. Entirely my own idea.

I do not regard it as a press conference, Mr. Chairman, for the simple reason that my sole purpose was not to say anything about the content of my statement, but simply to notify these gentlemen that I wished to request the privilege of making an extended statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you happen to call on Mrs. Lattimore to act as your agent in notifying those whom you wished to meet with you this morning?

Mr. HOLLAND. A very simple reason. I tried through my office to make hotel reservations at about six hotels in Washington, and was not able to get a room. I therefore called Mrs. Lattimore and asked her if she would be kind enough to do some telephoning around Washington, and since she was doing that, if she would also mind notifying these representatives of the press.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no more questions on that point, Mr. Chairman.

Senator EASTLAND. You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, may I ask if it is the decision of the committee that they will not permit me to make this statement?

Senator EASTLAND. No, that is my idea.

Mr. HOLLAND. Your ruling, sir?

Senator EASTLAND. I have made no ruling.

Senator O'CONOR. I understand that it has been held in reservation.

Senator EASTLAND. The acting chairman of the committee cannot waive a rule of the committee. The committee itself might do it.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, since I do wish to be fair and courteous to this subcommittee, may I then ask whether you will have any objection to my making available to the press the text of this statement either during this morning's session, or at the end of this morning's session?

I do not wish to do anything which you feel is improper or discourteous.

Senator EASTLAND. I think we had better get on with the questions. Mr. Morris has some questions. You were brought here under subpoena and I want you to answer them.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, there are a few preliminary matters before we get into the substance of the examination.

I called you last week, as you may recall, in connection with the testimony that Professor Colegrove and Professor Stassen gave in connection with a round-table conference.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Twenty-five people participated in that conference and we asked you if you would inform us, if you would come down and testify and tell us how many of these 25 people were members of the Institute of Pacific Relations in this conference. You said it would be inconvenient for you to come down and that you would send the names down and their associations with the institute and the first time you were down here you would put those statements under oath.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I now offer you your letter to me, Mr. Holland, of September 28, 1951, where you do set forth the IPR associations of the various people connected with the institute.

Will you now make that a part of the official records?

Mr. HOLLAND. I confirm this letter, Mr. Chairman. If you wish, I will read the text of the covering letter, but otherwise I am prepared to say this is a true statement, to the best of my recollection and belief.

Senator SMITH. I wish you would examine each of those pages, to see that they are copies of the letter you sent.

Senator EASTLAND. He testified they were.

Senator SMITH. I heard him say it, but I noticed that he did not turn his sheets and look. I want to be certain that there is no question about it.

Mr. HOLLAND. Since it is a short covering letter, I think I might read it.

Senator EASTLAND. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Why not read the covering letter?

Mr. HOLLAND (reading):

DEAR MR. MORRIS: In accordance with your telephoned request, I send you herewith a memorandum indicating as precisely as possible the IPR connections of the persons who attended the State Department conference on Far Eastern policy, October 6-8, 1949.

You will note on pages 3 and 4 that Messrs. Brody, Colegrove, Holcomb, McNaughton, Murphy, Quigley, Reischauer, and Stassen were not members of or actively participating in the work of the Institute of Pacific Relations at the time of the State Department conference.

Would you kindly notify Senator McCarran of my desire that this statement be made part of the record of the hearings and indicate that on a later occasion. I will be glad to confirm the memorandum as part of my sworn testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. Then the list does show that 17 of the 25 people were at that time associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. HOLLAND. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MORRIS. That is a fair statement?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You see, Mr. Chairman, the question has come up as to how the Stassen testimony is related to the Institute of Pacific Relations.

In this 3-day conference, of the 25 people called in to engage in that discussion, 17 of the 25 were then active members of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator EASTLAND. The testimony has been that that list was made up by Dr. Jessup; is that right?

Mr. MORRIS. The conference was under his direction.

Senator EASTLAND. The testimony was that the list of those provided was made up by him.

I think this information should be given to the subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee.

Mr. MORRIS. It shall be done.

Senator EASTLAND. I understand he testified that he did not compile that list largely from people affiliated with the Institute of Pacific Relations, but from the heads of the departments of political science in the different universities of the country.

I do not know whether it is true, or not.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Chairman, I did understand Mr. Holland to have some comment to make. I thought it was audible that you did.

indicate some opinion as to whether or not that compilation was made under the circumstances, did you not?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am not clear, Mr. Chairman, which compilation you are talking about. Do you mean the original list of people who came to the State Department conference?

Senator EASTLAND. Who were invited.

Mr. HOLLAND. I had no knowledge of, or connection with, that conference; absolutely none. All I have done in response to Mr. Morris' request is to take the list of names he sent me, look into our files and record, and indicate what connection those people have, and as he points out, 17 of them had some kind of connection.

Now, the nature of the connection is indicated in this memorandum. Some were officers; most were just ordinary members. Some had been contributors to IPR publications. A few had attended IPR conferences.

But the precise nature of their connection is indicated in the memorandum, and I do not think it is necessary to read it.

Senator EASTLAND. Proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Holland, I notice, however, that you did not give the IPR association of the board of three people who were appointed by Dean Acheson to run this conference. That is Mr. Jessup, Mr. Case, and Mr. Fosdick.

Are you prepared to testify as to the connection of those three gentlemen?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am prepared. I think I gave one of your staff information informally over the telephone.

Dr. Jessup's connection, I think is well known. I don't think I need take your time. As you know, at one time he was the chairman of our international governing body of the Pacific Council.

Mr. MORRIS. For what period of time was that, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. He was chairman of our international governing body of the Pacific Council from 1939 to 1942.

In addition, at a later date, he was chairman of the American Institute of Pacific Relations from 1939 to 1940.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he chairman of the research committee?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Jessup was chairman of the research advisory committee of the American Institute of Pacific Relations for a brief period in 1944.

He severed any activity; he withdrew from any activity, and active participation in the Institute when he went into the State Department in 1946, but he is still an ordinary member.

Senator EASTLAND. Between 1944 and 1946, what was his connection with the Institute?

Mr. HOLLAND. He was an ordinary member, and may still have been trustee. I am afraid I don't have the information.

Senator EASTLAND. He was active in the affairs of the Institute?

Mr. HOLLAND. In 1944 and 1946, I would say not active, Mr. Chairman, because at that time he was doing a number of consultant jobs for the Government in connection with UNRRA, I think, and such things. Nevertheless, he was a member and may have been consulted on IPR affairs occasionally. I cannot speak from direct knowledge on that.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the association of Mr. Case?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Everett Case of Colgate University, had been a treasurer of the American Institute of Pacific Relations from 1932 to 1934. He is still an ordinary member.

Mr. MORRIS. And Mr. Fosdick?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Fosdick at an early period, about 1933, appears in our records as having been invited to membership. The membership card is not clear that he paid any dues. That may well have been because he was a high official of the Rockefeller Foundation at the time and we, therefore, did not dun him.

He also appears to have been invited to serve on the board of trustees in 1934, but, again, we have no records of his having attended the meetings.

My own belief is that he considered it would not usually be appropriate for him since he had by then become president of the Rockefeller Foundation, but he at least seems to have had that nominal connection back in 1933, 1934.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, we have had testimony about a briefing at this conference by a person named Cora Dubois. Was she active in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. HOLLAND. Miss Dubois is an ordinary dues-paying member. She has never been an officer or trustee, and, to the best of my knowledge, has never taken any active part in meetings or conferences of the institute. She has been asked to review books by us, and I think has been invited to write articles, but I do not believe she has actually contributed, although I am not sure on the last point.

Senator SMITH. May I ask one question?

Mr. Holland, just now the committee's counsel made the statement and you answered it; have you read all the testimony that has been taken in this case that is available to you?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am afraid I have not been able to read it all. As you know, it has been very voluminous.

Senator SMITH. You know that these people who testified had been sworn?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am not quite clear what testimony you are referring to.

Senator SMITH. With respect to just what you finished answering.

Mr. HOLLAND. About the connections of these people?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. HOLLAND. I know I am saying it under oath.

Senator SMITH. You know that what Mr. Morris stated and asked you about has also been testified to under oath?

Mr. MORRIS. By Mr. Stassen and by Mr. Colegrove.

Mr. HOLLAND. I see what you mean.

Senator SMITH. The reason I say that is that I notice some person in the paper this morning referred to unsupported statements which the committee counsel made. I want to make it clear that Mr. Morris made that statement as to what was testified to under oath.

Mr. HOLLAND. I understand.

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you, Senator.

Mr. Chairman, will you receive that into evidence?

Senator EASTLAND. What is it?

Mr. MORRIS. That is the list which was sent in by Mr. Holland.

Senator EASTLAND. Was it identified by him?

Mr. MORRIS. He identified it.

Senator EASTLAND. It will be admitted into evidence.

Mr. MORRIS. He affirmed the underlying facts in that letter.

Senator EASTLAND. It will be admitted.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 326" and is as follows:)

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.,  
New York 22, N. Y., September 28, 1951.

Mr. ROBERT MORRIS,

*Counsel, Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security,  
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. MORRIS: In accordance with your telephoned request, I send you herewith a memorandum indicating as precisely as possible the IPR connections of the persons who attended the State Department conference on far eastern policy, October 6-8, 1949.

You will note on pages 3 and 4 that Messrs. Brodie, Colegrove, Holcombe, MacNaughton, Murphy, Quigley, Reischauer, and Stassen were not members of or actively participating in the work of the Institute of Pacific Relations at the time of the State Department conference.

Would you kindly notify Senator McCarran of my desire that this statement be made part of the record of the hearings and indicate that on a later occasion I will be glad to confirm the memorandum as part of my sworn testimony.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,  
*Executive Vice Chairman.*

IPR CONNECTIONS OF PERSONS ATTENDING STATE DEPARTMENT CONFERENCE ON FAR  
EASTERN POLICY OCTOBER 6-8, 1949

Joseph W. Ballantine: Trustee, American IPR, February 1949 to present; member, American IPR, 1948-?; contributor to Far Eastern Survey, 1948 and 1950.

Claude A. Buss: Member, American IPR, 1945-?; active in San Francisco Bay region; contributor to Far Eastern Survey; attended International IPR Conference, 1947; attended American IPR National Conference, 1947.

Arthur G. Coons: Trustee, American IPR, February 1947 to present; member, American IPR, 1935-?; active in southern California; attended American IPR National Conference, 1947.

John W. Decker: Member, American IPR, 1938-?; contributor to Far Eastern Survey, 1946.

John K. Fairbank: Trustee, American IPR, April 1944-March 1946, February 1947 to present; member, American IPR, 1936-?; contributor to Pacific Affairs, September 1949; contributor to Far Eastern Survey, 1947, 1948 and 1949; author of American Education in the Far East (1942, reprint from Social Education); What Can the United States Do in China? (1949, 16 pp.); Next Step in Asia (1949), contributor; attended International IPR Conferences in 1945 and 1947.

William R. Herod: Trustee, American IPR, February 1940-December 1942, January 1946-February 1951; member, American IPR Executive Committee, November 1940-December 1942; vice chairman, American IPR, November 1940-April 1942; member, American IPR, 1938-?; attended IPR International Conference, 1939.

Benjamin H. Kizer: Trustee, American IPR, December 1935-March 1946, February 1947 to present; member, American IPR Executive Committee, 1936-39; vice chairman, American IPR, March 1943-March 1946; member, American IPR, 1933-?; contributor to Far Eastern Survey, 1944; author of North Pacific International Planning Board, data paper, 1942; United States-Canadian Northwest, 1943; attended IPR International Conferences in 1933, 1936, 1942, 1945; attended India-America Conference, 1949; active in Pacific Northwest.

Owen Lattimore: Editor, Pacific Affairs, 1933-July 1941; author of Inner Asian Frontiers of China 1940 and 1951; Empire in the East (chapter), 1936; Manchuria: Cradle of Conflict, 1935; Mongols of Manchuria, 1934; trustee, American IPR, February 1943 to present; non-quorum member, American IPR Executive Committee, 1946-1949; chairman, American IPR Research Advisory Committee, March 1946-March 1951; Member, American IPR, 1936-?; attended IPR International Conferences in 1933, 1936, 1939, 1942, 1945, 1947; attended India-America Conference, 1949.



George C. Marshall: trustee American IPR, April 1949 to present.

Nathaniel Peffer: Member, American IPR, 1937-?; contributor to Pacific Affairs, September 1935 and March 1937; contributor to Far Eastern Survey, 1946, 1947; author of Prerequisites for Peace in the Far East (Inquiry Series); Basis for Peace in the Far East; attended IPR International Conference in 1936.

W. S. Robertson: member, American IPR, 1939-?; helpful in financial solicitation in New York.

John D. Rockefeller 3d: member, American IPR, 1933-?; spoke at Bankers Club lunch in 1949; attended IPR International Conference, 1929, in American Secretariat.

Lawrence K. Rosinger: fellowship holder, American IPR, 1939-40; Research staff, American IPR, July 1948-September 1950; author of Deadlock in China, 1940; China's Wartime Politics, 1937-44, 1944; India and the United States; 1950; State of Asia, 1951; co-author and editor; attended IPR International Conferences, 1939 and 1945; attended India-America Conference 1949.

Eugene Staley: trustee, American IPR, February 1942-February 1943; chairman, American IPR Research Committee, April 1941-March 1943; member, American IPR, 1937-48; Director, Bay Region Division, American IPR—subsequently World Affairs Council of Northern California; attended IPR International Conferences, 1939 and 1945.

Phillips Talbot: Member, American IPR, 1947-?; contributor to Far Eastern Survey, 1950; author, India and Pakistan (FPA report) 1949; attended India-American Conference 1949.

George E. Taylor: Trustee, American IPR, March 1946-February 1947, February 1948 to present; member, American IPR, 1941-?; contributor to Pacific Affairs, 1935, 1936, 1937, 1941, 1942; author of Struggle for North China (inquiry series), 1940; Changing China (Webster school pamphlet) 1942; America in the New Pacific, 1942; Reconstruction Movement in China, 1936 (35 pp.); Some Aspects of China's Economic Reconstruction (in Japanese) 1937; What Can the United States Do in China, 1949 (16 pp.); attended IPR International Conference, 1939; fellowship holder, American IPR, 1941-42.

Harold M. Vinacke: Member, American IPR, 1933-51; contributor to Pacific Affairs, December 1946; author of the United States and the Far East data paper, 1950; Far Eastern Policy of the United States (FPA report) 1951; attended several regional American IPR conferences.

The following were not members of and were not actively participating in the work of the Institute of Pacific Relations at the time of the State Department Conference:

Bernard Brodie: Member, American IPR, 1943-47.

Kenneth Colegrove: Member, American IPR, 1938-47 (was assigned to write a report for the IPR inquiry series, but never delivered).

Arthur N. Holcombe: Member, American IPR, 1932-48; member, American IPR Research Committee, 1930-32 or 1934; attended several regional American IPR conferences.

Ernest MacNaughton: Member, American IPR, 1936-42.

J. Morden Murphy: Trustee American IPR, February 1950 to present; member, American IPR Executive Committee, March 1951-?; attended India-American Conference, December 1949.

Harold J. Quigley: Member, American IPR, 1931-43; member, American IPR Research Committee, 1930-32 or 1934; contributor to Pacific Affairs, September 1937 and September 1947; author of Chinese Politics and Foreign Powers, 1927; attended IPR International Conference, 1931.

Edwin O. Reischauer: Member, American IPR, 1944-48; contributor to Far Eastern Survey, 1948; coauthor of Next Step in Asia.

Harold E. Stassen: Elected to membership, American IPR, September 1938, and again in March 1940. Regretted April 1940; invited to attend India-America Conference, December 1949.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Chairman, there have been some actions taken on the part of the staff in connection with the last open hearing that we had here. We were directed to issue a subpoena in connection with the Vandenberg diaries about which the last witness before the committee made certain recommendations.

I would like to report that a subpoena has been issued to Arthur Vandenberg, Jr., the New York Herald Tribune, and the Houghton Mifflin Publishing Co. that they make available the diary of the late

Senator Vandenberg from January 1, 1947, to July 1, 1950, that that be made available to the committee.

In connection with the other request, we have sent two letters to the President and one letter to the Secretary of State in relation to that open hearing.

I wondered if you would like to have them in the record at this time.

Senator EASTLAND. Yes. Will you read them?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir. [Reading:]

OCTOBER 8, 1951.

The PRESIDENT,  
*The White House.*

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: During recent testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee there was extensive reference to a Cabinet meeting held at the White House on February 5, 1949, at which was present the late Senator Vandenberg.

It is respectfully requested that the minutes of that meeting be made available to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

Sincerely yours,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

OCTOBER 8, 1951.

The PRESIDENT,  
*The White House.*

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: During recent testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, there was reference to a Cabinet meeting held on November 26, 1948, during which the late Secretary of Defense James Forrestal made recommendations that the AVG be reactivated.

It is respectfully requested that the minutes of this Cabinet meeting be made available to the Senate Internal Security Committee.

Very sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

OCTOBER 8, 1951.

HON. DEAN ACHESON,  
*Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.*

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: During the recent testimony of former Gov. Harold Stassen before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on October 6, 1951, Senator Homer Ferguson of this committee related that he had seen, in the American Embassy in Hong Kong, a copy of a message from the State Department that was sent to the Nationalist Government in the month of October 1949, and which stated, according to Senator Ferguson, that no further military aid would be given the Nationalist Government as far as Formosa was concerned.

It is respectfully suggested that a copy of this message be made available to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

Your cooperation in this matter will be appreciated.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

Senator EASTLAND. They will be admitted in evidence.

(Documents referred to and read in full were marked "Exhibits Nos. 327, 328, 329," and filed for the record.)

Mr. MORRIS. On September 28, 1951, Senator McCarran sent to the President the following letter, to which we received a reply yesterday.

Mr. MANDEL. This is dated September 28, 1951.

The PRESIDENT,  
*The White House:*

A letter from Robert Ramspeck, Chairman of the United States Civil Service Commission, dated July 13, 1951, contains the following statement about Ellen Van Zyll de Jong Atkinson:

"Ellen Van Zyll de Jong Atkinson was employed by the War Department from October 22, 1941, to April 30, 1945, when she resigned. In connection with an

application for a position with the Office of War Information, Mrs. Atkinson was the subject of an investigation as to her qualifications, including loyalty. Mrs. Atkinson was not appointed and the investigation of her was discontinued. Precautionary measures were taken to prevent Mrs. Atkinson's reemployment in the Federal service at a later date until the question of her loyalty has been resolved."

Inasmuch as Ellen Atkinson was a staff member of the Institute of Pacific Relations which is presently under inquiry, it would be appreciated if her file were made available to this committee.

Sincerely,

PAT McCARRAN, *Chairman.*

Here is the reply, dated October 8, 1951, from the White House :

DEAR SENATOR McCARRAN: I acknowledge your letter of September 28, 1951, requesting the file of Ellen Van Zyll De Jong Atkinson be made available to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

I am requesting the Secretary of the Army to make Mrs. Atkinson's employment record available to the subcommittee. However, in conformity with the position I have heretofore stated on several occasions, I do not feel that the information so made available to the subcommittee should include investigative data of a confidential nature.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

Senator EASTLAND. They may be admitted in evidence.

(Documents referred to and read in full were marked "Exhibits Nos. 330-A and 330-B," and filed for the record.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, what is your present position in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. HOLLAND. My position is secretary-general of the International Institute of Pacific Relations, and also concurrently and temporarily executive vice chairman of the American Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. How long have you held both positions?

Mr. HOLLAND. I have been secretary-general since March 1946, and I have been executive vice chairman of the American Institute since, I believe, August 1950.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your association with the institute prior to that time, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. My association is quite long, Mr. Chairman. I began as a junior research assistant in Honolulu which was then the international headquarters, in January 1929.

From 1931 to 1933, I was acting international research secretary of the institute, and from 1933 to 1944, I was the international research secretary, which is equivalent to research director, of the institute.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Holland, are you in a position to tell us what the principal sources of revenue have been for the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us as fully as possible, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. May I divide my answer into two parts, first, relating to the international institute, and, second to the American.

I think it is known, Mr. Chairman, that the institute is a loose association of independent national organizations called national councils in 10 countries, each with their own independent offices and programs and organization.

The sources of funds of the International Institute of Pacific Relations consists of donations, or, rather, of contributions supplied by

each of the national councils. A quota is worked out every 2 or 3 years and as far as possible each national council tries to pay that quota.

In addition, the International Institute of Pacific Relations receives and has received over a considerable period substantial grants from American foundations, say the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corp.

In addition, one or two large firms, chiefly outside the United States, have occasionally made contributions direct to the International Institute of Pacific Relations.

At the present time, Lever Bros., London, does that.

Finally, some small income, I say net income, is received from the sale of publications and from the sales of our quarterly journal, *Pacific Affairs*.

The financial sources of the American Institute of Pacific Relations are, first, substantial contributions by leading American companies. I won't give you the list, but they include major corporations, such as the Standard Vacuum Oil Co., the International General Electric, the Chase Bank, the National City Bank, and some 40 or 50 similar well-known corporations.

In addition, funds are received from ordinary individual gifts. There are a considerable number of wealthy persons who have given liberally at various times to the Institute. They range all the way from Mr. Thomas W. Lamont to Mr. Frederick V. Field, and both of those contributions have been mentioned in the press already.

Next are ordinary membership subscriptions. The membership consists today of about 1,100 people.

The minimum membership is \$7.50 a year. The ordinary membership fee is \$15 a year. Then there are, I think, two other categories, contributing and supporting membership.

Then finally there are, of course, substantial contributions also to the American Institute of Pacific Relations from the big foundations, and there, again, the principal ones have been the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corp.

MR. MORRIS. Could you tell us substantially what the Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations contribute each year to the institute?

MR. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I do not have a very detailed statement on that. It will take a long time to give it. I would be glad to supply it to the committee. I can give you totals approximately, but it extends over a very long period of years.

MR. MORRIS. Give us a rough estimate. If you want to give it in detail, we will put that in the record.

MR. HOLLAND. The record shows in the 26 years since the American IPR has been operating, but let me begin with the International IPR.

MR. MORRIS. Please do.

MR. HOLLAND. In the 26 years since the International IPR has been operating total receipts amount to about two and a half million dollars, actually \$2,569,000, which is an average of about \$100,000 a year.

Of this, 48 percent came from the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corp. together. I don't have immediately the breakdown between those two.

About 30 percent came from the national council quotas, and about 9 percent from publication sales, and 3 percent from miscellaneous sources.

In answer to your question on the foundations, if we include grants made to the American IPR, the contribution of the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Foundation to the work of the IPR through 1950 totals \$2,176,000. Our latest grant in 1950 consisted of a 2-year grant from the Rockefeller Foundation of \$60,000; that is to say, \$30,000 a year for the International IPR.

I am sorry. Fifty thousand dollars for the International IPR divided into two installments of \$20,000 and \$30,000, and \$60,000 to the American IPR divided into two installments of \$30,000 each.

Mr. MORRIS. You are going to supplement that, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, I will be glad to. We have a full record of the sources for each foundation.

Senator SMITH. Is that sort of a handbook?

Mr. HOLLAND. I do have copies of this, which is just a brief description of the organization. I will be glad to make additional copies available.

Senator EASTLAND. Thank you, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. How many members are there in the American Council of the IPR?

Mr. HOLLAND. At the present time approximately 1,100.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you aid individuals in obtaining grants from the various foundations to do research work?

Mr. HOLLAND. At times we have done this.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us about that, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. On a number of occasions in addition to requesting funds for ourselves or for our own research program, the institute offices have brought to the attention of various foundations the fact that some university or research institution or some individual scholar is working on a particular piece of research which is in general related to the problems that the institute itself is interested in.

That is to say political, economic, and cultural conditions in the Far East. On a number of occasions, therefore, we have actually requested and sometimes recommended to the foundation officers that they should make grants directly to those institutions or individuals.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you estimate the number of people who obtained grants through your intercession in that way, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. Speaking for myself I would estimate I suppose between 10 and 15 over the whole period of my connection as a research officer back to 1933. If you wish, I can give you one or two examples that I remember.

Mr. MORRIS. I have a list here. How about Robert W. Barnett?

Mr. HOLLAND. I myself did not take part in this, but I can tell you the circumstances. This was not so much a direct request for funds. At that time the Rockefeller Foundation indicated that they would be prepared to give every year to the American IPR a fellowship for one or two qualified young men to get training in far-eastern studies. The procedure was that the American IPR executive committee would consider various candidates and then nominate several names to the Rockefeller Foundation.

The foundation would then select the one or two that they thought were suitable and award them a fellowship usually of about \$1,800 or \$2,500 a year. Mr. Barnett held one of those fellowships.

Mr. MORRIS. Who else have held those?

Mr. HOLLAND. Another man that I recall—I speak only from memory because this was the American IPR—was Mr. Walter Radius, of Stanford University. Another one was Mr. Lawrence Rosinger, who was being connected with the institute on another occasion. There were four or five. If you have the names, I would be glad to confirm them.

Mr. MORRIS. T. A. Bisson?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Bisson's case was different. Mr. Bisson's was more recent and was an example of where a specific grant was made to his university, the University of California, on a recommendation jointly from me and Professor Odegard, the head of his department at the university. This was about 2 or 3 years ago.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Mr. Grajdanzev?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Grajdanzev, who goes under the name of Andrew Grad, is also a case of a special grant being made by the foundation to the IPR, but on the understanding—I should say to the international IPR—on the understanding it was to be used for his specific projects, namely, a very detailed sociological survey of a Japanese town. This was made on my recommendation supported, as always, by the chairman of my international research committee, Sir George Sansom.

Mr. MORRIS. You yourself had a grant, did you not?

Mr. HOLLAND. No. Well, I am not sure, but I can explain the circumstances. I went on leave from the Institute of Pacific Relations for a period of 1 year between 1931 and 1933. My purpose of going on leave was to take one of the regular Rockefeller Foundation social science fellowships for foreign study. I was entirely separated then from the institute.

This is part of the foundation regular fellowship series. It was not made to the IPR. It was awarded to me specifically in order to allow me to study in Cambridge, England.

Mr. MORRIS. How about E. Herbert Norman?

Mr. HOLLAND. I do not recall the circumstances. I think it is quite possible he was given a special Rockefeller Foundation grant at the suggestion of Mr. Edward C. Carter, but I cannot be absolutely sure of that. I do know that Mr. Norman worked as a temporary research member of the international secretariat roughly about 1938 writing a book on Japanese economic history.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, how is it decided by the institute or how was it decided by the institute who should be selected for these various grants? Start with the case of Mr. Norman. How was the selection of Norman determined?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I can speak only from imperfect recollection here, but I am reasonably certain my account is accurate.

We needed an author for our inquiry series, which was to be a series of books designed to provide background information on the Sino-Japanese conflict on the possibility there might be a Sino-Japanese peace conference for which a great many background studies would be useful, not for the Government, but just for the general public.

As part of the series of reports on Japan we thought it was desirable to have a historical study showing how the Japanese system of government had evolved out of the old medieval system which came to an end with the restoration in 1868.

Mr. Norman had recently completed a graduate course at Harvard University under the great Japanese scholar, Mr. Elizayev, in specializing on the history of the Meiji period of Japan. That was the period of the restoration.

He had made a very exhaustive survey of all of the Japanese literature, was very familiar with Japanese language materials. We were informed by a number of experts in the Japanese field that he was uniquely qualified to write in this particular field. I know that Mr. Carter therefore approached him with a request that he should prepare this volume for us.

As I have said before, I believe it may have been in that connection that he asked the Rockefeller Foundation to give Mr. Norman a fellowship to enable him to work in our office preparing this book. This was in 1938. It was at this time when he was doing this research—Mr. Norman did most of his work in the Columbia University library.

I understand it was there that he first made the acquaintance or first saw and probably spoke to Dr. Karl Wittfogel, who has previously testified here.

MR. MORRIS. You are an expert in the field of Chinese political affairs, are you not?

MR. HOLLAND. No, I would not say that. My own training has been in economics. If I have any specialty at all, it is in far eastern general economic problems. I have some knowledge of Chinese economic problems and as a research director I have had to generally familiarize myself with Chinese politics, too. But I do not consider myself a specialist in that field.

MR. MORRIS. You also have had to deal with various organizations, particularly around New York City, that have to do with Chinese research?

MR. HOLLAND. Yes, I have.

MR. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with an organization called the American Friends of the Chinese People?

MR. HOLLAND. I am acquainted with it only in the sense that I have learned about it in very recent months. I knew it as the name of an organization, I suppose, as far back as 1941 or perhaps before that, just before Pearl Harbor, because I vaguely remember it as one of the organizations which was active in trying to organize American feeling to launch a boycott against Japan.

For some reason I have been looking in my own records. I seem to have had no connection with it and therefore in answer to Mr. Morris' question, it is only since my executive session before this committee some weeks ago when the question arose that I have taken the trouble to inquire a little about it. In that sense I have since become familiar.

MR. MORRIS. What did you find the political nature of that organization to be?

MR. HOLLAND. I find considerable disagreement. I find some people who say that it contained a number of left-wing people who urged policies of rather vigorous anti-Japanese character at that time, which some people today say were in line with the views of the Communists.

I found other people who say they knew about it who said that it was a mixed organization containing quite a number of eminent and well-known people who had quite different political points of view.

I cannot myself say that I am satisfied as to which is the more correct organization. Obviously it was a mixed organization. To what extent it could be properly called a Communist-front organization, I really have not been able to decide in my own mind.

Mr. MORRIS. People active in the IPR were very active in American Friends of the Chinese People, and in its journal, *China Today*; is that the fact?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman—

Mr. MORRIS. Isn't *China Today* the publication? I mean the publication of The American Friends of the Chinese People?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, this again is a fact which I have ascertained for myself since just within the last year. I know that I had ascertained it before my executive session, but just precisely when—in any case in fairly recent years I knew of the existence of the publication *China Today*, but I had not collected it in my mind as being the official publication of this organization.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Frederick Field was secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations at a time when he was one of the editors of *China Today*, was he not?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I have also tried to get some information on this because a similar question was asked me by Mr. Morris in the executive session. I myself knew that after 1945 that Mr. Field had this connection with the magazine *China Today*. I put it in that way for a very special reason.

When I say after 1945, I mean that at that time I was on Government duty in China. As you know, at about that time, sometime in 1945, the Amerasia case broke. After I returned to this country, I was curious to read more about it. In the course of inquiring about this, because I think it was in that connection that this matter was raised, I asked a number of people whether this had been a fact that Mr. Field had been editor of the magazine *China Today*.

A number of these people said yes, but they understood he wrote under a pseudonym. I am not sure whether he was ever on the magazine, on the masthead of the magazine, under his own name because I have not had a chance to look through the files.

Senator SMITH. Was he trying to hide who he was in writing these materials on account of his relationship with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am afraid I really don't know. I am not even sure whether this related to the period of after he had ceased to be an employee of the IPR, which was in 1940. So I am afraid I do not know the answer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Holland, your reply seems to indicate that you mean to convey the idea you were not familiar with the publication *China Today* prior to the time when, being in China, you made these inquiries; is that correct?

Mr. HOLLAND. I made the inquiries after I returned from China at the end of 1945. The answer to your question is essentially "Yes," but I did know of the existence of this magazine. I am sure that I must have seen it occasionally in the library. But I have recently taken the trouble to look at one or two of the bound volumes which we still have in our library. I find I really was not familiar with it.

Mr. SOURWINE. The bound volumes were in your library at the time?

Mr. HOLLAND. Only 2 years. I don't know how that happened.



Mr. SOURWINE. What were those years?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am afraid I can't recall now, but I did take the trouble—I looked up in connection with another name which you may be asking me about later.

Mr. SOURWINE. You want the committee to understand it was not a magazine which you habitually read or frequently read or which you were at that time familiar with?

Mr. HOLLAND. That is quite true.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, you said Mr. Field used a pseudonym in China Today. Do you know what pseudonym?

Mr. HOLLAND. I think I said I was told Mr. Field used a pseudonym. I was told at that time that his pseudonym was Frederick Spencer.

Senator O'CONOR (presiding). Was any explanation given as to the reason for his use of the pseudonym?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; there was not, Mr. Chairman.

Senator O'CONOR. At that time did you hear any discussion at all as to why he was using it?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I did not, Mr. Chairman, and I am afraid I did not at that time ask the question. If I may continue a moment, Mr. Chairman, since I do want to give a full picture and since I have said I have recently tried to find out a little bit more more of the facts of this matter, I was told just the other day by a person in New York who said that he knew the actual circumstances of these pseudonyms that this information which I have just said that Mr. Field used the name of Frederick Spencer was in fact not correct; that Mr. Field actually wrote under the pseudonym of Lawrence Hearn.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who told you that?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Philip Jaffe told me this 2 or 3 days ago.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it your intention to convey to the committee the impression that up until a few days ago you had no knowledge or information with regard to Mr. Field's using a pseudonym in writing for the publication China Today?

Mr. HOLLAND. No. As I have indicated, I learned about this fact shortly after my return from China in 1945.

Mr. SOURWINE. Prior to that time you had not known or heard of his using a pseudonym in writing for that magazine?

Mr. HOLLAND. To the best of my recollection that is correct.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Holland, had not you talked with Mr. Field after this inquiry began about the use he made of pseudonyms in writing those articles? Have you not discussed this with Mr. Field?

Mr. HOLLAND. Since this subcommittee's work began?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I have not discussed this.

Senator SMITH. It has never been mentioned between you and Mr. Field?

Mr. HOLLAND. No.

Senator SMITH. You have seen him frequently?

Mr. HOLLAND. No. I have seen him twice since the seizure of our files in February.

Senator SMITH. That is all.

Mr. MORRIS. The last 90 days he has been in jail.

Mr. HOLLAND. So I understand.

I want to be perfectly frank. I did see him because he came one day to my office soon after the seizure to ask what in the world it was all about.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you seen him in prison?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I have not. I saw him here. I was present in the audience the day he testified here.

Mr. MORRIS. You have testified in executive session, I believe, that it was your understanding that Frederick Field wrote under the name of Frederick Spencer. Who told you that?

Mr. HOLLAND. I have been trying to recall, Mr. Chairman, because I did make the statement in executive session, and I am sorry I have not been able to recall whom I learned it from. I know I talked to a large number of people when I returned from China about November 1945.

I am sorry; I really made an effort to try and recall, but I cannot at the moment. There may have been evidence in our files which would indicate it, but I cannot recall it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, it just so happens that we had a sample copy of China Today ready for presentation today. I notice that on the cover the first article is Whither American Policy in China, by Lawrence Hearn, which Mr. Holland just testified that Mr. Jaffe said was the pen name of Frederick Field in China Today.

Mr. HOLLAND. May I ask the date, Mr. Chairman?

Senator O'CONNOR. Yes, March 1936.

Did you wish to examine it?

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it possible Mr. Field might have written for that publication under both pseudonyms?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I am afraid I can't answer. Obviously it is possible.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had at one time been told that he used the other pseudonym.

Mr. HOLLAND. As I say, late in 1945 I was told that he had used the name of Frederick Spencer, but apparently, according to Mr. Jaffe, that was wrong information.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Jaffe tell you that was wrong and he never used that name?

Mr. HOLLAND. What he told me was that the real fact was that the pseudonym used by Field was Lawrence Hearn.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your understanding was he intended to tell you he had never used the Spencer pseudonym?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes. He didn't put it in so many words, but I interpreted him as meaning the previous statement that Field used the name of Spencer and that was wrong.

Mr. SOURWINE. In fairness to Mr. Jaffe and your other informant, whose name you can't recall, you cannot say now that Mr. Jaffe definitely did deny that he had ever used the name of Spencer?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; he did not deny it.

Mr. SOURWINE. That he was meant to refer to Mr. Field?

Mr. HOLLAND. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. I notice one of the editors of China Today is a man named Hansu Chan. Do you know who he is?

Mr. HOLLAND. I have also learned what some people have said is the real identity of Hansu Chan, namely, that it was Mr. Chao-ting Chi, whose name has appeared in these hearings before. I learned this fact also after I returned from China at the end of 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. Where is Mr. Chi now?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chi, I am told, is somewhere in China as an official of one of the central banks in the Communist Government of China.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, he is a Chinese Communist official now?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am afraid I am not in a position to answer that, Mr. Chairman. I know he is a high official of a Chinese Communist bank.

Senator O'CONOR. Under the Communist regime?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes. I have no knowledge of whether he is a Communist Party member or not.

Mr. MORRIS. He was a staff member of the Institute of Pacific Relations, was he not?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I would describe him better as a temporary research worker, as I have indicated before. We kept a rather small regular staff, but we would engage specific research workers on a fee basis to write a particular report for us.

Senator O'CONOR. Over what period did that extend in his case?

Mr. HOLLAND. In Mr. Chi's case—I think I have the actual records—they are not here, but I know it was approximately between 1939 and 1941, probably in the middle, after which time Mr. Chi left us, leaving his work unfinished, I am sorry to say, in order to take a job with the Chinese National Government Currency Stabilization Board.

Mr. MORRIS. But, Mr. Holland, you will concede his association with the Institute of Pacific Relations was substantial? Mr. Mandel and I have gone through your files and noticed extremely frequent letters to and from Mr. Chi and continual references to Mr. Chi throughout. Will you make that concession?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. I do not feel I should make that concession. If counsel will ask me more precise questions, I will be glad to answer.

Senator O'CONOR. Just what in your opinion was the extent of his association?

Mr. HOLLAND. The extent of his association, Mr. Chairman, was that, as I have described, of a research worker engaged for this period to write a specific book on China's wartime economic problems, which unfortunately he never finished.

In addition, he was, I think, prior to that, an occasional contributor to our magazine and a book reviewer. I think there is a record of his having attended one or more of our international conferences. I recall he was at our conference in 1936, I believe, in California.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you keep track of him after he left the institute, sir?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am not sure I would say "kept track." I certainly knew about his work because I was interested as an economist in the work of the Currency Stabilization Board.

I also saw Mr. Chi later when I visited in China, Chungking, in the middle of the war in 1943. At that time he had become a senior official in the Ministry of Finance.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you correspond with him?

Mr. HOLLAND. I think it is almost certain I did for the very simple reason I was very angry he had not finished up his report, and I was trying to get him to at least complete a portion of it which would not have the material that it would embarrass him as a government official, which we could get out. He eventually did succeed in that. We published in proof form only 100 copies of parts of his report.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, subsequent to the war, continue to keep in touch with him?

Mr. HOLLAND. I did not keep in touch with him. When I went to China, visited Shanghai in 1937, I called on a number of officials in the—

Mr. SOURWINE. We are talking about subsequent to the war.

Mr. HOLLAND. I meant 1947. In 1947 I visited a number of Chinese officials in Shanghai including leading members of the banks there. At that time I met Dr. Chi, who was then the director of research department of the Central Bank of China, which was still then a Nationalist organization. He was at that time very interested in having one of his associates prepare an economic history of the Man-chu dynasty in China and wanted me to take it up with the Rockefeller Foundation, take up the question of whether some grant would be got for 24 scholars who had done a good deal of the work on it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know him at that time as Hansu Chan?

Mr. HOLLAND. No. I must have known since, as I say, the name had been mentioned to me in 1945. I never thought of calling him because I had known him previously as Chi. We always called each other by the first name. I called him Chi.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you continue contact with him after 1947?

Mr. HOLLAND. I did not continue contact, but I think I wrote one letter to him some time between 1947 and probably 1949. I am afraid I don't recall that. It is possible because I was still curious to know whether he might still be in a position to give us something for the grant we made.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you continue the relationship after that time, let us say after 1949, either personal contact or correspondence with him?

Mr. HOLLAND. Not to the best of my recollections, Mr. Chairman, but again without looking at my files I can't be sure. I do want to say a word on the point which has already been brought into the hearings a little earlier in a letter. I think some time in early 1950 in one of the other hearings there is a reference to a letter from me to Mr. Iverson Macadam, the director of our British unit, in which I make a reference to Mr. Chi and describe him as someone who may be one of our most influential friends in China.

My reason for that was very simple. Mr. Macadam had written to me saying that a prominent official of the British-American Tobacco Co., who is one of his own board members, was going out to China shortly and wanted to visit a number of cities and also get in

touch with a number of Chinese professors and research people, and asked me if I could give the names.

I gave the names of several professors in Peking and Shanghai who had previously been active in the China branch of the IPR. Also along with this list I mentioned Dr. Chi as the research director of this bank. I said that, "As you know, he has now become an official in the People's Bank of China and may be one of our more influential friends in China."

Mr. SOURWINE. At least you would not want the committee to understand that Mr. Chi was a person whose connection and importance was so negligible he dropped out of sight after he left the institute?

Mr. HOLLAND. I don't believe I could answer the question that way, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOURWINE. It sounded a little bit as though you were attempting to make a point something like that earlier.

Mr. HOLLAND. I would like my testimony to stand as it is, indicating that I had a specific meeting with Dr. Chi in 1947, that I may have written him a letter between 1947 and 1949, and that I made a reference to him early in 1950 in writing to Mr. Macadam. I did not see Dr. Chi after 1947 because it was not possible to go back.

Mr. SOURWINE. The reference in 1950 was that you considered him one of IPR's more influential friends in China?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am afraid I did not put it that way. To the best of my recollection the phrase was "he may be one of our more influential friends in China."

Mr. SOURWINE. By "our" did you not mean the IPR?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I thought that is what I said.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Morris, I think there is a certain real distinction in my saying he may be one. I don't want to quibble about it, however.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just one more question. You have just recounted three specific instances of contact with Dr. Chi.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, correction, please. The last was not a contact, nor was the in-between one, which is a possibility of my having written a letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. You however enumerated those instances in such a way that the impression might have been gathered that it was an exclusive list. In other words, that it included all of your contacts either in person or by correspondence. Did you intend it that way?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I think I have made it clear that so far as—

Mr. SOURWINE. You can answer that "Yes" or "No." Did you intend it that way? Did you intend that to be an exclusive list?

Mr. HOLLAND. I did not intend it to be an exclusive list. Obviously it might have been.

Mr. MORRIS. May we get back to the American Friends of the Chinese People in China Today? We have mentioned two editors, two, I believe, of the three editors of that publication, Mr. Frederick Field, who was writing under the name of Lawrence Hearn, Mr. Chao-ting Chi, who was writing under the name of Hansu Chan.

The third was J. W. Phillips. Do you know who he was?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I do not know from direct knowledge, or I do not know certainly, but I have a recollection—where I picked it up I don't know—that Mr. Phillips was in fact Mr. Jaffe.

Mr. MORRIS. That is Philip Jaffe?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he tell you he was Phillips?

Mr. HOLLAND. I can't recall, but I have it somewhere in my mind. I put it that way because I think this question was asked me in the executive session earlier. Therefore, it has become part of my memory. I can't be quite sure whether I had it in my mind before that or only since.

Senator O'CONNOR. Mr. Holland, in your recent conference with Mr. Jaffe in which he discussed the use by Field of a pseudonym, did he make any mention of the fact that he had been using one himself?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, he did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to mention here—

Senator SMITH. Do you have any doubt in your mind but that this pseudonym of Phillips for Mr. Jaffe was a pseudonym he used?

Mr. HOLLAND. I think, Senator, that it certainly is a very good presumption. I am under oath. Therefore, when you ask me something specific I try to make it. Certainly my own general feeling, since whenever this recent date was, has been that Mr. Jaffe wrote under the name of Phillips.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you were talking with Mr. Jaffe about Mr. Field's pseudonym, or at any other time, had you discussed with him the question of pseudonyms he himself, Mr. Jaffe, might have used?

Mr. HOLLAND. I did not, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have never heard him state whether he did or did not use a pseudonym in writing?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I have not heard him.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I do have the letter that we both made reference to here. It has already been introduced as an exhibit. It is exhibit 1-A. It is dated February 10, 1950. It is from Mr. Holland to Mr. Macadam and the last paragraph reads:

If Loudon goes to Shanghai I hope he will see Chi Chao-ting, vice president of the Bank of China who has recently been named as Chinese Communist delegate to the Economic and Social Council of the UN. You may remember that Chi was attached to the IPR International Secretariat in 1940 and wrote one of the inquiry reports on China's economic development (distributed only in brief form because it was incomplete). He may well prove to be one of our more influential friends in China.

That is 1950.

Just bearing on the reputation of this American Friends of the Chinese People organization, Mr. Chairman, I would like to mention the fact that it has been cited as a Communist front by two particular organizations. I don't want to accept this as conclusive, but I would like it accepted on the general reputation of the American Friends of the Chinese People.

Mr. Mandel, will you read that into the record?

Senator SMITH. May I ask a question first?

Senator O'CONNOR. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Holland, the last paragraph of this letter of February 10, 1950, which Mr. Morris just read to you, shows that you

say that this man Chi has recently been named as a Chinese Communist delegate to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Do you recall where you got that information?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; from the newspapers.

Senator SMITH. That is all?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Senator SMITH. You had not heard directly from Chi himself?

Mr. HOLLAND. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you read the testimony of Mr. Field that it was through Mr. Chi he was appointed foreign agent of three Chinese Communist principals?

Mr. HOLLAND. I heard Mr. Field state that here in his testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel.

Mr. MANDEL. "American Friends of the Chinese People, also known as Friends of the Chinese People, has been cited as a Communist front by the Special Committee on Un-American Activities in its report of March 29, 1944," this being prior to the issuance of the Attorney General's list. This organization is of course no longer in existence. "It was also similarly cited by the California Committee on Un-American Activities in its report of 1948."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, will you therefore acknowledge that the three editors—Mr. Chi, Frederick V. Field, and Mr. Jaffe—were people who were active in the IPR during the time they were editors of China Today?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I will be glad to answer if counsel will indicate the dates. I am not quite clear in my mind when they were active in China Today.

Mr. MORRIS. I have here March 1935's list, Hansu Chan, editor, page 102 in the volume No. 6 of March 1935.

Mr. HOLLAND. So far as Dr. Chi is concerned, he was not active at all. As I have indicated, he was first employed by us in 1939, I believe. He may have contributed articles before that, but I can't recall definitely. Certainly I would say he was definitely not active in the institute as early as 1935.

This doesn't mean he could not have been a member or an occasional contributor.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Mr. Jaffe?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Jaffe, to the best of my recollection, was also not active at all at that time. I can't again remember—

Mr. MORRIS. When did Mr. Jaffe become active?

Mr. HOLLAND. My best recollection was when I was invited to attend the only conference of ours which he attended, which was in 1939 at Virginia Beach. It is possible Mr. Jaffe may have been an ordinary member before 1939.

Mr. MORRIS. I have here in a list of things just casually made up by Mr. Mandel that Mr. Chi had an article in March 1936 in your publication, Pacific Affairs.

Mr. HOLLAND. As I have indicated, Mr. Chairman, it is quite possible that Dr. Chi contributed to our publications before 1939 when he was engaged by us to write his book. I would not say he was active at all. I do emphasize that fact.

Mr. MORRIS. You do concede, however, that the three of them were active in China Today and in the IPR?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. I do not concede that blanket statement because, as I indicated previously, by any reasonable meaning of the word Dr. Chi was not active. When I use the word "active" I think most reasonable people would say you were dealing with people over a considerable period of time who were taking a leading part in the committees of the institute or attending a great number of its conferences and writing very frequently for its publications.

Senator O'CONOR. In that connection do you agree with the observation that Mr. Morris made before that the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations reveal considerable correspondence and other indications of the activity of Mr. Chi?

Mr. HOLLAND. Of course I acknowledge that. As much of this correspondence was somewhat of a quarrel between me and Mr. Chi as to when he was going to finish his book, I don't think that it necessarily indicates he was actively associated in the ordinary sense of the word. I don't want to extend this conference or to quibble, but I think it is a valid distinction.

Senator O'CONOR. I think you have made it quite clear.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you read the volumes of China Today that you do have in your office?

Mr. HOLLAND. No. I am sorry I have not read them. I looked at them rather quickly to get some idea of the kind of people who contributed to them and also to see if it was true that these pseudonyms appeared on the masthead.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, on the basis of everything will you give us an estimate on your part as to whether or not you think this organization, the American Friends of the Chinese People, publishing as it did China Today, was an organization that was friendly to the Communists? Will you concede that much?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. I think I indicated before that I got two rather contradictory impressions from the people I asked about this. My own feeling is that it is not possible to make the statement which counsel has made. I think it is clear that one can find in this magazine a number of articles which are sympathetic to the Chinese Communists.

As I said, I only looked at it rather hastily. I don't recall noting any articles which were sympathetic to communism in general or to Russia because I think it dealt chiefly with the Far East. Undoubtedly there were, I think, articles which were sympathetic to the Chinese Communists.

Also I have noticed that the magazine carried articles by people who were obviously not Communists, one of them being Senator Schwellenbach, of Washington, another Mr. George Fitch, of the YMCA in China, who has subsequently, as many people know, become one of the most ardent opponents of communism and a most vigorous spokesman for the Chinese Nationalists, and his wife, Mrs. Geraldine Fitch, together with a number of others. I just recall those three at the moment.

Mr. MORRIS. You have made a survey of China Today to the extent you know about those people?

Mr. HOLLAND. As I indicated, I looked hastily through the volume just at the title pages and content pages to get a quick idea of what



sort of names appeared on the front and only for these two volumes.

Mr. MORRIS. You claim you are in no position to say that China Today is a pro-Communist publication?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; that is my considered judgment.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know the Canadian affiliate of the American Friends of the Chinese People, called the Canadian Friends of the Chinese People?

Mr. HOLLAND. I know this only by having heard it mentioned in the testimony, I think, related to one of the earlier sessions here, and I have forgotten which one.

Mr. MORRIS. What was that?

Mr. HOLLAND. It had some connection with Dr. Norman, but I don't recall which session it was brought up in.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I don't think this item has come up. We are introducing this item for the first time today.

Mr. HOLLAND. I have been under the impression that Mr. Norman was described somewhere as the secretary or had some connection with the Canadian Friends of the Chinese People, and the name of that organization came to me then very recently as a surprise because I had not heard of it before.

I am perfectly willing to give another possible reason for my knowing this because I am trying to be very candid. My recollection was, as I indicated, but it is also true that Mr. Jaffe in the course of talking to me about this matter of Frederick Field's pseudonym said that—I don't know whether he said he knew or he had heard Mr. Norman had been a member of the organization called the Canadian Friends of the Chinese People. It sticks in my mind because it came as a surprise to me.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he tell you he was secretary?

Mr. HOLLAND. I believe he did, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOURWINE. In what connection did Mr. Jaffe bring that up?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Jaffe told me this—I am a little embarrassed at having to tell this, but since you have asked it I will put it quite frankly—Mr. Jaffe came to tell me that Mr. Morris had been to see him to ask if Mr. Jaffe would cooperate with this committee in providing all the information he knew about either people in the Institute of Pacific Relations or people in the various Communist organizations.

Mr. Jaffe told me he had met with Mr. Morris at lunch with his lawyer and that they had discussed a number of these questions. He did not indicate that he had discussed Mr. Field's—yes, I think he did. He indicated a question of Mr. Field's pseudonym had been discussed. I can't recall whether he said that the question of the Canadian Friends of the Chinese People had been discussed.

I think it was at this conference that Mr. Jaffe himself probably told me. I say probably because I am not absolutely sure in my mind. I have the recollection, as I stated first, that I had learned of this through hearing it in the testimony. That is very natural because I have been trying to study this voluminous testimony for the last several weeks. It is certainly hard for me to remember exactly where I learned each particular item.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Jaffe mention to you that Mr. Morris discussed with him the question of his, Jaffe's, own use of a pseudonym?

Mr. HOLLAND. I don't believe he did, Mr. Sourwine.

Senator SMITH. When did this conversation with Mr. Jaffe take place, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. I think it was about 7 to 10 days ago, to the best of my recollection.

Senator SMITH. Where did it take place?

Mr. HOLLAND. In my office.

Senator SMITH. Did Mr. Jaffe come to your office?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Did he come voluntarily?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, he did.

Senator SMITH. You had not heard before about any conversations he had with Mr. Morris or anybody else about this matter?

Mr. HOLLAND. No. It came as rather a surprise to me. I have met Mr. Jaffe more on occasions in recent months because he and literally scores of other people who cannot afford to buy the transcript of these hearings just besieged my office asking if they could look at certain passages, particularly Mr. Budenz' numerous accusations. This is the reason for Mr. Jaffe having asked if he could see certain passages.

I do not recall his having—I have forgotten the original question.

Senator SMITH. The point I was trying to find out was whether or not Mr. Jaffe had come to your office to tell you about this conversation of his own accord or if you had heard about it and asked him to come?

Mr. HOLLAND. He came to tell me.

Senator SMITH. He did tell you about the conversation he had with Mr. Morris?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he indicate to you whether or not he was going to testify?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; he did not. I got the impression—I was still frankly rather—well, he did not. I am glad to tell you if you wish anything further, but the answer is "No."

Mr. SOURWINE. I think the the committee would be interested in the impression you got since you stated you got one.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I have no objection, but if my counsel wishes to advise me that it is not relevant—

Mr. SOURWINE. I don't think your counsel can rule on what is a germane question.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I am quite willing to accept your wish.

Senator O'CONOR. We are not entirely interested in the matter of your opinion as we are in the matter of facts. If there are any facts on which you did base an opinion, it would certainly be relevant.

Mr. HOLLAND. I am glad to tell you facts that registered in my mind. This is why I said I was embarrassed: Because it seemed rather striking. I got the fairly definite impression from Mr. Jaffe's conversation that Mr. Morris had been hoping to get some cooperation from Mr. Jaffe on the ground if he testified he would be immune from any subsequent legal action because of a pending immunity law—I am not familiar with the details of it, but I have seen a discussion in the papers, by which certain witnesses if they agreed to testify would not be held liable subsequently for anything they might have said.

It was the first I heard of such a case, and therefore it stuck in my mind.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does Mr. Jaffe make a practice of informing you with regard to contacts he may have in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations or related matters?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; it was very surprising. It is very rare indeed. I never had such an experience.

Mr. SOURWINE. This was the first instance in which Mr. Jaffe had made any such report to you?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have others who have been contacted by representatives of this committee come to you with reports of their contacts?

Mr. HOLLAND. I recall one other case, Mr. Raymond Dennett, who told me simply that he had been questioned in executive session and indicated that part of the questions dealt with the staff set-up when he was our executive secretary.

I must say in fairness to Mr. Dennett he did not give me any precise indication of the question, just indicated it covered that subject.

Mr. MORRIS. He went into a little more detail than that?

Mr. HOLLAND. He told me what his general attitude was, as I think you know from his testimony, and part of it concerned the question of the union of the employees.

Mr. MORRIS. You made a memorandum in fact of his conversation, did you not?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you make that memorandum available to this committee?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; I am glad to do so.

Mr. MORRIS. Then we will note the precise extent to which he did relate the material of the conversation.

Mr. HOLLAND. It was on the telephone from Boston; therefore, I jotted down the main points.

Mr. MORRIS. We were at the point of discussing the various grants that had been given to individuals through the intervention and the aid of the Institute of Pacific Relations. We were discussing the fact that Herbert Norman had gotten a grant. That is how we got into this business of the American Friends of the Chinese People, "China Today" and the Canadian Friends of the Chinese People.

I notice the next name on this list is Mr. Walter Radius.

I think you mentioned him.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Lawrence K. Rosinger. Can you tell what Rosinger's associations with the IPR had been?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes. Mr. Rosinger, I think then a recent graduate from Columbia, I believe was awarded one of the junior fellowships to work at the IPR by the Rockefeller Foundation probably back about 1939, 1938. I don't have the years because, as I say, I was not in the American IPR at that time. I did see him around the office. Then he left us after 1 year. I think he wrote one or two articles and a pamphlet at that time.

I believe he went to work for the Indian trade commissioner's office in New York. Subsequent to that I believe he went on the staff of the Foreign Policy Association. Then somewhere in 1943 while he was still employed, I think by the Foreign Policy Association, I invited him to prepare a short book for the Institute of Pacific Relations on China's wartime politics.

This consisted of about 50 pages of a brief analysis and description followed by some 50 pages of documents about the Chinese Government set-up. This was published, I think, in 1944 or 1945 by the Princeton University Press and is still available. I think there are a few copies still on sale. It had a rather good reception, and it has for a long time been regarded as a useful reference work.

Then about 1948 when the Foreign Policy Association was going through rather drastic financial retrenchment and they decided to drop most of their research staff, I learned that Mr. Rosinger was going to be leaving and discussed with him the question of whether he would be prepared to undertake a research assignment for the Institute of Pacific Relations. He said that he would.

I therefore went to the Rockefeller Foundation officers and asked if they would be prepared to give a substantial grant—I think it was \$6,000 or \$9,000—to enable him to direct a rather large book on the postwar Far East. Originally it was planned as essentially a one-man job, but after a few months we realized it was too big a job for one man and therefore it eventually became a symposium by 13 authors and three of the chapters were written by Mr. Rosinger.

This book under the title "The State of Asia" was published last year by Alfred Knopf under the auspices of the American Institute of Pacific Relations.

So then Mr. Rosinger finished that assignment about September 1950 and went off our payroll and is no longer employed by the IPR. He went off and was awarded a rather generous what is called area training fellowship by the Social Science Research Council of Washington to complete a detailed study of the Chinese Renaissance, on which I believe he is still working.

Mr. MORRIS. What was Mr. Rosinger's role in your Indian conference in 1949?

Mr. HOLLAND. In 1949 we held a special conference in Delhi on Indian-American relations. This was financed in considerable part by the Carnegie Corp., which made rather large grants to, I think, seven or eight university presidents to go out to India in the belief that India was going to become suddenly much more important, and that not only should you send experts out there, but it was important to get the heads of universities to realize the importance of India and of Indian studies in their universities.

Among them was the new president of Cornell, President Malott; President Darden of the University of Virginia; President Hancher of Iowa, and a number of others.

It happened just before this conference was to start there was a reception at the Waldorf-Astoria for Mr. Nehru, Prime Minister Nehru. In the reception it happened that Mr. Barnard, the president of the Rockefeller Foundation, was talking to Mr. Shiva Rao, who has been one of the long-time advisers of the Prime Minister. They got talking about this forthcoming conference.

Mr. Rao said, "I think it is important you ought to send out a number of younger people who are interested in specializing for some time in Indian affairs and also who know a good deal about east Asia because one of the big problems is that India has been so long cut off from east Asia we don't really have enough people who know about Japan and China."

This conference I understand was subsequently followed up in the Rockefeller Foundation, and they called my predecessor, Mr. Clayton Lane, the secretary of the American IPR, to inquire whether it would serve the institute's purposes if a special grant were made available to enable Mr. Rosinger to go out to this conference and also to make a tour of India.

Mr. Lane naturally said "Yes," and I think a grant of something like \$2,000 was made available for travel.

In connection with that conference also Mr. Rosinger wrote a report called Indian-American Relations. This was subsequently published by Macmillan under the title of "India and the United States." This volume here is the proceedings of this Indian-American conference.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, you will notice in the report on the India-American Relations Conference, this digest here, that the rapporteur of the report was Lawrence K. Rosinger.

Mr. HOLLAND. That was true. As I indicated, he prepared one of the documents for this conference.

Mr. MORRIS. That indicates active participation in IPR affairs as late as 1949?

Mr. HOLLAND. Certainly.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, I noticed your press release. Did you read the testimony of Mr. Canning before our committee about Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, Mr. Chairman. I am not sure whether I read it. But I was here that morning, so I certainly heard the testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that Mr. Canning had identified Mr. Rosinger as a member of the Communist Party in 1940?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. In 1940?

Mr. HOLLAND. Did I know in 1940?

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know he identified in 1940 Lawrence Rosinger as a member of the Communist Party at a time prior to that?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I did not. I heard it for the first time when he testified here a few weeks ago.

Mr. SOURWINE. So the record may be clear, let me rephrase the question.

Did you know that Mr. Canning had identified Mr. Rosinger as having been, in 1940, a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; I heard him say so here.

Mr. MORRIS. You did hear that he testified before this committee that Lawrence Rosinger was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I have already answered that. It was the same question.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, there was public testimony before the New York State legislative committee at that time that Lawrence Rosinger, according to the testimony of Mr. William Canning, was a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. HOLLAND. This I did not know. I would have answered if you had made the thing clear.

Mr. CROSSMAN. Might I ask that you read what he said? I was there, and he said he couldn't tell whether he testified to that fact publicly or not. I heard him. He said he testified twice, once privately

and once publicly. He couldn't remember whether he had testified to that fact publicly or not.

Mr. MORRIS. I had asked Mr. Holland the question whether he knew that Mr. Canning had identified Mr. Rosinger to have been a member of the Communist Party in 1940.

Mr. CROSSMAN. Publicly.

Mr. MORRIS. Publicly. The answer is—

Mr. CROSSMAN. He doesn't know; but I do remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just a minute, Mr. Chairman, please. I don't believe Mr. Crossman can testify for Mr. Holland or that he should on this record purport to correct and change Mr. Holland's testimony.

Senator O'CONOR. Yes; Mr. Holland has answered it.

Mr. CROSSMAN. I am not purporting to change it.

Senator O'CONOR. Proceed with the next question.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in regard to this problem of identifying somebody to have been a member of the Communist Party, great care has to be exercised at all times. I think ordinarily we would not introduce the executive session which takes place prior to the full session into the public record. But I think I would like to reintroduce at this time the testimony of Mr. Canning at executive session in connection with Lawrence Rosinger's membership in the Communist Party.

Mr. Mandel, will you read into the record the testimony of Mr. Canning? Mr. William Canning had been a member of the City College unit of the Communist Party. He was on the staff of the City College at the time.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us, Mr. Canning, what you knew of a man named Lawrence Rosinger?

Mr. CANNING. I knew Lawrence Rosinger at City College where in 1935 I became an instructor in history. Rosinger was a graduate of City College either of that year, 1935, or 1936. I knew him fairly well during the few years of my party membership.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know him as a Communist Party member?

Mr. CANNING. I knew him as a Communist Party member.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that, Mr. Canning?

Mr. CANNING. From his own discussions with me. He spoke frequently about his activities in the Communist unit at Columbia University.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you in that unit, Mr. Canning?

Mr. CANNING. No; I was not.

Mr. MORRIS. In what unit were you at that time?

Mr. CANNING. I belonged to the City College of New York unit.

Mr. MORRIS. You disclosed to him you were in that unit?

Mr. CANNING. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. So that when you two discussed various political activities you discussed them as a member of one unit talking to a member of another unit?

Mr. CANNING. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you give us his unit?

Mr. CANNING. The Columbia University unit.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it customary for members of one Communist unit to disclose that fact to members of another Communist unit and discuss the activities?

Mr. CANNING. That happened quite frequently during that period. Possibly in later years there was more tightening up of secrecy.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any reason to believe that Mr. Rosinger left the Communist Party?

Mr. CANNING. No; I have not.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what Rosinger is doing now?

Mr. CANNING. So far as I know he is on the staff of the IPR.

Mr. HOLLAND. What was the date of this, Mr. Chairman? Is it permissible to tell us the date?

Mr. MORRIS. I will strike out the last sentence if it is a question of whether he is a member of the Institute. Communist Party membership is what I am talking about.

Have you heard the testimony of Mr. Karl Wittfogel?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; I was here.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you read the testimony of Mr. Budenz about Mr. Rosinger being a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, I have not read that. I saw it reported in the paper. Mr. Budenz has named so many names I did not actually read the testimony, but I saw the report in the paper.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I don't think it would be necessary to read Mr. Wittfogel's or Mr. Budenz's testimony at this point.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, before counsel finishes with this subject of Dr. Wittfogel's testimony, I would like to say a word or two regarding the allegations concerning Mr. Rosinger made by Dr. Wittfogel.

Senator O'CONOR. Inasmuch as you have been asked generally about the other session, you may do so.

Mr. HOLLAND. I say this because naturally I want to indicate that I have been taking the work of this committee seriously and quite naturally therefore I was very disturbed when Dr. Wittfogel, whom I have known a long time—we have been cordial friends for a long time, as late as last year I sublet his apartment. Therefore I was quite disturbed when he made the statement he considered Mr. Rosinger to be a Communist. I spoke to Mr. Rosinger about it afterward as soon as I could.

And particularly I was concerned about Dr. Wittfogel's statement that he apparently reached this conclusion in large part on the basis of certain of Mr. Rosinger's writings. Therefore, what my chief concern was, is there anything in Mr. Rosinger's two principal books for the IPR which would give ground for this?

I therefore asked Mr. Rosinger to talk to me about it. He did. He gave me a brief memorandum, which I will not read textually, but if you will permit me, I would like to look at it to refresh my memory as I talk to you.

Essentially, however, it was pointed out to me by Mr. Rosinger that he had not come in to the——

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I am wondering about this. Is that a proper way to get Mr. Rosinger's testimony in? If he wants to testify, I would be in favor of hearing him.

Senator O'CONOR. I do not think it is proper for one witness to testify for another.

Mr. HOLLAND. I would much prefer the other. My only point was that I felt some time in the hearings the rest of this story should be heard.

Senator SMITH. In other words, you think Mr. Rosinger would like to be heard here?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am afraid I can't answer that directly. All I was saying if there is to be testimony, certainly it would be better for him to testify.

Senator O'CONOR. He should be given an opportunity, but if he wishes to deny it, he should come in person and take an oath and testify rather than do it through another person.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

May I add one point further, which I think is valid for me? My chief concern was the quality of the books he had written for the Institute of Pacific Relations because it is possible that he might have had other affiliations long before I knew him. I therefore did take the trouble to look at these publications. I do know with all sincerity and submit to the committee that any honest appraisal of these books I have mentioned—China's Wartime Politics and India and the United States—would show they are truly scholarly and balanced pieces of work.

This is certainly confirmed by a number of reviews in very reputable, scholarly publications. Not only that, this most recent book which is mentioned, namely *The State of Asia*, contains a chapter on China by Mr. Rosinger. Quite naturally there have been differing opinions on that particular chapter.

The New York Times was somewhat critical of it, called the book as a whole extremely good and included Mr. Rosinger's chapter on India, but was critical of the China chapter.

On the other hand, I find that the Catholic journal, *Commonweal*, praised the book very highly and particularly singled out the chapter on China as admirable, I don't want to always quote reviews, but it did seem this was a pertinent point from the point of view—

Senator SMITH. Have you the book?

Mr. HOLLAND. I don't have it here.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, inasmuch as Mr. Holland has characterized the testimony of Mr. Wittfogel, at this time I think we should read it into the record. It is very brief. It amounts to about two lines.

Senator O'CONOR. From what page are you reading?

Mr. MANDEL. This is page 313 of the testimony of August 7, 1951:

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I met Rosinger there, and he was treated as a Communist and spoken of as a Communist by Finklestein.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you read the preceding part?

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

Mr. MORRIS. Can you tell us more about Lawrence Rosinger's experience at that time? You testified about Moses Finklestein's Communist study group and Rosinger was a member of that. Can you tell us anything further?

Mr. WITTFOGEL. I don't remember whether it was a permanent group. It was an institution. I was invited a very few times. I met Rosinger there and he was treated as a Communist and spoken of as a Communist by Finklestein. And afterward I met Rosinger a number of times and up to my formal break he was a very friendly man.

Mr. MORRIS. I introduce that in the record because Mr. Holland has said that Mr. Wittfogel has testified that Rosinger was a Communist from Rosinger's writings.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I am sure at a later stage in Dr. Wittfogel's remarks he did discuss Mr. Rosinger's writings. Specifically he said he had taken part in helping some people in Seattle and sent a memorandum to the executive secretary of the American IPR protesting against some of Mr. Rosinger's writings, or rather, protesting against his being engaged.



If I may add one more point because I have taken the trouble to have this compiled, Mr. Rosinger's book *China's Wartime Politics* was described in the United States Quarterly Book List published by the Library of Congress as "One of the few dispassionate accounts of current Chinese politics to appear in English in recent years."

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you read that book list?

Mr. HOLLAND. The quarterly book list?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. HOLLAND. I have read the list. I have not seen this particular review. This is being compiled by my staff. I am willing to leave it out if you wish.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, I don't want to interrupt your line of questioning, but are we getting close to a recess?

Mr. MORRIS. I think so. On the question of the grants, who received the grants, I think I can put that off until a later time.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have one matter that will take a few minutes if the chairman will permit. I would like to close it up at this morning's session. It jumps quite a ways from anything we have discussed before.

I have here, which I will hand you in a moment, a clipping from the Washington Post of February 10, 1951, being an Associated Press story—that was the time of the subpoenaing before this committee of the records of the IPR—and I call your attention to the two marked paragraphs which I will now read:

As for the subcommittee's seeing the files, Holland said "We have no objection to their being seen by any properly accredited agency provided they are used fairly and nothing is quoted out of context."

He said the IPR voluntarily opened all its files to the FBI last summer when McCarthy's charges were first made. He said an FBI team spent several weeks examining them.

I would like to ask you, sir, if you would examine that news story and tell the committee if it reports in substantially accurate fashion what you said to the newspaper men at that time.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, Mr. Chairman, it does.

Mr. SOURWINE. I hold here in my hand, and I will show you this in a moment, a press release headed:

For immediate release, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York, Telephone Eldorado 5-1759, Statement of IPR Secretary General on Seizure of Institute's Back Files.

I want to read from that, but first I will ask you if that is a press release which you issued. The first page is all I will ask you to identify. That is all I will read from at this time.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I identify this.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to read from it.

Mr. HOLLAND. May I just check the date? I am afraid it is not given.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you read the first page?

Mr. HOLLAND (reading):

Statement of IPR secretary general on Seizure of the Institute's Back Files—dated 2/9/50. That is February 9, 1950.

Commenting on the statement of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee investigating un-American activities—

I am afraid I didn't have the title exact then.

Senator SMITH. Was that 1950 or 1951?

Mr. HOLLAND. It is obviously a mistake, Mr. Chairman. It refers to this year—

\* \* \* that it had subpoenaed "several thousand documents belonging to the IPR," Mr. William L. Holland, secretary general of the Institute stated today that these documents consisted of old correspondence files mostly relating to the years 1925 to 1945. He denied that these files had "recently been transferred" from New York, but said that they were moved during the summer of 1949 in order to make space in the Institute's overcrowded files at its New York office. To avoid storage charges, the Institute, he said, asked Mr. Edward C. Carter, the former secretary general of the Institute from 1933 to 1946, to store them in the barn belonging to his summer home in Lee, Mass.

Holland stated that the contents of these files had been well known to the FBI since the summer of 1950 at which time he and Mr. Clayton Lane, then an executive of the American IPR, wrote Mr. J. Edgar Hoover inviting the FBI to make a thorough investigation of all the IPR files and records both in New York and in Lee. Holland said that he and Mr. Lane took this action because the IPR's work has always been open in the matter of public record. During subsequent weeks, a group of FBI agents made a thorough search of all the IPR files and were given full permission to copy or photostat any material they wished to reproduce.

Holland said that the institute's officers had no objection to making these files of the institute available to any accredited United States agency, but said he felt the Senate subcommittee should have served the subpoena on the institute's officers who are the proper custodians.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to ask you, sir, again, if that is a press release which you issued?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are the statements therein true?

Mr. HOLLAND. They were true, to the best of my belief and conviction.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you now believe them to have been true at the time they were made?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOURWINE. You stated that the files had recently been transferred from New York, or rather you denied that the files had been transferred from New York but said they were moved during the summer of 1949 in order to make space in the institute's overcrowded files at its New York office.

Senator O'CONOR. Will you answer audibly so the reporter can get it?

Mr. HOLLAND. That is the statement in my press release.

Mr. SOURWINE. That statement necessarily implies, does it not, that the files were moved out of the institute's New York office and up to Lee, Mass.?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; it does, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that what actually happened?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes. If I may explain the exact circumstances, I will be glad to do so.

Mr. SOURWINE. They were moved to Lee directly?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; not directly but first to a warehouse in the Bronx where some older files had also been stored for a time. These, in turn, were put together and put on a truck and sent to Lee.

Mr. MORRIS. What warehouse was that, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am sorry; I don't recall it. I gave the name to the FBI. I know we have a record.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that a commercial warehouse where you rented space?

Mr. HOLLAND. The reason was this, Mr. Chairman: that warehouse, I understand, had stored a great deal of bulky goods for Russian war relief during the war and thus was known to Mr. Edward C. Carter. When we were looking for a place to put some of our old files when we moved from our previous office in 1943—I think it was at 129 East Fifty-second Street—Mr. Carter spoke to the manager of this warehouse who agreed that since they had so much business through Mr. Carter, they would give us free storage for this relatively small amount of stuff.

Mr. MORRIS. What kind of business had they from Mr. Carter?

Mr. HOLLAND. He was president of Russian War Relief. They had thousands of tons of clothing they were shipping to Russia.

So this material in 1943 was sent to this warehouse. In 1948, rather. We had two floors in our present building. But for reasons of financial retrenchment we decided to give up one and consolidate on one. That meant there was a problem of excessive overcrowding of files. So, therefore, we said, "Why don't we move some of our back files here," and at the same time or approximately that time, the manager of the warehouse said "I am sorry, I have got a lot of business now and I don't believe I can go on giving you free storage."

So we decided we would have to put them somewhere else.

At this stage, Mr. Carter said, "Why not—since we are not going to be using them, and I will probably want to consult them in writing my memoirs and looking over the stuff for the proposed history of the IPR—send them up to my barn?" His barn, by the way, is not a barn in the ordinary sense of the word. It has been renovated and consists of offices and a library and a regular study room.

Mr. SOURWINE. It has all the usual appurtenances of a barn, does it not?

Mr. HOLLAND. I would say it is anything but typical of a barn. It is made over to look like an office.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have they removed the manure chute?

Mr. HOLLAND. I'm not sure. I didn't examine it the last time.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean your reference to that manure chute was without knowledge as to whether there was one?

Mr. HOLLAND. I do know there was a pile at the back of the barn. Whether the chute is there, I cannot say.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead, Mr. Holland.

Mr. HOLLAND. Somewhere in the summer—I don't recall the exact month—the old files already in the Bronx warehouse together with some of the files in our present office were put on a truck and sent up to Mr. Carter's place.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is this your testimony: The movement was from the Institute of Pacific Relations' overcrowded office in New York to the warehouse and almost immediately thereafter up to Lee?

Mr. HOLLAND. That is true.

Senator SMITH. How long did they stay in the warehouse?

Mr. HOLLAND. You mean at this immediate period?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. HOLLAND. I am afraid I can't say. It was a short time. It was just a matter of getting a truck to take them up. I could find out, I am sure. It may have been the same truck that took the stuff

from our office, went up to the Bronx, loaded the stuff on and took it to Lee.

Senator SMITH. When they were moved from the warehouse in the Bronx to Lee, Mass., did that take place about the time a rumor got out that this committee was looking for those files?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am not sure when the rumor was.

Senator SMITH. Did you not know some days before?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, very definitely. This was the middle of 1949, to the best of my recollection. These rumors you speak of—at least the talks about leaks from the files which, I suppose, is what you mean—they came shortly before the actual seizure which was February 1951. This was the middle of 1949. They went up to Lee. They remained there untouched certainly, because Mr. Carter had no time to look at them.

When Senator McCarthy began making his charges about Mr. Lattimore and the IPR in 1950, then Mr. Lane, who was then the executive secretary of the American IPR, after talking to me, invited the FBI to come and make a search.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the second point in this statement. May I question you about that? Before we do that, I want to sum up and be sure I understand your testimony.

These files were at either your own office, in the warehouse of which you speak, or at Lee, Mass., or en route from one of those places to the other?

Mr. HOLLAND. To the best of my knowledge, they were.

Mr. SOURWINE. They were not out of your custody and control at any time?

Mr. HOLLAND. The files in the warehouse, as far as I know, were untouched. I was not responsible for having moved them.

Mr. SOURWINE. With your knowledge and consent they were not out of your control?

Mr. HOLLAND. No.

Senator SMITH. How long were the records in the warehouse with the Russian War Relief goods?

Mr. HOLLAND. From some time in 1943 to the middle of 1949.

Senator SMITH. Did you check them during that time?

Mr. HOLLAND. No.

Senator SMITH. Do you know whether any records that have not been produced here of the IPR were packed with goods going to Russia and shipped to Russia?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, Senator Smith, I am sure this is not true because the reason we could store the things free was because all the stuff had gone, and, therefore, the warehouse was empty.

Senator SMITH. All the Russian war relief goods had gone. I thought you said they were there.

Mr. HOLLAND. This warehouse had a great deal of business. The stuff had all been shipped as far as I know.

I must say I am not speaking from direct knowledge because it was Mr. Carter who handled those things.

Mr. SOURWINE. If I may go back to the statement which you have repeated here in different words but which, in the press release, was set forth:

Holland stated the contents of these files have been well known to the FBI since the Summer of 1950 at which time Mr. Clayton Lane, executive secretary

of the IPR, wrote Mr. J. Edgar Hoover inviting the FBI to make a thorough investigation of all the IPR files and records both in New York and in Lee.

Is that a correct statement?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did make such an offer?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes. You say "you." Mr. Clayton Lane actually made it.

Mr. SOURWINE. I meant you and Mr. Clayton Lane.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that offer made in good faith?

Mr. HOLLAND. It certainly was.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the last part you have this sentence:

During subsequent weeks a group of FBI agents made a thorough search of all of the IPR files and were given full permission to copy or photostat any material they wished to reproduce.

Was that a correct statement?

Mr. HOLLAND. To the best of my knowledge and belief, it was a correct statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. You made available to the FBI at that time all of your files, that is, the ones in your office, the ones in the warehouse and the ones at Lee, Mass.?

Mr. HOLLAND. We did. The way it was done was this way: We notified the FBI of our wish to have them come and look. They learned from us some were in Lee. They asked if they might go there. Mr. Carter provided them with the key to the barn. They worked there for something like 3 weeks, a team of them. He provided them with a heater to keep warm because it got cold up there. They took out several hundred documents which they thought were pertinent.

Mr. SOURWINE. They had access not only to your files at Lee but to all your other files?

Mr. HOLLAND. Of course. Another team worked for many weeks in our office in New York.

Mr. SOURWINE. You made available to the FBI all the files you had? You did not hold out anything?

Mr. HOLLAND. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Holland, did the Institute of Pacific Relations, your international organization, or any part of your organization, have any activities in any of the European countries other than Russia?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, indeed. We had one of the constituent national councils in England, another in France, and another in Holland.

Senator SMITH. In any of the Central European countries?

Mr. HOLLAND. No. The basis for membership is either the country is in the Pacific area or the Far East or has possessions there.

Senator SMITH. So your group had no work in any of the Central European countries?

Mr. HOLLAND. No.

Senator SMITH. I believe you said you had a conference in Delhi, India?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Did you have any work done by your association in Mongolia or China?

Mr. HOLLAND. There was never any branch in Mongolia, which you know is an inaccessible sort of country. In China, we had from the beginning an active branch. The Chinese are one of the charter members. The China council continued in operation up until quite recently, I think 1949 or '50.

Senator SMITH. Did any of your representatives or officials or interested members travel in Mongolia and do any work of any sort there?

Mr. HOLLAND. Only one, to my knowledge, Mr. Lattimore, but I am certain that—if we are speaking about Inner Mongolia, yes. He did travel there while working part time as an editor of our magazine. I don't believe he traveled through Outer Mongolia, the Russian satellite state. Certainly he did not travel there while working for the Institute of Pacific Relations. He visited over there with Vice President Wallace.

Senator SMITH. What about Mr. Carter? Did he travel through?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Carter has traveled across the trans-Siberian railway but never been to Mongolia.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to be sure I understand you correctly so I can close this matter in my own mind as well as in the record.

Is it your intent to testify here that at the time you issued this press release in February—I believe February 9 of this year—you had already given the FBI access to and they had examined all of the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. HOLLAND. I can certainly say that the first part of your statement is correct. We had given them access. I personally did not see whether they literally went through every folder.

Mr. SOURWINE. I did not mean that as a catch question.

Mr. HOLLAND. There is one important point, Mr. Chairman. I am trying to give you a full picture. Mr. Sourwine has not asked me the question, but I think it is only fair to say that this is what I have told the FBI: a few days later—I think it was 3 days later—Mr. Field came to my office on a Saturday morning and said—

Mr. SOURWINE. You finally figured out what I was driving at.

Mr. HOLLAND. I was not sure until you asked me about the date.

I wish to tell you frankly that Mr. Field came to my office and said:

I don't know whether you know it, but ever since 1941 or 1943 there have been some old files of the IPR sitting in my cellar. There were a number of old vouchers and accounts which were sent down there in 1941 or 1943.

Mr. MORRIS. What position did Mr. Field have in the institute at that time?

Senator O'CONOR. I do think he ought to complete the answer now.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Field said:

I have absolutely forgotten all about these until I read the news about this seizure. Then I looked through my own files because I was naturally curious to know what in the files there might be that would affect me. I found, along with a number of my own personal files in the cellar, several cartons—I think 20 or 24—of old Institute of Pacific Relations files.

I was considerably upset about this, and said, "Well, I hate to learn this now, but it seems to me the only thing to do is to bring them up to the IPR." This I did. They are still there in the IPR offices and I have asked the FBI to examine them, too.

Mr. SOURWINE. When were they integrated?

Mr. HOLLAND. They have not been integrated.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are they included in the files you have made available to representatives of this committee?

Mr. HOLLAND. They are right there in the office. I am glad to make them available at any time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have they before now been pointed out?

Mr. HOLLAND. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you tell the FBI about these files?

Mr. HOLLAND. I should think about 2 weeks ago.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does that square up with all the other answers you have been giving here today?

Mr. HOLLAND. I think it does, Mr. Sourwine.

Senator O'CONOR. Is there any explanation why the FBI was not notified until 2 weeks ago of the existence of the additional files that Mr. Field had when they had been notified of course, long since, of the existence of the others?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Senator O'CONOR. What is the explanation?

Mr. HOLLAND. It is something I am somewhat concerned about. The simple reason is I looked them over hastily myself by opening the tops of the cartons. As far as I could see, there were a lot of old vouchers of paid bills there. It was only 2 weeks ago when someone else on my staff—I have forgotten who it was—asked: "Where are we going to put these?" To maintain our record of frankness with the FBI, I should at least tell them that these are here and ask them if they would come up. Mr. Guiliano, one of the agents of the FBI, who had looked through the previous file, came up with two or three of his men and went through all of them. They took out a few letters, memoranda, and some bills. I noticed one of the things he took out was a check paid to Mr. Stanley Hornbeck of the State Department with travel expenses to one of our meetings and a few other things, took them away and I presume photostated them and returned them to me a few days alter.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many cases or boxes of files are in that category?

Mr. HOLLAND. These are in cartons. Approximately, I should think, 16 to 20. I haven't actually counted them.

Mr. SOURWINE. With 16 or 20 cartons of papers and correspondence, bills and receipts, perhaps other memoranda and documents which had not been shown to the FBI in February or indeed until some 2 weeks ago, do you think it is a fair statement to say all of the files had been made available to the FBI?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, I do, for this reason: I am convinced from my looking at the thing and my subsequent looking over the stuff, that the FBI took out, this is practically all duplication of what was in our files. It was our practice to send carbon copies of our things to a number of people. There are a great deal of duplications. If you were to look in our San Francisco office you would find many more. We don't have a San Francisco branch, so technically I made all the files available to the FBI. There are some in Honolulu and San Francisco.

Mr. SOURWINE. These were in your New York office and they were duplicates and that is why the FBI had all the files?

Mr. HOLLAND. The reason was the one which I gave before: That I had looked at these and considered there was nothing there of importance.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was on that basis you testify today the FBI had all the files?

Mr. HOLLAND. I don't get your question.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are testifying today that the FBI had been given all the files. That was based, you said, did you not, on your own opinion that the material and these 16 or 20 cartons duplicated matter which had already been made available to the FBI?

Mr. HOLLAND. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Please restate it in your own language.

Mr. HOLLAND. The point is at the time you were asking me about this press release, when I made that answer that was my honest conviction.

Mr. SOURWINE. You testified this morning that it was the truth and that you still believed it to be the truth. You testified this morning without regard to the press release, except as background, that the FBI had been given all of the files of the institute, had been given access to them.

You think that was an accurate statement?

Mr. HOLLAND. I think it is an accurate statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why do you think so?

Mr. HOLLAND. Because, first of all, I was answering the question of the press release at the time. That was a true statement then. I have subsequently, on my own initiative, volunteered this information which makes it completely true, that the FBI has seen all the files.

Senator SMITH. That is not the point as I understand Mr. Sourwine's question. The point he is making, this morning when you testified that everything had been turned over that was a true statement. So far as we knew, it was not a true statement. I never heard, and I don't suppose a good many of us have heard about these additional files.

Why did you testify this morning when your statement, when made, was a true statement and still was a true statement that the FBI had all the files?

Mr. HOLLAND. Your question was: my statement when made was a true statement. That is, I consider true. I came down here perfectly expecting this question to be asked. That is why, when I finally got the idea of what Mr. Sourwine was getting at about the date that I volunteered the information. This is a true statement of the facts. When I issued that release, that was a true statement, to the best of my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean at that time the files were still in Field's basement?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, sir, they were, because it was a day or two later—

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not know it?

Mr. HOLLAND. I did not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had any other files been moved out of Mr. Field's basement?

Mr. HOLLAND. Not to my knowledge.



Mr. SOURWINE. These 16 cartons are the only files of the institute which ever were in his basement?

Mr. HOLLAND. I don't know, but to the best of my knowledge, that is true. I did not have anything to do with moving of those files. I can only report what happened, to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. With regard to these files, I believe you testified they had been in Mr. Field's basement since 1943 or thereabouts.

Mr. HOLLAND. I believe so. It was 1941 or 1943. I'm not sure.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you still say it is your opinion that these files are duplicates of material already made available to the FBI?

Mr. HOLLAND. I cannot say they are all duplicates, because I have not been through them all myself. I do know from looking at a few of them they are duplicates.

Mr. SOURWINE. And did I understand you correctly when you said a moment ago that the reason you did not call them to the attention of the FBI was because you thought they were duplicates?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, it was not just that. I didn't say that.

My first statement was that I looked these over. From looking in the tops of the cartons I could see that nearly all of them were old vouchers and bills. I, therefore, really felt there was no significant material in them. It was only more recently when someone on my staff asked about moving them that I thought, just to make our record complete, I should at least tell the FBI about these and have them look at them.

Mr. SOURWINE. You noticed, did you not, they were not, as a matter of fact, duplicates?

Mr. HOLLAND. I cannot say.

Mr. SOURWINE. You should know that from the fact that the Federal Bureau of Investigation, according to your testimony, has taken certain items out to have them photostated and have them returned to you?

Mr. HOLLAND. This is obviously true of the vouchers, but whether they have found any correspondence which is not duplicates, I cannot say, because I don't know what they took.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to ask two more questions, if I may.

Was it your intention to tell this committee or its representatives about these files?

Mr. HOLLAND. It was my intention to show these files to Mr. Morris, because, as you may recall, Mr. Morris, you told me that tomorrow you hoped to come up and make a further examination.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you form the intention to tell us about them?

Mr. HOLLAND. At the time when the FBI people came to look them over. It was when they picked out a few things which they indicated they wanted to look at that it was clear to me that there conceivably was material here of substance which the subcommittee should see.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were not consciously withholding the information from this committee or its representatives that these files existed?

Mr. HOLLAND. Certainly not. I want to make this final statement: I have made a very conscious effort throughout the whole of this business and with some considerable effort, and at times embarrassment, to play fair with this committee to show where our files are, to volunteer information to Mr. Morris and his staff. This has been the line we have taken all along. I am sorry that I did not call the FBI to

look at this material immediately at the time. I ask you to believe what a whirlwind of work and activity I have been going through. I am the only senior executive officer at the present time.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Holland, one question there, because I am sure the committee does not want to be unfair to you.

As I understand you to answer Mr. Sourwine, Mr. Field acquainted you with the fact just 2 or 3 days after seizure?

Mr. HOLLAND. That is true.

Senator SMITH. That there were these files in his basement?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Senator SMITH. That was about when?

Mr. HOLLAND. It was on a Saturday about 3 or 4 days later than the seizure.

Senator SMITH. That was along in last January or February?

Mr. HOLLAND. The seizure was on February 8. My release was next day, February 9.

Senator SMITH. So you are saying about the 12th or 15th of February you knew that?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Senator SMITH. You had from the 12th or the 15th up to now?

Mr. HOLLAND. Two weeks ago.

Senator SMITH. And you have been here before this committee and have never, until now, volunteered to us the story about the extra files that Mr. Field had in his basement?

Mr. HOLLAND. That is correct.

Senator SMITH. Why didn't you disclose to us months ago when you learned of these additional files that you did have them?

Mr. HOLLAND. Because, Senator, I looked at this material, saw that it was old vouchers. There are other vouchers and old boxes in our office yet.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said you had not looked at it until a couple of weeks ago.

Mr. HOLLAND. You are wrong. I did, as I indicated, look hastily in the tops of the cartons at the time when the stuff was brought up. It seemed to me that this was, as far as I could see, old files.

I would be the first to admit, Senator Smith, if I had been alert I should have notified the counsel immediately at that time. I had no intention of concealing it.

The fact is this material had been in our office. Mr. Morris has not asked me to just indicate this or that folder. If he goes through our files—he was coming up tomorrow literally fishing for whatever he could find. He was, I am sure, going to look in any other parts of the office when he got around to it.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I want to ask this further question: Where else are there files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. HOLLAND. Today?

Senator SMITH. Today. You said in San Francisco just now, I believe.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, when you say "of the IPR," I meant in previous years we had branch offices in San Francisco, in Seattle, and in Honolulu.

Senator SMITH. Are their files there?

Mr. HOLLAND. These branches were independent. I have no direct knowledge of where they are.

Some of them may be in San Francisco. In San Francisco, for instance, the IPR was dissolved some years ago and now taken over by the Northern California Council of World Affairs.

Senator SMITH. Who has control of those files?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am sorry, I don't know. We did not have control of those outside offices. They operated independently.

I am sure there are some files today in Honolulu because that was the origin of the IPR. Mr. Loomis, the executive secretary, no doubt has them.

Senator SMITH. Do you have any more files at your home?

Mr. HOLLAND. No.

Senator SMITH. Does Mr. Field have any more in his home?

Mr. HOLLAND. Not to my knowledge.

Senator SMITH. Does Mr. Carter have any?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am not sure, Senator. I think it is quite possible Mr. Carter has some, again, duplicates of things which he has kept for his own memoirs.

Senator SMITH. They might be, in your eyes, duplicates and not duplicates in the eyes of the committee.

Mr. HOLLAND. I agree. I cannot say for sure about Mr. Carter.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I believe that we ought to ask Mr. Carter and maybe some of these other people under oath as to any other files that they may have that we ought to have.

Mr. HOLLAND. May I continue with a few points on this at the next session?

Senator O'CONOR. I do think you can after recess.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, you made a great point of the fact that Mr. Field resigned as secretary in 1940.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes. I didn't make a point of it; I just reported.

Mr. MORRIS. Why were files put in his basement in 1941 or 1943?

Mr. HOLLAND. I don't know the answer, Mr. Chairman. I was not, at that time, in the IPR. It is a fact that Mr. Field remained a trustee and a member of the executive committee of the American IPR. I am sure there are people in the office who can probably remember why that was done.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you endeavor, during the recess, to find out what other files were put in Mr. Field's home, other than the ones you have just described, the 16 or 20 boxes, after 1940 when Field resigned as secretary?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, I would certainly try. I can only ask if anybody in my office remembers what was sent there.

Mr. Field may have had other things.

Senator SMITH. He has not got any of them with him.

Mr. HOLLAND. I don't know.

Senator O'CONOR. The committee will stand in recess for 1 hour.

(Whereupon, at 1:40 p. m., a recess was taken until 2:40 p. m., this same day.)

#### AFTERNOON SESSION

The hearing reconvened at 2:40 p. m., upon the expiration of the recess.

Senator SMITH (presiding). We will come to order.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to say for the record in case there was any misconception about it that there was no intention on my part this

morning, nor, I am sure, on the part of the committee, in asking about the meeting Mr. Holland held this morning with certain members of the press, to imply in any way that there was anything wrong about reporters going to that conference or to such a conference.

As a matter of fact, the committee, of course, understands that when a reporter is asked to attend a conference at which he has reason to believe some news may be produced or released, it is his duty to attend; it is part of his job, and it might be pointed out that the committee has no reason to question that news coverage by any of the news services or newspapers mentioned has been anything but fair and objective.

Before you start, Mr. Morris, the line of questioning that you have before this afternoon, I would like to wind up one last thread with regard to the matter we were talking about at the conclusion of this morning's session.

Did I understand you correctly, Mr. Holland, that these files which had been in Mr. Field's basement came back to you, that is, back to the offices of the Institute of Pacific Relations on approximately the 12th of February, some 3 or 4 days after you had issued your press release of February 9?

Mr. HOLLAND. That is true. I think it was February 12. It was a Monday morning, because I went down myself over the Saturday and Sunday and got myself filthy putting these dusty files into cartons.

Mr. SOURWINE. They were not in cartons in the basement?

Mr. HOLLAND. They were sitting there in old transfer cases too bulky for me to carry upstairs.

Mr. SOURWINE. You actually put them in the cartons and then moved the cartons?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. So at that time you issued your press release of February 9 you did not know the existence of these files in the basement?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, I did not. It was a great bombshell to me when Mr. Fields came in the following Saturday and told me.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you been able to ascertain what other files Mr. Fields kept in his home?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes. I telephoned during the lunch hour and so far as my staff know there were no other files.

I can actually give you a much more precise statement of when things were moved there, and, if you wish, or if you prefer, I will put that in a memorandum, just as you wish, Senator.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have it.

Mr. HOLLAND. I gave this very precisely to the FBI and I am glad to give it to the committee.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to find out whether there were other files of the institute put down in Mr. Field's basement, or where ever they were, subsequent to 1940 when he resigned as secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. HOLLAND. Let me give you the story because I know it quite clear.

I think it will take just 5 or 6 minutes, Senator.

As indicated, the reason for all this moving of files was in 1943 when the institute decided to move from its old offices at 159 East Fifty-Second Street, to its new and present office in 1 East Fifty-

fourth Street—there are two organizations, the International IPR and the American IPR, both separate, but both using the same offices—in 1943 the old American IPR files from about 1927, the beginning, right up to 1942—in other words, all except the current files which they needed—were moved to Mr. Field's cellar.

Mr. MORRIS. All of them were put there?

Mr. HOLLAND. All the IPR stuff at that time was sent to Mr. Field's cellar.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is somewhat different from what you told us this morning.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. This now is in 1942?

Mr. HOLLAND. 1943.

Mr. MORRIS. And this is a time when Field is no longer secretary?

Mr. HOLLAND. Field was a member of the executive committee, but had resigned from the secretaryship a few years before.

At the same date all the opened files of the International IPR, namely, from 1925 right up to 1943, were sent to our new office, which was of the International IPR, which was on the fourth floor of our present building, namely, East Fifty-Fourth Street.

The American IPR had the fifth floor. They only took over what current files they needed, whereas the Pacific Council, which was separate, at that time brought all its files.

Now, that was the situation until 1947. In '47 while I and most of the international senior officers were away at a conference in England—

Mr. SOURWINE. If you will pardon me, you say that was the situation until 1947. I take it by that you mean that from 1943 until 1947 all of the files of the American Council of IPR which you had felt you get along without and which had in 1943 been moved to Mr. Field's basement, remained there in his basement?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Where was his basement?

Mr. HOLLAND. It is in his home somewhere on West Twelfth Street. I forget the exact number.

Mr. MORRIS. How many people in the institute knew these files were there?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am afraid I can't say. Of my present staff I would say that probably—I think only two people.

Mr. MORRIS. How about the board of trustees? Did they know?

Mr. HOLLAND. I really cannot say. I am sure that some former employees must have known because certainly there was nothing surprising about it then.

As I understand it, the reason Mr. Field offered was simply because he had been secretary, was still active on the executive committee, and he offered them the free storage there, but I must say this: I had no direct information about this.

I am only reporting what I have learned.

Mr. MORRIS. But the fact here is that Mr. Field at that time was an open contributor to the Daily Worker and therefore an open Communist, and was it not of some concern to the institute that all their files were in his basement?

Mr. HOLLAND. So far as I know no such concern was expressed, but, as I say, I cannot speak from direct knowledge then, because the Inter-

national IPR which I was connected with brought all its files over and we were not involved in that.

Mr. Carter at this time was in the International also.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Carter knew they were there, did he not?

Mr. HOLLAND. I can't say for sure, Senator, because he was also, like me, in the International IPR and I don't know whether he had anything to do with the arrangement to send them to Mr. Field.

At that time in 1943 I believe the Secretary of the IPR was Mr. William Lockwood, now at Princeton University.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know they were there?

Mr. HOLLAND. I learned they were there, I think in 1949, as you will see if you will allow me to finish my statement of what actually happened. May I go on?

Senator SMITH. Yes; go ahead.

Mr. HOLLAND. As I said, that was the situation until 1947. Then sometime in the fall of 1947 while I was away and Mr. Carter and several of the international officers were away in England at a conference, it was decided, because we knew our budget for next year was going to be cut, to consolidate the two floors in our present office. This meant that the International IPR on the fourth floor decided to move upstairs to the slightly larger office on the fifth.

That meant that we had to do something about our files and also our furniture. It was for this reason, I find upon talking on the phone, that all the files from 1925 up to that date, namely, up to 1945, everything prior to my tenure, of the International IPR, was sent to this warehouse in the Bronx, together with a lot of our furniture, and this was apparently the chief reason for sending it to a warehouse.

We had so much furniture and stuff besides files. This takes care of 1947, so that now you have the situation that the International IPR's files, the old files, are up in the Bronx warehouse.

The old files of the American IPR are still in Mr. Field's cellar.

Now, in 1949, the warehouseman told us that we would have to take our stuff out or else start paying storage fees. So we decided that we would ship it up to Mr. Carter's, but, at the same time, they decided that since there was a great deal of historical material in the old American IPR files, namely, Mr. Field's cellar, they should take that, too, so what happened was that a truck was sent down to Mr. Field's place, and they took the old files from there with one exception, which I will explain in a moment, sent the truck up to the warehouse, loaded all the old International files there on a truck; disposed of the furniture, and sent all those files up to Lee, so that therefore, you had sent up to Lee the old International files from 1925 to 1945, and most of the old American IPR files from 1927 to 1943.

Now, the exception is that in going through these files in Mr. Field's cellar, the girls—I don't know who they were, junior typists, and so on—they went down and saw there were several cartons—I mean transfer cases—there of old vouchers and of stuff that looked like duplicates and which seemed to have no value whatever for historical purposes.

This was left behind in Mr. Field's cellar, and I believe the idea was that it should be just thrown away. It was, therefore, a complete accident that this stuff which should have been thrown away lay there and whether Mr. Field was supposed to get rid of it, or somebody else,

is not clear, but in any case, it was forgotten about and it was only when this seizure of the files took place in February 1951 that Mr. Field in the process of going down to his cellar to look at his own personal records there, saw this stack of stuff and immediately notified me.

I think that is as accurate an account as I can give of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you did not learn that those files were in there, in Mr. Field's cellar, until 1949?

Mr. HOLLAND. That is true; that is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you did learn it in 1949?

Mr. HOLLAND. I say I must have heard it then. I do not recall it.

The only thing which brought it back to my memory was this bomb-shell of Mr. Field coming in and telling me, but I am sure I must have heard it talked about because I remember vaguely the circumstances of sending the stuff out.

Mr. SOURWINE. But what Mr. Field did just a few weeks ago—

Mr. HOLLAND. In February, you mean?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Then you recalled the circumstances of—

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; but I did not recall all the steps which I have outlined here because that has only been given to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell us why you testified this morning that the 16 cartons were the only files that had ever been in Mr. Field's basement?

Mr. HOLLAND. Because this is what I considered to be a fair statement of the case.

In other words, the files in Lee and the files which I learned were in Mr. Field's cellar comprised the whole of the IPR files so far as I know.

This precise step I learned about by telephoning at lunch time.

Mr. SOURWINE. In fairness to you, in view of the fact that you have testified that at the time you issued your February 9 press release, you did not know that these other files existed?

Mr. HOLLAND. These remaining files which Mr. Field told me about?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to ask you to say whether if you had at the time you had issued the press release known they existed, would you still have said in the press release that all of the IPR files had been made available to the Federal Bureau of Investigation?

Mr. HOLLAND. My honest answer is I think I probably would have because I am afraid I was acting with some indignation at this moment and I felt in any reasonable sense of the word we had shown the FBI all our files, but as I indicated this morning, later on when, as I said, 2 weeks ago—actually I found the date was about September 14—that one of the girls in the office asked me, "Well, where do you want all these cartons put?" that I recognized to be literally true, and to be literally in accordance with the line we had been taking of showing the FBI everything, that I should ask them to come and look at it, which they did, and I find they actually came and inspected on September 20.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to ask you if this I hand you is a press release which you issued?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; it is.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you look at the last page and tell me the date on which it was issued?

Mr. HOLLAND. This says February 16, 1951.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you any question that that is the date when it was issued?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I believe it is true.

Mr. SOURWINE. That contains this paragraph on the first page of the release:

A wholly misleading impression has been created by some recent press reports to the effect that Senator McCarthy "supplied a tip" which led to the seizure of certain IPR correspondence files by the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee investigating un-American activities. I therefore wish to point out again that there was never any secret or mystery about the presence of these files at the house of Mr. Edward C. Carter (former secretary general of the IPR) in Lee, Mass. The location and contents of these files were known not only to several IPR officers and staff members but also to a group of at least a dozen FBI agents, who at the explicit invitation of the institute's executive officers studied the IPR files and financial records in Lee, and also in New York, for a period of 6 or 7 weeks during April, May, and June, 1950. The agents were freely authorized by the IPR officers and by Mr. Carter himself to make notes or copies of any materials they considered of interest, and did so. They also had numerous discussions with present and past officers or staff members of the institute to elucidate questions arising out of the correspondence files.

All these facts were made known at the time to the trustees of the IPR; and, in a letter published in the May 29, 1950, issue of Newsweek, Mr. Clayton Lane, then executive secretary of the American IPR, stated that "The FBI has inspected the institute's files thoroughly on my invitation."

I ask you was that statement to the best of your knowledge and belief accurate at the time it was made?

Mr. HOLLAND. I consider it was accurate for the reason that I mentioned this morning: that, as far as I know, even though I had been told of this stuff in Mr. Field's files, from my cursory look at the cartons I had no reason to believe that the FBI had not seen all the files.

Senator EASTLAND. You said you believed it was accurate. In reality, was it accurate?

The question was not whether you believed. Was it accurate?

Mr. HOLLAND. I consider it was accurate, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOURWINE. This statement includes two sentences I would like to ask you about. This sentence—the quotes are mine—says:

They also had numerous discussions with present and past officers or staff members of the institute to elucidate questions arising out of the correspondence files.

"They" obviously refers to the Federal Bureau of Investigation?

Mr. HOLLAND. That is true.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether in the course of any of those discussions the attention of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was called to any of the files that were in Mr. Field's basement, or that had been in Mr. Field's basement?

Mr. HOLLAND. I do not know for sure. I do believe that in discussing how the files got to Lee the FBI was told, as I have indicated here, they previously had been stored there from 1943 to 1947.

What the FBI, I think, was not told was that part of them had been left behind.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, you could not have told the FBI about it at that time because, according to your testimony here, you did not know it at that time.



Mr. HOLLAND. I do not get your question, Mr. Sourwine. I am sorry.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the time that the FBI——

Mr. HOLLAND. That was 1950, of course.

Mr. SOURWINE. You could not have told them about the files in the basement because you did not know about it.

Mr. HOLLAND. You keep saying "the files in the basement." You mean the stuff that was left behind?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; that is right, the 16 to 20 cartons.

Mr. HOLLAND. These conversations with the FBI in 1950 were not concerned primarily with how the files got there. What they wanted to know was what did Mr. Lattimore mean when he wrote this letter, or who was he writing to. It was chiefly Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. SOURWINE. You state in the release that all these facts were made known at the time to the trustees of the IPR.

Can you tell us whether the trustees of the IPR were at the time apprised of the fact that files were in or had been in Mr. Field's basement?

Mr. HOLLAND. I cannot remember that because Mr. Clayton Lane was then the executive secretary of the American IPR and the one who reported it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were the files ever authorized to be placed in Mr. Field's basement by vote or direction of the trustees?

Mr. HOLLAND. That I cannot say. It was 1943, you see, and I am afraid I was not in the American IPR then. I don't know.

Senator Smith, may I add, with reference to the release there, what I think is a pertinent point?

I think you or Senator O'Connor was asking me about other IPR files in other places at the present time. As I indicated, I think it is very likely there are some in what used to be our San Francisco branch office, in our Seattle branch office, and in our Honolulu branch office.

One other point I think is very important to make here to give a full picture. I hope you will allow me to explain it clearly.

I have some serious doubt about whether the files when they were seized by your committee in February 1951 in Lee were complete. I say this because, as you yourself indicated, sir, there were some rumors in the press that there had been some mysterious leakages in the press, and I actually wrote a letter, I think, to Senator Ferguson, saying I was puzzled about this——

Senator EASTLAND. You say there was leakage to the press?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

The Washington Daily News and the New York Mirror published what they said were excerpts of these files. They did almost the day after.

Senator EASTLAND. They could not have gotten anything from the committee.

Mr. HOLLAND. That was exactly it.

Senator EASTLAND. They were 2 days getting down here and under Treasury guard.

Mr. HOLLAND. I didn't know that, and I was frankly puzzled and I therefore wrote a letter, I believe to Senator Ferguson, in which I rather protested about this, feeling that perhaps there had been some

accidental leakage here, and he assured me to the best of his knowledge there was not.

That left me even more mystified.

Just recently, I think 3 or 4 weeks ago, I read a newspaper story in the New York Post which stated very precisely that several months before this subcommittee's seizure was made these files had been previously rifled by—I must quote what the story said—Senator McCarthy's agent, Mr. Surine; Mr. Schroeder, who was the man that made your seizure, and some local neighborhood farm boy up there, and this story said that these materials——

Mr. MORRIS. You say "this story." What do you mean?

Mr. HOLLAND. The New York Post reported that these were brought to New York and shown to Mr. J. B. Matthews of the Hearst press there, and that also Senator Mundt was told about them, and the story in the New York Post said that Senator Mundt advised that the material should be sent back to Lee and that this was done, and he also advised that your subcommittee should make the seizure and should serve the subpoena duces tecum on the neighboring lady, Mrs. Markham.

Mr. MORRIS. Who wrote that story, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. A man called Mr. Shannon. I can't remember his name. Mr. W. Shannon, I think, of the New York Post.

I mention this, Mr. Chairman, only because it cleared up—at least, it seemed to be a possible explanation of something that had puzzled me very much as to how this leakage might have occurred.

I don't know whether they are the true facts or not, but I felt I ought to report it to you.

Senator SMITH. Let me ask you a question.

From the evidence that has come out before this committee, has there been any single case of any document being offered here that was not genuine so far as you know?

Mr. HOLLAND. By your committee?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. HOLLAND. No. I have seen none; no.

Senator SMITH. If there was any tampering with any of those records, there was nothing put in there which would tend to falsify the particulars and then afterward presented to this committee?

Mr. HOLLAND. Not to my knowledge; and perhaps I should say, when Senator Ferguson wrote assuring me that there would be no leakage from this committee so far as he knew, that made me more puzzled.

Mr. SMITH. Did you ever visit Mr. Carter's barn yourself?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; I have been there many times over the years, because it was used as a place for weekly conferences or discussions on Far East affairs.

Senator EASTLAND. The barn?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes. It was remodeled to have a meeting room and library. A barn is a misleading word for it.

Senator SMITH. How many times did you say you visited this barn? How many times after the records were carried there had you been there up to the time of the seizure?

Mr. HOLLAND. The records were carried there in 1949. Not very often. I should think probably not more than two or three times.

Senator SMITH. Had you had access to the records in the barn?

Mr. HOLLAND. I would have any time I wanted to, but I do not believe I ever opened them. I saw them standing there.

As you know, there were 60 cases or so.

Senator SMITH. If you had occasion to try to verify some statement you did have the right and privilege of going there and examining the files?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Who else besides yourself had that privilege?

Mr. HOLLAND. There was no rule about it, Senator, but I am sure if I had asked one of my staff to go there and look something up that Mr. Carter would have raised no question whatever.

Senator SMITH. So that a good many people had access to this barn and to these papers?

Mr. HOLLAND. They could have had access; I can't say they did.

As a matter of fact—I am sure this would be confirmed—no one did, because the simple fact was that Mr. Carter remained busy on other things and never did get started seriously on the work of writing—

Senator EASTLAND. Who had access to that barn in Mr. Carter's absence?

Mr. HOLLAND. Members of his family, certainly, because Mrs. Carter often stayed up there.

Senator EASTLAND. There was a caretaker there who had keys; was there not?

Mr. HOLLAND. No one was ever appointed as caretaker or designated by that. I think Mr. Carter testified here that this neighborly lady, Mrs. Markham, was given the key, as he explained, so that in case there was any emergency, particularly a fire, they could open the door. The chief purpose of giving her the keys, they were all on a ring covering the house and the barn and everything—they used to do their house-cleaning.

Senator SMITH. Did you ever go in Mr. Field's basement yourself?

Mr. HOLLAND. I did on this one occasion when—

Senator SMITH. Except this one time.

Mr. HOLLAND. No.

Senator SMITH. That was the only time you ever went there?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes. It was a very uninviting place.

Senator SMITH. All right, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you finished examining on that statement, Mr. Sourwine?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, I have.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that we receive Mr. Holland's statement, reserving, however, the right to examine it. I know I have not had a chance to examine them, and you can imagine how unfair it would be.

Mr. HOLLAND. I very much appreciate Mr. Morris' suggestion.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would concur in that, but I have not had an opportunity to examine this as it has only been in my hands about the last 20 minutes and I would, therefore, like to ask a couple of questions about it as a foundation for introducing it in the record.

This is in very good form and begins with what is titled "Introductory Statement by William L. Holland."

Did you write or introduce that statement?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would the same be true with regard to all the rest of the statement, or was some of it prepared by others?

Mr. HOLLAND. I can indicate the parts which were specifically—to answer your question quickly, some parts of it were drafted by others and gone over by me.

Mr. SOURWINE. To aid the committee in evaluation of it, as you say, will you run through it and indicate?

Mr. HOLLAND. I dictated “My own role in the IPR.”

I dictated “Some points not brought out by the McCarran subcommittee.”

This consists largely of a description of the IPR and is practically a summary of what is in that pamphlet which was circulated this morning.

I just simply asked one of my assistants to go through the pamphlet and pick out the salient points.

The next section, “Who were ‘associated’ with the IPR,” I prepared that myself, on page 10.

Mr. SOURWINE. There are two subheadings, one on page 7, “The international IPR,” and one on page 9, “How the institute is financed.”

Were those dictated by you?

Mr. HOLLAND. These were also summaries of that pamphlet.

Mr. SOURWINE. Prepared by someone else in your office?

Mr. HOLLAND. That is true.

Page 10, “Who were ‘associated’ with the IPR,” I prepared that myself.

Mr. SOURWINE. On that page, sir, about the twelfth or thirteenth line from the bottom—it is in the fourth paragraph on the page—there is a name which has been stricken out. Can you tell us who that was whose name was stricken out?

Mr. HOLLAND. The name was Moses Finkelstein. It was pointed out to me rather late last night that it was rather erroneous. This is a category of people whom I said had nothing whatever to do with the institute, and then I said the following are examples, but in picking out the examples I find that I included practically all people who have been alleged to be Communists or spies, rather, it says there, “had numerous connections with various Communist agents, Soviet officials, and persons alleged to have transmitted official secrets to Communist couriers.”

It was pointed out to me that it was not particularly true of Moses Finkelstein.

Mr. SOURWINE. You eliminated his name not because he was connected with the IPR, but you did not want to assert that he was in the category of those named?

Mr. HOLLAND. That is right.

The rest of that statement I prepared.

Page 12 is simply a list of the people who have ever served on the executive committee of the IPR and was compiled by my staff from my records.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does it include all of such people?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, if you and Senator Eastland would like to have a copy of the statement, I would be glad to give you one. Senator SMITH. If you have an extra copy.

Mr. MORRIS. On the third item of that you said:

Some points not brought out by the McCarran subcommittee.

You said an assistant of yours aided you in the preparation of that. Will you name that assistant?

That is the third item on page 6.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; Miss Miriam Farley, editor of the Far Eastern, but, as you can see from that whole text, it is chiefly an excerpt of this pamphlet I circulated this morning, *Understanding Asia*.

Mr. SOURWINE. And I had asked the question whether this list included all of the committee members during the period covered.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes. This is an attempt to state every one who has ever served on the executive committee of the American IPR.

Page 14 is a list of 20 distinguished Americans active in the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does that indicate that this earlier list of executive committee members may include some who did not actively participate?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, it does not, and my purpose for including the members of the executive committee was because by definition—at least by my belief—if you are an executive or if you are on an executive committee, you are active in a real sense, whereas, if you are a trustee, you may be somewhat inactive.

The selection on page 14 is somewhat arbitrary, but I just picked out rather hurriedly a number of distinguished names that I could remember with their connections.

Page 16, "IPR publications and publication policies," I prepared myself.

On page 17, you will notice a partial list of anti-Communist writers in IPR publications.

Senator EASTLAND. In your judgment, was Mr. Frederick V. Field a Communist?

Mr. HOLLAND. My judgment, Senator Eastland, is that he was not a Communist up to 1940, at which time—

Senator EASTLAND. All right, is he a Communist today, in your judgment?

Mr. HOLLAND. My judgment on that is that I do not know that he is a Communist, but I feel that he is a 100-percent Communist sympathizer and supporter, and has been, probably since about 1947.

Senator EASTLAND. Let us say, not card-carrying member—but a Communist sympathizer and supporter. How many other Communist sympathizers and supporters are there in the IPR in the American section?

Mr. HOLLAND. Are you speaking of the organization today?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes.

Mr. HOLLAND. To the best of my belief and knowledge, none.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you think Owen Lattimore is a Communist sympathizer?

Mr. HOLLAND. I do not, sir. He is not on the staff of the IPR and has not been—

Senator EASTLAND. In the past 5 years how many Communist sympathizers and supporters were connected with the American section of the IPR?

Mr. HOLLAND. Past 5 years, 1945 or 1946. Again may I ask, Senator Eastland, you are speaking of the American IPR staff?

Senator EASTLAND. Connected with it.

Mr. HOLLAND. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, I do not know what the Senator means by "connected." This word has been so loosely used

that I am not sure what he means. I think I can give a little time and give my opinion so far as staff or employees are concerned.

Senator EASTLAND. I am at a loss to learn why so many Communists were connected with your organization and why action was not taken to put them out.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I cannot honestly say that I feel a large number or a large proportion of Communists were connected with the IPR. I do not deny that some may have been, or some secret Communists whom we don't know about, or didn't know about—you asked about what steps were taken.

The only case I can report is that, as you well know, Mr. Field in 1947 was asked by the trustees of the organization to resign, and I think that was based on the belief that whether he was a Communist member, he was a Communist sympathizer.

Senator SMITH. Your board of trustees asked Mr. Field to resign?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Senator SMITH. In what year?

Mr. HOLLAND. Perhaps I should say—I think it was the executive committee.

Senator SMITH. And when was that?

Mr. HOLLAND. In 1947.

Senator SMITH. When was it that Mr. Field was allowed to take the records to his house, or they were sent there?

Mr. HOLLAND. 1943.

Senator EASTLAND. Some of those records were left there until 1949, were they not?

Mr. HOLLAND. That is true.

Senator EASTLAND. What about Joe Barnes? Do you have any reason to believe he was a Communist?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I do not.

I feel I can speak with some knowledge here because I do know Mr. Barnes.

Senator EASTLAND. You know that we have had five people who swore he was a Communist?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; I have noticed that from the reports.

I don't know whether it is pertinent now, Mr. Chairman, but I do have with me a letter from Mr. Barnes in which he not only denies that charge, but does explain the actual facts about his connection with the IPR. I don't wish to introduce it if you don't want it.

Senator EASTLAND. He says he is not guilty.

Mr. HOLLAND. I see you do not want it, so I will not introduce it.

May I finish answering on Mr. Barnes? I said I do feel I do have some basis for knowledge here. I knew Mr. Barnes when he was a colleague in the IPR in 1934. I had not seen him very frequently from 1934 up to about 1947, but I read his writing in the Herald Tribune, and it seemed to me inconceivable that a man who wrote as he did about Russia, and who I know got in the bad graces of the Soviet censors, could be a Communist or Communist sympathizer.

Now, in the past 6 weeks I had occasion to talk to Mr. Barnes.

Senator SMITH. Would you tell us how you knew he got in the bad graces of the Soviet censors? Did Mr. Barnes tell you that?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, he did. Not tell me directly, but he stated, I think, in his press release.

Senator SMITH. That was the basis of your testimony there? That is all you knew about it.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Senator SMITH. You did not talk to the Soviet censors themselves?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, I did not.

As I was just saying, I have also seen Mr. Barnes on a good many occasions during the past 2 months, and in fact, for about 2 or 3 weeks I stayed at his house in New York because I was moving from my apartment and I, therefore, had many occasions to hear his views and I just feel personally very strongly that not only is he not a Communist or Communist sympathizer, but it is almost inconceivable that he could be.

Senator EASTLAND. Of course, you do not believe that Alger Hiss was a Communist or Communist sympathizer.

Mr. HOLLAND. I was never asked my opinion on that. If you ask me to answer that directly, I will.

Senator EASTLAND. Here is a list of 37 names connected with your organization who have been identified as Communists or under Communist discipline, and I would like to know how so many people that were generally known to be Communists would get places in that organization with you and the other officials not knowing anything about it, that is, if you were not going along with the Communists.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, may I begin by saying first that I do not accept the accuracy of the word "identification" as it has been stated here.

Senator EASTLAND. There has been testimony here under oath.

Mr. HOLLAND. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, but I would stick to my statement on that. I have tried to answer by way of some very concrete facts in my statement in this section, "Who were 'associated' with the IPR," and I think you will see there what I think are very accurate statements about a number of these people.

Therefore, I do not accept the statement that an excessively or in any sense even an unusually large number of people in the Institute of Pacific Relations have been Communists.

Senator EASTLAND. How about Len De Caux? He was kicked out of the CIO as a Communist. He was a member of your board of trustees; was he not?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am not personally acquainted with Mr. Len De Caux, and I was not in the IPR when he was a trustee. I will only report that at that time the CIO was a very well-known and reputable union, that at that time Mr. Len De Caux was the international educational director of the CIO and it was therefore nothing very surprising that he should have been asked to be a trustee of an organization like this.

Senator EASTLAND. What about Israel Epstein?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am prepared to make a statement about Israel Epstein, if you wish, now.

Mr. Epstein is a case of someone who did contribute a publication on Chinese labor problems to the IPR. This may take perhaps 5 or 7 minutes, Senator.

Senator EASTLAND. No; it is not worth it.

Mr. HOLLAND. I do not know that he is a Communist. I believe from his writings in the last 2 or 3 years that he is a certainly strong Communist sympathizer, but from the time I met him and commis-

sioned him to write a report for us, which is 1943 in Chungking up to about 1948 or 1949, when he finally, after much delay finished this report, I had no evidence to suggest that he was a Communist, or anything more than a rather strong critic of the Chinese Nationalist regime.

After that time he showed himself rather clearly in his activities in New York to be a very strong pro-Communist sympathizer.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, you are aware of the time we examined Mr. Carter—you thought unfairly—on the question of a letter that he wrote in which he was urging the leaders of our Congress and the leaders of our State Department that they do everything possible to read Israel Epstein's book so that they might be swayed by it.

How do you reconcile that statement to what you have just said?

Mr. HOLLAND. I will answer first by saying that I did not make the statement, that is, that was Mr. Carter's statement, and, as far as I can see, it had no connection with Mr. Epstein's role in the IPR, what you just said. It was just one report. It started in 1943 and was completed about 1947.

If you would ask me my opinion, Mr. Chairman, I would be glad to give it.

Mr. MORRIS. We had this letter which was introduced into the record which was written by Mr. Carter in his official capacity as secretary general of the IPR in 1947—

Mr. HOLLAND. I am sorry, Mr. Morris, I was secretary general in 1947.

Mr. MORRIS. What role did he have then?

Mr. HOLLAND. I think he was executive officer of the American IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. He was telling of the extensive efforts that he was then making to get Epstein's book in the hands of the State Department and the leaders of the Eightieth Congress so that he could sway American policy along the lines of Israel Epstein's book.

I think I could get the letter, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HOLLAND. I would rather have the letter because the last clause that the counsel has just said is misleading. I don't believe there was anything in the letter or testimony which indicated Mr. Carter was doing this in order to sway—

Senator SMITH. Why would he have been doing it?

Senator EASTLAND. Did you know traitor Harry Dexter White?

Mr. HOLLAND. May I ask, Mr. Chairman, if the Senator would state his question again?

Senator EASTLAND. Did you know traitor Harry Dexter White?

Mr. HOLLAND. I certainly cannot answer that question, Mr. Chairman, because I have no knowledge that Mr. White was a traitor.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you know him?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, I never met Mr. Harry White. I know he was invited to one IPR conference, but he did not come.

Senator EASTLAND. The information is that he was at the head of an espionage ring in Washington. That is true, is it not, in the Government in Washington?

Mr. HOLLAND. I have no evidence which would make me believe—

Senator EASTLAND. You read that?

Mr. HOLLAND. I have read the story, but do not consider it at all convincing, but, Mr. Chairman, may I say the Senator said, "You know that is true, do you not?"



I wish it to be understood that I do not know it is true.

Senator EASTLAND. All right, Harry Dexter White was an active supporter of the institute, was he not?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman—

Senator EASTLAND. Look at me and answer my question.

Mr. HOLLAND. No, no.

Senator EASTLAND. What about William Mandel?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Mandel was employed to write one book for the IPR back about 1942 or 1943 on Soviet Central Asia.

Senator EASTLAND. Why was a Communist employed to write that book?

Mr. HOLLAND. I do not know whether Mr. Mandel is a Communist. Certainly at the time we had no reason to believe that he was a Communist.

Senator EASTLAND. Mr. Holland, do you not think that it is sinister?

Here is an organization that attracts Communists from all over the country and they participate in it and the officials do not know that they are Communists. They do not know anything about it.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I will answer that by saying that the Senator's first remark is completely erroneous and misleading. There is no evidence whatever to suggest that the Institute of Pacific Relations attracted Communists from all over the country.

Senator EASTLAND. Here they are.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I respectfully submit that that is a gratuitous slander on a reputable organization.

Senator EASTLAND. There they are.

Mr. HOLLAND. They are mere allegations, many of which in my opinion—

Senator SMITH. They have been sworn to.

Mr. HOLLAND. These have been sworn statements by witnesses appearing before you. I do not believe that the evidence which they have given would stand up in the courts of this country.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you think for a minute, Mr. Holland, that that was a conspiracy by a great number of people to come before this committee and to commit perjury against those people in order to injure the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. HOLLAND. I do not make any such statement, Mr. Chairman.

Senator EASTLAND. Of course, you do not. You really think that is true, but yet if they were not Communists—

Mr. HOLLAND. Senator Eastland is repeatedly putting words in my mouth. If he will ask me specific questions, I will answer them.

Senator SMITH. I do not believe you have allowed him to do that up to now.

Senator EASTLAND. No, sir; he certainly has not.

Mr. HOLLAND. Thank you, but I do not consider—this is my first time before any such committee, Mr. Chairman. If I speak too much, please tell me so.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I get into this point about Israel Epstein?

Senator SMITH. Let me ask him one question.

I understood you to say just now that from what you had seen of Mr. Barnes and had talked to him in these recent months, you were not willing to say that he was Communist or Communist-dominated, or a Communist sympathizer.

Mr. HOLLAND. Or even a Communist sympathizer; that is true.

Senator SMITH. That is the idea you got from your contacts with Mr. Barnes during the last few months?

Mr. HOLLAND. No.

Senator SMITH. How long have you known Mr. Barnes?

Mr. HOLLAND. I have known Mr. Barnes since approximately 1931. I knew him fairly closely from 1931 to 1934, as a colleague in the office, and I certainly had that impression then.

I will tell you in all candor that I was somewhat curious in view of these allegations to see if there was anything in his present conversation which would give me any grounds for doubting my earlier opinion, and I did not find them.

Senator SMITH. If he had been a Communist in the past you would not expect him to talk like a Communist while this investigation was going on, would you?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; that is true. I would agree. I would not, no; but having known him previously as a close friend, I would think that it would be unlikely that he would start acting as if he were a new person.

Mr. MORRIS. You indicated that I did not state the case properly when I said the Institute of Pacific Relations was endeavoring to sway the opinion of the United States Government by Israel Epstein's book.

I would like to read from a letter which has been introduced in evidence as exhibit No. 116 from Mr. Carter.

Senator EASTLAND. Did Carter acknowledge writing that letter?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, he did.

I think it's of the utmost importance that you devise some means of getting it read at an early date, among others, by Secretary of State George Marshall, Senators Vandenberg, Morse, and Ives, John Foster Dulles and John Carter Vincent of the State Department.

This is June 12, 1947 and they are the leaders of the Government at that time. They are the leaders of the Eightieth Congress and the leaders of the State Department.

You will know better than I how to make certain that they read it in the near future. A letter from me on the subject might lead a few of them to think that I was recommending it because I was an admirer of Epstein and for that reason they might slightly discount my recommendation.

I have another suggestion to make. The book is so full of profound understanding and admiration of the Chinese people that I think it is equally important to find ways and means of getting a wide circulation in China.

Then it goes on to say:

Referring to General Marshall, I wish you could find someone who would get him to read the book from start to finish and not simply the end with Epstein's analysis of Marshall. It seems to me he would need the cumulative effect of the preceding chapters to make him reassess objectively his own role.

I assume that John Carter Vincent would read the book with a very open mind. Probably he is generally acquainted with most of the material, but he has probably never seen it organized so logically. If he were sold on the book he might persuade General Marshall to read it from cover to cover.

Of course, many will say that Epstein is a special pleader. I think this is probably true, but I think he is pleading for a more sound analysis of the world than many of the other current special pleaders. I hear that the New York Times has asked Owen Lattimore to review the book. I hope other publications will make as wise a choice.

I imagine the Kuomintang government will put the book on the forbidden list for import in China. I would hope that you could get it into the hands of Am-

bassador Leighton Stuart and some of the American correspondents like Benjamin Welles, Christopher Rand, and Arch Steele, Sun Fo, Madam Sun Yat-sen, and a few others, before the bronze curtain falls.

Now, if you concede, Mr. Holland, that Israel Epstein is a man who has Communist sympathies, would you not admit that Mr. Carter in his official capacity, whatever it was, in the Institute of Pacific Relations at that time was endeavoring to influence the course of our foreign relations at that time?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, I would not make that admission. It is perfectly clear from the statement that Mr. Carter hoped that these officials would read the book, but it is also perfectly clear that Mr. Carter knows that high officials of this kind have to take into account thousands of other factors, and particularly the secret intelligence which they have at their disposal, before they can make up their minds, and to suggest that this one book by a man which Mr. Carter says himself is obviously somewhat biased would sway the opinion of these high government officials seems to me to be preposterous.

Senator EASTLAND. Was that book Communist propaganda?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am sorry to say I have not read Mr. Epstein's book. I am willing to say on the basis of what has been indicated in Mr. Carter's letter that it certainly was sympathetic to the Chinese Communists.

Senator EASTLAND. Yes; to the Chinese Communists; then, to plant that book in the hands of the Secretary of State and officials of the American Government was an attempt to influence them by Communist propaganda, was it not?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I do not believe I can accept that. It was not an attempt to plant a book. This was published and sold in thousands throughout this country.

Senator EASTLAND. If it was not the influence, then why was it given to them?

Mr. HOLLAND. For this very reason: To provide a lot of important facts which would enable General Marshall and these other people to know what they were going to be up against.

Senator EASTLAND. Important facts from the Communist viewpoint, were they not?

Mr. HOLLAND. A description of what was happening in China as reported by a pro-Communist writer.

Senator SMITH. Do you think that Mr. Carter could have expected that this book contained facts and information that was not readily available to the State Department with all of its resources for gathering information?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am afraid I don't know what was in his mind, but, as he indicated in the letter there, he says something about not having seen it put together in this way.

Senator EASTLAND. He gave them the book to influence them, did he not?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, I did not write the letter. I cannot say what was in Mr. Carter's mind.

Senator EASTLAND. That is your judgment, is it not?

Mr. HOLLAND. As I indicated, I do not believe that is true.

Senator EASTLAND. That was bound to be the purpose.

Mr. HOLLAND. I have already said I do not believe that to be the case.

Senator EASTLAND. You do not think he wanted to influence them?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I think he simply wanted them to see a number of facts.

Senator SMITH. Did you discuss with Mr. Carter who was to circulate this book among these men at that time?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; at the time I did not know they had done it.

Mr. SOURWINE. If the Senators have finished that line, perhaps we can get back and run through this statement and get on to other matters.

Senator SMITH. I have one question before I forget it.

I believe you told us that the files were put in Mr. Field's basement in 1943?

Mr. HOLLAND. That is true.

Senator SMITH. That was after Mr. Field had come to be known as a Communist, was it not?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am afraid I can't answer—

Senator SMITH. Well, the record will show.

Mr. HOLLAND. My own recollection is that Mr. Field became fairly generally recognized as a Communist because he wrote in the New Masses about 1945. I say that because I was out of this country in China through 1944 and 1945, but you may be more correct than I am.

Senator SMITH. Were you connected with the institute in 1940?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Senator SMITH. And Mr. Field resigned as secretary—

Mr. HOLLAND. In that year.

Senator SMITH. In 1940.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Senator SMITH. So after he had resigned as secretary, 3 years after that, these files of the IPR were stored in his basement.

Mr. HOLLAND. That is true.

As I indicated, he was still a member of the executive committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. We had, I think, reached page 17, in discussing this statement. Is that correct?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before you tell us who, if anyone, helped in the preparation of that paragraph that begins under that heading, "Anti-Communist writers in IPR publications," I wish you would look up the last sentence of the first paragraph on that page in which you say that no IPR publication has advocated communism or urged acceptance of Communist policies or programs.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Because you yourself a moment ago made a distinction with regard to who might have been in the IPR.

I am wondering if what you mean there, perhaps, is not this: That no IPR publication has urged acceptance of Communist policies or programs as such?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman; I appreciate Mr. Sourwine's attempt, but this is my own statement, and I would rather not have it—

Senator SMITH. You do not like those words "as such"?

Mr. HOLLAND. I don't ever like that phrase.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean to say that you can positively state yourself that no IPR publication has ever urged acceptance of any policy or program which was at the time it was so urged a policy or program urged and advanced by the Communist Party?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I cannot say that because it is a complete restatement and misinterpretation of my sentence here.

Mr. SOURWINE. Obviously, I cannot say that. I want to know what you mean precisely by your language here. I do not want to trick you.

Mr. HOLLAND. I do feel that I took some time writing this sentence. It reads:

But no IPR publication has advocated communism or urged acceptance of Communist policies or programs.

I believe that to be a fair statement. I may be wrong and I will be glad to be shown if I am wrong.

Mr. SOURWINE. We are challenging what you mean by it, and not challenging whether it is fair, or not.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I meant what I said here.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is a quibble and I am not engaging in semantics with you.

Senator SMITH. So we may get the idea you attempted to convey, just what did you mean?

Mr. HOLLAND. I thought about this rather carefully and I meant that no IPR publication, to the best of my knowledge and belief—and I have known them for a long time—has ever advocated communism or has urged the acceptance of it.

In other words, has urged anyone, the reader, to accept Communist policies or programs, and I say that in any country.

Senator SMITH. Are you attempting to differentiate between a writer in your publication and the publication?

Mr. HOLLAND. I say publication, sir; that is what I mean.

Senator SMITH. No publication of its own does anything except editorially; is that what you mean?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am sorry, sir. If this book contains a statement that we should recognize and approve the policies of the Chinese communism, I say that publication advocates, but no IPR publication does that.

Mr. SOURWINE. That would be advocating communism as such. I am sure we can reach an understanding as to what the question is.

Will you define what you mean by Communist policies or programs as you use the phrase in that sentence?

Mr. HOLLAND. I mean official policies or programs as stated by either Communist leaders, that is to say, leaders of Communist parties or important leaders in countries which have Communist Governments.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean the essence of the statement itself, or the statement as quoting such leaders?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am sorry. I do not grasp that question.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is a statement of a policy by a known Communist leader a Communist policy within the meaning of the phrase as you use it only when it is attributed to that leader, or is it a Communist policy within the meaning of the phrase as you use it whenever it is advanced by anyone as a proposal?

Mr. HOLLAND. I would say that the latter part of your statement is not correct—

Mr. SOURWINE. I did not make a statement; I asked you a question.

Mr. HOLLAND. Then, I cannot answer the question because you stated it in a way in which I cannot give the answer.

Senator SMITH. Try to give him another question.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right.

You have stated, sir, that you include in the phrase: "Communist policies or programs," as you have used them, a policy which was enunciated and urged by a known and recognized Communist leader.

I believe you also used the word "official."

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. First, will you drop the word official and say, "a policy enunciated and urged by a recognized world leader in the Communist movement is a Communist policy." Is that what you mean?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; I would say so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you still call it a Communist policy if Joe Blow, who is not a Communist leader, picks it up and restates it and urges the same or approximately the same as the Communist leader who originally enunciated it?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; sometimes it would be, and sometimes it would not be.

May I illustrate? We are making this unnecessarily difficult, Senator.

Senator SMITH. We are for me.

Mr. HOLLAND. If Joe Blow has learned that reform in China is a good thing and is long overdue, and it ought to have been started long ago, that is in some respects similar to what Communists have been saying, but it does not in any sense make Joe Blow a Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. No one says it does.

I am still simply trying to define your statement when you use the term "Communist policies or programs." You mean only a policy or program which is not only favorable to communism, but which is enunciated by a Communist, which is labeled as a Communist policy or a Communist program; is that not a fair statement?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, I am sorry; it is not. Let me give you an illustration again. Let us take Mr. Epstein, for example, since we have been talking about him.

If Mr. Epstein in the book we have been talking about says, "I think the Chinese program of redistributing lands is a good thing and that the American people ought to support it," I say that he is advocating a Communist policy. Mr. Epstein may not be a Communist himself, but this is simply a matter of using common sense, but if some well-known leader—and I can think of some connected with our own ECA program—say that we think land reform in certain parts of China ought to have been carried out a long time ago, that is just common sense in their opinion, and because the Communist leaders have been saying the same thing in other years or today, it has absolutely no bearing whatever on whether he is or is not a Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean the question of whether it is a Communist program depends upon who utters it?

Mr. HOLLAND. And, most of all, it depends on the contention on which he is using the argument.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right, so it is in that restricted sense that you have made the statement that no IPR publication has urged the acceptance of Communist policies or programs?

Mr. HOLLAND. I do not accept Mr. Sourwine's statement that it is restricted in any significance or meaningful sense of the word "restricted."

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you trying to say that no IPR publication has ever contained a representation favorable to the Communists, or that no IPR publication has ever urged acceptance of a policy or program which was at that time an avowed policy or program of the Communist Party?

Mr. HOLLAND. I did not, obviously, make such a statement. My statement stands as it is, Mr. Chairman. I think I have made it very clear.

Mr. MORRIS. In connection with Israel Epstein's the Unfinished Revolution in China, we have had three witnesses identify Israel Epstein as a Communist. Elizabeth Bentley said he was a Soviet agent.

In addition to that, we have introduced into the record his writings in the Communist press. Would you say that his Unfinished Revolution in China, is a Communist book?

Mr. HOLLAND. On those grounds, no. There may be other evidence which would convince me that his book is essentially a Communist book, but, as I have said, I have not read it, so I can't give a judgment.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could we continue now, sir? I think we were up to page 17.

Mr. HOLLAND. Page 17, the middle of the page, is a partial list of writers well known for their active opposition to communism, whose work the IPR has published.

This particular list I compiled from two sources: One, my own memory, and second, Mr. Morris some weeks ago asked me if I would send down to him a list of writers or articles in our journal which, in our opinion, were anti-Soviet, and so it is a mixture of those two, but it is my selection and it is a partial one.

If I had time I could think of others.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Chamberlin write an article?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chamberlin wrote a very important textbook for us on Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. When he wrote an article for you, you repudiated it?

Mr. HOLLAND. I, no.

Mr. MORRIS. I mean the IPR.

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I am sorry, the IPR did not repudiate Chamberlin. We published a note by Mr. Chamberlin in our journal in Pacific Affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you say?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am sorry, I don't recall it. I was not connected with it at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. On page 18, sir—

Mr. HOLLAND. The institute is not partisan. This was written in first draft by me and polished up here and there as to English and arrangement by Miss Farley.

Mr. SOURWINE. And on page 20.

Mr. HOLLAND. Page 20, "Some false impressions." This went through three drafts, the first of which was mine; second of which was Miss Farley's, and I finally revised it again, the third draft.

The next page, "The Soviet Council of the IPR." This is my own work, part of it based on material in this pamphlet which was circulated.

Page 23 was my own work, and is now. I think it is important. It is a statement of rather specific, and I think, vituperative, criticism of the Institute of Pacific Relations by Tass and by the Soviet radio, particularly relating to our conference in India in 1950, and a violent attack on a book one of our people published written as a review, written in 1949, which the Soviet historical review denounced as an example of imperialist objectivity.

Mr. SOURWINE. That runs over to page 24.

Mr. HOLLAND. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say that is a result of your own research?

Mr. HOLLAND. You see, most of it is quotations from the Soviet press and radio and it is of my own work.

Mr. SOURWINE. Some of it from the book by Owen and Eleanor Lattimore?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; on page 24 there is a quotation on Lattimore's book on The Making of Modern China, but that is not a reference by a reviewer.

Page 25 is headed "Frederick V. Field's role in the institute." That was also written by me in first draft and was revised, I think once, by Miss Farley, and then finally completed the final draft myself 2 or 3 nights ago.

On page 26 there is a brief statement by the institute on Amerasia, which I wrote myself.

On page 27, "The institute did not 'smear' Nationalist China," is my own work.

Mr. MORRIS. Whoever used the word "smear"?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Alfred Kohlberg.

Mr. MORRIS. What has that to do with this investigation?

Mr. HOLLAND. Because a great part of the stories coming out of this investigation have paralleled to an extraordinary degree the precise nature of the charges brought by Mr. Kohlberg against the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator SMITH. Has Mr. Kohlberg testified before this committee?

Mr. MORRIS. He has not testified before this committee, and this is entirely irrelevant thinking Mr. Holland is bringing into this thing.

Mr. HOLLAND. I will accept your correction on this.

Mr. MORRIS. You knew very well that was the case. You knew he has not testified before this committee?

Senator SMITH. Let him answer.

Did you know whether or not Mr. Kohlberg had testified before this committee?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I didn't know whether he had, or not. I know he has not testified in public, but I think, Mr. Chairman, you will recognize that it is only reasonable that there has been widespread public discussion throughout the press and for months now, and even



in your own sessions here, that testimony has been given indicating that IPR writers, and particularly Mr. Bisson, violently attacked and criticized Nationalist China.

Mr. MORRIS. No assertions whatever, Mr. Holland. We put his writing right in the record.

Mr. HOLLAND. I maintain, Mr. Chairman, that other witnesses here have certainly given the impression that they considered the Institute of Pacific Relations has unfairly attacked Nationalist China, and I think the use of the word "smear" there is a popular and reasonable interpretation of the word.

In my section I specifically mention this incident of Mr. Bisson, and I point out that Mr. Bisson certainly wrote this article in the Far Eastern Survey. It was immediately followed by an immediate rebuttal of a vigorous Chinese Nationalist official, which we printed at the same time other magazines, namely, Life, the New York Times, and the Reader's Digest, were also publishing very strong criticism of the Chinese national war effort at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say that section was your own work?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; it was.

Senator WATKINS. Is there any ruling on the withdrawal of this material by Mr. Holland, this particular one?

Mr. HOLLAND. I think the report is not being accepted by the sub-committee yet.

Senator SMITH. I thought that Mr. Holland admitted that he did not know of Mr. Kohlberg having testified, and the statement was made by Mr. Morris that Mr. Kohlberg had not testified. That should certainly show that there is no place for this particular language to be in here.

Senator WATKINS. The point I want to make is this: That in this hearing we receive different points of view and if that is his point of view, I do not see why we should not take it. I surely would not vote to have it excluded.

Mr. HOLLAND. I appreciate Senator Watkins' remarks, and I would certainly only want it understood as my belief.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Holland, do you feel that in a hearing of this sort, which has been going on for a good many months, the committee when it is taking testimony from witnesses who are sworn to tell the truth, is being fair in requiring testimony to be sworn to?

Mr. HOLLAND. I certainly do, and I admire the procedure the committee has followed.

Senator SMITH. Do you know of anything the committee may do to conduct a fairer hearing?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; to call more witnesses who would give a more accurate and informed picture of this organization, and I appreciate the fact that you have allowed me to do it today.

Senator SMITH. Of course, you realize that we cannot take but one at a time.

Mr. HOLLAND. I do, and I appreciate the very fair hearing you have, given me today.

Senator SMITH. Would you like to give Mr. Morris a list of names that you think should be called?

Mr. HOLLAND. Senator McCarran has already asked for a list of that sort, and we are prepared to give you such a list.

Senator SMITH. Do you know of any testimony that has been taken by this committee unfairly, or any witnesses treated unfairly, so far as the committee is concerned?

Mr. HOLLAND. There are a number of cases, Mr. Chairman, which I say apologetically. I feel that Mr. Morris, no doubt inadvertently or accidentally, has both asked unfair questions and occasionally made unsworn statements himself which I think tend to give a slightly misleading impression.

Mr. MORRIS. Ask him for an example.

Mr. SOURWINE. In defense of Mr. Morris, may I ask, Mr. Chairman, that if counsel is going to continue the practice of constantly coaching the witness, he at least move far enough away so that it will be audible and go on the record?

Mr. CROSSMAN. I thought I had a right to communicate.

Senator SMITH. I think so, but there has been some little complaint about your whispering to the witness, and I think when he is asked a question you ought to let him answer.

Mr. CROSSMAN. But do I have a right to communicate with him possibly before he answers the question?

Senator SMITH. Strictly speaking, the committee could conduct the hearing without any counsel, but out of an abundance of caution we do not want any witness to testify to something that would be unfair to him or that would be prejudicial to him personally. We have adopted this practice of letting counsel come in, but I think objecting to a question that might be asked him and then questioning whether or not you should suggest an answer is quite a different thing.

Mr. CROSSMAN. I would be quite glad if I could conduct myself as I do in court, and I did not know that I had that privilege.

Senator WATKINS. I do not know of any court that would permit you to tell a witness how to answer a question. It is never permitted in any court that I know anything about.

Senator SMITH. That is right. I do not believe our courts would allow one of us to go up and prompt the witness while he was on the stand, but I can understand that this is a little unusual proceeding.

Mr. CROSSMAN. Mr. Davis, in the senatorial investigations, was allowed to communicate in the course of the proceeding.

Senator WATKINS. That is, with respect to whether he ought to answer. He certainly was not allowed to go so far as to tell him what he ought to answer.

The witness is sworn to tell the truth and not the counsel.

Mr. HOLLAND. I assure you on my oath that at no time today has Mr. Crossman told me what to say. Once or twice he has said, "I wish you wouldn't answer."

Senator SMITH. I do not believe he should whisper, in any event. He could advise you not to answer questions.

Mr. CROSSMAN. Of course, I object to the form of the questions sometimes.

Senator SMITH. As to the form, if it is capable of being understood by Mr. Holland, I do not think there would be too much to that because this is strictly not a court procedure and no attempt is made to conform to court rules.

Mr. SOURWINE. I interjected because—perhaps I was mistaken—it appeared to me at the time the witness had been asked for an example to support the charge that he had made that Mr. Morris was making testimony unsworn, which was inaccurate or incorrect, that Mr. Crossman had leaned over to whisper to him and suggesting something for the witness to say.

Mr. HOLLAND. That was not so.

Mr. SOURWINE. I apologize to Mr. Crossman.

Mr. HOLLAND. In the rather limited time we have had to examine the transcript, we have found—and I say “we” because I have had the assistance of counsel in this—a number of cases in which we feel that an inaccurate or misleading, or, in some cases, false impression has been given as a result of the methods adopted by the counsel.

Now, in many cases, I feel certain that Mr. Morris has done this inadvertently, but it is something we feel that we should like to submit to you later on as a memorandum.

Senator SMITH. Could you illustrate just what you mean? I know that no counsel I have ever seen has done that when he has asked a question.

Every once in a while there may be an objection so far as the form is concerned.

Will you point out to Mr. Morris what statements he has made that are incorrect?

I had understood that where Mr. Morris has made statements, as he has done upon several occasions today, he was speaking from sworn testimony hitherto introduced here and he was reading it or paraphrasing it.

Mr. HOLLAND. In those cases, I think that is certainly Mr. Morris' intention, but we have found in the transcript—

Senator SMITH. Can you tell us about them?

Mr. HOLLAND. A number of cases.

Mr. HOLLAND. I can remember one. You will excuse me. There are many. There was a hearing in which the discussion of Mr. Harry White's connection with the IPR was under discussion. And the statement appears in the transcript, that is, from Mr. Morris, that, well, he was a delegate at an IPR conference.

Well, that is a statement, and it happens to be an incorrect statement.

Senator SMITH. Was that a statement, or a question?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, I took particular notice, and it was in the form of a statement, and it was construed by the witness as a statement.

Senator SMITH. Have you not many times heard a lawyer ask a question in just that way?

Mr. HOLLAND. But in this case, you see, it was not only a statement but it was an inaccurate one and had a rather serious bearing, because, as I pointed out, Mr. White was not a delegate to an IPR conference. This was not asked in the form of a question.

Senator SMITH. It was the witness' privilege to answer it either way, affirmatively or negatively, was it not?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, it wasn't.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we introduced a letter here recently by Mr. Jessup, wherein he recommended, among others, 10 people who had been identified before this committee as members of the Communist Party, a Harry Dexter White.

Senator SMITH. That has been sworn testimony before this committee?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right. The letter mentioned a group of people, and 10 of them had been identified before this committee by sworn testimony, and Jessup was recommending that this man, Harry Dexter White, be made a delegate to the Hot Springs convention in 1945.

Was that the incident?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, it was an earlier incident in the hearing, I think. This was an earlier occasion.

Mr. MORRIS. Here he was being proposed as a delegate to the Hot Springs convention.

Mr. HOLLAND. I cite this as only one instance from memory.

I have three or four pages, which I honestly feel—and all I ask is that you allow us to submit these to you. I do not make any unfair allegations against the counsel. I just say that sometimes an unfair implication has been given as a result of that.

Senator SMITH. Anyone can understand how lawyers can ask questions sometimes. They do not always ask them perfectly.

Now, then, you have made a very careful study and analysis of the transcript in this case?

Mr. HOLLAND. Not all of it, because it is too much for me to keep up with, but up to 2 or 3 weeks ago, yes.

Senator SMITH. Have you been the source of some of the statements received by this committee alleging that this committee is receiving demonstrably false testimony and statements from the counsel?

Have you been the one making those statements to newspaper men?

Mr. HOLLAND. I do not believe, sir, that I have used those words.

I have certainly said to a number of friends, and I may have said it in certain press releases, that I consider some aspects of the committee's procedure up to now to have been unfair, chiefly because I feel we have not been given a proper chance until now to state our case. And I felt that for 12 or 13 weeks now nothing but adverse testimony against this organization has been spread over the newspapers of the country.

Senator SMITH. Did you know, Mr. Holland, that Mr. Carter was examined here for days and days? He is one of your main men.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Carter, sir, was, I think, examined in three sessions and was given practically no opportunity to make the kind of lengthy explanatory statements that you kindly allowed me to do today.

Even now, sir, you have not allowed me to make anything like a full or even a reasonably rounded statement of what the IPR really is. But I appreciate your willingness to permit me to make my statement.

Senator SMITH. You realize, do you not, that when people are being investigated the committee is first entitled to have answers to questions put to them.

Mr. HOLLAND. I realize that.

Senator SMITH. You realize that if you started an investigation any other way, the party being investigated could talk forever and never get to the point being inquired about.

Mr. HOLLAND. I appreciate that, sir, very fully.

But you used an argument on me, or at least Senator Watkins did, that Mr. Carter was given his chance.

All I was saying was that Mr. Carter was not given anything like the chance you have kindly given me.

Senator SMITH. Has Mr. Carter ever stated to this committee that he never had a chance to express himself? I did not think so.

Mr. MORRIS. No, Senator. We also had Mr. Field here, and we gave him ample opportunity to speak.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Field was a worn-out man taken from jail at 5 o'clock in the morning and perhaps practically on the point of collapse, because he said he hadn't eaten. But I do appreciate Senator Watkins' point, and certainly you have asked Mr. Carter a great many questions, and he has tried to give answers, but he is not an officer of the institute today.

And yet much of the effect of this unfavorable testimony reflects on the organization today.

Therefore, it is only proper, I think, that people who are in positions to have responsibility in the organization today and over the past 2 or 3 years should be given a full chance to testify.

That is why I appreciate your offer to us to name other witnesses. We are very glad to have that opportunity.

Senator SMITH. I want to know whether or not you subscribe to the testimony earlier given to this committee by Mr. Carter with respect to its accuracy.

Mr. HOLLAND. With respect to what, sir?

Senator SMITH. With respect to the accuracy of his testimony. Do you say Mr. Carter did not tell us the truth and give us the facts?

Mr. HOLLAND. Oh, no, sir. I make no such charge. I only said he did not have anything like an opportunity to explain and give positive statements. In other words, you carefully selected bits of the evidence and confined him to answering those, and did not give him anything like an opportunity—

Senator SMITH. I do not recall anything other than that Mr. Carter was given a full opportunity to say everything he wanted to say.

Mr. HOLLAND. I am sorry, sir. I disagree with you on that.

Senator SMITH. Otherwise, I am persuaded that the tactics you could try to adopt is to go so far afield with extraneous statements that this whole matter will be clouded. Is that your point?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. I want you to have a perfectly fair hearing.

Mr. HOLLAND. I do appreciate that, and I think today you have given me the kind of opportunity we have been wanting and which we think should have been accorded to us perhaps 5 or 6 weeks ago.

Senator SMITH. I think perhaps all of us have had enough experience to know that the witness prefers to say what he wishes to say on extraneous matters if he can, if he can get the examiner off of the subject.

Mr. HOLLAND. May I just say that my reason, or my main reason, for making these remarks, sir, is not in any way to imply hostility or criticism, but I am constantly reminded of the very inspiring remarks which Senator McCarran made at the beginning of this investigation, in which he said that the subcommittee would conduct a full and impartial hearing and would seek only facts, not headlines.

And I believe that by calling me today, and other witnesses whom you have now kindly asked us to suggest, you will get—a little overdue, but you will get—a much more accurate and useful picture of this organization than has hitherto emerged.

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Holland, I note that you said you should have been called weeks ago. Would you think that it would have been proper for us to call you in every time some one said something that you thought was damaging?

Mr. HOLLAND. Not at all, sir.

Senator WATKINS. To run in and give some more testimony?

Mr. HOLLAND. Not at all, sir.

Senator WATKINS. We have to take this in a sort of organized, systematized way, and as we were going into this you could not be permitted to run in every time we had a witness who was unfavorable.

I think probably the development has reached the stage where you should be in, and I personally want everybody connected with the institute that can throw any light on its conduct to come and testify.

I am willing to sit here for the rest of the year if necessary to hear them.

Senator SMITH. I may say that I do not think you need be too concerned as to the fairness or unfairness of this committee, when we learned today, after much prodding by Mr. Sourwine of Mr. Holland, that there were 16 packages of papers about the IPR in Mr. Field's basement of which we had not heard until today, or at least I had not heard until today.

Senator WATKINS. How does that fit in with the statement of the institute officials that everything had been made available to the FBI and this committee?

Senator SMITH. I mention that to bring you up to date.

Senator WATKINS. But I wanted it understood as far as I am concerned, and I think the committee is acquainted with my thought on the matter, because it happens to coincide with theirs, that it is proper that in every case you hear one side until they get through, and then the other side comes in. You may have to wait 2 months before you get to that point, because we do not work everyday.

From what I can see of the conduct of the counsel in this case, it has been absolutely fair.

Personally, I hope we will go on and get all these people in here that know anything about this.

Mr. SOURWINE. We were on page 28, Mr. Holland.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes. There is a short heading there, "The institute has not been listed as a subversive organization," which I prepared, and at the bottom something about "the myth of the 'powerful combine,'" which I prepared.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the end of page 28. •

Mr. HOLLAND. And "The institute welcomes constructive criticism," which I also prepared.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just one or two questions on that subject.

As you have indicated in the number of cases here, you prepared an original draft, Miss Farley went over that, and you went over it again. So it is obvious this must have been under preparation for quite some time; is that right?

Mr. HOLLAND. Portions of it have, I should say for perhaps a month or 6 weeks. But most of the parts which I say I wrote myself I have

done under very considerable pressure, in fact up to almost midnight last night.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, I want to ask: Have you told us about everybody who has assisted in the preparation of this?

Mr. HOLLAND. I believe I have, sir, with the one exception that my counsel has seen various drafts at various times and also suggested changes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you mentioned something about having recently had a fairly close connection with Mr. Joseph Barnes. Would you repeat again what that was?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes. I forget how long ago, but——

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what I wanted to get. How long ago.

Mr. HOLLAND. It was some time, I think, in the first half of August. I saw Mr. Barnes in a restaurant on the other side of the room, and I had not seen him for a very considerable time, so I went over and spoke to him.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that in New York City?

Mr. HOLLAND. In New York City. And he asked me what I was doing for the summer. I said, "I am here on my own. My wife is away in California." He said, "I am also on my own. My wife is in the country. Why don't you come over and stay at my place." So for a period of—I don't know—2 weeks or 2½ weeks, I spent quite a number of nights at his place.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you move out? How recently? Last month? In September?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, it was some time in September.

Mr. SOURWINE. Past the middle of September?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, I think it was probably in the first half. I am not sure.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would it be fair to say that portions at least of this statement were under preparation at the time you were living in Mr. Barnes' quarters?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, I think so, because, as I have indicated, considerable portions are taken directly from this earlier pamphlet we published.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you discuss that with him?

Mr. HOLLAND. I told him I was preparing it. I can say, however, that he gave me no advice, did no drafting for me on this particular document. He did give me some suggestions as to how it possibly might be made more—how a press release on it might eventually be written. He said it was too long and dull.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you didn't consider the advice in connection with the preparation of it?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, Mr. Barnes hasn't had any contact directly with the IPR for a long time and therefore isn't in a position to know about a lot of these details here.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you discuss this or the preparation of it with Mr. Carter?

Mr. HOLLAND. No. Mr. Carter knew I was working on it, but I never consulted him about the text of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you in connection with preparing this avail yourself of the knowledge or advice of Mr. Lattimore or Mrs. Lattimore?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, I did not. They knew I was preparing it. My hesitation was simply that I have, of course, discussed many other things with Mr. and Mrs. Lattimore; but looking down these headings here, I know I didn't consult them on this.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did they read this before you came to testify here today?

Mr. HOLLAND. No. They have seen certain portions of it, namely, the sections which are in the other pamphlet.

Mr. SOURWINE. But they did not see them as portions prepared for inclusion in this?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, these documents were stapled together late last night and were brought down on the midnight train.

Mr. SOURWINE. When I say "prepared for inclusion in this," I didn't mean physically for inclusion in this paper. I mean the draft after it had occurred to you that this was eventually to be a press statement.

Mr. HOLLAND. No, to the best of my knowledge they weren't consulted on that.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no more questions on that, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SMITH. I want to ask him a few.

Mr. Holland, you say this was in preparation over how long a time? I have forgotten.

Mr. HOLLAND. I am afraid I have forgotten what I said, myself. But it has been probably—

Senator SMITH. Several weeks?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Senator SMITH. And several drafts were made of different portions of it?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Senator SMITH. And this was gone over very carefully by you?

Mr. HOLLAND. To the best of my ability; because I was working under very great pressure in the past weeks.

Senator SMITH. And you prepared it for presentation here today?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. And you want to have it just exactly right from your standpoint?

Mr. HOLLAND. Within the limits of the time available to me; yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. You want to have it just exactly right from your standpoint. That is what you are trying to do.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, sir. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could this be admitted, now, Mr. Chairman, with the understanding that the committee reserves the right to question Mr. Holland about it further?

Senator SMITH. It is so ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 331" and is as follows:)



FACT AND FICTION ABOUT THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS—STATEMENT BY  
WILLIAM L. HOLLAND, SECRETARY GENERAL, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS;  
EXECUTIVE VICE CHAIRMAN, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS,  
OCTOBER 10, 1951

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT BY WILLIAM L. HOLLAND

I have prepared this statement as a supplement to the testimony which I expect to give in response to questions directed to me by members of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee in a public hearing on October 10. I have prepared it because this will be the first occasion on which a responsible officer of the Institute of Pacific Relations has had any opportunity to describe the real facts about the organization, aims, and activities of the institute and to answer some of the numerous misleading or erroneous statements about it which have been made in previous hearings.

The present statement is by no means to be interpreted as a full and final answer to these misstatements and misleading allegations. To deal fully with them would take much more space than is available here and would require at least a month's intensive work after the subcommittee had finished taking testimony from witnesses.

Because of this, I wish to repeat here the request which was made on August 10 by the institute's legal counsel, namely that the institute's officers and counsel be given access to the IPR files which the subcommittee seized last February and has withheld from the institute ever since, and also that the institute's officers and legal counsel be given at least one month to study the whole record with a view to suggesting further evidence or providing a statement to form part of the subcommittee's record or both. These were eminently reasonable requests, but the subcommittee has ignored them.

The present statement is intended chiefly for the following purposes:

(1) To provide a clearer and more balanced account than has thus far emerged from the subcommittee hearings as to the aims, methods, activities, publications and personnel of the Institute.

(2) To explain or refute some of the more serious cases of misstatements and misleading allegations which have been made either deliberately or inadvertently by certain witnesses, but which have gone uncorrected in the record.

(3) To indicate how some of the procedures adopted by the subcommittee thus far have inevitably led to the presentation of a very distorted picture of the institute and to suggest some corrective steps which should be taken if the subcommittee is to live up to the opening statement made by its chairman. In that statement, he stressed that it intended to conduct its investigation in a fair and impartial manner, adopting a truly objective approach and seeking facts rather than publicity.

Since I am speaking as the executive officer of both the international IPR and the American IPR, and as a person who has been closely connected with the institute's work and staff for a very long period, I wish to add a few statements about my own role in the institute and to answer some of the questions which may be asked about me in the hearings. I mention this because I am concerned that the members of the IPR and the general public, as well as the Senators on the subcommittee, should understand my position and responsibility, past and present. I also want to show that the institute's officers are completely sincere in saying that, despite the unfair allegations thus far made, they welcome an investigation of the IPR, provided only that it is fair and comprehensive.

I stress this fact because the impression has been given in certain newspapers that the institute has concealed many suspicious or discreditable facts about itself. This has tended to lend color to the false rumors maliciously spread by a few unprincipled persons that the institute has been an agency or tool of the Communists or a channel for Soviet espionage activities or a sinister, secret pressure group influencing the development of far eastern policy.

To the thousands of loyal and well-informed people who have been thoroughly familiar with the institute and its activities over the past 26 years, these stories are slanderous and manifestly absurd. But in these days when public thinking and feeling about Russia, China, and the Far East generally have become so charged with emotion, even the most fantastic rumors tend to be taken seriously; and it therefore becomes necessary to refute them in a careful and detailed manner.

## MY OWN ROLE IN THE IPR

My work for the IPR began in January 1929 when I came from New Zealand to work as a junior research assistant and private secretary to Dr. J. B. Condliffe, the research secretary of the international headquarters of the IPR, then located in Honolulu. After attending the Kyoto (Japan) conference of the IPR in 1929, I worked in north China in 1930 as a research assistant to Prof. R. H. Tawney in the preparation of his noted IPR book, *Land and Labour in China*.

I was acting international research secretary of the IPR from 1931 to 1932. After a year's leave of absence for study in England, I became international research secretary in 1933 and held this position until 1944, frequently visiting the Far East and Western Europe (though not Russia). During 1943 and 1944, I was editor of *Pacific Affairs*. I was given leave in 1944 to work for the OSS and the OWI in Washington and New York. I became a naturalized American citizen in July 1944. From February to October 1945, I was acting director of the China division of the United States Office of War Information in Chungking.

In March 1946 I was appointed secretary general of the international IPR, succeeding Mr. Edward C. Carter who had held that position since 1933. For a brief period in 1948 and again from August 1950 to the present, I have also acted temporarily as executive vice chairman of the American IPR concurrently with my position as international secretary general. I have also taken over the functions of the international research secretary.

I thus carry a complicated set of responsibilities. Some responsibilities are to the American IPR, some to the other nine national councils of the institute, some to the foundations and corporations which contribute generously to both the American and international budgets of the IPR, and some to the individual research workers and contributors to the IPR journals.

These diverse responsibilities are not always easy to harmonize. This problem has grown increasingly acute as public controversy, especially in the United States, has become more bitter over the trend of events in the Far East and as sharp differences have appeared between the foreign policies of such countries as the United States, Britain, India, and the U. S. S. R. toward developments in China, Korea, Japan, and southeast Asia.

This point needs to be kept in mind because it serves to explain the peculiar limitations imposed on the international officers of a nonpartisan organization like the IPR which is international but nonofficial and is simply a loose confederation of completely autonomous national societies, each differing somewhat in organization and activities. It should never be forgotten that the international IPR is not a unitary, monolithic organization with national branches controlled by a central headquarters. Nor is it even a federation of identical or like-minded societies such as Rotary International or the International YMCA.

The autonomous national councils of the IPR, though differing in their programs and constitutional structure, have nearly all sought a wide diversity of interests and attitudes among their members. They are not groups of like-minded persons, linked by common political attitudes or professional interests. For the most part they are united only by a belief that the unfettered nonpartisan collection of facts and discussion about the problems of the Far East and the Pacific area is important and that (because the truth in these complex problems is inevitably many-sided) it is wise to seek a diversity of opinions and interpretations, including the views of persons with whom one sharply disagrees.

Even more striking is the absence of any common ideology or philosophical approach as between IPR members in one country and those in another. This difference is often vividly revealed in the frank but friendly clash of opinion which occurs in the private international conferences of the institute, such as the one held in Lucknow in October 1950. Any attempt to force this great diversity of views into one philosophical mold or conceptual scheme would be fruitless and ridiculous. This fact has always been recognized by the national councils and individual members of the institute and differences of opinion and even vigorous disagreements have always been welcomed, not only in the conference round tables, but in the conference preparatory papers and in the larger scholarly research volumes and magazine articles published under the institute's auspices.

All this is familiar enough to IPR members, but it is apt to be forgotten at a time when the institute has been dragged by partisan extremists into the middle

of a nation-wide American political controversy over far-eastern policy which is itself becoming more and more a football of 1952 election campaign politics.

As the servant of both a far-flung and diversified international organization and of an American society of some 1,100 persons with widely differing and strongly felt opinions, I, as the executive officer of the IPR, have to serve many masters. I must try to do this without allowing the institute to degenerate into the condition where the attempt to compromise and please all conflicting points of view results in mere confusion and ineffectualness. At the same time, I must always strive to see that important points of view of varying schools of opinion find expression in the institute's activities and publications and not use the fact of conflicting opinions and counsel as an excuse for imposing my own ideas or pet theories on the conduct and content of the institute's work.

Having been so long connected with the institute and so largely responsible for the administration of its research, I cannot dissociate myself from its past activities, nor would I want to. I feel considerable pride in having been associated with it, though I would be the last to assert that the institute's officers have never made errors in judgment or that in particular my own decisions, looked at in retrospect, have always been wise. Nor could I in good conscience give the impression that the institute today has been radically transformed, when, in fact, I believe that it has always been basically committed to the principles of freedom of scholarly inquiry and diversity of opinion.

Those principles remain as valid and important as ever. It has simply become more difficult to apply them, because of the great change which Soviet postwar policy has produced in the whole climate of opinion on the crucial problems of communism and nationalism which beset the Far East and the far eastern policies of the western nations.

At the same time, as an executive officer of an organization which has some responsibility to the general public, and which depends for its existence on its public reputation as well as on the financial support of foundations and corporations, I have to be realistic. In particular, I have to take account of the honestly held views of well-informed, genuine friends of the IPR concerning the present-day activities of the institute and the policies which it must follow if it is to keep or regain the financial support and confidence of the individuals and foundations that make its existence possible.

To steer a wise course in such conflicting currents is not easy. I can only say that I have made an honest effort to serve the over-all interests of the institute. Whether I have succeeded or will succeed in this is for others to judge. I appeal to both the subcommittee members and the general public to have understanding of the job which Mr. Swope and I (and the other institute officers, who give generously of their time and energy) are trying to do. We are concerned with an area of the world where the need for facts and for cool heads as well as warm hearts was never greater than it is today.

As for my "associations" outside the IPR, I must admit that I have not been a great "joiner." Before I became an American citizen, I was a member of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. Today I am an ordinary member of the Foreign Policy Association and of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. I am a member of the board of the Public Affairs Committee, New York, and of United Service to China. From 1944 I have been a board member of the China Aid Council (now inactive). I have been a director and am still a member of the Far Eastern Association. I am not active in politics but registered as a Democrat in New York City for the last two presidential elections. I am neither a Communist nor an ex-Communist, nor a Communist fellow traveler. To the best of my knowledge, I have not been accused of Communist "associations." In Chungking in 1945, I met Mao Tse-tung, at the time when he was brought down from Yen-an by Ambassador Patrick Hurley. I also met Chou En-lai then, at a reception given by Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer.

*Some points not brought out by the McCarran subcommittee*

The institute should be judged by its record as a whole, not by bits and pieces culled from its files. For example, the contents of the 28 volumes in its "inquiry" series are more important evidence of the nature of its activities than an informal comment on tentative plans for this project in an intraoffice letter which the committee has publicized. It should be judged primarily by what it has done, not by speculations about projected programs. The contents of the two-hundred-

odd research volumes and conference reports published by the institute are a better index of its influence on American thinking than allegations by ex-Communists who had nothing to do with this organization's program and publications.

There is not space here to present the institute's full record of achievement in four continents over the last 26 years. A brief summary of this record is given in the pamphlet, *Understanding Asia*, issued by the institute in June 1951.<sup>1</sup> Four points only will be stressed here: (1) The institute is an international organization. (2) It is a nonpartisan organization. (3) It has never tried to influence the actions of governments. (4) The character of its work has been determined not by Communists, but by the hundreds of eminent citizens and scholars who have taken an active part in the institute as officers of the organization, as delegates to its conferences, or as writers of books and articles which it has published.

#### *What the institute is*

The Institute of Pacific Relations is an association composed of national councils in 10 countries. Each national council is autonomous and carries on its own work in its own distinctive way. Together they cooperate in an international IPR program of research, publications, and conferences. This program is directed by a Pacific Council in which each national council is represented, and administered by a small international secretariat working in New York under the direction of the Pacific Council.

The institute at present consists of the following independent national councils:

American Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.  
Australian Institute of International Affairs  
Canadian Institute of International Affairs  
Comité d'Etudes des Problèmes du Pacifique (France)  
Indian Council of World Affairs  
Japan Institute of Pacific Relations  
New Zealand Institute of International Affairs  
Pakistan Institute of International Affairs  
Philippine Council, Institute of Pacific Relations  
Royal Institute of International Affairs (Great Britain)

The institute was founded in 1925 at a conference in Honolulu of religious leaders, scholars and businessmen from various countries of the Pacific area, who, even then, realized the need for greater knowledge and frank discussion of the problems of Asia and the relations of Asia and the West. The impetus came in part from leaders of the YMCA.

At this first conference it was realized that intelligent discussion was impossible on many subjects because many basic facts were lacking about the peoples, resources, trade, and politics of the Pacific area. This led to the inauguration by the international IPR of a large and continuing research program which subsequently received generous support from the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corp. The IPR has played an important part in increasing available knowledge about Asia in the United States and other countries. The Rockefeller Foundation has called the institute "the most important single source of independent studies of the Pacific area and the Far East."

Since 1925 the institute has held 11 international but nonofficial conferences, the latest having taken place at Lucknow, India, in 1950. Conference membership is usually about a hundred, and consists of delegates chosen by each national council. The agenda is carefully prepared and full documentation is provided in the form of data papers compiled by the international secretariat and the national councils. While the conferences are private and the press is excluded to assure full freedom of discussion, reports of the discussion are subsequently published.

Dr. Ralph Bunche, the distinguished United Nations official and Nobel prize winner, attended his first international conference as a member of the American group at the Eighth IPR Conference, held at Mount Tremblant in Canada in 1942. He recently said: "Although I have participated in a great many international conferences since, I have never experienced a more profitable one than the Mount Tremblant Conference, or one that was better conducted."

<sup>1</sup> Available on request from the American IPR, 1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

*The International IPR*

Following are the names of the chairmen of the Pacific Council, international governing body of the institute, from 1925 to the present:

1925-29: Ray Lyman Wilbur (United States), former Secretary of the Interior  
 1929-33: Jerome D. Greene (United States), former member of the firm of Lee, Higginson & Co.

1933-36: Hon. Newton D. Baker (United States), former United States Secretary of War

1936-39: J. W. Dafoe (Canada), former editor, Winnipeg Free Press

1939-42: Philip C. Jessup (United States), professor of international law, Columbia University

1942-45: Edgar J. Tarr (Canada), former president, Monarch Life Assurance Co.

1945-47: Percy E. Corbett (Canada), professor of government, Yale University

1947-50: Huntington Gilchrist (United States), American Cyanamid Co.

1950: Arthur H. Dean, attorney, Sullivan and Cromwell, New York

The following persons, as chairmen of the international research committee, have directed the international research program of the institute from 1925 to the present:

Prof. James T. Shotwell, Columbia University

Prof. Charles P. Howland, Yale University

Dr. Carl L. Alsberg, Food Research Institute, Stanford University

Prof. J. B. Condliffe, University of California

Sir George Sansom, East Asian Institute, Columbia University.

Other prominent persons who have taken an active leadership in the work of the IPR outside the United States include the following:

Rt. Hon. A. V. Alexander, former Minister of Defense, Great Britain

Dr. Horace Belshaw, Professor of Economics, Victoria College, Wellington, New Zealand

R. J. F. Boyer, Australian Broadcasting Commission

K. P. Chen, president, Shanghai Commercial Bank, China

Dr. Chiang Mon-Lin, former Minister of Education, China

Rt. Hon. Arthur Creech-Jones, former Minister of Colonies, Great Britain

Lionel Curtis, All Souls College, Oxford

J. W. Dafoe, former editor, Winnipeg Free Press, Canada

Sir Frederic Eggleston, former Australian Ambassador to the United States

Pierre Gourou, professor of geography, Sorbonne, Paris

Dr. Hu Shih, former Chinese Ambassador to the United States

Junnosuke Inouye, former Premier of Japan

Viscount K. Ishii, former member, House of Peers, Japan

Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, Foreign Minister, Pakistan

Pandit H. N. Kunzru, Servants of India Society, India

K. C. Li, Wah Chang Trading Co., New York

Yoshisaburo Matsukata, general manager, Kyodo News Agency, Japan

Sir Andrew McFadyean, president, Liberal Party, Great Britain

Walter Nash, former Finance Minister, New Zealand

Dr. Inazo Nitobe, former member, House of Peers, Japan

Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, Indian Ambassador to the United States

Archibald Rose, British American Tobacco Co.

Hon. Newton W. Rowell, former President of the Privy Council, Canada

Albert Sarraut, former Premier of France

Hon. W. Downie Stewart, former Minister of Defense, New Zealand

Arnold J. Toynbee, director of studies, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain

Sir Frederick Whyte, former president, Indian Legislative Assembly

W. W. Yen, former Chinese Ambassador to the U. S. S. R.

The American Institute of Pacific Relations, one of the national councils of the IPR, is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization composed of about 1,100 businessmen, scholars, teachers, journalists, Government officials, community leaders, and others interested in contemporary Far Eastern problems. Membership is open to anyone but voting rights are limited to American citizens. The American Institute is governed by a board of about 60 trustees who are elected by the membership and who in turn elect the officers and members of the executive committee which supervises the work of the staff. Besides cooperating in the international IPR research and conference program, the American Institute publishes the fortnightly Far Eastern Survey, publishes books, pamphlets,

reading lists and other educational materials, holds meetings, conferences and study groups, and in various ways, often in cooperation with other organizations, works to promote the study and discussion of Far Eastern problems in the United States.

A list of the members who have been executive committee members and of prominent Americans who have actively taken part in the work of the American IPR is given elsewhere in this statement.

*How the institute is financed*

The work of the international Institute of Pacific Relations is financed principally by contributions from its national councils and by grants from foundations. In the 26 years from 1925 through 1950 total receipts amounted to \$2,569,000, an average of about \$100,000 a year. Of this total, 48 percent came from the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corp., 40 percent from the national councils, 9 percent from sales of publications, and 3 percent from miscellaneous sources. The American IPR contributed 29 percent of the total receipts, the British and Canadian national councils 3 percent each, the China council 2 percent, and the Japanese council 1 percent; the eight other national councils each contributed less than 1 percent. Thus United States sources, including foundations, supplied 77 percent of the organization's income. If grants to the American IPR are included, the contribution of the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corp. to the work of the IPR through 1950 totals \$2,176,000. In 1950 the Rockefeller Foundation voted a new grant of \$50,000 to the international institute and \$60,000 to the American IPR.

The American Institute of Pacific Relations derives its funds from membership subscriptions, gifts from individuals and corporations, and grants from foundations. From 1925 through 1950 its total net income was \$2,536,000, of which 50 percent came from foundations (chiefly the Rockefeller Foundation, Carnegie Corp. and Carnegie Endowment), 33 percent from individual and corporate contributions, 12 percent from sales of publications, and 5 percent from miscellaneous sources. Leading contributors to the American IPR today include the Standard-Vacuum Oil Co., International General Electric Co., National City Bank, Chase National Bank, Bankers Trust Co., International Business Machines Corp., International Telephone and Telegraph Co., Electric Bond and Share Co., and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. Lever Brothers (London) is a major contributor to the international IPR.

Among other large corporate contributors have been Alexander & Baldwin, American Trust Co., Castle & Cooke, Time Inc., J. P. Morgan, Studebaker Corp., Reader's Digest, American President Lines, Matson Steamship Co., Bank of Hawaii, Pan American Airways, Bank of America, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., Shell Oil Co., National Cash Register, Wilbur Ellis Co., Bank of California, American Foreign Power Co.

Major individual contributors to the IPR have included the late Frank C. Atherton, Juan Trippe, Henry R. Luce, Jerome D. Greene, Mrs. Thomas W. Lamont, the late Joseph P. Chamberlain, Mrs. Frances Bolton, Joseph E. Davies, Mrs. Wallace Alexander, Mrs. Frank Gerbode, Arthur H. Dean and Gerard Swope. The large contributions of Frederick V. Field (total \$60,000) and of the late Thomas W. Lamont (total \$14,700) have already been reported in the press.

**WHO WERE "ASSOCIATED" WITH THE IPR?—STATEMENT BY WILLIAM L. HOLLAND, EXECUTIVE VICE CHAIRMAN, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS**

The counsel for the McCarran subcommittee has made great efforts to show that numerous persons, many of whom are alleged to be Communist agents or sympathizers, were "associated" or "connected" with the IPR. Early in the hearings he required Mr. E. C. Carter to give quick "yes" or "no" answers on whether some 80 people on a list were "connected" in any way with the institute. In subsequent hearings, he has often said that certain persons had been shown to be "connected" with the institute. This "guilt by association" technique is so misleading and unfair that one must attempt to make some meaningful distinction between those who were closely and significantly associated with the IPR and those who had only marginal or negligible contacts.

Senator Ferguson has recently given a somewhat apologetic explanation of the fact that he was a member of the American IPR for 10 years and paid dues for 7. He described his association as merely "nominal" but it was certainly closer than that of some of the persons named in the testimony. However, he

hardly need feel apologetic because he was in good company. Many other Senators and Congressmen, including Senators Flanders, Elbert Thomas, Thomas Hart, and Representatives such as Mrs. Frances Bolton, have been IPR members, have taken an active part in its meetings and contributed to its budget. Moreover, their associations extended over the period when Mr. Frederick V. Field was still active in the American IPR either as executive secretary (1934-40) or as a member of the executive committee (1941-47).

It should be noted first that dozens of people who have had no contact or association of any kind with the IPR have been named in the hearings. Only in a few cases has the subcommittee counsel troubled to point out that these people had nothing whatever to do with the institute. He has thus left the impression in the minds of the public that the IPR had numerous connections with various Communist agents, Soviet officials, and persons alleged to have transmitted official secrets to Communist couriers. Persons in this category include Nathan Silvermaster, Noel Field, J. Peters, Elizabeth Bentley and her lover Golos, Theodore Geiger, Jack Stachel, Louis Budenz, Louis Balemuth, Mary Price, Victor Perlo, Harrison George, General Berzin, General Krivitsky, and many others.

Second, many other people named as "associated" with the IPR have had only the most marginal, insignificant, contacts with it and have exerted no influence whatever on its activities or publications. Persons in this category include Duncan Lee, Solomon Adler, Harry White, Agnes Smedley, Mildred Price, John Service, John P. Davies, Lawrence Duggan, Frank Coe. Some of these people were ordinary dues-paying members for varying periods; some were personally acquainted with IPR staff members; some attended occasional IPR meetings. None of these persons were ever officers, trustees, or employees of the institute, or contributors to its publications, and none ever had any influence in the formulation or execution of its policies or programs. (The subcommittee's counsel made a labored effort to show the "association" of Agnes Smedley, an acknowledged Chinese Communist sympathizer though not herself a Communist Party member, with the IPR simply because she wrote a letter to the institute in 1941 asking IPR officers to request the International Red Cross to try to get a Chinese friend released from a Japanese internment camp in Hong Kong.)

The subcommittee has tried to make much of the institute's alleged associations with two well-known former Government officials, Lawrence Duggan and Harry White, both of them now dead, and unable to answer the charges of disloyalty brought against them by ex-Communists. The IPR never had the active cooperation of Mr. Duggan and Mr. White in its program. Neither was even an ordinary member of the institute. The subcommittee counsel has described Mr. White as a delegate to one of the IPR international conferences, whereas he was one of those invited but unable to accept. Mr. Duggan, as a State Department official, was informally consulted a few times about the possibility of establishing IPR groups in certain Latin-American countries.

The preposterous allegation has been made by Elizabeth Bentley that Mildred Price (for many years executive secretary of the China Aid Council, a well-known philanthropic society and one of the constituent agencies of United China Relief) was in charge of a Communist "unit" which had responsibility for the IPR and certain other Far East organizations. The facts are that Miss Price has played no part whatever in the institute's work. She has been an ordinary dues-paying member but has never been active in IPR affairs. She has never been a trustee, or served on IPR committees, or been a substantial financial contributor, or worked as an employee or advisor of the IPR or attended its conferences. She has very rarely even visited the IPR offices or been invited to meetings. At no time has she been in a position to know in detail anything of the program or administration of the institute. It is thus quite impossible for her to have been "responsible" for the IPR or to have influenced its policies, activities, or publications, even had she been inclined to do so (and there is certainly nothing in her conduct or attitudes to suggest that she would be).

Far more meaningful evidence of who were really "associated" with the IPR and really in a position to control, influence, and supervise its activities, were the able and loyal citizens who have served as active IPR officers and members of its executive committee and other major committees. The attached lists of members of the American IPR executive committee and members of other major committees over the past 25 years or so gives an infinitely more authentic picture of who controlled and shaped the institute's policies and programs than the grotesque caricature painted in the subcommittee hearings. These people were not "dupes" or "window dressing" but actively participated in the American institute's affairs.

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC., EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE  
MEMBERS, 1927-51

Initials at end of line indicate member is or was at one time: C—chairman, American IPR; VC—vice chairman; T—treasurer; S—secretary.

*Dates of  
committee  
membership*

- 1929-39: Wallace M. Alexander,<sup>1</sup> Alexander & Baldwin Ltd., San Francisco (VC)  
 1947-48: Edward W. Allen,<sup>1</sup> Allen, Froude, Hilen & DeGarmo, Seattle  
 1948-51: Raymond B. Allen,<sup>1</sup> President, University of Washington, Seattle (VC)  
 1929-39: Carl L. Alsberg,<sup>2</sup> director, Food Research Institute, Stanford University (C)  
 1932-36: Newton D. Baker,<sup>2</sup> former United States Secretary of War (C)  
 1943-46: Eugene E. Barnett, international committee, YMCA  
 1948-49: Edward W. Beltz, Standard-Vacuum Oil Co.  
 1928-30: George H. Blakeslee, professor of international relations, Clark University  
 1949: Hugh Borton, East Asian Institute, Columbia University  
 1947: Lincoln C. Brownell, American Bank Note Co.  
 1943-45: Robert D. Calkins, School of Business, Columbia University  
 1927-32, 1940-44, 1946-51: Edward C. Carter, former secretary general, IPR (VC and S)  
 1932-34: Everett Case, president, Colgate University (T)  
 1932-42: Joseph P. Chamberlain,<sup>2</sup> professor of public law, Columbia University (VC)  
 1947-48: Dwight L. Clark,<sup>1</sup> Occidental Life Insurance Co., Los Angeles  
 1927-40, 1944-46: Ada L. Comstock (Notestein), former president, Radcliffe College (VC)  
 1932-36: George S. Counts, Teachers College, Columbia University  
 1946-47: John L. Curtis, National City Bank of New York  
 1946-50: Arthur H. Dean, partner, Sullivan & Cromwell, New York (VC)  
 1944-46: Raymond Dennett, World Peace Foundation, Boston (S)  
 1947-51: Walter F. Dillingham,<sup>1</sup> Oahu Land & Railway Co., Honolulu (VC)  
 1927-32: Stephen P. Duggan,<sup>2</sup> Institute of International Education  
 1934-47: Frederick V. Field, secretary, American IPR, 1934-40 (S)  
 1929-32, 1936-39: Galen M. Fisher, specialist on Japanese civilization, Berkeley  
 1946-48: Huntington Gilchrist, American Cyanamid Co.  
 1951: L. Carrington Goodrich, professor of Chinese, Columbia University  
 1927-39: Jerome D. Greene, former partner, Lee Higginson & Co. (C)  
 1939-42: Francis S. Harmon, Motion Picture Producers & Distributors of America (T)  
 1940-42: W. R. Herod, president, International General Electric Co. (VC)  
 1946, 1948, 1950: William L. Holland, secretary general, IPR (VC)  
 1927-32: Charles P. Howland,<sup>2</sup> professor of international relations, Yale University  
 1943-46: G. Ellsworth Huggins,<sup>2</sup> Catlin, Farrish & Co. (T)  
 1927-32: Edward H. Hume, medical missionary in China  
 1936-40, 1944-46: Philip C. Jessup, professor of international law, Columbia University (C)  
 1932-36: Frederick P. Keppel,<sup>2</sup> president, Carnegie Corp. of New York  
 1927-32: William H. Kilpatrick, professor of education, Columbia University  
 1936-39: Benjamin H. Kizer, Graves, Kizer & Graves, Spokane (VC)  
 1927-30: Thomas W. Lamont,<sup>2</sup> J. P. Morgan & Co. (VC)  
 1948-50: Clayton Lane, executive secretary, American IPR, 1948-50 (S)  
 1949-51: Lewis Lapham, president, American Hawaiian Steamship Co.  
 1946-49: Owen Lattimore,<sup>2</sup> Walter Hines Page School of International Relations  
 1942-44, 1946-51: William W. Lockwood, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University (S)  
 1950: James A. Mackay, National City Bank of New York  
 1950: Clifford B. Marshall, Standard-Vacuum Oil Co. (T)  
 1943-46: James L. McConaughy,<sup>2</sup> president, United China Relief  
 1929-32: Mrs. Alfred McLaughlin, civic leader, San Francisco  
 1936-39: James D. Mooney, General Motors Export Corp.

<sup>1</sup> Regional nonquorum member.<sup>2</sup> Deceased.



*Dates of  
committee  
membership*

- 1941-43, 1946: Harriet L. Moore, research director, American Russian Institute (S)
- 1944-47: Lawrence Morris, Hawkins, Delafield & Wood, New York
- 1932-39: Mrs. James W. Morrisson, active in League of Women Voters (VC)
- 1951: J. Morden Murphy, Bankers Trust Co.
- 1937-42: Philo W. Parker, Standard-Vacuum Oil Co. (VC)
- 1936-38: Charles J. Rhoads, formerly Brown Bros. & Co., Philadelphia (T)
- 1927-32: Henry M. Robinson,<sup>2</sup> Security First National Bank, Los Angeles
- 1929-36: Chester Rowell,<sup>2</sup> San Francisco Chronicle
- 1943-46: Lawrence D. Seymour, Dodge & Seymour
- 1936-39: David L. Shillinglaw, David L. Shillinglaw & Co., Chicago
- 1927-36: James T. Shotwell, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- 1927-36: Mrs. F. Louis Slade,<sup>2</sup> active in League of Women Voters (VC)
- 1927-36: George Soule, editor, New Republic, 1924-47
- 1943-48: Robert Gordon Sproul, president, University of California (C)
- 1946: Donald B. Straus, Management Employee Relations, Inc. (T)
- 1950: Gerard Swope, honorary president, General Electric Co. (C)
- 1947-49, 1950: Donald G. Tewksbury, Teachers College, Columbia University
- 1932-36: Mrs. John Paul Welling, formerly vice president, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (VC)
- 1947-48: Lynn White, Jr.,<sup>1</sup> president, Mills College
- 1927-29, 1937-42, 1948-49: Ray Lyman Wilbur,<sup>2</sup> chancellor, Stanford University (C)
- 1951: Heaton L. Wrenn,<sup>1</sup> Anderson, Wrenn & Jenks, Honolulu (VC)

**TWENTY DISTINGUISHED AMERICANS WHO HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN THE WORK OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS (EXCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE)**

Carroll Binder, editorial editor, Minneapolis Tribune, Minneapolis; trustee, 1935-45; delegate, first and sixth IPR conferences; vice chairman, 1943-46.

Isaiah Bowman (deceased), geographer; formerly president, the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore; trustee, 1931-41; member, AIPR Research Committee, 1929-32.

Ralph J. Bunche, top-ranking director, Division of Trusteeship, United Nations; acting mediator on Palestine, United Nations; New York; Nobel Peace Prize; delegate, eighth and ninth IPR conferences; active in Washington IPR branch.

Brooks Emeny, president, Foreign Policy Association, New York; trustee, 1938 to date; delegate, sixth, seventh, and eighth IPR conferences; vice chairman, 1947-48.

Harold H. Fisher, chairman, Hoover War Library, Stanford University, Calif.; formerly, director, School of Naval Administration; chairman, American delegation, eleventh IPR conference. Member, AIPR Research Committee, 1948-51.

Henry F. Grady, formerly United States Ambassador to Iran; formerly president, American President Lines, San Francisco; trustee, 1941-49; active in San Francisco Bay region IPR work.

Mortimer Graves, administrative secretary, American Council of Learned Societies, Washington; delegate, ninth IPR conference; trustee, 1943-49; vice chairman, 1946-47.

Mrs. Edward H. Heller, member, Democratic National Committee; Democratic National Committeewoman for California, 1944-48; education secretary, War Finance Division, United States Treasury, northern California and Massachusetts, 1941-45; trustee, 1938-45; delegate, sixth IPR conference; active in San Francisco Bay region IPR branch.

Felix M. Keesing, executive head, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Stanford University, Calif.; United States Senior Commissioner, South Pacific Commission; delegate, fourth and ninth IPR conferences; member, AIPR Research Committee, 1945-48; author of three IPR research volumes.

Grayson Kirk, vice president and provost, Columbia University, New York; executive officer, Third Commission, San Francisco Conference, 1945; delegate, ninth IPR conference; member, AIPR Research Committee, 1944-48; chairman, International Program Committee, IPR, 1946.

<sup>1</sup> Regional nonquorum member.

<sup>2</sup> Deceased.

Henry R. Luce, publisher, *Time*, *Life*, and *Fortune*, New York; director, United China Relief, and Yenching University, China; trustee, 1933-47; delegate, fifth IPR conference; vice chairman, 1946-47; member, finance committee, 1938-46.

Maj. Gen. Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, chairman, Far Eastern Commission, Washington; formerly president, Foreign Policy Association, New York; trustee, 1940-46; delegate, seventh, eighth, and ninth IPR conferences.

James G. McDonald, first United States Ambassador to Israel; formerly chairman of the board and honoray chairman, Foreign Policy Association, New York; formerly High Commissioner for Refugees From Germany; trustee, 1929-40; delegate, third and sixth IPR conferences; member, IPR Education Committee, 1929-30.

Donald M. Nelson, formerly Chairman, War Production Board, Washington; formerly president, Society of Independent Motion Picture Producers, Los Angeles; trustee, 1946-50; vice chairman, 1947-48; active in Los Angeles IPR branch.

Mrs. Anrelia Henry Reinhardt (deceased), formerly president, Mills College, Oakland, Calif.; trustee, 1927-44; delegate, third IPR conference; active in San Francisco Bay region IPR work.

W. W. Waymack, formerly vice president and editor, Des Moines Register and Tribune; formerly member, United States Atomic Energy Commission; Pulitzer Prize winner; trustee, 1941-43, 1951 to date; delegate, ninth IPR conference.

Sumner Welles, former Secretary of State, Washington; trustee, 1946 to date; vice chairman, 1947-48; chairman, Washington IPR branch, 1946-47.

Brayton Wilbur, Wilbur Ellis Co., San Francisco; trustee, 1943 to date; delegate, eighth IPR conference; member, nominating committee, 1943-46; treasurer, San Francisco Bay region division, IPR, 1942-46.

Quincy Wright, professor of international law, University of Chicago; formerly consultant, Foreign Economic Administration and Department of State; formerly technical adviser to American member, International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Germany; trustee, 1935-40; delegate, first, second, fifth, sixth, and seventh IPR conferences; member, AIPR Research Committee, 1928-32, 1938.

Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, United States Navy, retired; formerly commander in chief, United States Asiatic Fleet; trustee, 1940-46; delegate, seventh and eighth IPR conferences; vice chairman, 1943-46.

#### IPR PUBLICATIONS AND PUBLICATION POLICIES

Since 1925 the IPR has published about 220 major research volumes, written by scholars from a dozen or more countries, which may be found in libraries throughout the world, and which are recognized as standard works in their fields. They deal with such subjects as population problems, land utilization, agrarian problems, industrialization of eastern countries, the family, colonial administration, nationalist movements, labor problems, international politics, and international trade and investment in the Pacific area. In addition, several hundred monographs, data papers, pamphlets, and other smaller studies have been issued. The international institute publishes a quarterly magazine, *Pacific Affairs*, and several of the national councils issue their own periodicals.

The following titles, taken at random from the long IPR publications list, illustrate the character of its research and publications:

- British Economic Interests in the Far East, by E. M. Gull (1943)
- Commodity Control in the Pacific Area edited by W. L. Holland
- Trade and Trade Barriers in the Pacific by Philip Wright (1935)
- British Rule in Eastern Asia by Lennox A. Mills (1942)
- The State of Asia by Lawrence K. Rosinger
- Asia and the West by Maurice Zinkin
- China's Economic Stabilization and Reconstruction by D. K. Lieu (1948)
- Banking and Finance in China by Frank M. Tamagna (1942)
- Land Utilization in China by J. Lossing Buck (1937)
- History of Press and Public Opinion in China by Lin Yu-tang (1936)
- Land and Labor in China by R. H. Tawney (1932)
- China, the Land and the People by Gerald Winfield (1948)
- The Struggle for North China by George E. Taylor (1940)
- Essays on the Manchurian Problem by Shuhsi Hsu (1932)
- The Western World and Japan by Sir George Sansom (1950)
- Japanese Industry by G. C. Allen (1940)
- Western Influences on Modern Japan by I. Nitobe and others (1931)
- Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction by Jerome S. Cohen (1949)

Government in Japan by C. B. Fahs (1940)  
 Japan's Emergence as a Modern State by E. Herbert Norman (1940)  
 The Chinese in Southeast Asia by Victor Purcell (1951)  
 Colonial Policy and Practice by J. S. Furnivall (1948)  
 The Economic Development of French Indochina by Charles Robequain (1944)  
 The Structure of Netherlands Indian Economy by J. H. Boeke (1942)  
 The Left Wing in Southeast Asia by Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff (1950)  
 Government and Nationalism in Southeast Asia by Rupert Emerson and others (1942)  
 Thailand, the New Siam by Virginia Thompson (1941)  
 The South Seas in the Modern World by Felix M. Keesing (1941)  
 Agricultural Organization in New Zealand by Horace Belshaw (1936)  
 Australia and the Far East edited by I. Clunies Ross (1936)

A fuller list is available in the printed catalog issued regularly by the IPR.

It is worth noting that most of the studies published by the institute are purely factual and descriptive, expressing no political judgments or sympathies. Among the few that are concerned with political and ideological problems, there are some which describe the methods of the Communists in Asia and the ways in which they try, sometimes successfully, to appeal to Asian peoples. In a few articles or chapters, some writers in IPR publications have described the earlier phases of Chinese Communist activities in a relatively sympathetic way. Other IPR articles or reports have, of course, been highly critical of Communist policies and practices. But no IPR publication has advocated communism or urged acceptance of Communist policies or programs.

It is worth noting also that very few of the institute's publications deal with Russia. The institute has not concerned itself with internal conditions in the U. S. S. R. as a whole, but only with Soviet Asia and Soviet relations with far eastern countries. Similarly, publications on China form only a fraction of the institute's total output. The great majority of its publications deal with Japan, India, southeast Asia, the South Pacific, and the far eastern interests or policies of North American or Western European nations. Publications on China and Russia together form probably less than 20 percent of the institute's total product.

Manuscripts of IPR publications are always submitted before publication for comment and criticism by competent authorities. The author is requested to take such comments carefully into account in revising his study, though he himself naturally makes the decision and accepts responsibility for his final text.

#### ANTI-COMMUNIST WRITERS IN IPR PUBLICATIONS

Following is a partial list of writers well known for their active opposition to communism, whose work the IPR has published. This should dispel any notion that the IPR tended to favor authors sympathetic to communism.

Edwin M. Borchard	Lin Yutang
Joseph W. Ballantine	Chiang Mon-lin
Jan O. M. Broek	Shuhsi Hsu
Kurt Bloch	Max Beloff
William Henry Chamberlin	L. E. Hubbard
George B. Cressey	Sir Frederic Eggleston
J. B. Condliffe	Victor Purcell
C. B. Fahs	Gerard Friters
Randall Gould	Roger Levy
Robert J. Kerner	H. J. van Mook
Paul M. A. Linebarger	M. R. Masani
Paul Langer	J. Lossing Buck
Herrymon Maurer	Percy E. Corbett
Robert C. North	Lenox A. Mills
David N. Rowe	Shiroshi Nasu
Rodger Swearingen	E. Stuart Kirby
Benjamin Schwartz	Sir George Sansom
H. Arthur Steiner	Robert A. Fearey
Milton Sacks	Sir Frederick Whyte
George E. Taylor	C. M. Chang
Gerald F. Winfield	Walter H. Mills
John N. Washburn	Arnold J. Toynbee
Hu Shih	D. K. Lieu
Franklin Ho	

## THE INSTITUTE IS NONPARTISAN

At the outset of its existence, the institute adopted the principle of complete nonpartisanship. The constitutions of the international institute and of all its national councils provide that the organization shall advocate no policies and express no opinions on public issues. This does not mean that individual members of the institute, or delegates to its conferences, or writers for its publication, may not express their personal opinions. On the contrary, a major purpose of the institute is to provide a forum in which issues of the day may be debated from all points of view.

Thus the institute is not a society of like-minded people interested in advancing some particular philosophy or policy. It is not even a federation of like-minded groups, for there are wide differences in national outlook, organizational structure, and operative methods among its national councils. Its membership is very diverse, including people of many different professional and business interests and of nearly all shades of political opinion. This is true to a degree which would be hard to find in an organization promoting some particular cause or "line."

Moreover, since it is international, the IPR membership represents different national viewpoints as well. Institute conferences are invariably marked by frequent differences of opinion, often among the delegates from a single country. The one thing that all institute members agree on is that reliable and up-to-date information about the Pacific area is urgently needed if the citizens and governments of that area are to adopt and carry out wise policies. To the advancement of such knowledge, the institute has devoted itself for the past 26 years.

In its research program the institute uses the best professionally qualified people it can find. Because it has always recognized the importance of having the facts analyzed from a variety of viewpoints, it has never been identified with any one school of thought, with any political faction, or with any one national outlook. It has permitted writers of very diverse opinions to express their own views about any problem or government, but has insisted that these opinions be clearly indicated as those of the writer alone, not of the institute.

Perhaps, the best evidence that the institute has been truly nonpartisan is in the character of the criticism which it has received in the 26 years of its existence. This has come from many directions. For example, before the war the institute was criticized by Japanese writers for allegedly favoring the cause of Nationalist China against Japan. Since the war it has been attacked by certain partisan critics in the United States for allegedly helping to ruin Nationalist China. It has also been denounced by Russian writers in Soviet publications who have called it a mouthpiece of Wall Street imperialism and similar epithets. Its initials were once interpreted by an Australian Communist publication as standing for "Institute of Pirates and Robbers," because the Rockefeller Foundation gave it such large financial support.

## THE INSTITUTE DOES NOT TRY TO INFLUENCE GOVERNMENT POLICIES

The claim that the institute has exerted a strong influence on the Department of State is unfounded. Many of its publications have of course been read by officers of the Department, but its publications represent no consensus of views. For the institute is not an "action" organization. It takes no stand on public issues. It does not pass resolutions and it does not engage in lobbying. It makes no attempt to influence in any way the policy of the United States or any other government.

Specific evidence on this point is given by Joseph W. Ballantine, who was a member of the Department of State from 1937 to 1946, serving as Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Deputy Director and later Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, and Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. Mr. Ballantine says in a recent letter:

"During the period that I served in the Department of State I never sought or received any advice on United States far eastern policy from the Institute of Pacific Relations; nor am I aware of any attempts being made during that period by the Institute of Pacific Relations to influence United States foreign policy. May I add that over an even longer period covering my acquaintance with the Institute of Pacific Relations, so far as I know it has consistently adhered to its avowed aim of serving as a nonpartisan research agency and to a policy of not engaging in action movements or in sponsoring any particular doctrine or policy."

But, it may be asked, even if the institute as such does not push particular policies, what about its members; what about its publications? The answer is that people of diametrically opposite opinions may be found among the members of the American Institute and also among those who write for it. If the Department of State had adopted all of the suggestions that have been put forward individually by institute members or by writers in institute publications, it would have found itself moving in a great many different directions at the same time.

There is nothing surprising in the fact that officers of the institute have had occasional contact with members of the Department of State. Such contacts are regularly maintained by every large American organization in business, education, and other fields. Nor is it remarkable, much less a matter for censure, that several former officers and staff members of the American Institute have entered Government service. During the war, in particular, many such persons were glad to place their special training and knowledge at the disposal of their country, and the institute was proud that it had helped to train a good many younger specialists who were available when the country needed them. The institute is not alone in this distinction. It is equally true of such institutions as the Council on Foreign Relations, the Brookings Institution, and the Foreign Policy Association. Indeed, the first of these has always had much closer and more lasting relations with the State Department than the IPR. There is hardly a university or a large business firm in the country which has not likewise furnished specialized talent to the Army, Navy, State Department, or other Government agencies. This is evidence that the institute has performed a valuable public service; it is not evidence of insidious "infiltration."

#### SOME FALSE IMPRESSIONS

To answer all of the false or misleading statements that have been made about the institute would require a book. The following paragraphs deal with only a few major allegations that have been mentioned in the press.

#### WAS THE INSTITUTE CONTROLLED BY COMMUNISTS?

Few people who look at the facts would claim that the institute is under Communist influence today. The ex-Communist Louis Budenz has recently made the palpably absurd statement that it is a "captive" organization "completely controlled" by the Communists. Last year, however, he made the contradictory assertion before the Tydings committee that it was not a Communist organization. He alleged, however, that in earlier years, especially in the late thirties and early forties, Communists "infiltrated" the organization, set up a "Red cell centering round the IPR," and used institute publications as a channel for spreading Communist propaganda.

Budenz' testimony has been specifically refuted by his former Communist associates, Earl Browder and Bella Dodd. Nevertheless this story has come to be regarded as plausible by some people, who say: "Well, the Reds probably did plant a few of their people in the IPR and did use it for their purposes in past years, but these people were mostly cleaned out several years ago, especially in 1947 when Frederick V. Field was asked to resign from the board of the American IPR."

Because this view is held by some responsible persons, even by some friends of the institute, it merits careful consideration. But evidence to prove it is hard to find. If Communists had succeeded in infiltrating the institute and controlling its policies, would not the institute's publications have given clear evidence of Communist influence? But analysis of its publications in this period demonstrates that the institute was, as usual, publishing a large variety of materials on many subjects, reflecting many points of view, and written by qualified writers of many schools of opinion, including known anti-Communists. Even on the controversial topic of China's internal politics, which is discussed at more length below, institute publications did not support any one interpretation of China's problems; some of them, indeed, were written by supporters of the Nationalist Government.

No two scholars, probably, would agree exactly in their evaluation of institute publications in this period. Some people may honestly believe that several of these publications are open to criticism in the light of information that is available today. Others may feel that they have found what they consider evidence of bias in a very few of the institute's many publications. Other equally eminent scholars have not found such bias. Some experts would express

criticisms which are in complete contradiction to those voiced by others. It seems clear that whatever differences of opinion may exist about this or that book or article, there was no deliberate or consistent attempt on the part of the institute to slant its research material in one particular direction. Such an attempt could not have escaped detection by the institute's officers, who have always been alert to see that the institute's objective and nonpartisan character was maintained.

#### *The Soviet Council of the IPR*

Stories have appeared in the press to the effect that the institute files seized by the McCarran subcommittee "revealed" a contribution of \$2,500 from "Moscow" to the institute, with the implication that the institute was a paid agent of Soviet propaganda. There is no truth whatever in this implication.

The institute has never made any attempt to conceal the sources of its funds, which have been published in its official reports. They were fully investigated by the FBI and by the Tydings committee in 1950, and the facts were made public at that time.

The international work of the institute is supported by contributions from its affiliated national councils, together with foundation grants. A Russian scientific society, the Pacific Institute, was admitted as a national council in 1934. It was made up of representatives of leading Soviet scientific societies concerned with the Far East, and headed by a leading geographer, Prof. V. E. Motylev of the institute of the Soviet World Atlas. The Russians were never active, however, except on one occasion, in 1936, they sent no delegates to institute conferences, nor did they seem interested in cooperating in its research program. After 1939 they took no part in the institute's activities, neglecting to answer even routine correspondence. In 1950 the institute learned from reports in the Soviet press that the Pacific Institute in Russia had been dissolved.

The only IPR publications originating with the Soviet Council were one article on The Sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway, published in Pacific Affairs in 1935, and five descriptive pamphlets on economic aspects of the Soviet Far East, submitted to an IPR conference in 1936. In other words, the Russians made almost no attempt themselves to present their policy and views through the medium of the institute.

Between 1935 and 1939 the Soviet Council, like other national councils, contributed annually to the institute, its contributions ranging from \$2,000 to \$3,000. These contributions were unconditional and had no strings attached. The total annual budget of the institute in these years ran from \$90,000 to \$100,000, of which contributions from the Soviet Council represented 2 to 3 percent. After 1939 no funds were received from Soviet sources.

From its foundation in 1925 through 1950 the total income of the international Institute of Pacific Relations amounted, in round figures, to \$2,569,000, an average of about \$100,000 per year. Of this total, Soviet contributions represented one-half of 1 percent.

The statement of Gen. Alexander Barmine before the McCarran subcommittee to the effect that in 1933 Soviet military intelligence officers used the institute as "cover" for obtaining secret military intelligence, was the rankest hearsay. There is not a shred of evidence to support it, much less to justify the outrageous insinuation that institute staff members would have been willing to act as agents for Soviet military intelligence. General Barmine himself clearly showed while giving his testimony that he had serious doubts as to the validity of this so-called evidence. When asked by a Senator whether the FBI had the "evidence" that Barmine had just given to the subcommittee, he replied, "Well, if you call it evidence \* \* \*."

The publications of the institute are found in many libraries and are available for sale to anyone. They have been widely used as reference works by teachers, journalists, and Government officials, including military intelligence officers of many countries. Russian officers may have used them in this way, but there is nothing sinister in that. The institute is not in any sense an agency for collecting secret or confidential information. Its reference files are open and so are its library and publications. It has never been in the employ or under the control of any government and has never been an agent of any government's intelligence service.

#### *Soviet criticism of the IPR*

There is documentary evidence which shows the type of attack to which the IPR has been subjected in the Soviet Union. A Soviet propaganda campaign was carried on against the eleventh IPR conference held at Lucknow, India,

in 1950. Articles attacking the conference appeared in *Izvestia* and in *Tass* releases repeatedly, and were broadcast by the Moscow radio. The IPR was said to be an organization financed by American industrialists who were using the conference to see how they could capture the "enormous markets and sources of raw materials" of the Far East that they were in the process of losing. The aim of the conference was also, it was said, to find "methods and means by which the national liberation movement can be undermined from within, and 'nationalism' can be used for the struggle against the Communist parties." The following are other typical quotations:

"The eleventh conference on Pacific problems has opened at Lucknow. Such conferences are being convened once every 3 years by the Institute of Pacific Relations, a private organization, the center of which is in the United States of America. The institute exists on donations from the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie Trust and from large United States entrepreneurs, who are interested in the exploitation of the natural resources of the countries of Asia and the Pacific area. The leaders of this institute, which acts under the dictation of the State Department, are using the conferences which are being convened for them for working on the public opinion of eastern countries in the interests of American imperialism. The conference in Lucknow debated the question of nationalism in the Far East and its international importance. A leading role in the conference is being played by William Holland, American secretary general of the Pacific Council—a sort of executive body of the institute.

"Judging by press reports, the discussion centers on the question of the methods and means by which the national liberation movement can be undermined from within, and 'nationalism'—the desire of the people of these countries for national independence—can be used for the struggle against Communist parties, which are marching in the vanguard of the national movement. For instance, Holland proposed that the reactionary governments of Asia should use religion in the struggle against the growing influence of the Communist parties. He also hinted at the desirability of those countries employing experienced administrators—in other words American advisers and consultants. At the conference several round-table groups have been formed for discussing questions connected with the situation in individual countries.

"It emerges from press reports that the meetings of these groups are largely devoted to questions of struggle against the Communist parties of various countries of Asia. From the rostrum at Lucknow speeches are made which contain slanderous attacks against the U. S. S. R. and C. P. R. The conference is also debating the question of a peace treaty with Japan and the Constitution of Japan and it is assumed that a discussion will be held on the Korean question" (*Tass*, October 7, 1950).

"Reviewing international events, 'Izvestia' today carries an article on the Lucknow conference, saying that the conference on Pacific problems in Lucknow, serves as a striking illustration of the fact that the Asian peoples do not believe a single word when the representatives of American imperialism say that they wish well toward the countries of Asia.

"Between October 3 and 15, the so-called Institute of Pacific Relations, whose permanent secretariat is in New York, held its eleventh conference in Lucknow.

"This institute is one of the unofficial channels by which American imperialism exercises influence over the Asian countries.

"The conference was attended by some 150 delegates from 11 countries, not yet free of imperialist influences. The aims of the conference, and its real sponsors, were very obvious from the agenda.

"It is enough to mention here that the Lucknow conference discussed the question of combating the democratic movement in the countries of southeast Asia, and what is called regional cooperation among the southeast Asian countries, as well as 'American economic aid,' and so on.

"It is not difficult to guess that the American imperialists sought to utilize the conference as a subsidiary organ for preparing the ground to hammer together under United States aegis another aggressive military bloc, this time for southeast and south Asia" (*Moscow Radio Voice English* 2130-hours, October 26, 1950, beamed to southeast Asia).

Another example of Soviet criticism is to be found in an article which appeared in 1949 in *Voprosy Istorii*, the leading historical journal of the Soviet Union. This was a 24-page article attacking American historians for falsifying American policy in China. Fifteen pages were devoted to violently criticizing a book (*American Policy and the Chinese Revolution*) published by the IPR in

1947, written by Dr. Dorothy Borg. At the outset, the article stated that: "The American Institute of Pacific Relations \* \* \* invariably mentions in the introductions to its publications its alleged objectivity \* \* \*. The example of the Borg book shows perhaps especially clearly the true value of this imperialist objectivity." In the same article the writer also denounces Owen Lattimore's analysis of the Chinese bourgeoisie as follows:

"The desire to blacken and slander the struggle of the working people of China during the revolution of 1925-27 is explained not only by the quite understandable hatred of revolutionary movements of the masses on the part of the learned lackeys of imperialism. Slander in this case is also used for the purpose of representing, contrary to truth, the Chinese bourgeoisie, which has betrayed the country's national interest, as the progressive force in the Chinese national liberation movement.

"In one form or another this little idea can be found in the works of all the above-named authors. Most clearly it has been formulated by Chiang Kai-shek's former American adviser during the Second World War, Lattimore. Lattimore declared the Chiang Kai-shek clique to be 'the bearer of the revolutionary traditions' of the Chinese people. The bought rulers of Kuomintang China, according to Lattimore, are 'the sons and disciples of the Chinese revolutionaries of 20 or 30 years ago.'<sup>1</sup> As for the betrayal of revolution by the Kuomintang in 1927, Lattimore considered it to be only a sensible desire to make a certain 'pause' in order to 'consolidate its already impressive victories (!) and try to win by negotiation (with foreign powers—author) the rest of what had yet to be won.'"<sup>2</sup>

#### *Frederick V. Field's role in the institute*

But what about Frederick V. Field? Mr. Field has not been active in the American IPR since 1947, when he was requested to resign from the board of trustees. He had been executive secretary of the American Institute from 1934 to 1940. Whether Mr. Field was secretly a Communist while he was a member of the institute staff cannot be ascertained, but his actions suggest that it was only after he resigned his institute job that he began to engage in outside pro-Communist activities. There is widespread agreement that as secretary of the American Institute Mr. Field was scrupulously correct and impartial in his research work and administration.

Many people can testify to this from personal knowledge. When, in June 1940, Mr. Field expressed a desire to resign as secretary, many distinguished members of the American Institute expressed, in more than formal terms, their admiration for the work he had done in the IPR. These included Frank C. Atherton of Castle and Cooke, Honolulu; D. G. Crawford, president of the University of Hawaii; Prof. Philip C. Jessup, of Columbia University; F. P. Keppel, president of the Carnegie Corp.; Mrs. Ada McConstock Notestein, president of Radcliffe College; Dr. Ray Lyman Wilbur, president of Stanford University; and Prof. Quincy Wright of the University of Chicago.

When, in September, Mr. Field definitely submitted his resignation, the executive committee accepted it only after satisfying themselves that he could not be induced to reconsider his decision. The chairman of the executive committee at that time was Philo W. Parker, president of the Standard Vacuum Oil Co. Subsequently the board of trustees adopted a resolution commending his many services to the institute, which concluded:

"Throughout his connection with the institute he has been most scrupulous and exacting in maintaining the highest objective standards for his own IPR writing and that of his colleagues. \* \* \* The board of trustees desire that the officers assure Mr. Field that he will be eagerly welcomed back to the active staff of the American Council when he completes his present work."

Similarly, between 1940 and 1947, when he was a trustee of the American Institute and a member of its executive committee, those who were associated with him testify that he never tried to inject pro-Communist views into the publications or meetings of the institute, but always supported its traditional policy of nonpartisan research. Even though many other trustees and members of the executive committee were strongly opposed to his outside political activities (after his resignation from the staff), they found nothing to censure in his conduct within and concerning the institute.

<sup>1</sup> Lattimore, Owen and Eleanor, *The Making of Modern China*, p. 183, London, 1945.

<sup>2</sup> Lattimore, *ibid.*, p. 138. Here are clearly to be seen the causes of Lattimore's friendliness for Chiang Kai-shek and company. He is being attracted by the refusal of this clique of traitors to oppose imperialist expansion or to struggle for the genuine national liberation of China.



In retrospect many members of the American Institute naturally feel today that Mr. Field should have withdrawn from the board of trustees several years earlier than 1947. There was no valid legal ground for ousting him from the board (to which he had been duly elected by vote of the membership). However, after considerable discussion the officers of the American Institute pressed him in 1947 to resign, not because of any unbecoming conduct on his part within the organization, but because his pro-Communist outside activities seemed likely to damage the institute's public reputation.

The scholarly quality and objectivity of Mr. Field's research work for the Institute are clearly shown in his two major publications, *American Participation in the China Consortiums* (1931), a specialized monograph, and the *Economic Handbook of the Pacific Area* (1934), a widely used factual reference work. Examination of these books will demonstrate their scholarly and objective character. Mr. Field may well be criticized for his subsequent pro-Communist activities and writings after he left the institute staff. But it is clear that these books are not vehicles of Communist propaganda.

Mr. Field's financial contributions to the American Institute formed only a small fraction of its total income. His gifts were all unconditional. They amounted to \$60,000, contributed mostly between 1934 and 1947. This represented about 3 percent of the American Institute's total receipts in that period. On the other hand, during much of the period 1934-40 Mr. Field drew a salary from the American Institute. It is worth noting that several other individuals also contributed very large sums over considerable periods to the institute, and during the years when Mr. Field was secretary.

#### *The institute and Amerasia*

It is sometimes thought that the magazine *Amerasia* was sponsored by the institute. This is not the case. *Amerasia* was independently financed, chiefly by Philip Jaffe. Founded in 1937, it was recognized for at least 5 years thereafter as a useful journal of opinion on far eastern topics, reflecting many points of view. Its board of editors included several of the leading, and by no means pro-Communist, far eastern specialists in the United States, and it published articles from a large number of reputable scholars, businessmen, and journalists of differing nationality and point of view.

In its early years *Amerasia* carried articles by many well-known non-Communist writers, some of whom also wrote at various times for the Institute of Pacific Relations. Several members of its editorial board had also served for varying periods on the staff or on the board of trustees of the American Institute. Many institute members wrote for it, as did most of the far eastern specialists in the country at one time or another.

After about 1943, when it became clear that Mr. Jaffe wished to use the magazine chiefly to advance his own ideas, most of the members of the editorial board resigned, and in 1944 it appeared under the sole editorship of Mr. Jaffe and Miss Kate Mitchell. Mr. Jaffe is a member of the American Institute but was never an officer, a trustee, or a member of its staff, nor did he ever hold any position in the International Institute. He never served on IPR committees or played any part in formulating IPR programs.

#### *The institute did not "smear" Nationalist China*

Recent charges that the institute, at the instigation of Communists, began a "smear campaign" against Nationalist China are merely a rehash of earlier, discredited allegations made in 1944 by Alfred Kohlberg. They were fully investigated at the time by the executive committee of the American Institute, which concluded that they were without foundation. This conclusion was endorsed in 1947 by an overwhelming vote of the membership. Nevertheless these discredited allegations were repeated and circulated by Mr. Kohlberg long after their falsity had been demonstrated. They were then picked up by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy in his attacks on Owen Lattimore and Dr. Philip C. Jessup in 1950. They were rehashed again in Miss Freda Utley's book, *The China Story*, and now they are being repeated once more before the McCarran subcommittee.

Mr. Kohlberg's accusations referred to writings and statements made as far back as 1938. Yet until Mr. Kohlberg made his charges, toward the end of 1944, at a time when American policy toward China was becoming the subject of controversy in the United States, no one had ever seriously suggested that the institute was under Communist control. On the contrary, institute publications were being praised in many countries, including Nationalist China, and the China Council of the institute continued its active participation in the IPR and made generous contributions to the institute's international budget right up to

1949. It is surely astonishing that among the whole body of far eastern specialists who were thoroughly familiar with the IPR and its publications, none detected this alleged following of the Communist party line by the IPR, and that only Mr. Kohlberg made this "discovery."

Examination of institute publications on China between 1938 and 1944 reveals many which were pro-China in the sense of exposing Japanese aggressive operations against China, but nothing even remotely resembling a "campaign" against the Chinese Nationalist Government. Numerous books, pamphlets, and articles on China were issued in this period by the institute's international secretariat and its national councils. Several of them were written by leading Chinese Nationalist scholars. Most were purely descriptive. A few were in part critical of conditions in Nationalist China, but also praised China's resistance to Japan.

Particular mention has been made of one article published in the Far Eastern Survey in 1943, by T. A. Bisson, a well known far eastern expert, who criticized certain aspects of the Nationalist Government and spoke favorably of some features of then small Communist areas of China. Mr. Bisson has categorically denied the allegation that he wrote this article at the behest of American Communist leaders. It was followed in the next issue by a vigorous rebuttal of Mr. Bisson's article from the pen of Dr. C. L. Hsia, a Nationalist Government official. At this same period Life magazine, the New York Times, the Reader's Digest and other periodicals were publishing much more outspoken criticisms of corruption and military incompetence in Nationalist China, written by Pearl Buck, Brooks Atkinson, Hanson Baldwin, and others. Indeed, it can be argued that the institute, partly out of deference to the feelings of its China council, failed to publish as much as it might have done on the internal deterioration of Nationalist China after about 1943, which is now admitted even by many Chinese Nationalist writers.

This point deserves notice because today we are beginning to see the development of situations in other parts of Asia where ominous internal situations may have to be reported bluntly and honestly if the public is to get a realistic understanding of the problems of Asia with which the United States Government must deal. If an independent organization like the Institute of Pacific Relations is to do its job effectively in such a vital area and at such a critical period as the present, it cannot evade the frank but informed and balanced discussion of these controversial issues. Its duty indeed is to analyze such issues and present the facts as objectively as possible before the problems come into the headlines, so that editorial writers, commentators, and lecturers can have the benefit of accurate and reliable background studies on which to base their own writing or speaking.

The institute has not advocated Chinese Communist policies or published propaganda for the Chinese Communists. It has published a few factual reports analyzing Chinese communism, which have described its sources of strength as well as its sources of weakness. Such realistic appraisals are indispensable if we are to deal intelligently with the problem of communism. The IPR did not start or promote the theory that the Chinese Communists were "mere agrarian reformers." Probably the most prominent person to assert that the Chinese Communists were not "real" Communists was Ambassador Patrick Hurley.

No doubt many authors who wrote on China for the institute in the early 1940's would revise some of their judgments in the light of today's knowledge. How good a job the institute has done in covering the complex and changing problems of China will always be a matter of individual opinion. But the evidence does not support charges of a smear campaign against the National Government or of pro-Communist bias.

*The institute has not been listed as a subversive organization*

The name of the Institute of Pacific Relations has never appeared on the list of subversive organizations issued by the Attorney General.

In 1948 the institute was improperly included in a list of hundreds of so-called "subversive" organizations compiled by the California Senate Committee on Un-American Activities (the Tenney committee). This listing was made, without hearings or other proper investigation, on the basis of the unsubstantiated allegations made earlier by Alfred Kohlberg. As a result of protests from the institute, the Tenney committee removed the institute's name from its list in its 1949 report.

In March 1951, however, the Committee on Un-American Activities of the United States House of Representatives issued a Guide to Subversive Organizations which included the institute on the basis of its 1948 listing by the California committee, ignoring the fact that the California committee had changed its

mind in 1949, although the institute had brought this fact to the attention of the House committee.

*The myth of the "powerful combine"*

In her book, *The China Story*, Miss Freda Utley speaks of a "powerful combine," including the Institute of Pacific Relations and various other groups and individuals, which "exerted paramount influence on the press and radio and on lecture platforms \* \* \* to spread the gospel according to Mao Tse-tung." According to Miss Utley this combine exerted a controlling influence over the book-review columns of the *New York Times*, the *New York Herald Tribune*, and the *Saturday Review of Literature*; over Harper's magazine and the *Atlantic Monthly*, which "rarely if ever published articles on the Far East unfavorable to the Communist cause"; and even over the eminent columnist Walter Lippman, one of the many publicists who, according to Miss Utley, followed the "IPR-State Department line."

In all this farrago about combines and interlocking directorates there is just one grain of truth, which Miss Utley and others have seen fit to distort for their own purposes. This is that most of the leading American students of the contemporary Far East having during the past 25 years been associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations in one way or another. A list of Americans whose books, articles, or special studies have been published by the institute would almost constitute a *Who's Who* of the outstanding scholars in the field. As pointed out above, these men and women represented a wide diversity of views. When the institute is described as a "powerful combine" pushing some particular "line" of thought or action, the scholars who know its work best are either angry or amused.

But while differing among themselves, as a group these writers have reflected the scholarly opinion of their day. The institute, in other words, is one of the organs through which American—and world—scholarship on contemporary Asia has found expression. Insofar as its publications show a changing emphasis over the years, this reflects changes in the currents of scholarly interest and informed opinion in the United States and other countries. The institute reflects such currents; it does not create them.

As William W. Lockwood has pointed out in a recent letter to the *New York Times*, the attack on the institute by Senator McCarthy and others is an attack on a whole generation of American scholarship on the Far East. Such an attack has ominous implications for American democracy both at home and abroad. As Mr. Lockwood says:

"There are no easy answers to the problems of Asia. But the least we can do in our own interest is to encourage American officials, journalists, scholars, and businessmen to report freely and honestly their findings, without fear of being irresponsibly labeled as Communists, black reactionaries, or anything else. Otherwise we shall sacrifice one of the chief assets of democracy in its struggle against communism."

*The institute welcomes constructive criticism*

The institute has no objection whatever to constructive criticism of its work; on the contrary it has always welcomed such criticism. But constructive criticism is very different from irresponsible allegations of disloyalty and treason.

The institute does not contend that in the administration of an extremely large and varied program of research, publications and conferences in many countries over a period of 26 years, in which a great many people have taken part, none of its officers or staff members ever made any mistakes. In evaluating the institute's record there is room for differences of opinion. The institute has been criticized by some for being too academic and specialized in its research, by others for being too concerned with current, quasi-journalistic studies of contemporary events, by others for not focusing on a few basic topics, and by still others for not trying to exert a direct influence on the formation of public opinion at the grass roots level. There is some basis for all of these criticisms and institute officers constantly try to take them into account, within the limits of the institute's modest budget.

The institute does not claim that none of its voluminous publications is open to criticism, but it does indignantly repudiate the suggestion that it has deliberately departed from the principle of nonpartisanship which is basic to its very existence. It specifically denies the untrue and insulting allegation that its policies have been secretly determined by the Communist Party or any other political group. An analysis of its record demonstrates the falsity of this outrageous charge.

In these days there is sometimes a temptation to go to absurd lengths to prove that an organization or an individual is not Communist. It is a fact that none of the institute's officers are Communists. The institute's officers do not maintain that the institute has never had any Communists or Communist sympathizers among its dues-paying members or among the contributors to its periodicals. Anyone, whatever his political affiliations, can become a member of the American Institute by paying his membership fee, just as anyone can join the National Geographic Society. The institute, like other similar organizations, has accepted articles and manuscripts on their professional merits and has not conducted special investigations into the open or clandestine political affiliations of their authors.

Finally, it is important for westerners and especially for Americans to remember that the institute is an international organization which has many members in Asia. In most Asian countries its reputation today stands high because it has refused to become a platform for the prevailing views of any one nation, but has tried to remain a forum for the expression of different national attitudes. Strange as it may seem to Americans today, one of the risks that the institute runs is that its repute among leading non-Communist Asians may suffer because they feel it is becoming too much subject to the pressures of American party politics and to the pressure of pro-Chinese Nationalist groups in the United States.

Against this danger and against the risk of allowing the institute to be used as an instrument for either left-wing or right-wing partisan groups, the institute's officers will continue to be vigilant. They believe that both institute members and the general public will recognize the value of an organization which does not preach or propagandize but simply tries to supply accurate and up-to-date information about that crucially important part of the human race which lives in the Far East.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, just to show how impossible it is to ask any questions on that press release today, there is a reference in there about Mr. William Henry Chamberlin being a writer for the IPR. He is cited as somebody who is anti-Communist, has a reputation for being anti-Communist. Well, there is, for instance, a report in the files, just as an example, where Mr. Carter admitted in a meeting in Moscow that it was a mistake for William Chamberlin's article to have appeared in *Pacific Affairs*, and we also have *Pacific Affairs* here with Owen Lattimore, then the editor, repudiating the article officially in his publication. I don't know how many other instances of unfair allegations are made in that statement, but it is impossible for the staff to be given a press release today and for them to be able to ask Mr. Holland any questions on it.

I cite that as one of the examples of the impossibility of this and of the wisdom of the committee rule that such a statement should be submitted well in advance.

Mr. SOURWINE. The point you are making, Mr. Morris, is, is it not, that the placing of it in the record now in this way without asking further questions about it is not to be taken as an indication that there may not be subsequent challenge to any or all of the statements.

Mr. HOLLAND. I accept that.

Senator WATKINS. That is really a brief, is it not?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, I do not consider it a brief, because I unfortunately have not had the time as yet to deal with any of the scores of—

Senator WATKINS. As far as it goes?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, Mr. Chairman, I would say that it is much more a general introductory factual statement. If you will allow me later the privilege of dealing with many of the specific statements which have been made which I consider incorrect or misleading, I would certainly love to do that.

Senator SMITH. Are there incorrect or misleading statements in here? Did you say you want to have the chance to correct incorrect or misleading statements contained herein?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, I mean if you will allow me later to correct——

Senator SMITH. In other words, you stand for the truthfulness of every statement of fact made herein?

Mr. HOLLAND. To the best of my knowledge and belief, yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. And you are willing to affirm every statement contained herein as true, the same as if you made it verbally here in this hearing?

You are willing to swear to the truth of the statements here contained?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am not sure of the procedures involved here. I have already told you that I considered this to be true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Senator SMITH. I want to know if this is a statement that you are willing to stand on as a statement of facts sworn to.

Mr. HOLLAND. May I consult on that?

(Brief consultation with Mr. Crossman.)

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, sir; certainly.

Senator WATKINS. You want that to be considered as a part of your sworn testimony?

Mr. HOLLAND. My hesitation was because I thought there was a legal problem involved.

Senator SMITH. What I want to know is whether you want that to be considered as a part of your sworn testimony subject to the penalties of perjury.

Mr. HOLLAND. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And, as counsel has suggested, you would be willing to read it into the record.

Mr. HOLLAND. And I suggest that it be made a part of the printed record.

Senator WATKINS. As if you had read it as part of your testimony?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would it upset you, Mr. Morris, if I started a new line very briefly?

Mr. MORRIS. No. That is all right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you familiar, Mr. Holland, with the press release issued by Mr. Girard Swope attacking this committee and its procedure?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am familiar with the release. I was present at the press conference when it was given.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you assist in the preparation of that press release?

Mr. HOLLAND. To a slight degree I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us any others who assisted in the preparation of that press release?

Mr. HOLLAND. I would say principal assistance came from our legal counsel, Mr. Wardwell.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know of anyone not in the employ of the Institute of Pacific Relations, as counsel or otherwise, who did assist in the preparation of it?

Mr. HOLLAND. Not in the employ of the institute?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. HOLLAND. No, I don't know anyone.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Barnes didn't assist in any way in the preparation of that?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, he did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Nor did Mr. or Mrs. Lattimore?

Mr. HOLLAND. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Thank you.

Senator SMITH. How old is Mr. Swope, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. I think he is either 74 or 75, sir.

Senator SMITH. Now, where were you when you had the conference with him?

Mr. HOLLAND. This conference was had in the Broad Street Club, downtown New York, immediately following one of our regular large discussion luncheon meetings, at which a great many heads of big corporations had come for a talk on India.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you suggest to Mr. Swope that he give out this interview, this press release?

Mr. HOLLAND. I have been one of many people who have been discussing with Mr. Swope the desirability of issuing a statement on some aspect of this subcommittee for some considerable time, and this includes our counsel.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was because of Mr. Swope's prominence as a business man and a good citizen of America, was it not?

Mr. HOLLAND. I would say primarily because he is the senior officer of the Institute of Pacific Relations, as chairman.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does he take any active part in the activities of the institute now?

Mr. HOLLAND. Oh, certainly. He keeps me jumping.

Mr. SOURWINE. How often does he come to the office?

Mr. HOLLAND. I suppose he doesn't come to the office more than once in every 2 or 3 weeks, but he makes me go to his office twice a week without fail, and sometimes oftener.

Mr. SOURWINE. Which came first, Mr. Swope's decision that he would give this press conference and issue this press release, or the issuance of the press release itself?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am not quite sure that I got the point. Which came—

Mr. SOURWINE. Which came first, Mr. Swope's decision that he would give this press conference and issue the press release, or the preparation of the press release?

Mr. HOLLAND. I would say the decision to give a press conference. Whether he decided that it would be this particular one on this particular date and that particular place, I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was that decided, as far as you know?

Mr. HOLLAND. I think it was decided about 4 weeks ago. I say that because one reason why it was given now is that Mr. Swope had been away on Cape Cod for something like 3 weeks, and this was the first opportunity after he got back to meet, come downtown.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean by that that the fact that you were to be here to testify today had no connection with his decision to make the press release when he made it?

Mr. HOLLAND. I can't say that it had no bearing on it, Mr. Sourwine, but I do say that the question of a press conference has been under discussion for many weeks. In fact, I may say, as you can

well understand, that a great many friends of the IPR have been saying quite frankly, "You should have had such a press conference long ago."

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; they have been urging Mr. Swope to have such a conference, have they not?

Mr. HOLLAND. I should say they have been urging me, because I am the executive officer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Haven't you passed it on to Mr. Swope?

Mr. HOLLAND. To a limited extent I have. But I also had an appreciation of his position, the fact that he was away on Cape Cod, and also the fact that he, and not only he but I, too, wanted to give what we thought was a reasonable period for the subcommittee to conduct its hearings before we raised what we think are rather fair criticisms.

Mr. SOURWINE. How long had Mr. Swope been up on Cape Cod?

Mr. HOLLAND. As I said, I think it was about 3 weeks before last Sunday.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then it must have been just before he went to Cape Cod that he decided to give a press conference when he came back; is that right?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; the decision as to the date was not made. It was simply that there would have to be in his opinion a press conference.

I think it is possible that under some circumstances if he had come down for some urgent business before, he would have given it then. In fact, I hoped he would have given it earlier.

I will personally tell you, Senator, that I was a little unhappy at the fact that it came only the day before I was called. I would have preferred the two things to be quite distinct.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have nothing further on that line, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have a few things to finish up here, and the hour is getting late, but I had only finished 2 of my 14 points, and I estimated the 14 could have been covered today.

Senator SMITH. You were an optimist, were you not?

Mr. MORRIS. I think I was.

Mr. Chairman, I think we had gotten off the line of questioning. We had been discussing the grants made by the Rockefeller Foundation to various individuals at the intervention of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Now, I would like to have introduced into the record this whole letter from Mr. Chester Barnard of the Rockefeller Foundation to Senator McCarran, of September 20, 1951.

In addition to giving the amount of contributions to the institute, it also indicates the names of 11 people in the institute who have received these grants.

We had discussed Mr. Norman and Mr. Rosinger, and I had just gotten to that point, and I had introduced into the record the testimony of three witnesses on Lawrence Rosinger's membership in the Communist Party.

Mr. Holland, at that point, undertook to cite a few newspaper book reviews to refute the sworn testimony of three witnesses. It was not my intention, Mr. Chairman, to introduce any book reviews about Rosinger's books into the record today, but inasmuch as Mr. Holland has elected to do that, I would just like to introduce one book review.

Senator SMITH. All right. Go ahead.

Mr. MORRIS. This is a book review from the Daily Worker of August 3, 1945, by Samuel Sillin. It appears on page 11. The first paragraph begins as follows:

Interest in China as the pivot in the war against Japan has been registered during the past year in a number of stimulating books by Harrison Forman, T. A. Bisson, Owen Lattimore, Edgar Snow, and other American observers. These authors, riddling the heavy fog of Kuomintang censorship, have played an important part in enlightening the American reading public on the Far East. They have persuasively refuted the lies of Lin Yutang regarding the Chinese Communists. They have urged a consistent American policy of encouragement to the democratic, unifying forces in China as the key to a quick victory in the Pacific.

To the impressive list of informed books on the Far East may now be added Lawrence K. Rosinger's scholarly, readable volume, *China's Crisis*. \* \* \*

I think that is the pertinent point.

It goes on to give a little biographical sketch of Rosinger.

But, as I say, Mr. Holland has elected to give book reviews, and I would like to offer this book review for the record.

Mr. HOLLAND. May I just state for the record that *China's Crisis* was not published by or under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator SMITH. He did not say that.

Mr. HOLLAND. No. I just want that noted.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like this whole communication from the Rockefeller Foundation to go into the record in its entirety.

Senator SMITH. Suppose you look at that and see if you have any doubt about its genuineness.

Mr. HOLLAND. Oh, sir, I would never question Mr. Chester Barnard's—

Senator SMITH. All right. That will go in.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 332" and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT 332

THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION,  
New York, N. Y., September 20, 1951.

HON. PAT MCCARRAN,  
*United States Senate, Washington 25, D. C.*

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: AS you requested in your letter of September 10, I am sending you herewith a list of appropriations made by the Rockefeller Foundation, as well as by the former Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial (which was consolidated with the foundation in 1929), to the Institute of Pacific Relations. The grants are classified according to the recipient named in the appropriation. You will note that in some instances the recipient, in the early years, was simply the Institute of Pacific Relations. Subsequently grants were made to the Pacific Council of the Institute or to its international secretariat, and to the American Council, which later changed its name to the American Institute of Pacific Relations. I am also sending you a list of persons who received fellowship awards from the foundation and who in the course of their fellowship periods spent some time in study and training at the Institute of Pacific Relations.

For a number of years the Rockefeller Foundation has supported studies in the field of international relations. It has also supported studies of the languages and cultures of various areas of the world heretofore relatively neglected in American scholarship. In this connection, it has made grants to many organizations here and in other countries. Some of these doubtless cooperated with the Institute of Pacific Relations on various projects; a few were affiliated with the institute in the sense that, while established as independent organizations with programs only in part concerned with the Pacific area, they served as national



constituent members of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The affiliated organizations to which the foundation made grants for a variety of projects are:

The Australian Institute of International Affairs, Sydney, Australia.

The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto, Canada.

The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, England.

If you wish a record of grants to these affiliated organizations, we shall be glad to prepare it for you.

In preparing the lists enclosed, we have exercised the utmost care and believe them to be complete. I trust this letter and the lists will provide you with the information you require.

Sincerely yours,

CHESTER I. BARNARD.

**LIST OF ALL APPROPRIATIONS MADE FOR THE WORK OF THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS BY THE FORMER LAURA SPELMAN ROCKEFELLER MEMORIAL AND BY THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION**

NOTE.—Appropriations noted below have all been listed and described in annual reports to the public issued by the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial and by the Rockefeller Foundation. Until recently small grants in aid have not been described in detail but have been grouped under the general heading grants-in-aid in each division of program. In addition to its annual reports, beginning with 1950, the foundation has issued quarterly reports on its appropriations. In 1929 the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial was consolidated with the Rockefeller Foundation.

**APPROPRIATED BY THE LAURA SPELMAN ROCKEFELLER MEMORIAL**

Year of action	Purpose	Appropriation	Expenditures	Balance
1926....	Institute of Pacific Relations—American Council: <sup>1</sup> For research activities, July 1, 1926, to June 30, 1927, conditional on \$50,000 being obtained from other sources toward American quota of institute.	\$10,000	\$10,000	-----
1927....	For research activities, to be paid \$15,000 a year in 1927, 1928, and 1929 on condition \$50,000 in cash from other sources be secured in each of these years, exclusive of bequests, for consolidated expenditure budget for work of central international headquarters of institute in Honolulu and for work of American group in continental America.	45,000	45,000	-----
1928....	Institute of Pacific Relations: Toward its international program of research in the social sciences in 1928, 1929, and 1930.	60,000	60,000	-----
1928....	Toward its international program of research in the social sciences, payable 1929 \$25,000 on basis of \$1 for each \$1 secured in cash from other contributing sources for same purpose during 1929; 1930, \$25,000 on basis of \$1 for each \$2 secured in cash from other contributing sources for same purpose during 1930.	50,000	50,000	-----
	Total .....	165,000	165,000	-----

**APPROPRIATED BY THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION**

1929....	Institute of Pacific Relations—Continued			
1930....	For research activities during 1929 .....	\$35,000	\$35,000.00	-----
	Toward its international program of research in the social sciences:			
	1931 \$25,000 outright per year			
	1932 \$25,000—\$1 for each \$2 collected, per year.			
	1933 \$25,000 outright per year			
	1934 \$25,000 outright per year			
	1935 \$25,000—\$1 for each \$3 collected per year....	250,000	250,000.00	-----
	Special projects and programs:			
1940....	Expenses of R. Barnett's trip to China to make study of Shanghai and East China for institute, Aug. 15, 1940, to Oct. 14, 1941.	800	800.00	-----
1943....	Stipend for Dr. Jan O. E. Broek to permit him to complete study of economic geography of southeastern Asia, Jan. 1, 1943, to July 31, 1944.	5,278	4,797.95	<sup>2</sup> \$480.05
1948....	Study of Japanese town by Dr. A. J. Grad; available to Mar. 31, 1951.	7,400	7,400.00	-----

See footnotes at end of table.

## APPROPRIATED BY THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION—Continued

Year of action	Purpose	Appropriation	Expenditures	Balance
<b>Institute of Pacific Relations—Continued</b>				
<b>Special projects and programs—Continued</b>				
1949	Preparation of short geography of Korea; available to Mar. 31, 1951.	\$2,000	-----	<sup>2</sup> \$2,000.00
1949	Study of Philippine rural economic problems—Prof. J. Spencer; available to Nov. 10, 1951.	1,200	\$1,200.00	-----
1950	Completion of study of Japanese communism; Langer and Swearingen; available to Sept. 30, 1950.	500	500.00	-----
<b>Institute of Pacific Relations—Pacific Council:</b>				
<b>For general expenses and research programs for—</b>				
1935	1936, 1937, 1938	135,000	135,000.00	-----
1938	1939, 1940	80,000	80,000.00	-----
1940	1941, 1942	89,000	89,000.00	-----
1942	1943, 1944	107,000	107,000.00	-----
1943	1945	41,000	41,000.00	-----
1946	1946-50	173,000	173,000.00	-----
1949	Period ending Mar. 31, 1950	25,000	25,000.00	-----
1950	Period ending Dec. 31, 1952	50,000	20,000.00	30,000.00
1947	For expenses of tenth conference, to be held in Stratford-on-Avon; available to Dec. 31, 1947.	4,000	4,000.00	-----
<b>Institute of Pacific Relations—international secretariat:</b>				
<b>Studies and surveys:</b>				
1938	For studies of issues involved in present situation in Far East, Feb. 15, 1938, to Dec. 31, 1940.	90,000	90,000.00	-----
1950	For a political and economic survey of southeast Asia, by Dr. V. Purcell, for period ending Nov. 30, 1950.	2,081	2,066.40	<sup>2</sup> 14.60
<b>Institute of Pacific Relations—American Council:<sup>1</sup></b>				
<b>For general expenses:</b>				
1931	For use in 1930	30,000	30,000.00	-----
1931	For use in 1931, 1932, 1933	60,000	60,000.00	-----
1933	Additional in 1933	20,000	20,000.00	-----
1933	For use in 1934	25,000	25,000.00	-----
1934	For use in 1935	25,000	25,000.00	-----
1935	For use in 1936, 1937, 1938	47,500	47,500.00	-----
1938	For use in 1939, 1940	30,000	30,000.00	-----
1940	For use in 1941, 1942	30,000	30,000.00	-----
1942	For use in 1943, 1944	30,000	30,000.00	-----
1943	For use in 1945	15,000	15,000.00	-----
1946	For use in 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950	60,000	60,000.00	-----
1950	For period ending Sept. 30, 1952	60,000	30,000.00	30,000.00
<b>For special projects and programs:</b>				
1934	Language School at Harvard University for intensive study of Russian language; 1934.	2,500	2,500.00	-----
1934	Development of instruction in Russian language at Columbia University; 1935.	5,000	5,000.00	-----
1935	Experiments in intensive teaching of Chinese language to English-speaking students, Jan. 1, 1936, to Dec. 31, 1938.	17,500	17,305.00	<sup>2</sup> 195.00
1939	To permit council to act as host and participate in 1939 study meeting of Institute of Pacific Relations; available to Dec. 31, 1939.	2,500	2,500.00	-----
<b>English translations of source material on Chinese history:</b>				
1939	July 1, 1939, to June 30, 1942	31,700	31,649.09	<sup>2</sup> 50.91
1942	July 1, 1942, to June 30, 1945	56,100	56,067.45	<sup>2</sup> 32.55
1945	July 1, 1945, to Dec. 31, 1946	25,000	25,000.00	-----
1946	July 1, 1946, to June 30, 1947	25,000	24,997.42	<sup>2</sup> 2.58
1943	Sept. 1, 1943, to June 30, 1944	4,000	4,000.00	-----
1944	To enable Columbia University to invite Chinese professors to join faculty for 1 year during the period—			
	July 15, 1944, to Oct. 14, 1946	5,500	5,500.00	-----
	July 15, 1944, to Jan. 15, 1947	5,500	4,978.13	<sup>2</sup> 521.87
1948	Annual review of American, Far Eastern policy; available to Aug. 31, 1949.	7,000	7,000.00	-----
1949	Toward the expenses of Prof. Owen Lattimore's attendance at the New Delhi conference; available to Jan. 31, 1950. <sup>3</sup>	1,500	1,500.00	-----
1949	Expenses of L. K. Rosinger's attendance at New Delhi conference; available to Jan. 31, 1950.	2,000	2,000.00	-----
1950	Travel and living expenses of Prof. Tadao Yanai-hara; available to July 31, 1950.	300	285.35	<sup>2</sup> 14.65
	<b>Total</b>	1,721,859	1,658,546.79	63,312.21

<sup>1</sup> The name of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations was changed in 1946 to the American Institute of Pacific Relations.

<sup>2</sup> Lapsed.

<sup>3</sup> This grant was made to the Johns Hopkins University.

Prepared Sept. 19, 1951.

Persons who received Rockefeller Foundation fellowship awards who spent some of their fellowship period in study and training at the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Name of fellow and last address on foundation's file	Period of fellowship	Field of interest
Barnett, Robert W., Chief, Economics Branch of the Division of Chinese Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D. C.	Sept. 1, 1939 to Aug. 31, 1940....	International relations.
Belshaw, Horace, Director, Rural Welfare Division, Food and Agricultural Organization of UN, 1201 Connecticut Ave., Washington, D. C.	Jan. 13 to Nov. 12, 1936.....	Economics.
Bonnet, Henri, Ambassador from France to the United States, 2221 Kalorama Rd., Washington, D. C. <sup>1</sup>	Aug. 11 to Sept. 11, 1936.....	International relations.
Broek, Jan O. M., professor of geography, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.	Sept. 15 to Dec. 31, 1942.....	Economic geography.
Hanwell, Norman D. (deceased 1941).....	June 10, 1938 to June 9, 1939.....	International relations.
Norman, Egerton H., Minister, Canadian Liaison Mission, Tokyo, Japan.	Sept. 15, 1936 to June 18, 1939....	Chinese and Japanese languages.
Radtus, Walter A., Director, Office of Transport and Communications Policy, Department of State, Washington, D. C.	Jan. 11, 1938 to Jan. 10, 1939....	International relations.
Rosinger, Lawrence K., editorial and consulting work for Prentice-Hall and McGraw Hill; home address, 2775 Morris Ave., Bronx, N. Y.	Sept. 12, 1939 to Sept. 11, 1940..	Do.
Taylor, George E., Director, Far Eastern and Russian Institute, University of Washington, Seattle, Wash.	Aug. 1, 1941 to Aug. 31, 1942.....	Do.

<sup>1</sup> Part of fellowship period spent in attendance at the California Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, held in August 1936.

In addition, fellowships were awarded to Russell G. Shiman, and William Holland, who were at the time members of the staff of the American Council of Pacific Relations.

Name of fellow and last address on foundation's file	Period of fellowship	Field of interest
Shiman, G. Russell, consultant economist, Oldwick, N. J.	Aug. 1, 1937 to Jan. 31, 1938.....	International relations in the Far East.
Holland, William L., secretary-general, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1 East 54th St., New York, 22, N. Y.	Sept. 27, 1932 to June 17, 1933....	Economics (studied in Europe).

Prepared: Sept. 19, 1951.

Mr. MORRIS. And on the question of Mr. Rosinger's books, I would like this to go into the record, too, without its being read.

Senator SMITH. What is that?

Mr. MORRIS. That is from the New York Times.

Mr. HOLLAND. May we just know what this particular review is?

Senator SMITH. We will show it to you.

Mr. HOLLAND. If it is the one I think it is, it will be all right. We can identify it quickly. This is the New York Times magazine, is it?

Yes, I know it. Thank you.

Senator SMITH. These reviews may go in the record.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits 333 and 334," and are as follows:)

[Daily Worker, August 3, 1945, p. 11]

## ROSINGER'S CHINA BOOK AIDS DEMOCRATIC FORCES

(By Samuel Sillen)

Interest in China as the pivot in the war against Japan has been registered during the past year in a number of stimulating books by Harrison Forman, T. A. Bisson, Owen Lattimore, Edgar Snow, and other American observers. These authors, riddling the heavy fog of Kuomintang censorship, have played an important part in enlightening the American reading public on the Far East. They have persuasively refuted the lies of Lin Yutang regarding the Chinese Communists. They have urged a consistent American policy of encouragement to the democratic, unifying forces in China as the key to a quick victory in the Pacific.

To the impressive list of informed books on the Far East may now be added Lawrence K. Rosinger's scholarly, readable volume, *China's Crisis* (Knopf, \$3). Mr. Rosinger, Far East research associate of the Foreign Policy Association, is the author of another valuable study, *China's Wartime Politics: 1937-44*. A young man (30), his reputation as a sound, level-headed commentator will be further strengthened by the new book.

For *China's Crisis* is a carefully documented analysis which maintains the right balance between a hard-hitting criticism of the Kuomintang and a firm defense of our alliance with the Chinese people. Rosinger warns that "No matter how disheartening current developments in China may be, it is in the fundamental self-interest of the United States to work for a strong progressive China and not to write off China as a factor in the war." His book, therefore, avoids a cynical approach as well as an overoptimistic attitude toward the serious problems in the Far East.

The central problem, as Rosinger says, is "whether China's war effort shall continue and gather strength or disintegrate further, as it is doing at present." Clearly, the answer to this question deeply affects the speed and thoroughness with which Japanese imperialism is defeated.

In the months since Rosinger wrote his preface (dated April 11), the situation inside China, and also in regard to certain American policies toward China, has further deteriorated rather than improved. This lends added urgency to Rosinger's conclusion that China can overcome her crisis only through democracy, which is the precondition of unity.

Rosinger warns that Chungking's "present policy of suppression, a wartime version of civil-war practices prevailing before resistance, is a sterile course of action. It can lead only to ineffectiveness in carrying on the struggle with Japan and to internal strife after Japan's defeat. The alternative policy, which Chungking has so far rejected, is to recognize the legal equality of all groups, to incorporate them at once in a genuine coalition government, and to institute democratic political, economic, and military reforms for the country at large."

This means, in the first place, that Chungking must abandon its reactionary policy toward the Chinese Communists. On the Chinese Communists, Rosinger makes several important observations. He emphasizes that they are "deeply rooted in Chinese political life and their political stability and power arise from inside China." At the same time he very properly corrects the widespread impression that the Chinese Communists are not really Communists, but "agrarian democrats." This does not, of course, alter the fact that, while their ultimate desire is for a Socialist China, the Communists support a progressive program within the framework of a modified capitalism.

Rosinger concludes his book on this note, distinctly worth repeating today: "There is dynamite in Chinese politics, and we may have to make at short notice many crucial decisions, affecting our relations not only with China, but also with the Soviet Union. It will, therefore, be necessary for the United States to be ready to implement or modify its policies rapidly. The greater our flexibility, the greater will be our ability to promote progressive trends in wartime and postwar China."

The main point to be remembered, he says, above all transitory developments, is that "only a progressive China working in harmony with its Allies in war and peace can serve the interests of this country."

Rosinger's book ably supports this thesis, which needs to be driven home to the American people at this hour.

*China's Crisis* is a serious contribution to our understanding of the Far East, an important challenge to those policy makers who are supporting the divisive, reactionary forces in China.

## ASIA IN UPHEAVAL

THE STATE OF ASIA, BY LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER, REVIEWED BY RICHARD L. WALKER

The first two chapters are the exceptions to the uniform excellence of the volume. These are by Mr. Rosinger, author of *China's Crisis* and other books, whose work does not measure up to that of his associates. In his introductory summary chapter he does not point out the pattern of an integrated Communist movement in southeast Asia—a pattern which emerges clearly from a reading of the other chapters. Nor does he consider communism a really serious threat. He fails to note the continued close dependence on the west of the new states for whom national self-determination has not proved a panacea, a dependence which gives them a very vital stake in the cold war.

In his chapter on China Mr. Rosinger's analysis of the Communist regime, based on published plans, regulations, constitutions, proclamations, Communist statistics, and percentage figures, is comparable to an attempt to describe the Government of the Soviet Union on the basis of the 1936 constitution. The violent anti-United States propaganda, militarism, Soviet imperialism, and penetration, and the compulsory apparatus to which Mr. Rosinger gives little attention were all apparent even in the honeymoon period to which he limits himself.

He leaves with the reader the impression that the peaceful intentions and uniformly excellent plans of the Chinese Communists were unfortunately disrupted by the promotion of the war in Korea in which they had no part. Mr. Rosinger uses loose terminology, presentation of false alternatives, and innuendo to present a one-sided picture of the Chinese Communist regime. We wonder, for example, just who are the "politically conscious" Chinese and Asians to whom he refers so frequently or just what is a "right-wing Asian point of view."

Mr. Rosinger's chapters, however, must not be allowed to detract from the high standards set by the other writers. *The State of Asia* is a real contribution to our understanding of a vitally important area in the world of today and tomorrow.

Mr. MORRIS. There are several other things we would like to clear up.

Mr. HOLLAND, are you presently the secretary of the China Aid Council?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am the honorary secretary. Whether I am or not, I am in doubt, because the organization is in—I don't know what you would call it, but it is not active. It has ceased operating.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator McCarran received a letter on the letterhead of the China Aid Council, Inc., on October 9, 1951. On the letterhead the officers listed include a William L. Holland, secretary.

Mr. HOLLAND. That is true.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, are you acquainted with this letter that was written to Senator McCarran in connection with the testimony before this committee?

Mr. HOLLAND. May I see the letter?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, sir; I am acquainted with this. I had not seen this letter before, but I did see a preliminary draft which was discussed by some members of this organization.

Mr. MORRIS. Who prepared the draft?

Mr. HOLLAND. It was the work of several people. The president, Dr. Ernest Osborne, did some of it. A portion of it was prepared by Mrs. Edward C. Carter. And I think two or three paragraphs of it were drafted by me. And then the whole thing was discussed in a meeting—I have forgotten exactly when, probably a week or 10 days ago—of those people, plus three or four other members of the board, including Mr. Stanley Isaacs, of the New York City board, and Dr. Heaton and two or three others. And this meeting agreed that this letter should be sent to Senator McCarran, because they felt that references to the China Aid Council in earlier sessions of this sub-

committee hearing had given an incorrect impression, and particularly they felt the statement that it was a Communist front was seriously misleading and, in fact, highly unfair, because this has long been known as a reputable philanthropic organization, which is one of the original constituent agencies which made up United China Relief.

I don't want to take your time on this, Mr. Chairman, because Dr. Jessup, I think, gave a lengthy explanation of it the other day and it was reported somewhat in the press.

Mr. MORRIS. Don't you know, Mr. Holland, that this was originally a part of the American League for Peace and Democracy, which I think you will acknowledge was a Communist organization?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I have learned that the China Aid Council, at least an organization under that name, at an early date, I think prior to 1939, was in some way affiliated to this American League.

As to the second part of Mr. Morris' statement, I do not know, though I have heard it said, that the American League for Peace and Democracy was a Communist organization.

I might say that the China Aid Council ever since I have known it, which was since 1944, when I came in, and certainly ever since 1940, when it became a new organization, by the amalgamation of the American Committee for Chinese War Orphans and the old China Aid Council, has not been a Communist organization.

It could not conceivably have been recognized as the national constituent agency of United China Relief had it been a Communist organization, and I think you will see attached to that letter, sir, a letter from the national secretary of the United China Relief, which gives the facts, the financial statement, and indicates what a very valuable and substantial contribution the China Aid Council made to the war effort of China, all China.

This was during the war against Japan.

Senator WATKINS. I just glanced at that letter.

As I recall, part of it was objecting to the committee receiving evidence that reflects upon this council. You do not, certainly, take the position that we cannot take evidence that reflects on anybody here. We would never get anywhere in investigating.

Mr. HOLLAND. I agree, sir.

Senator WATKINS. That seems to be a protest against receiving such evidence.

Senator SMITH. You attempted to draw some distinction between "secretary" and "honorary secretary" when Mr. Morris asked you the question if you were not secretary.

Well, now, a simple answer to that would have been "Yes" or "No," would it not?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am perfectly willing to say "Yes," sir.

Senator SMITH. Now, for some reason or other, you attempted to draw a distinction between a secretary and an honorary secretary and say that you were honorary secretary.

Is not your name shown on this letterhead as "secretary," without any suggestion that you are honorary or otherwise.

Mr. HOLLAND. It is, sir. You will also see on there that there is something called executive director at the bottom, and everyone knows that that title means the person who runs the organization.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was that person?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mildred Price.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you heard the testimony before the committee that Mildred Price is a Communist?

Mr. HOLLAND. I have heard the testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. And it is detailed testimony, is it not, by a person who was, according to the testimony, working very closely with Mildred Price in a Communist organization?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am not sure. Are you referring to Elizabeth Bentley's testimony?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Mr. HOLLAND. I saw it. It did not seem to establish that she was working with Mildred Price closely, but rather her sister, Mary Price.

Mr. MORRIS. Shall we read the testimony of Mildred Price?

Mr. SOURWINE. The testimony is in the record, Mr. Morris.

Mr. HOLLAND. I used the term "honorary secretary," because, as you know, I was a New Zealander and brought up in the literary tradition there, and the customary phrase was "honorary secretary."

Senator SMITH. How long have you been in America?

Mr. HOLLAND. Since 1930 or thereabouts.

Senator SMITH. Well, you know what a secretary is.

And you know your name was printed there as secretary, do you not?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, sir. And it is also clear from that letter that the executive secretary, who is called executive director, at the bottom of the page, there, is someone else. That was my sole purpose.

Senator SMITH. I do not see anything about executive secretary.

Mr. HOLLAND. I see executive director there.

Senator SMITH. That is Mildred Price.

Mr. HOLLAND. Which means the person who ran the office, sir.

Senator SMITH. We did not ask you about executive director.

We asked you where on there there is any reference made to honorary secretary.

Mr. HOLLAND. Sir, I am glad to withdraw the word "honorary" secretary, sir. My duties as secretary were simply to attend meetings and to sign minutes of the annual meeting once a year.

I received no compensation.

Senator SMITH. Then why were you so anxious to draw a distinction between a secretary and an honorary secretary?

Mr. HOLLAND. For the good reason, sir, that in most people's mind when you say "the secretary of an organization"—most people think it is the operating person, the one who runs the show, and in this case my duties were so nominal—now, I am not disassociating myself from the organization. I am glad to belong to it. But it is just as a matter of fact.

This is a reasonable statement, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you exceed your duties when you participated in the drafting of this letter?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, sir; because I am a member of the board and just like any of the other people.

Mr. MORRIS. Just a few things. Now, Mr. Chairman, I have here a handbill of the China Aid Council, which shows that it was at the time affiliated with the American League for Peace and Democracy. [Handing to witness.]

Mr. HOLLAND. May I just ask if there is any indication of the date to which this applies, and may I ask where it comes from? It is hard to tell what that is.

Is it an announcement of some meeting, or what?

Mr. MANDEL. I can say that there are dated materials that give that association, letterheads.

This one is not dated.

Mr. MORRIS. Why don't we get it? We can get it before the hearing is over.

Senator SMITH. I thought he asked you whether you had ever seen one of these before.

Do you know what it is?

Mr. HOLLAND. No.

Senator SMITH. Do you know where it came from?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. Do you know anything at all about it?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, sir. As I indicated, my association with this organization began in 1944, and there was absolutely no question of any affiliation with a communist organization.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could the record show that the witness' answers and the questions put to him were in connection with exhibit 100 in this record?

Senator SMITH. All right. Let the record so show.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Holland, we have asked you to supply a list of staff members of the IPR.

Mr. HOLLAND. I have prepared this. As you know, your request was just a few days ago.

Mr. MORRIS. I understand, Mr. Holland.

Mr. HOLLAND. And therefore I have brought you a great many pages giving you all the employees of the institute so far as my staff had time to go through the cards.

For the American IPR it covers all the people that we can get cards on for 1944 to 1951. For the international IPR it covers all we can get for the period 1943 to 1951.

For the earlier years, in a reasonably short time I can give you most of the other information.

I have indicated here not merely the list of names but the date when their employment began, the date when it ended, and the nature of their position. I am glad to turn that over.

Mr. MORRIS. And is it your testimony that this compilation is accurate, to the best of your knowledge?

Mr. HOLLAND. It is. It has been compiled by members of my staff, but I believe it to be accurate as far as I can judge.

Mr. MORRIS. May that not be introduced into the record at this time, Mr. Chairman, but be turned over to the staff?

Mr. HOLLAND. Until it is complete.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, I would like introduced into the record, Mr. Chairman, this letter, which is on the letterhead of the China Aid Council, over the signature of Ernest G. Osborne, president, to the Honorable Patrick McCarran, United States Senate, Washington, D. C., dated October 9, 1951.

This purports to be a protest on the part of the China Aid Council against certain statements made before this committee.



Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, show that again to the witness. I want to be sure that the record shows that this is the letter concerning which, the presiding officer, Senator Smith, questioned him, and concerning which there was some previous testimony as to his name appearing on the letterhead as secretary.

Senator SMITH. What is the date of that?

Mr. HOLLAND. October 9, 1951.

Senator WATKINS. That is the letter you were talking about?

Mr. HOLLAND. I saw an earlier draft discussed at this meeting. I had nothing to do with the sending or the typing and have never seen this letter before. But substantially, it seems to be the same as the draft which we discussed.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew enough about it to know that it had an enclosure with it, financial statements, and so forth, because you volunteered that.

Mr. HOLLAND. Certainly.

Senator WATKINS. I wish the witness would pick out that part which he said he drafted.

Mr. HOLLAND. I am not sure I can identify it, because it was discussed and rehashed so many times in the meeting.

Mr. MORRIS. There are quite a few members of the Institute of Pacific Relations on that board, are there not, Mr. Holland?

Why don't you quickly run through that list of members there and tell us which ones are active in the IPR?

Mr. CROSSMAN. Which is he to do first?

Mr. MORRIS. I am sorry.

Mr. CROSSMAN. He can't do both.

Senator WATKINS. That is right. We understand.

Mr. HOLLAND. I will just mark in pencil down the side those parts which I had a substantial part in drafting.

Senator SMITH. Just the initials.

Mr. HOLLAND. The point is that they were subsequently revised and discussed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, for convenience in the record, would you wish to order that when this letter is printed in the record the paragraphs which have been initialed should be printed in italics?

Senator SMITH. Or otherwise identified. That will be all right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Very good.

Mr. HOLLAND. I have marked, Mr. Chairman, the parts that I distinctly remember. It is certainly possible that I had some small part in the discussion of the other things, but the final draft was done outside my office and without my knowledge. This does not necessarily mean that I wrote exactly those words, but the substance of them I helped to draft, mostly orally, in the meeting.

Senator WATKINS. Did you have anything to do with the last paragraph?

Mr. HOLLAND. May I just see it again, sir?

I do not believe, sir, that I drafted this, but I remember distinctly taking part in the discussion of it, and on the whole I agree.

Senator WATKINS. It represents your idea?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, sir; as in this particular case.

Senator SMITH. Let me ask you one or two questions. I notice on the letterhead beside your name, being shown as secretary, is the name of Mrs. Edward C. Carter.

Is that the name of the Mrs. Carter who testified?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; it is, sir.

Senator SMITH. I notice also several other members mentioned here. Israel Epstein?

Mr. HOLLAND. That is the man we have been talking about, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. How about John K. Fairbank? Is he active in the IPR?

Mr. HOLLAND. He is a trustee of the institute.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Julian R. Friedman?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Friedman, as you know from earlier testimony, wrote a report for the IPR. I am not sure whether he is a member or not.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Talitha Gerlach?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am not sure. I don't know whether she is a member.

Senator SMITH. You know her, do you?

Mr. HOLLAND. I met her in meetings here. I might say, Mr. Chairman, that I have a short statement which I prepared myself on the China Aid Council, which I would be glad to give at another time if you wish.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Philip J. Jaffe?

Mr. HOLLAND. Jaffe has been quite active on the board.

Mr. MORRIS. Arthur Upham Pope?

Mr. HOLLAND. He has been completely inactive.

Mr. CROSSMAN. I am not sure about that "Jaffe has been quite active on the board."

Mr. SOURWINE. If you please, you are not under oath, sir.

Mr. CROSSMAN. No; but I am entitled to object to the form of questions.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are objecting to an answer.

Senator SMITH. Will you read back the last portion, Mr. Reporter? (The reporter read, as directed.)

Mr. HOLLAND. To make that clear, when I said Jaffe has been quite active on the board, I meant, of course, on the board of the China Aid Council.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, Mr. Chairman, the record shows that counsel objected to the answer of the witness and put words in the witness' mouth, and the witness has now corrected his testimony in accordance with the instructions of his counsel.

I don't believe that is proper, and I would ask the Chair to rule on it.

Mr. CROSSMAN. Well, Senator, I don't think that is a correct statement of the thing.

I think that Mr. Holland was thrown off, and when he said that Jaffe was a member of the board, he had obviously forgotten what the previous question had been. He has now made a correct answer.

Senator SMITH. A member of the board of what?

Mr. HOLLAND. Of the China Aid Council. There is no ambiguity here at all, really, because he has never been a member of the board of the IPR.

Senator SMITH. Has he been a member of the IPR?

Mr. HOLLAND. He has been a member of the IPR.

Senator SMITH. Has he participated in the meetings of the IPR?

Mr. HOLLAND. To the extent I indicated earlier. He has attended one conference and has contributed.

Senator SMITH. Has contributed to the IPR publications?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I meant contributed to the IPR.

Sentor SMITH. Has he ever contributed to its publications?

Mr. HOLLAND. I can't be sure of that, sir. It is conceivable that he has written a book review for us, but I don't recall.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Mildred Price?

Mr. HOLLAND. Would you ask your question precisely?

Mr. MORRIS. Was Mildred Price active as a member of the institute?

Mr. HOLLAND. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Is she a member?

Mr. HOLLAND. She is a member but has taken practically no part in meetings and has never served on committees or been a trustee or employee and in fact has had only a very slight connection with any part of the work of the organization.

Mr. MORRIS. Has she been to the office?

Mr. HOLLAND. She has been to the office a number of times to see me in connection with the work of the China Aid Council.

Mr. MORRIS. Has Helen Schneider been a member of your staff?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; Miss Helen Schneider was a member of our staff in the capacity of production manager or distribution manager, I think the title was, of our magazine Pacific Affairs.

I mean, you will find the dates given in the second part of that statement, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, she is listed in here?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; with the dates and the nature of the job. I may say she worked in the international secretariat, that is to say, the international part of the IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that at the same time she was an employee of Amerasia?

Mr. HOLLAND. No. The reason was that she was very unhappy in Amerasia and let us know that she would like to have a change of job, and my colleague, the then editor of Pacific Affairs, Mr. Lilienthal, talked to her one day and found that she was willing to take a job as proofreader and distribution manager, and so engaged her as his assistant on the magazine.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to start another point.

I am offering this letter from the China Aid Council, dated October 9, 1951, for the record.

Senator SMITH. It is received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 335" and is as follows:)

CHINA AID COUNCIL, INC.,  
AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR CHINESE WAR ORPHANS  
AND CHINA CHILD WELFARE,  
New York, N. Y., October 9, 1951.

HON. PATRICK MCCARRAN,  
*United States Senate, Washington, D. C.*

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: I have learned with astonishment and indignation that in the hearings of your Subcommittee on Internal Security, statements have been made by Elizabeth Bentley and others to the effect that the China Aid Council was a communist or communist-front organization. These

misrepresentations have been repeated in connection with Dr. Jessup. On behalf of the Board of the China Aid Council I desire to make the following statement:

*The China Aid Council (CAC) is a well-known and reputable philanthropic organization. It has functioned since 1941 as one of the original constituent agencies of United China Relief (later named United Service to China, Inc.) It was formed by the amalgamation in 1940 of an earlier organization known as the China Aid Council with The American Committee for Chinese War Orphans.*

*The CAC was purely a non-partisan welfare, health, and educational organization, and at no time did it interest itself or take part in political activities or advocate communist policies.*

*The CAC devoted itself to two main lines of aid to China, first and principally, to support of orphanages and other child welfare activities in all parts of China; secondly, to support of the several International Peace Hospitals in the communist areas of Northwest China. These activities were part of a wide-spread American movement to give aid to all Chinese areas and groups in the struggle against Japanese aggression.*

*As a recognized agency of UCR the CAC derived nearly all its funds from UCR and regularly had its program and budgets approved by the officers and directors of UCR. During the three years in which UCR was part of the National War Fund, the CAC programs and budgets were also included in the total UCR budgets approved by the officers of the National War Fund. The relationship of CAC to UCR is confirmed in the enclosed letter and summary of expenditures submitted by Mr. B. A. Garside, principal executive officer of UCR throughout its existence.*

*As will be seen from the enclosed auditor's summaries of the CAC funds sent to various institutions in China, the amounts going to Nationalist areas were considerably in excess of those sent to Communist areas.<sup>1</sup>*

Mildred Price served very capably and devotedly as Executive Secretary of CAC from September 1939 to May 1950. At no time did the Board members of CAC see anything in her administration of the CAC, or in her conduct or conversation to suggest that she was a communist. Many of them had ample opportunities to observe her work at close hand and to know her personally and never found any reason to suspect her of partisanship or of trying to use the CAC for communist purposes or as a communist front. It is their conviction that she is not a communist and that she is a loyal American citizen.

In the spring of 1949 a request came from China that all CAC expenditures should be henceforth channeled exclusively through Mme. Sun Yat-sen's China Welfare Fund. This request led to disagreements in the Board of CAC but Mildred Price together with a majority of the Board refused to accede to this demand and insisted that the CAC should maintain its traditional policy of giving aid to both nationalist and communist areas solely on the basis of human need. As a result this remained the policy of the CAC and Mme. Sun requested that no further funds be sent by the CAC to her organization.

After the communists came to power in the Chinese mainland, conditions were such that it became impracticable for the CAC to continue supporting the institutions which it had previously aided. It therefore decided to suspend operations indefinitely.

As loyal citizens and representatives of a reputable philanthropic body which has given funds impartially to relieve human suffering and help orphaned children in China, we wish emphatically to repudiate the unfounded and insulting allegations that the CAC was a communist or subversive organization.

By allowing such a base allegation to go without question into the testimony, your Subcommittee has done us and the CAC a grave injustice. As a matter of elementary fairness we ask you to acknowledge this letter publicly and to see that it is inserted in the record of your subcommittee's hearings together with the enclosed letter from Mr. Garside and the attached financial statements.

Very truly yours,

ERNEST G. OSBORNE, *President.*

EGO:kl  
Enclosures (3)

<sup>1</sup> Italics were indicated by initials WLH.

UNITED SERVICE TO CHINA, INC.,  
New York, N. Y., August 17, 1951.

Dr. ERNEST G. OSBORNE,  
President, China Aid Council,  
New York, N. Y.

DEAR DR. OSBORNE: The enclosed tabulation shows that during the ten-year period between January 1, 1941, and December 31, 1950, the amount expended by the China Aid Council in carrying on its work in China, as reported to this organization, was \$5,111,612.01.

Of this amount, approximately four million dollars was spent by CAC during the years of World War II in carrying on its services, with major emphasis on child welfare, in all accessible parts of China, and among all classes, creeds, and parties.

The remainder was expended after the war on similar forms of aid to the Chinese people as they attempted to rebuild their war-shattered country—an attempt that has now been tragically halted by Communist aggression.

During the past decade China Aid Council rendered services of great and permanent value to the Chinese people and to the cause of Chinese-American friendship and cooperation. We earnestly hope that further opportunities for such cooperative efforts may again arise.

Sincerely yours,

B. A. GARSIDE,  
Executive Vice President.

Enc.

UNITED SERVICE TO CHINA  
(Formerly United China Relief)

NEW YORK, N. Y.

*Summary of expenditures from funds raised through united efforts of UCR-USC and member agencies, Jan. 1, 1941–Dec. 31, 1950, by China Aid Council*

Year	(1) For China program			(2) Administration and promotion—received from UCR-USC	Grand totals
	Received by CAC direct	Received from UCR-USC	Total		
1941 <sup>1</sup> .....	\$40,528.43	\$11,713.72	\$52,242.15	\$15,511.23	\$67,753.38
1942.....	22,814.68	664,493.73	687,308.41	16,062.98	703,371.39
1943.....	10,637.30	903,096.50	913,733.80	15,970.90	929,704.70
1944.....	18,970.63	1,079,526.04	1,098,496.67	18,689.31	1,117,185.98
1945.....	11,858.05	1,226,120.42	1,337,978.47	23,460.96	1,261,439.43
1946.....	12,163.98	675,204.95	688,368.93	26,797.90	715,166.83
1947.....	7,313.40	113,162.16	120,475.56	28,742.39	149,217.95
1948.....	37,468.24	78,472.25	115,940.49	19,878.34	135,818.83
1949.....	19,875.36	10,578.16	30,453.52	-----	30,453.52
1950 (special payment).....	181,630.07	4,763,367.93	4,944,998.00	165,114.01	5,110,112.01
		1,500.00	1,500.00	-----	1,500.00
Total.....	181,630.07	4,764,867.93	4,946,498.00	165,114.01	5,111,612.01

<sup>1</sup> Expenditures for 1941 are made up of the total received direct by the agency during the year, plus the remainder actually spent from UCR funds. They do not include any balance brought forward by CAC 1940, nor the balance it had in hand or in transit at the end of 1941.

*China Aid Council—financial report on 10 years of work, Dec. 31, 1938–Dec. 31, 1948*

Cash on hand, Jan. 1, 1939-----	\$1,011.61
Receipts (10-year period)-----	5,171,885.74
Total accounted for below-----	\$5,172,897.35
Disbursed for relief, rehabilitation, and education (10-year period)-----	\$4,975,150.59
Disbursed for administrative expenses-----	188,167.41
Total accounted for below-----	5,163,318.00
Relief funds on hand Dec. 31, 1949-----	9,579.35
Breakdown of receipts:	
1. From United Service to China:	
(a) Contributions for China work-----	\$4,779,946.71
(b) Toward administrative expenses-----	141,325.12
2. China Child Welfare-----	7,000.75
3. Direct contributions-----	7,000.75
4. Benefits and merchandise sales-----	32,964.67
Total-----	5,171,885.74

## Breakdown of disbursements:

## To China:

1. China Welfare Fund (formerly China Defense League) <sup>1</sup> -----	\$1,952,666.28
2. Yu Tsai School for Talented Children-----	166,476.89
3. Nutritional Aid Council-----	8,460.23
4. Children's work in Nationalist China <sup>2</sup> -----	2,844,740.72
5. Miscellaneous-----	2,806.47
	4,975,150.59

## In United States of America:

Includes operating expenses such as sal- aries, employment retirement plan, traveling, and miscellaneous office ex- penses-----	188,167.41
Total-----	5,163,318.00

<sup>1</sup> Includes International Peace Hospitals, Cave Nurseries, CWF administrative expenses.<sup>2</sup> Includes Madame Chiang's orphanages, YWCA nurseries, Canton Children's Center, Hsiang Shan's Children's Home, Peiping Yu Ying Tang.

This statement was prepared by the auditor of the China Aid Council, Mr. Joseph Robbins, 505 Fifth Avenue, New York.

Mr. MORRIS. There is one thing I would like to mention here, before we conclude for the day: that Senator McCarran has received from the State Department a copy of the transcript of the October 6, 7, and 8 round table discussion on far eastern policy held in the Office of the Secretary of State.

We have hurriedly looked that thing through, Mr. Chairman. I do know, however, that the list of questions that is being discussed by the conferees is not given in full, and in running through the transcript quickly, I see that there is no compilation of the questions.

So I was wondering if the chairman would authorize a request of the State Department that that list of questions to which the people at the conference, the conferees, addressed themselves be made available to this committee.

Senator SMITH. All right.

It is so ordered.

Mr. MORRIS. And, Mr. Chairman, as you can see, we have only gotten through a very little of this proposed hearing today, and I would like to know when we can resume again.

Senator SMITH. We have another hearing tomorrow, our Judiciary Committee does.

Mr. MORRIS. And Friday we have another hearing planned here.

It would have to be some day next week, then, Mr. Holland.

Senator SMITH. You will have to have some time to look through this, because it may be more or less burdensome in getting down through it.

You can advise him when you are ready as much in advance as possible, so that he can arrange his affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. I have always tried to do that, Mr. Chairman.


Senator SMITH. Have you anything else this afternoon?

Mr. MORRIS. Nothing else this afternoon, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SMITH. Then we can recess until further call.

(Whereupon, at 5:15 p. m., the hearing was recessed subject to the call of the Chair.)







So  
 the S  
 at th  
 able  
 Se  
 It  
 M  
 gotte  
 woul  
 Se  
 Com  
 M  
 It  
 Se  
 this,  
 thro  
 Y  
 poss  
 M  
 Se  
 M  
 Se  
 (V  
 call

## INDEX TO PART IV

NOTE.—The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organization in this index

### A

	Page
Acheson, Dean	982, 1038, 1040-1042, 1049, 1065, 1067, 1068, 1075, 1112, 1113, 1115, 1117, 1118, 1123, 1125, 1126, 1131-1133, 1145, 1149
Adler, Solomon	1027, 1218
Adloff, Richard	1222
AEC ( <i>see</i> U. S. Atomic Energy Commission).	
A. F. L. ( <i>see</i> American Federation of Labor).	
AIPR Research Committee	1220, 1221
Airport Hotel (Seimchan, Soviet China)	1106
Alexander & Baldwin	1217, 1219
Alexander, Rt. Hon. A. V.	1216
Alexander, Wallace M.	1217, 1219
Allen, Edward W.	995, 1219
Allen, G. C.	1221
Allen, Hilen, Frouds & DeGarmo	995
Allen, Raymond B.	1219
Allied Powers	1027, 1030, 1239
All Souls College (Oxford)	1216
Alsberg, Dr. Carl L.	1216, 1219
AMCO ( <i>see</i> Institute of Pacific Relations, American Council).	
Amerasia	955, 1155, 1203, 1228, 1229
American Bank Note Co.	1219
American Committee for Chinese War Orphans	1241, 1246, 1247
American Council of Learned Societies	1220
American Cyanamid Co.	996, 1216, 1219
American Embassy (Hong Kong)	1120
American Embassy (London)	1037
American Embassy (Nanking)	1026, 1027
American Federation of Labor (AFL)	1075, 1100, 1102, 1104, 1137
American Foreign Power Co.	1217
American Friends of the Chinese People	1154, 1155, 1160-1164, 1166
American Hawaiian Steamship Co.	1219
American Institute of Pacific Relations ( <i>see</i> Institute of Pacific Relations, American Council).	
American League for Peace and Democracy	1078, 1241, 1242
American President Lines	1217, 1220
American Radio Association	946
American-Russian Institute	988, 1220
American Trust Co.	1216
American Volunteer Group (Flying Tigers)	1125, 1126, 1149
Anderson, Wrenn & Jenks (Honolulu)	1220
Anglo-Chinese College (Foochow)	996
AP ( <i>see</i> Associated Press).	
Armed Services Committee (House)	1026, 1041, 1049, 1064
Army Military Mission (China)	1026, 1069
Army War College	1132
Asia	1136
Asiatic Fleet (U. S.)	995
Asiaticus (Heinz Moeller) (Hans Mueller)	973, 974, 1012
Associated Press (AP)	1094, 1132, 1142, 1172
Atherton, Frank C.	1217, 1227
Atkinson, Brooks	1229

	Page
Atkinson, Ellen Van Zyll De Jong	1004, 1083, 1034, 1149, 1150
Atlantic Monthly	1136, 1230
Atlantic Monthly Press	1136
Atlantic Pact	1065
Atomic Energy Commission ( <i>see</i> U. S. Atomic Energy Commission).	
Austern, Hilda ( <i>see</i> Hilda Austern Bretholtz).	
Australian Broadcasting Commission	1216
Australian Institute of International Affairs	1215, 1236
Australian Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.	1215
Axis	1015, 1104

## B

Baker, Newton D.	1216, 1219
Baldwin ( <i>see</i> Alexander & Baldwin).	
Baldwin, Hanson	1229
Balemuth, Louis	1218
Ballentine, Joseph W.	1147, 1222, 1223
Bank of America	1217
Bank of California	1217
Bank of China	1161
Bank of Hawaii	1217
Bankers Club	1148
Bankers Trust Co.	1217, 1220
Barmine, Gen. Alexander	1225
Barnard, Chester	1167, 1234-1236
Barnes, Joseph	980, 1108, 1193, 1197, 1210
Barnes, Kathleen	945
Barnett, Eugene E.	970, 971, 1219
Barnett, Robert W.	1152, 1236
Barr, General	1122
Beloff, Max	1222
Belshaw, Horace	957, 1216, 1222
Beltz, Edward W.	1219
Benes, President	1057
Bentley, Elizabeth	1202, 1218, 1242, 1246
Berlin University	1008
Berzin, General	1218
Bevin, Mr.	1061, 1132
Biddle, Francis	1101
Big Four	993
Biggerstaff, Knight	998
Binder, Carroll	1220
Bissell, Gen. Clayton	1004
Bisson, T. A.	957, 994, 995, 1017-1019, 1025, 1153, 1204, 1229, 1235, 1239
Blakeslee, George H.	1219
Bloch, Kurt	1222
Blumenthal, Annette	938
Boeke, J. H.	1222
Bolles, Blair	976
Bolton, Mrs. Frances P.	995, 1217, 1218
Book and Magazine Guild	941, 942, 945
Borchard, Edwin M.	1222
Borg, Dorothy	996, 1227
Borton, Hugh	1219
Rowman, Isaiah	1220
Boyer, Raymond	1000, 1001
Boyer, R. J. F.	1216
Bradley, General	1065
Bradley, Lt. Robert J.	998
Bretholtz, Hilda Austern	945, 956, 957, 998
Bricker, Governor	1098
British-American Tobacco Co.	1159, 1216
British Espionage Act	1033
British Foreign Office	1033
British Government	1118

Page		Page
1150	British Joint Chiefs of Staff	1033
1230	British Liberal Party	1216
1136	British Tories	1013
1065	Broad Street Club (New York City)	1233
	Brodie, Bernard	1144, 1147, 1148
	Broek, Jan O. M.	1222, 1236
1216	Bronx Warehouse	1174
1236	Brookings Institution	996, 1224
1215	Brooklyn Interracial Assembly	1105
1104	Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees	1104
	Brotherhood of Railroad Clerks	1104
	Brotherhood of Railway Carmen	1104
	Brotherhood of Teamsters (AFL)	1104
3, 1219	Browder, Earl	1012, 1088, 1090, 1099, 1106, 1108, 1224
	Brown Bros. & Co. (Philadelphia)	1220
1229	Brown, Harvey	1104
1218	Brown, Dr. Norman	1071
2, 1223	Brownell, Lincoln C.	1219
1217	Buck, J. Lossing	1221, 1222
1217	Buck, Pearl	1229
1161	Bucyrus-Erie Co.	996
1217	Budenz, Louis F.	1077-1110, 1112, 1165, 1170, 1218, 1224
1143	Bunche, Ralph	990, 993-995, 1036, 1215, 1220
7, 1220	Buss, Claude A.	1147
1225	Butterworth	1062, 1128
14-1236	Byrnes, James F.	1101

## C

	Cabinet ( <i>see</i> President's Cabinet).	
	CAC ( <i>see</i> China Aid Council).	
	California College	995
	California Committee on Un-American Activities	1162, 1229
16, 1222	California University	995, 1216, 1220
1219	Calkins, Robert D.	970, 971, 995, 1219
1057	Cambridge College (England)	1153
42, 1246	Canadian Friends of the Chinese People	1164, 1166
1008	Canadian Institute of International Affairs	1215, 1236
1218	Canadian Royal Commission	999, 1001
61, 1132	Canning, William	1168, 1169
1101	Carey	1075
993	Carnegie Corp.	1151, 1167, 1215, 1217, 1219, 1227
998	Carnegie Endowment for International Peace	1220
1220	Carnegie Foundation	1152, 1217
1004	Carr, Sam	999
235, 1239	Carter, Edward C.	937,
1219		957, 964-967, 982, 983, 985, 988, 994, 997, 998, 1002, 1012, 1013, 1153,
1222		1154, 1173-1175, 1182, 1185, 1187, 1189, 1190, 1195, 1197, 1199,
938		1207, 1208, 1210, 1213, 1219, 1231, 1240, 1243-1245.
1222	Carter, Mrs. Edward C.	1190
976	Case, Everett	1038, 1145, 1146, 1219
217, 1218	Castle & Cooke	1217, 1227
942, 945	Catholic Journal	1171
1222	Catlin, Farrish & Co.	1219
996, 1227	Central Bank of China	1159
1219	Chamberlain, Joseph P.	970, 1202, 1217, 1219
1220	Chamberlin, William Henry	1222, 1231
1000, 1001	Chan, Hansu ( <i>see</i> Chao-ting Chi).	
1216	Chang, C. M.	1222
1065	Chang, P. H.	1094
998	Chao-ting Chi (Hansu Chan)	1012, 1157-1163
6, 957, 998	Chapman, Agatha	1000, 1001
1098	Chase, Mr.	990
1159, 1216	Chase Bank	1151, 1217
1063	Chen, Han-seng	1012

	Page
Chen, K. P.	1216
Chen Li-fu	1094
Cheng, Chen	1087, 1094
Chennault, General	1024, 1025, 1031, 1086, 1087, 1126
Chi, Chao-ting (Hansu Chan)	1012, 1157-1163
Chiang Fa-kwel	1087
Chiang Mon-lin	1216, 1222
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations	1220
Chicago Tribune	1105
Chicago University	996, 1221, 1227
China Aid Council	1214, 1218, 1240-1249
China Defense League	1249
China Desk (State Department)	982
China Foundation	995
China Today	1155, 1157, 1162-1164, 1166
China Welfare Fund	1247, 1249
China white paper	1049, 1076, 1091, 1092
Chinese armies (pre-Pearl Harbor)	1125
Chinese Communist Army	1057, 1058, 1087
Chinese Communist People's Republic	1041, 1045, 1049, 1056-1058, 1061, 1063, 1065, 1070, 1083, 1119, 1131, 1133- 1135, 1158, 1226.
Chinese Eastern Railway	1225
Chinese guerrillas	1069
Chinese National Government Currency Stabilization Board	1158
Chinese Nationalist blockade	1068, 1119, 1133
Chinese Nationalist Government	950, 991, 992, 994, 1022, 1023, 1026, 1029, 1030, 1043, 1045, 1047, 1049, 1051-1058, 1064, 1067-1070, 1083, 1087, 1094, 1111-1126, 1132-1136, 1149, 1158, 1163, 1167, 1195, 1203, 1204, 1228, 1229, 1231, 1249.
Chinese Nationalist Navy	1068
Chou, Enlai	1010, 1094, 1214
Chung-Hsi, Pai	1087
Chungking government	990, 992
Churchill, Winston	1014, 1024, 1031, 1037, 1087
Church of the Master (New York City)	1106
CIO ( <i>see</i> Congress of Industrial Organizations).	
CIO News	995
City College ( <i>see</i> College of the City of New York).	
Civil Affairs Division (U. S. War Department)	995
Civil Service Commission (United States)	1033, 1034, 1149
Clarion	1000, 1001
Clark, Dwight L.	1219
Clark University	1219
Clayton, William	980, 981
Clubb, Edmund O. (J. E. N.)	974
Coe, Frank	980, 981, 985, 990, 992-995, 1218
Cohen, Jerome S.	1221
Colegrove, Kenneth W.	963, 1007, 1008, 1075, 1076, 1129, 1130, 1143, 1144, 1146-1148
Colgate University	1146, 1219
College of the City of New York (City College)	1169
Collins, Charles A.	1105
Columbia University	995, 996, 1154, 1169, 1216, 1219, 1220, 1227, 1237
Commerce Department	1104, 1106
Comité d'Etudes des Problèmes du Pacifique (France)	1215
Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy	1017
Commonweal	1171
"Communist" ( <i>see</i> Political Affairs).	
Communist International	1010, 1100
Communist Party	945-950, 954, 957, 962-968, 974, 977, 985-991, 1000-1034, 1037-1048, 1065-1110, 1114, 1116, 1118-1121, 1127-1129, 1131-1135, 1154, 1155, 1158, 1161, 1163, 1164, 1168-1170, 1191-1202, 1206, 1212, 1215, 1218, 1222, 1226-1231, 1234, 1235, 1239-1242, 1247
Communist Party (Canada)	1000, 1001,

Page		Page
1216	Communist Party (China)-----	950, 991,
1094	1009-1011, 1013, 1016, 1021-1024, 1026, 1029, 1030, 1041, 1048-1050,	
1094	1052, 1054-1058, 1060-1062, 1064-1067, 1069, 1070, 1082-1084, 1086,	
1126	1087, 1091, 1093, 1094, 1096, 1097, 1107, 1116, 1118, 1119, 1121, 1127-	
1163	1135, 1158, 1161, 1163, 1164, 1198, 1200, 1218, 1222, 1229, 1235, 1239	
1087	Communist Party (France)-----	1106, 1108
1222	Communist Party (Japan)-----	1072
1220	Communist Party (Korea)-----	1027
1105	Communist Party (Poland)-----	1003
1227	Communist Party (Russia)-----	1031,
1249	1044, 1045, 1049, 1050, 1058-1060, 1067, 1120, 1212	
1249	Communist Party (United States)-----	945-948,
982	954, 957, 963, 965-968, 974, 985-988, 1007, 1025, 1078, 1101, 1103,	
995	1108, 1168, 1170, 1192-1197, 1199, 1206, 1215, 1227-1229, 1234, 1242	
1166	Communist People's Republic Government-----	1041, 1045, 1049, 1056-
1249	1058, 1061, 1063, 1065, 1070, 1083, 1119, 1131, 1133-1135, 1158, 1226	
1692	Comstock, Ada L. ( <i>see</i> Mrs. Ada Comstock Notestein).	
1125	Condliffe, Dr. J. B.-----	1213, 1216, 1222
1087	Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO)-----	938-
041,	942, 945-947, 995, 1075, 1100-1102, 1104, 1137	
133-	Congress of Industrial Organizations (Eleventh Convention)-----	946
	Congress of the United States ( <i>see</i> United States Congress).	
1225	Connally, Senator Tom-----	1071, 1072
1069	Cooke ( <i>see</i> Castle & Cooke).	
1158	Coons, Arthur G.-----	994, 995, 1132, 1147
1133	Corbett, P. E.-----	994, 1216, 1222
950,	Cornell University-----	1167
049,	Council for Pan-American Democracy-----	995
136,	Council on African Affairs-----	1106
	Council on Books in Wartime-----	1136
068	Council on Foreign Relations (New York City)-----	1214, 1224
214	Counts, George S.-----	1219
087	County Court of Ottawa-----	1005
992	Cowles brothers-----	1104
087	Crawford, D. G.-----	1227
106	Crech-Jones, Arthur-----	1216
	Cressey, George B.-----	1222
995	Cromwell ( <i>see</i> Sullivan & Cromwell).	
	Curran, Joseph-----	1104
995	Currency Stabilization Board ( <i>see</i> Chinese National Government Currency	
149	Stabilization Board).	
001	Currie, Lauchlin-----	979-985, 987, 988
219	Curtis, John L.-----	1219
219	Curtis, Lionel-----	1216
981		
974		
218		
221	DaFoe, J. W.-----	1216
963,	Daily Worker-----	954,
148	955, 1012, 1017, 1024, 1077, 1084, 1088-1090, 1092, 1094, 1095, 1097,	
219	1099-1103, 1106, 1184, 1235, 1239.	
169	Darden-----	1167
105	Davies, John P.-----	1218
237	Davies, Joseph E.-----	1217
106	Davis, John Patton, Jr.-----	1021, 1022, 1025, 1079
215	Dean, Arthur H.-----	977, 1216, 1217, 1219
017	Dean, Mrs. Vera Micheles-----	976
171	DeCaux, Len-----	979, 990, 993, 995, 1194
	Decker, John W.-----	1147
00	Defense Department-----	1027, 1065
91,	DeGarmo ( <i>see</i> Edward W. Allen).	
29,	Delafield & Wood-----	1220
02,	Delany-----	1075
47	Democratic Convention (1944)-----	1097, 1099, 1100
01,	Democratic Party-----	1097-1100, 1220

## D

	Page
Democratic National Committee.....	1220
Dennett, Raymond.....	937-1005, 1166, 1219
Des Moines Register and Tribune.....	996, 1104, 1221
Dewey, Governor.....	1097, 1102, 1105
Dillingham, Walter F.....	1219
Dodd, Bella.....	1224
Dodge & Seymour.....	1220
Donovan, Gen. "Big Bill".....	1002
Dooman, Eugene C.....	980, 981, 1016
Douglas, William O.....	1100
Doull, Lieutenant.....	998
Downie, W.....	1216
Dubois, Cora.....	1129, 1130, 1146
Duclos, Jacques.....	1106, 1108, 1109
Duffield, E. S.....	1124
Duggan, Lawrence.....	1218
Duggan, Stephen P.....	1219
Dulles, John Foster.....	1197
Dumbarton Oaks.....	993, 995, 996, 1032, 1132

## E

East Asian Institute (Columbia University).....	1216, 1219
ECA ( <i>see</i> Economic Cooperation Administration).	
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.....	1161, 1162
Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA).....	1072, 1201
Economic Policy Committee.....	996
Eggleston, Sir Frederic.....	1216, 1222
Electric Bond & Share Co.....	1217
Elizayev.....	1154
Ellis Co., Wilbur.....	1217, 1227
Embick, General.....	1022, 1023, 1032, 1033
Emeny, Brooks.....	1220
Emerson, Rupert.....	980, 981, 994, 995, 1007, 1008, 1222
Employee loyalty investigation (State Department).....	1007
Enlai, Chou.....	1010, 1094, 1214
Epstein, Israel.....	1194, 1195, 1197, 1198, 1201, 1202
Espionage Act.....	1033, 1042

## F

Fahey, Col. Daniel D., Jr.....	995
Fahs, C. B.....	1222
Fairbank, John K.....	1025, 1147, 1245
Fairbank, Wilma.....	1025
Fairbanks, Mr.....	998
Fairchild, General.....	1022
Fa-kwei, Gen. Chiang.....	1087
Far Eastern.....	1192
Far Eastern Association.....	1214
Far Eastern Commission.....	1071, 1221
Far Eastern Survey.....	938, 949, 970, 971, 996, 1147, 1148, 1204, 1216, 1229
Farley, Hugh D.....	998
Farley, Miriam.....	938, 940, 945, 950, 952, 990, 992, 993, 996, 1192, 1202, 1203, 1209
Farrish ( <i>see</i> Catlin, Farrish & Co.).	
Fascist Party.....	946, 1102, 1104, 1105, 1108
Faymonville, Col. Philip R.....	980, 985, 988
FBI ( <i>see</i> Federal Bureau of Investigation).	
FEA ( <i>see</i> Foreign Economic Administration).	
Fearey, Robert A.....	1222
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).....	956
	1044, 1079, 1080, 1172, 1173, 1175-1180, 1183, 1186-1188, 1225
Federal Service ( <i>see</i> U. S. Government).	
Ferris, General.....	1030
Field, Frederick Vanderbilt (Frederick Spencer, Lawrence Hearn).....	940,
	947, 953-955, 970, 971, 980, 986, 990, 992-995, 1088, 1089, 1091-1094,
	1151, 1155-1157, 1160, 1162, 1164, 1177, 1179-1188, 1190, 1192, 1193,
	1199, 1203, 1208, 1209, 1217-1219, 1224, 1227-1229.

	Page
Field, Noel	1218
Finkelstein, Moses	1171, 1191
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.	1217
Fischl, Margaret	996
Fisher, Galen M.	1219
Fisher, Harold H.	1220
Fitch, George	1163
Fitch, Mrs. Geraldine	1163
Flanders, Ralph E.	1218
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy	996
<i>Flying Cloud</i> (steamship)	1067, 1132
Flying Tigers (American volunteer group)	1125, 1126, 1149
Fo, Sun	1021
Food Research Institute (Stanford University)	1219
Foreign Affairs	973
Foreign Affairs Committee (House)	1009, 1010, 1019, 1026, 1029
Foreign and Domestic Commerce Committee (House)	1026
Foreign Economic Administration (FEA)	980, 981, 994, 995, 1221
Foreign Policy Association (FPA)	976, 966, 1148, 1166, 1167, 1214, 1220, 1221, 1239
Foreign Relations (Chicago Council)	1220
Foreign Relations Committee (Senate)	1027, 1041, 1049, 1065, 1071, 1072, 1079, 1144
Forman, Harrison	1235, 1239
Forrestal, James	1122-1125, 1149
Forrestal Diaries	1122, 1123, 1124, 1125
Fortier, General	1062, 1133, 1137
Fortune	1221
Fosdick, Dr.	1038, 1039, 1050, 1054, 1056, 1063, 1129, 1145, 1146
Fourth Army Headquarters (Presidio)	988
FPA ( <i>see</i> Foreign Policy Association).	
Frank, Mark	1000, 1001
Franklin, William E.	998
Fraser, H. W.	1104
Friedman, Irving	1002
Friedman, Julian R.	1245
Friters, Gerard	1222
Froude ( <i>see</i> Edward W. Allen).	
Furnivall, J. S.	1222

## G

Garside, B. A.	1247, 1248
Geiger, Theodore	1218
General Electric Co.	1220
General Motors Export Corp.	1219
General Staff (U. S. War Department)	995, 1032
George, Daisy	1105
George, Harrison	1218
George Washington University	976, 996
Gerbode, Mrs. Frank A. (Martha)	965, 996, 1217
Gerig, Benjamin	1036
Gerlach, Talitha	1245
Gilchrist, Huntington	970, 971, 996, 1003, 1216, 1219
Goglidze, Sergei Arsenvich	1107
Golos, Jacob	1218
Goodrich, L. Carrington	1219
G. O. P. ( <i>see</i> Republican Party).	
Gordon, Eugene	1105
Gould, Randall	977, 1222
Gourou, Pierre	1216
Gouzenko	999
Grad, Andrew ( <i>see</i> Andrew Grajdanzev).	
Grady, Henry F.	1220
Grajdzanov, Andrew	957, 994, 995, 1153, 1236
Graves ( <i>see</i> Kizer & Graves).	



	Page
Graves, Mortimer.....	1220
Greenberg, Michael.....	1002
Greene, Jerome D.....	1216, 1217, 1219
Greene, Katrine R. C.....	945
Greenslade, Admiral John W.....	975
Griffin Philippines Mission.....	1120
Grew, Joseph B.....	980-985
Guam (U. S. Naval Government).....	996
Guffey, Joseph.....	1100
Guggenheim Foundation.....	1136
Guiliano.....	1178
Gull, E. M.....	1221

## H

Halsey, Admiral William F.....	1036, 1064, 1072
Hamilton, Maxwell.....	1071
Hancher.....	1167
Han-seng, Gen. Chen.....	1012
Hansu Chan ( <i>see</i> Chao-ting Chi).	
Harmon, Francis S.....	1219
Harper's magazine.....	1230
Harrison, George M.....	1104
Hart, Admiral T. C.....	994, 995
Hart, Thomas.....	1218
Harvard University.....	995, 1007, 1008, 1025, 1054, 1076, 1136, 1154, 1237
Harvard-Yenching Institute.....	1136
Hawaii University.....	996, 1227
Hazard, John N.....	1108
Hearn, Lawrence ( <i>see</i> Frederick Vanderbilt Field).	
Hearst Press.....	1189
Heaton, Claude E.....	1240
Heller, Mrs. Edward H.....	1220
Herald Tribune (New York City).....	1141, 1148, 1193
Herod, William R.....	1147, 1219
Hickenlooper, Senator.....	1079
Higginson & Co. ( <i>see</i> Lee, Higginson & Co.).	
Hilen ( <i>see</i> Edward W. Allen).	
Hillman, Sidney.....	1101
Hirohito, Emperor.....	994, 1016, 1019-1021, 1135
Hiss, Alger.....	980, 1032, 1194
Hiss, Donald.....	1079
Hitler, Adolph.....	1045, 1049, 1051, 1057, 1060, 1083, 1135
Ho Chi Minh.....	1031
Ho, Franklin.....	1222
Hoffman, Paul.....	1054, 1060
Holcombe, Arthur N.....	1144, 1147, 1148
Holland, William L.....	957, 1036, 1134-1250
Holmes, Julius.....	1037, 1042
Homer, Mrs. Dorothy Robinson.....	1106
Hoover, Herbert.....	1102, 1220
Hoover, J. Edgar.....	1173, 1176
Hoover War Library (Stanford University).....	1220
Hornbeck, Stanley K.....	980-983, 1032, 1178
Horne, Admiral F. J.....	997, 998
Hotel and Club Employees Union (AFL), Local 6, New York City.....	1105
Hot Springs Conference (IPR).....	968,
969, 975-980, 884, 986, 987, 989, 991-993, 995, 998, 1000, 1002, 1004,	
1005, 1207.	
Houghton, Mifflin Publishing Co.....	1117, 1148
Houk, John L.....	969
House Armed Services Committee.....	1026, 1041, 1049, 1064
House Committee on Foreign Affairs.....	1009, 1010, 1019, 1026, 1029
House Committee on Foreign and Domestic Commerce.....	1028
House of Commons.....	1061, 1132
House of Peers (Japan).....	1216

	Page
Howland, Charles P.....	1216, 1219
Ho Yin-ching.....	1094
Hsia, C. L.....	1229
Hsiang Shan's Children's Home (Peiping).....	1249
Hsu, Shuhsi.....	1221, 1222
Hubbard, L. E.....	1222
Huggins, G. Ellsworth.....	970, 971, 976, 1003, 1219
Hull, Cordell.....	980, 981, 982, 985
Hume, Edward H.....	1219
Hunton, Alpheus.....	1106
Hurley, Gen. Patrick.....	1022, 1214, 1229
Hu Shih.....	1216, 1222

## I

Ickes, Harold.....	1104
Independent Motion Picture Producers.....	1221
India-American Conference.....	1147, 1148, 1168
Indian Council of World Affairs.....	1215
Indian Legislative Assembly.....	1216
Inouye, Junnosuke.....	1216
Institute of International Education.....	1219
Institute of Pacific Relations.....	937- 942, 1004, 1013, 1014, 1032, 1033, 1035-1037, 1071, 1088, 1090, 1093, 1108, 1110, 1144-1148, 1150, 1153, 1155, 1158, 1160-1177, 1181-1188, 1191, 1199, 1200-1206, 1209, 1212-1225, 1227-1235, 1237, 1238, 1244- 1246.
Institute of Pacific Relations (American Council).....	937- 942, 945-951, 957-962, 968-984, 988-997, 1002, 1003, 1144-1148, 1150-1153, 1166-1168, 1171-1175, 1184, 1188, 1192, 1212-1225, 1227- 1235, 1237, 1238, 1244-1246.
Institute of Pacific Relations (British Council).....	1217
Institute of Pacific Relations (Canadian delegation).....	997, 998, 1217
Institute of Pacific Relations (Chicago office).....	938
Institute of Pacific Relations (Chinese Council).....	989, 1160, 1217, 1228
Institute of Pacific Relations (Education Committee).....	1221
Institute of Pacific Relations (Eighth Conference).....	1215, 1221
Institute of Pacific Relations (Eleventh Conference).....	1220, 1225
Institute of Pacific Relations (Fifth Conference).....	1221
Institute of Pacific Relations (Fourth Conference).....	1220
Institute of Pacific Relations (International Conference).....	1148, 1150-1152, 1216, 1228
Institute of Pacific Relations (International Finance Committee).....	976, 1147
Institute of Pacific Relations (International Program Committee).....	976, 1220
Institute of Pacific Relations (International Research Committee).....	976
Institute of Pacific Relations (Japanese Council).....	989, 1213, 1217
Institute of Pacific Relations (New York office).....	938, 942
Institute of Pacific Relations (Ninth Conference).....	968, 969, 975-980, 984, 986, 987, 989, 991, 992, 993, 995, 998, 1000, 1002, 1004, 1005, 1078, 1136, 1143, 1185, 1207, 1220, 1221.
Institute of Pacific Relations (Pacific Council).....	957, 971, 976-978, 995, 1003, 1145, 1184, 1215, 1216, 1225, 1226, 1235, 1237
Institute of Pacific Relations (Philippine Council).....	1215
Institute of Pacific Relations (San Francisco Bay region).....	976, 996, 1147, 1148, 1220, 1221
Institute of Pacific Relations (San Francisco Conference).....	939, 954, 995, 996, 1220
Institute of Pacific Relations (San Francisco office).....	939, 996
Institute of Pacific Relations (Seattle office).....	938
Institute of Pacific Relations (Seventh Conference).....	1221
Institute of Pacific Relations (Sixth Conference).....	1221
Institute of Pacific Relations (Soviet Council).....	1203, 1225
Institute of Pacific Relations (Third Conference).....	1221
Institute of Pacific Relations (Virginia Beach Conference).....	1162
Institute of Pacific Relations (Washington office).....	938, 939, 951, 955, 956, 984
Institute Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales (Geneva).....	996

	Page
Intelligence (Naval)-----	1080, 1081, 1112
Intelligence Branch (Royal Canadian Air Force)-----	999, 1001
Interdepartmental Psychological Warfare Committee (Canada)-----	999, 1000
Interior Department (United States)-----	1104
International Association of Machinists (AFL)-----	1104
International Business Machines Corp.-----	1217
International Civil Aviation Conference (Chicago)-----	996
International Conference (IPR)-----	1148, 1151, 1152
International Education Institute-----	1219
International General Electric-----	1151, 1217, 1219
International Labor Conference (Philadelphia)-----	995
International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg)-----	1221
International News Service (INS)-----	1142
International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission-----	995
International Peace Hospitals-----	1247
International Red Cross-----	1218
International Rotary-----	1213
International Secretariat-----	956, 957, 967, 978, 998, 1235
International Telephone & Telegraph Co-----	1217
International Workers Order-----	1103
International YMCA-----	1213, 1215
Iowa University-----	1167
Irwin, Mr-----	1141, 1142
Isaacs, Stanley-----	1240
Isbrandtsen Steamship Line-----	1067, 1133
Ishii, Viscount K-----	1216
Istoriî, Voprosy-----	1226
Ives, Senator-----	1197
Izvestia-----	1226

## J

Jackson, Mrs. Ada-----	1105
Jaffe, Philip J-----	956, 1156, 1157, 1161, 1162, 1164-1166, 1206, 1229, 1245
Jan, Lieutenant-----	998
Japan Institute of Pacific Relations-----	1215
Japanese Cabinet-----	1018
Japanese Diet-----	1018
Japanese Government-----	1019, 1072
Japanese House of Peers-----	1216
Japanese Liberal Party-----	1018
Japanese Progressive Party-----	1018
Japanese Social Democratic Party-----	1018
JCS ( <i>see</i> Joint Chiefs of Staff).	
J. E. N. ( <i>see</i> Edmund O. Clubb).	
Jenkins, Mrs-----	950
Jenkins, Shirley-----	940, 996
Jenks ( <i>see</i> Anderson, Wrenn & Jenks).	
Jessup Commission-----	1075
Jessup, Dr. Philip C-----	970,
971, 979, 985-989, 991-995, 1003, 1004, 1037-1039, 1046, 1054, 1056,	
1059, 1062-1065, 1068, 1075, 1113, 1114, 1118, 1119, 1128-1134, 1137,	
1138, 1145, 1216, 1219, 1227, 1228, 1247.	
Johns Hopkins University-----	996, 1136, 1220, 1237
Johnson, James B-----	1106
Johnson, Louis-----	1120
Johnstone, William C-----	938, 976, 980, 984, 990, 994, 996
Johnstone, Mrs. William C-----	996
Johnstone, William C., Jr-----	976
Joint Chiefs of Staff-----	1015-1017, 1021, 1023-1025, 1087, 1088, 1119
Joint Intelligence Committee-----	1015, 1022
Joint Strategic Survey Committee-----	1015, 1021, 1022
Joint War Plans Committee-----	1023
Jones, Jesse-----	1101, 1102, 1104, 1105
Jordan, Myra-----	1108
Judd, Congressman Walter-----	1027, 1071

## K

	Page
Kai-shek, Chiang	988,
992, 996, 1011-1015, 1017, 1021, 1023-1025, 1029-1031, 1045, 1047,	
1049, 1058, 1064, 1067-1069, 1082-1085, 1087, 1091, 1093-1096, 1109,	
1113, 1116, 1124, 1125, 1136, 1227.	
Kai-shek, Mme. Chiang	1249
Keesing, Felix M.	976, 996, 1220, 1222
Kennan, George	973, 1050-1052, 1128, 1129
Keppel, Frederick P.	1219, 1227
Kerensky, Alexander	962
Kerner, Robert J.	1222
Khan, Sir Mohammed Zafrullah	1216
Kilpatrick, William H.	1219
Kirby, E. Stuart	1222
Kirk, Grayson	970, 996, 1220
Kizer, Benjamin H.	979, 1147, 1219
Kizer, Carolyn	989, 996
Kizer & Graves (Spokane)	1219
Knight, Felix	1104
Knopf, Alfred	1167, 1239
Knowles, Col. Kennith	1108
Kohlberg, Alfred	974-978, 1203, 1204, 1228, 1229
Kremlin	1009, 1051
Krivitsky, General	1218
Kung, H. H.	1094
Kunzru, Pandit H. N.	1216
Kuomintang government	989,
991, 1030, 1056, 1083, 1085, 1086, 1090, 1093, 1094, 1097, 1197, 1227, 1239	
Kyodo News Agency (Japan)	1216

## L

Labour-Progressive Party	1000, 1001
Lamont, Thomas W.	1151, 1217, 1219
Lamont, Mrs. Thomas W.	1217
Lane, Clayton	1168, 1173, 1175, 1176, 1187, 1188, 1219
Langer, Paul	1222
Lapham, Lewis	1219
Lapin, Adam	1100
Larson, Ed.	1038
Lasker, Bruno	945, 996
Lattimore, Owen	938,
951, 963, 967, 970, 979, 988, 989, 991-994, 996, 1003, 1004, 1010-1017,	
1019-1021, 1025, 1027-1029, 1044-1047, 1049, 1050, 1054, 1060-1063,	
1066, 1067, 1069-1071, 1075, 1076, 1079, 1085, 1107, 1108, 1114, 1118,	
1119, 1123, 1130, 1131, 1133-1136, 1147, 1177, 1188, 1192, 1197, 1203,	
1210, 1219, 1227, 1228, 1233, 1235, 1237, 1239.	
Lattimore, Mrs. Owen (Eleanor)	951-953, 996, 1142, 1143, 1203, 1210, 1227, 1233
Lawson, William T.	1000
Leadership School (Young Communist League)	1000, 1001
League of Nations	996, 1003
League of Women Voters	1220
Lee, Duncan	1002, 1218
Lee, Higginson, & Co.	1216, 1219
Lee, Michael	997
Lee, Rosamund	938
Lenin	1089, 1108
Lever Bros. (London)	1151, 1217
Levy, Roger	1222
L'Heureux, H. J.	1003
Li, K. C.	1216
Liberal Party (British)	1216
Liberated Areas Branch (FEA)	995
Library of Congress	962, 969, 1172
Lieu, D. K.	1221, 1222
Life	1204, 1221

	Page
Li-fu, Chen	1094
Lilienthal, Philip E	1246
Lincoln, Abraham	994, 1099
Linebarger, Paul M. A	1222
Lin Yu-tang	1221, 1222, 1235, 1239
Lippmann, Walter	1098, 1230
Little, Brown & Co	1020, 1136
Lockwood, William W	937, 938, 945, 1185, 1219, 1230
London University	1009
Loomis, Charles F	997, 1182
Loudon	1161
Lovestone	1075
Lovett	1125, 1126
Lucas, General	1026, 1027
Luce, Henry R	1217, 1221
Ludden, Raymond	1026

## M

Macadam, Ivison	1159, 1160
MacArthur, Gen. Douglas	1018
	1036, 1042, 1046, 1062-1065, 1113, 1118-1120, 1137, 1138
MacArthur hearings	1113, 1118-1120
Machinists International Association (AFL)	1104
MacKay, J. A	996, 1219
Macmillan publishers	1168
MacNaughton, Ernest	1144, 1147, 1148
Maintenance of Way Employes Brotherhood	1104
Malott	1167
Management Employee Relations, Inc.	1220
Manchu dynasty	1159
Mandel, William	1196
Marder, Mr	1141, 1142
Markham, Mrs	1189, 1190
Marshall, Clifford B	1219
Marshall, Gen. George C	1024, 1049, 1051, 1052, 1054, 1056, 1060, 1063, 1086, 1087, 1119, 1120, 1124, 1126, 1128, 1131, 1132, 1134, 1148, 1198
Marshall plan	1049, 1051, 1052, 1054, 1060, 1119, 1120
Marx, Karl	1010, 1013, 1089, 1106, 1108
Masani, M. R	1222
Matson Steamship Co	1217
Matsukata, Yoshisaburo	1216
Matteson, Robert	1039, 1121
Matthews, J. B	1189
Maurer, Herrymon	1222
Mayflower Hotel	988
McCann, Colonel	1129
McCarthy, Joseph R	1172, 1175, 1187, 1189, 1228, 1230
McConaughy, Dr. James L	970, 971, 1219
McCoy, Maj. Gen. Frank R	966, 1071, 1221
McDermott, Mr	1118, 1123
McDonald, James G	1221
McFadyean, Sir Andrew	1216
McGovern, William Montgomery	1007-1034, 1069, 1087, 1088
McLaughlin, Mrs. Alfred	1219
McMahon, Senator	1079
MDAP Philippines Mission	1120
Mead, Senator	1104
Meaney	1075
Mickle, J. J	997
Midston House (New York City)	970, 971
Mikado ( <i>see</i> Emperor Hirohito).	
Mikolajczyk	1083
Military mission (China)	1026, 1069
Milliman, E. E	1104
Millis, Walter H	1122, 1124, 1125, 1222
Mills College ( <i>see</i> Mills Summer Institute).	

	Page
Mills, Harriett	989, 997
Mills, Lennox A	1221, 1222
Mills, Saul	1104
Mills Summer Institute	1220, 1221
Minarovich, Michael	945
Minh, Ho Chi	1031
Minneapolis Tribune	1220
Minnesota University	1036, 1050, 1132
MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)	1037
Mitchell, Kate	955, 956, 1228, 1229
Moeller, Heinz (Asiaticus) (Hans Mueller)	973, 974, 1012
Monarch Life Assurance Co	1216
Mon-lin, Dr. Chiang	1216, 1222
Mont Tremblant	978, 982, 993, 997, 1215
Mooney, James D	1219
Moore, Harriet L	937, 938, 988, 1108, 1220
Morgan, J. P	1217, 1219
Morgenthau, Henry, Jr	1017, 1028, 1029
Morgenthau plan	1017, 1028, 1029
Morris, Lawrence	970, 971, 1220
Morris, Robert	1080
Morrison, George Abbot	996
Morrison, Mrs. James W	1220
Morse, Senator	1197
Moscow Conference	1089
Moscow Radio	1226
Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America	1219
Motylev, V. E	1225
Mueller, Hans ( <i>see</i> Heinz Moeller).	
Mundt, Senator Karl E	1189
Murphy, J. Morden	1144, 1147, 1148, 1220
Murray, Philip	946, 947, 1100, 1104
Murray, W	1100, 1101

## N

Nash, Walter	1216
Nasu, Shiroshi	1222
National Board (Politburo)	1078,
	1079, 1084, 1085, 1088, 1091, 1099, 1101, 1103, 1109
National Cash Register	1217
National City Bank (New York)	996, 1151, 1217, 1219
National Geographic Magazine	1136
National Geographic Society	1231
National Republican Program Committee	995
National Resources Planning Board	995
National Security Council	1125, 1126
National War Fund	1247
Nationalist China	
Nationalist Blockade (China)	1068, 1119, 1133
Nationalist Chinese Government	950,
	991, 992, 994, 1022, 1023, 1026, 1029, 1030, 1043, 1045, 1047, 1049,
	1051-1058, 1064, 1067-1070, 1083, 1087, 1094, 1113-1126, 1132-1136,
	1158, 1167, 1163 1195, 1203, 1204, 1228, 1229, 1231, 1249.
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)	1119, 1120
Naval Intelligence	1080, 1081, 1112
Navy Department (United States)	995, 996, 998, 1026, 1080, 1112, 1221, 1224
Navy General Board (United States)	995
Navy Mission (China)	1026
Nazi Party	1120
Negro Labor Victory Committee	1105
Nehru, Pandit Jawaharal	1045, 1049, 1050, 1053, 1055, 1066, 1067, 1167
Nelson, Donald M	1221
New Advance	1000, 1001
New Delhi Conference	1237
New Masses	1199

	Page
New Republic .....	1220
Newsweek .....	1187
New York Age .....	1106
New York Council on Foreign Relations .....	1214
New York Herald Tribune .....	1117, 1124, 1141, 1148, 1193, 1230
New York Herald Tribune Newspaper Syndicate .....	1124
New York Mirror .....	1188
New York News .....	1105
New York Post .....	1105, 1189
New York Public Affairs Committee .....	1214
New York Public Library .....	1106
New York State Department of Labor .....	994
New York State Legislative Committee .....	1168
New York Times .....	955, 1007, 1008, 1105, 1129, 1142, 1171, 1197, 1204, 1229, 1230
New Zealand Institute of International Affairs .....	1215
Nightingale .....	1000, 1001
Nimitz, Admiral Chester .....	1071
Nitobe, Dr. Inazo .....	1216, 1221
NKVD ( <i>see</i> OGPU).	
Nobel prize .....	1215, 1220
Norman, E. Herbert .....	1153, 1154, 1164, 1166, 1222, 1234
Northern California Council of World Affairs .....	1182
North Korea People's Army .....	1028
North Pacific International Planning Board .....	1147
North, Robert C. .....	1222
Northwestern University .....	1007-1010, 1069, 1088
Notestein, Mrs. Ada Comstock .....	940, 970, 977, 1219, 1227

## O

Oahu Land & Railway Co. ....	1219
Occidental College (Los Angeles) .....	995, 1132
Occidental Life Insurance Co. ....	1219
Odegard, Professor .....	1153
OEEC .....	1056
Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation .....	937
Office of Strategic Services (OSS) .....	1002, 1015, 1025, 1033
Office of War Information (OWI) .....	938,
996, 1004, 1015, 1021, 1025, 1033, 1034, 1136, 1150, 1213	1213
OFRRRA .....	995
OGPU (Soviet Military Intelligence) .....	999, 1001
Olson, Culbert L. ....	1100
Order of Railway Conductors .....	1104
Osborne, Ernest .....	1240, 1243, 1247, 1248
OSS ( <i>see</i> Office of Strategic Services).	
Oumansky, Constantine .....	988
OWI ( <i>see</i> Office of War Information).	
Oxford University .....	1008, 1009

## P

Pacific Affairs .....	957, 967,
1013, 1136, 1147, 1148, 1151, 1162, 1202, 1213, 1221, 1225, 1231, 1246	1246
Pacific Coast Regional Committee of Social Science .....	995
Pacific Pact .....	1056
Page, Walter Hines .....	996, 1136, 1219
Pai, Chung-Hsi .....	1087
Pakistan Institute of International Affairs .....	1215
Pan American Airways .....	1217
Pandit, Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi .....	1216
Parker, Harriet H. ....	997
Parker, Philo W. ....	1220, 1227
Parsons, Rudy .....	1079
Pauley report .....	1027
Pavlov .....	1001
Pearl Harbor .....	972, 989, 991, 1012, 1154
Peking University .....	996

	Page
Pennsylvania newspaper editors.....	1047
Pennsylvania University.....	1035, 1071, 1111, 1114, 1132
Pentagon Building.....	1126
People's Bank of China.....	1160
Perlo, Victor.....	1218
Peters, J.....	1218
Petrov, Ivan Petrovich.....	961
Philippine Council (Institute of Pacific Relations).....	1215
Phillips, J. W.....	1160, 1161
PM.....	1105
Poland, Fred W.....	998, 999, 1000, 1001, 1004
Polish Communist Government.....	1003
Politburo ( <i>see</i> National Board).	
Political Action Committee (CIO).....	1100
Political Action Committee (Wayne County) (Detroit).....	1104
Political Affairs, formerly "Communist".....	1106, 1108
Pope, Arthur Upham.....	1245
Porter, Mrs. Catherine.....	938, 945
President's Cabinet.....	1105, 1106, 1113, 1116, 1126, 1149
Press Club.....	1065
Price, Mary.....	1218, 1242
Price, Mildred.....	1218, 1242, 1246, 1247
Princeton University.....	1185, 1219
Princeton University Press.....	1167
Privy Council (Canada).....	1216
Progressive Party.....	1106
Public Affairs Committee (New York).....	1214
Pulitzer prize.....	1221
Purcell, Victor.....	1222, 1237

## Q

Quigley, Dr. Harold S.....	1050, 1132, 1144, 1147, 1148
Quirino.....	1053

## R

Radcliffe College.....	1219, 1227
Radius, Walter.....	1153, 1166
Railroad Clerks Brotherhood.....	1104
Railway Carmen Brotherhood.....	1104
Railway Conductors Order.....	1104
Rajchman, Ludwig.....	1003
Ramspeck, Robert.....	1033, 1034, 1149
Rand, Christopher.....	1198
Randolph, Jeannette.....	945
Rao, Shiva.....	1167
Raymond, Elizabeth.....	945
RCAF ( <i>see</i> Royal Canadian Air Force).	
Reader's Digest.....	1204, 1217, 1229
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC).....	1104
Red Army (Russia).....	1084
Red Cross (International).....	1218
Red Guards (Russian).....	961
Reinhardt, Mrs. Aurelia Henry.....	1221
Reischauer, Edwin O.....	1025, 1144, 1147, 1148
Reorganization Act.....	1139, 1140
Republican Herald Tribune.....	1105
Republican Party (G. O. P.).....	1097, 1102, 1104-1106, 1114
Research Advisory Committee (American IPR).....	1147, 1148
RFC ( <i>see</i> Reconstruction Finance Corporation).	
Rhee.....	1053
Rheinische Zeitung (Cologne).....	1013
Rhoads, Charles J.....	1220
Rieve, Emil.....	946
Rishauer, Professor (Reischaver).....	1076



	Page
Robbins, Joseph	1249
Robequain, Charles	1222
Robertson, W. S.	1148
Robinson, Henry M.	1220
Rockefeller Foundation	1146, 1151-1154, 1159, 1166-1168, 1215, 1217, 1223, 1234-1236, 1237
Rockefeller, John D., III	1148
Roosevelt, President	985, 1014, 1016, 1023, 1024, 1030, 1085, 1087, 1092, 1094, 1097, 1098, 1100, 1102, 1104-1106, 1109, 1113, 1136
Root, Elihu	995
Rose, Archibald	1216
Rosinger, Lawrence K.	997, 1044-1046, 1049, 1050, 1069, 1070, 1076-1078, 1118, 1119, 1123, 1130, 1133, 1136, 1148, 1167-1172, 1221, 1234, 1235, 1237, 1239, 1240.
Ross, L. Clunies	1075, 1222
Rotary International	1213
Roth, Andrew	955, 997, 998
Rowe, David N.	976, 1071, 1222
Rowell, Chester	1220
Rowell, Newton, W.	1216
Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF)	999, 1000, 1001
Royal Institute of International Affairs (London)	1214-1216, 1236
Russell, Francis H.	1042, 1132
Russian Red Army	1084
Russian War Relief	1174, 1175

## S

Sacks, Milton	1222
St. Louis Post-Dispatch	1105
St. Paul Pioneer Press	1131, 1133
Salem Methodist Church (New York City)	1105
Salisbury, Laurence E.	950, 971, 996
San Francisco Chronicle	1014, 1220
San Francisco Examiner	965
San Francisco Regional Labor Board	995
Sansom, Sir George	1153, 1216, 1221, 1222
Sarrant, Albert	1216
Saturday Review of Literature	1230
Sayre, Harry	946
SCAP	1027
Schneider, Mr.	1077
Schneider, Helen	1077, 1078, 1246
School of Advanced International Studies (Washington, D. C.)	996
School of Business (Columbia University)	1219
School of Oriental Studies (London University)	1009
Schroeder	1189
Schwartz Benjamin	1222
Schwellenbach, Lewis B.	1163
Seattle Chamber of Commerce	995
Secretariat (American)	996
Secretariat (IPR)	994, 997, 998
Secretariat (League of Nations)	996
Security Council (United Nations)	1053
Security First National Bank (Los Angeles)	1220
Sen, Sun Yat	1096
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations	1027, 1041, 1049, 1065, 1071, 1072, 1079, 1144
Senate of the United States ( <i>see</i> U. S. Senate).	
Servants of India Society	1216
Service, John Stewart	955, 956, 1021-1023, 1025, 1026, 1078, 1218
Seventh Fleet (United States)	1067, 1069, 1119
Seymour, Lawrence D.	1003, 1220
Shahn, Tillie G.	938
Shan, Hsiang	1249
Shanghai Commercial Bank (China)	1216
Shannon, W.	1189

	Page
Sharpe, Frances	997
Shell Oil Co.	1217
Sherman, Stirling & Wright	977
Shih, Hu	1216, 1222
Shillinglaw, David L., & Co.	1220
Shiman, Russell G.	945
Shotwell, James T.	1216, 1220
Shuhsi Hsu	1221, 1222
Sillin, Samuel	1235, 1239
Silvermaster, Nathan	1218
Sino-Soviet treaties	949
Slade, Mrs. F. Louis	1220
Smedley, Agnes	1218
Smith, Alexander	1137
Smith, Dr. Tredwell	1108
Snow, Edgar	1235, 1239
Social Democratic Party (Japan)	1018
Social Science Research Council	1136, 1167
Socialist Party (China)	1239
Socialist Revolution (Russian)	962
Society for Applied Anthropology	996
Soong, T. V.	1087
Sorbonne (Paris)	1008
Soule, George	1220
South Pacific Commission	1220
Soviet Asia Mission	1085, 1106-1109
Soviet Council (IPR)	1203, 1225
Soviet press	1225
Soviet radio	1203, 1226
Soviet Union	949-954, 958-961, 964, 968, 969, 973, 983, 985-987, 999, 1001, 1013, 1015, 1024, 1028, 1034, 1041, 1049-1053, 1055, 1057-1060, 1082, 1084, 1085, 1087, 1090, 1092, 1093, 1096, 1099, 1102, 1106, 1107, 1109, 1119, 1128, 1193, 1202, 1212, 1213, 1216, 1218, 1222, 1225, 1226, 1240.
Soviet World Atlas	1225
Special Committee on Un-American Activities	1162
Spelman, Laura (Rockefeller Memorial)	1235, 1236
Spencer, Frederick ( <i>see</i> Frederick Vanderbilt Field).	
Spencer, J.	1237
Spotlight on the Far East	1017
Sproul, Dr. Robert G.	976, 1220
Stachel, Jack	1218
Staley, Dr. Eugene	976, 996, 1148
Stalin, Joseph	1010, 1012, 1014, 1057, 1107
Standard-Vacuum Oil Co.	1151, 1217, 1219, 1220, 1227
Stanford University	976, 996, 1153, 1216, 1219, 1220, 1227
Starobin, Joseph	1095
Stassen, Harold E.	1035-1075, 1111-1138, 1143, 1144, 1146, 1149
State Department	976, 980-985, 995-997, 1003, 1007, 1008, 1015, 1016, 1021, 1027, 1028, 1032-1038, 1041-1043, 1046-1050, 1059, 1060, 1062, 1064-1068, 1071-1076, 1091, 1092, 1112-1134, 1136, 1137, 1144, 1145, 1147, 1148, 1178, 1195, 1198, 1218, 1221, 1223, 1224, 1226, 1230, 1249.
State Department (Asiatic Section)	1128
State Department (China Desk)	982
State Department (Division of Chinese Affairs)	983, 996, 1092
State Department (Division of Far Eastern Affairs)	1123
State Department (employee loyalty investigation)	1007
State Department (Office of Public Affairs)	1132
State Department (Office of Special Political Affairs)	995
State Department (Visa Division)	1003
Steele, Arch	1198
Steiger, Andrew J.	1108
Stein, Gunther	1005
Steiner, Dr. Arthur	1071, 1222
Stewart, Maxwell S.	960, 1076, 1077

	Page
Stewart, Mrs. Maxwell S. (Marguerite).....	938,
940, 950, 957, 958, 960, 962, 964-966, 974, 975, 978, 987, 997	1021, 1025, 1030, 1031, 1094
Stilwell, Gen. Joseph.....	1220
Stirling ( <i>see</i> Sherman, Stirling & Wright).	1026, 1198
Straus, Donald B.....	1217
Stuart, Leighton.....	977, 1216, 1219
Studebaker, Corp.....	1021, 1198
Sullivan & Cromwell.....	1096
Sun Fo.....	1198, 1247
Sun Yat-sen.....	1100
Sun Yat-sen, Mme.....	1189
Supreme Court (United States).....	1222
Surine.....	1217, 1220, 1232-1234
Swearingen, Rodger.....	
Swope, Gerard.....	

## T

Talbot, Dr. Phillips.....	1056, 1134, 1148
Tamagna, Frank M.....	994, 1221
Tang, Yu Ying.....	1249
Tarr, Edgar J.....	1216
Tass.....	1203, 1226
Tawney, R. H.....	1213, 1221
Taylor, Mr.....	1055
Taylor, George E.....	1148, 1221, 1222
Taylor, Margaret R.....	945
Teachers College (Columbia University).....	1219, 1220
Teamsters Brotherhood (AFL).....	1104
Tenney committee ( <i>see</i> California Committee on Un-American Activities).	
Tewksbury, Donald G.....	1220
Textile Workers Union of America.....	946
Third Naval District (United States).....	1112
Thomas, Elbert.....	1218
Thompson, Laura.....	996
Thompson, Virginia.....	1222
Time, Inc.....	1217, 1221
Tito, Marshal.....	1055
Toronto Board of Education.....	1000, 1001
Toynbee, Arnold J.....	1216, 1222
Treasury Department ( <i>see</i> U. S. Treasury).	
Trigg, Charles Y.....	1105
Trippe, Juan.....	1217
Trotsky.....	1012
Truman, President.....	1032,
1033, 1062, 1065, 1068, 1112, 1115, 1119-1121, 1124-1126, 1149,	1150
Truman, Senator Harry.....	1101
Tsai, Yu.....	1249
Tse-tung, Mao.....	1010, 1012, 1014, 1021, 1045, 1049, 1061, 1214
Twaddell, Emily C.....	945
Tydings committee.....	1080, 1081, 1224, 1225
Tydings, Millard.....	1078, 1079
Tydings report.....	1007

## U

UCLA ( <i>see</i> University of California at Los Angeles).	
UCR ( <i>see</i> United China Relief).	
Un-American Activities California Committee.....	1162
Un-American Activities Special Committee (House of Representatives).....	1162,
1229, 1230	
Union of Office and Professional Workers of America (UOPWA).....	938-941,
945-947	
Union of Office and Professional Workers of America (Local 18, New York City).....	938-941
United China Relief.....	1218, 1219, 1221, 1241, 1247, 1248
United Gas, Coke and Chemical Workers.....	946

	Page
United Nations.....	968,
969, 973, 975, 977, 979, 993, 1003, 1021, 1032, 1036, 1053, 1056-1058,	
1061, 1070, 1072, 1073, 1088, 1090, 1096, 1098, 1132, 1134, 1135, 1161,	
1162, 1215, 1220.	
United Nations (armies and navies).....	968, 969
United Nations Charter.....	1036
United Nations (Children's Emergency Fund).....	1003
United Nations Conference (1945).....	975-977, 979, 1032, 1036, 1072, 1073
United Nations Economic and Social Council (UNESCO).....	1161, 1162
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.....	937, 995, 996
United Nations (Security Council).....	1053
United Paperworkers of America.....	946
United Press (UP).....	1113, 1114, 1142
United Service to China.....	1214, 1247-1249
United States Army.....	958,
959, 962, 964, 970-972, 988, 996, 997, 1026, 1030, 1031, 1060, 1086,	
1132, 1136, 1221, 1224.	
United States Army (Educational and Information Branch).....	959
United States Asiatic Fleet.....	995, 1221
United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).....	1221
United States Civil Service Commission.....	1033, 1034, 1149
United States Congress.....	995,
1026, 1043, 1049, 1055, 1069, 1071, 1098, 1118, 1119, 1128, 1195, 1197	
United States Department of Commerce.....	1104, 1106
United States Government.....	981,
989, 991, 997, 1033, 1034, 1042, 1043, 1047, 1051, 1062, 1098, 1099,	
1119, 1120, 1123, 1136, 1150, 1153, 1195, 1197, 1198, 1224, 1229.	
United States House of Representatives.....	1039, 1073
United States Interior Department.....	1104
United States Navy.....	958, 959,
962, 964, 970-972, 995-998, 1026, 1067, 1080, 1112, 1136, 1221, 1224	
United States Navy General Board.....	995
United States Quarterly Book List.....	1172
United States Seventh Fleet.....	1067, 1069, 1119
United States Supreme Court.....	1100
United States Treasury.....	1002, 1188, 1220
United States War Department.....	965, 995, 1004, 1034, 1149
University of Berlin.....	1008
University of California.....	995, 1216, 1220
University of California at Los Angeles.....	1071
University of Cambridge (England).....	1153
University of Chicago.....	996, 1221, 1227
University of Cornell.....	1187
University of Harvard.....	995, 1007, 1008, 1025, 1054, 1076, 1136, 1154, 1237
University of Hawaii.....	996, 1227
University of Iowa.....	1167
University of London.....	1009
University of Minnesota.....	1036, 1050, 1132
University of Oxford.....	1008, 1009
University of Peking.....	996
University of Pennsylvania.....	1035, 1071, 1111, 1114, 1132
University of Princeton.....	1185, 1219
University of Princeton Press.....	1167
University of Stanford.....	976, 996, 1153, 1216, 1219, 1220, 1227
University of Virginia.....	1167
University of Washington.....	1219
University of Yale.....	996, 1071, 1216, 1219
University of Yenching.....	1221
UNRRA.....	937, 995, 996, 1058, 1145
UOPWA (see Union of Office and Professional Workers of America).	
UP (see United Press).	
Ussachevsky, Mrs. Betty.....	956

	Page
U. S. S. R.-----	949-954,
958-961, 964, 968, 969, 973, 983, 985-987, 999, 1001, 1013, 1015, 1024,	
1028, 1034, 1041, 1049-1053, 1055, 1057-1060, 1082, 1084, 1085, 1087,	
1090, 1092, 1093, 1096, 1099, 1102, 1106, 1107, 1109, 1119, 1128, 1193,	
1202, 1212, 1213, 1216, 1218, 1222, 1225, 1226, 1240.	
Utley, Freda-----	1228, 1230

## V

Vandenberg, Arthur-----	1039, 1041, 1049, 1068, 1072, 1113-1118, 1120-1123, 1125,
	1126, 1148, 1149, 1197
Vandenberg, Arthur, Jr.-----	1116, 1117, 1123, 1148
Vandenberg Diary-----	1116, 1117, 1148
Van Mook, H. J.-----	1222
Van Zandt, J. Parker-----	996
Velebit, General-----	1055
Victoria College (Wellington, New Zealand)-----	1216
Viking Press-----	1124
Vinacke, Harold M.-----	1148
Vincent, John Carter-----	979-981, 983, 996, 1025, 1079-1081, 1085, 1085, 1092, 1107,
	1112, 1197
Virginia University-----	1167
Voice of America-----	1064, 1133
Voprosy Ekonomiki-----	1067
Wagner, Senator-----	1104
Wagner, Martin-----	946
Wah Chang Trading Co. (New York City)-----	1216
Waldorf-Astoria Hotel-----	1092, 1167
Walker, Frank-----	1101
Walker, Richard L.-----	1240
Wallace, Henry-----	950-953,
959, 1023-1025, 1030, 1081, 1084, 1085, 1087-1093, 1095-1106, 1108,	
1110, 1177.	
Wallace Mission (see Soviet Asia Mission).	
Walter Hines Page School of International Relations-----	996, 1136, 1219
War Department (United States)-----	965, 995, 1004, 1034, 1149
War Department (U. S. Civil Affairs Division)-----	995
War Production Board-----	1221
Ward, Angus-----	1133
Ward, Harry F.-----	1078
Wartime Information Board (Canada)-----	999, 1000
Washburn, John N.-----	1222
Washington Daily News-----	1188
Washington Post-----	1141, 1142, 1172
Washington University-----	1219
Waymack, W. W.-----	996, 1221
Wayne County (Detroit) Political Action Committee-----	1104
Webb-----	1122, 1123, 1126
Webster Publishing Co.-----	957-959, 962, 968, 969
Webster School-----	1148
Wedemeyer, Lt. Gen. Albert-----	1022-1025,
1031, 1071, 1086, 1087, 1091, 1093-1095, 1214	
Welles, Benjamin-----	1198
Welles, Sumner-----	1221
Welling, Mrs. John Paul-----	1220
Werner, Ludlow-----	1105
Willkie, Wendell-----	1098
White-----	1142
White, Harry Dexter-----	979-981,
984, 985, 1002, 1017, 1195, 1196, 1206, 1207, 1218	
White House-----	981,
983-985, 1068, 1069, 1112, 1113, 1116, 1118, 1121, 1122, 1125, 1126,	
1149, 1150.	
White, Lynn, Jr.-----	1220
White paper-----	1049, 1076, 1091, 1092

	Page
Whyte, Sir Frederick	1216, 1222
Wilbur, Brayton	1221
Wilbur Ellis Co. (San Francisco)	1217, 1221
Wilbur, Ray Lyman	975, 1216, 1220, 1227
Williams, Albert Rhys	1108
Wilson, Admiral	1022
Wilson, General	1032
Winfield, Gerald F.	1221, 1222
Winnipeg Free Press	1216
Wiss, Helen	945
Wittfogel, Dr. Karl	1154, 1170
Wood ( <i>see</i> Deiafield & Wood).	
Wood-Forbes Philippines Mission	996
Woodrow Wilson School (Princeton University)	1219
Worker	1103
World Affairs Council of Northern California	1148
World Court	995
World Peace Foundation	937, 1219
World War I	1136
World War II	1136, 1227, 1248
Wrenn, Heaton L.	1220
Wright ( <i>see</i> Sherman, Stirling & Wright).	
Wright, Philip	1221
Wright, Quincy	1221, 1227

## Y

Yakobson, Sergius	969
Yale Institute of International Studies	976
Yale University	996, 1071, 1216, 1219
Yalta Agreement	949, 979, 1108
Yanaihara, Tadao	1237
Yardumian, Rose	938, 956, 957, 997, 1003
Yarnell, Admiral H. E.	990, 992, 993, 1221
Yat-sen, Sun	1096
Yat-sen, Mme. Sun	1198, 1247
Yen, W. W.	1216
Yenching University	1221
Yin-ching, Ho	1094
YMCA (China)	1163
YMCA (International)	1213, 1215, 1219
Yoshida Cabinet	1018
Young Communist League	1000, 1001
Young Men's Christian Association (China)	1163
Young Women's Christian Association (China)	1249
Yu-tang, Lin	1221, 1222, 1235, 1239
Yu Tsai School for Talented Children	1249
Yu Ying Tang	1249
WCA (China)	1249

## Z

Zabotin, Colonel	999-1001
Zaihatsu	1017-1019, 1021
Zinkin, Maurice	1221

## O

A 175. Y3  
11





**UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY**

**Los Angeles**

**This book is DUE on the last date stamped below.**

**NO PHONE RENEWALS**

REC'D ID-DM

APR 05 1988



UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY

A 000 224 324 4

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

LOS ANGELES

THE LIBRARY OF

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

LOS ANGELES

THE LIBRARY OF

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

LOS ANGELES

THE LIBRARY OF

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

LOS ANGELES

THE LIBRARY OF

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

LOS ANGELES

THE LIBRARY OF

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

LOS ANGELES

THE LIBRARY OF

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

LOS ANGELES

THE LIBRARY OF

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

LOS ANGELES

THE LIBRARY OF

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

LOS ANGELES

THE LIBRARY OF

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

LOS ANGELES

THE LIBRARY OF

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

